{ "id": 4188847, "name": "PETER SINCLAIRE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ELDERHOSTEL, INC., a foreign corporation, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Sinclaire v. Elderhostel, Inc.", "decision_date": "2012-08-13", "docket_number": "Docket No. 30,089", "first_page": "623", "last_page": "628", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2012-NMCA-100" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "961 N.E.2d 865", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 29" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "822 F. Supp. 2d 874", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5733308 ], "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "877" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/822/0874-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMCA-141", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 834267 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/125/0779-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-036", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4244404 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" }, { "parenthetical": "alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 P.3d 1253", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2011-NMCERT-010", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 P.3d 70", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2011-NMCA-112", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4188506 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/1/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 P.3d 1047", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2012-NMCA-059", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4188073 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/1/0786-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMCA-047", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 2544432 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 5" }, { "page": "\u00b6 7" }, { "page": "\u00b6 7" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 11-12, 17" }, { "page": "\u00b6 7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/139/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 C.F.R. \u00a7 778.105", "category": "laws:admin_compilation", "reporter": "C.F.R.", "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 201", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 733, "char_count": 15600, "ocr_confidence": 0.833, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.403774483135233e-08, "percentile": 0.3963298632468534 }, "sha256": "535ceb5a84e9742cbeee1152900764f64117c2e2795dc08a82b748d83e6447af", "simhash": "1:f685cbf48c9808d0", "word_count": 2487 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:22:38.419741+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge", "CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Chief Judge", "MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge" ], "parties": [ "PETER SINCLAIRE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ELDERHOSTEL, INC., a foreign corporation, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nFRY, Judge.\n{1} In this case we consider what our Legislature intended when it enacted the statute requiring employers to pay overtime wages for hours worked in excess of forty hours in \u201cany week of seven days.\u201d We conclude that \u201cany week of seven days\u201d means a fixed and regularly recurring workweek established by an employer consistent with the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and regulations promulgated under the authority of the FLSA. We reject Plaintiff Peter Sinclaire\u2019s argument that the employer\u2019s workweek, for purposes of calculating overtime pay, should change each time an employee\u2019s work schedule changes. Because our interpretation coincides with that of the district court, we affirm the district court\u2019s judgment.\nBACKGROUND\n{2} The parties do not dispute the following facts. Sinclaire began work as an employee of Elderhostel in January 2006. Included with the letter from Elderhostel offering Sinclaire employment were documents explaining the procedures for payment of wages and instructions for completing time sheets, and Sinclaire acknowledged receipt of these documents. The documents stated that Elderhostel\u2019s workweek was from 12:01 a.m. Sunday to midnight the following Saturday. The documents also instructed Sinclaire to complete one time sheet for each week (Sunday through Saturday); if Sinclaire\u2019s program crossed over a Saturday, he was to complete two time sheets.\n{3} Sinclaire led educational tours for Elderhostel, some of which corresponded with the Sunday-to-Saturday workweek and some of which began on Wednesday and concluded the following Wednesday. As a result of Elderhostel\u2019s established workweek and Sinclaire\u2019s work schedule, if Sinclaire led a Wednesday-to-Wednesday tour \u201cthat required him to work forty-two hours from W ednesday through Saturday and forty-eight hours from Sunday to Wednesday, for a total of ninety hours[, Sinclaire] would not receive overtime pay based on the fifty hours he worked over forty\u201d from Wednesday to Wednesday. Instead, Sinclaire would receive ten hours of overtime \u2014 two hours in the first Sunday-to-Saturday workweek and eight hours in the second workweek. However, if Sinclaire\u2019s program ran from Sunday to Saturday, as it often did, and if he worked more than forty hours during that program week, he would receive time-and-a-half overtime for each hour over forty.\n{4} Sinclaire believed that Elderhostel should be paying him overtime based on the week he actually worked rather than on the Sunday-to-Saturday workweek. Because Elderhostel disagreed with this view, Sinclaire filed a claim for unpaid overtime wages with the New Mexico Department of Labor in February 2007. The Department ultimately dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, and Sinclaire filed a complaint in magistrate court. The magistrate court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Sinclaire had failed to prove the allegations in his complaint. Sinclaire then appealed the dismissal to the district court.\n{5} The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of what constitutes a \u201cworkweek\u201d under the then-applicable version of NMSA 1978, Section 50-4-22 (2005) (amended 2007), which provided that \u201c[a]n employee .. . shall not be required to work more than forty hours in any week of seven days, unless the employee is paid one and one-half times the employee\u2019s regular hourly rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty hours.\u201d Section 50-4-22(C) (emphasis added). Sinclaire argued that the statute, which is part of the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act (MWA), 1978 NMSA, \u00a7\u00a7 50-4-19 to -30 (1955, as amended through 2009), is remedial in nature and should therefore be liberally construed in light of its goal of protecting the worker. Consistent with this liberal construction, Sinclaire maintained, the emphasis is on the term \u201cany\u201d in the phrase \u201cin any week of seven days.\u201d Consequently, Sinclaire argued, he should receive overtime wages for any hours in excess of forty hours that he worked during any seven-day period, regardless of whether the period began on Sunday or Wednesday or any other day of the week.\n{6} Elderhostel argued that the MW A does not define any \u201cweek of seven days\u201d and that, as a result, Section 50-4-22(C) should be interpreted consistent with the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 201 to 219 (2006). Regulations promulgated under the FLSA provide that \u201c[a]n employee\u2019s workweek is a fixed and regularly recurring period of 168 hours \u2014 seven consecutive [twenty-four]-hour periods\u201d that \u201cmay begin on any day and at any hour of the day.\u201d Overtime Compensation, 29 C.F.R. \u00a7 778.105 (2011) (emphasis added). \u201cOnce the beginning time of an employee\u2019s workweek is established, it remains fixed regardless of the schedule of hours worked by him.\u201d Id. Thus, Elderhostel maintained that it appropriately established a Sunday-to-Saturday workweek and properly calculated Sinclaire\u2019s overtime wages on the basis of that workweek.\n{7} Following a hearing on the cross-motions, the district court granted Elderhostel\u2019s motion for summary judgment and denied Sinclaire\u2019s motion. This appeal followed.\nDISCUSSION\n{8} This case requires us to interpret Section 50-4-22(C), and we therefore undertake de novo review. See N.M. Dep\u2019t of Labor v. Echostar Commc\u2019ns Corp., 2006-NMCA-047, \u00b6 5, 139 N.M. 493, 134 P.3d 780 (stating that \u201c[cjonstruction of statutes is a question of law that we review de novo\u201d). We also review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Rodriguez v. N.M. Dep't of Workforce Solutions, 2012-NMCA-059, \u00b6 8, 278 P.3d 1047.\n{9} On appeal, Sinclaire makes the same argument that he made in the district court. The crux of his argument is that an employer must calculate each employee\u2019s workweek on the basis ofthe seven-day period the employee actually works, not on the basis of a fixed seven-day period arbitrarily established by the employer. Thus, according to Sinclaire\u2019s view, his workweek with Elderhostel would sometimes be from Wednesday to Tuesday and sometimes from Sunday to Saturday, or it could be an entirely different seven-day period, depending on his schedule. Elderhostel would be required to calculate Sinclaire\u2019s wages based on his \u201croving\u201d workweek.\n{10} We must determine what the Legislature intended by the language of Section 50-4-22(C), which requires an employer to pay time-and-a-half to an employee who works more than forty hours \u201cin any week of seven days.\u201d See Christus St. Vincent Reg\u2019l Med. Ctr. v. Duarte-Afara, 2011-NMCA-112, \u00b6 9, 267 P.3d 70 (explaining that the primary goal in interpreting statutes is to further legislative intent), cert. granted, 2011-NMCERT-010, 289 P.3d 1253. If the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply the statute as written. See Bishop v. Evangelical Good Samaritan Soc\u2019y, 2009-NMSC-036, \u00b6 9, 146 N.M. 473, 212 P.3d 361. However, \u201cwhere the language of the legislative act is doubtful or an adherence to the literal use of words would lead to injustice, absurdity},] or contradiction, the statute will be construed according to its obvious spirit or reason, even though this requires the rejection of words or the substitution of others.\u201d Id. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).\n{11} As the district court observed, the statutory phrase at issue here \u2014 \u201cany week of seven days\u201d \u2014 is not \u201ccrystal clear.\u201d Sinclaire contends that the focus should be on the word \u201cany\u201d such that an employee is entitled to overtime pay during any seven-day period. Elderhostel maintains that the phrase should be interpreted so that it is consistent with the FLSA and that \u201cany week of seven days\u201d permits different employers to establish whatever fixed seven-day workweeks they desire.\n{12} To determine which view more likely furthers the Legislature\u2019s intent, we turn first to the stated purpose of the MWA. Section 50-4-19 of the MWA states:\nIt is declared to be the policy of this act (1) to establish minimum wage and overtime compensation standards for all workers at levels consistent with their health, efficiency and general well-being, and (2) to safeguard existing minimum wage and overtime compensation standards which are adequate to maintain the health, efficiency and general well-being of workers against the unfair competition of wage and hours standards which do not provide adequate standards of living.\nThis declared policy recognizes that overtime standards protect workers\u2019 health and well-being by ensuring that workers are paid a premium for hours worked beyond the number of hours deemed to be a reasonable maximum per week. See Echostar, 2006-NMCA-047, \u00b6 7 (explaining that overtime statutes intend \u201cto compensate those who labored in excess ofthe statutory maximum number of hours for the wear and tear of extra work and to spread employment through inducing employers to shorten hours because of the pressure of extra cost\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). This policy is not inconsistent with Elderhostel\u2019s establishment of a fixed workweek. Employees of Elderhostel receive overtime wages for every hour in excess of forty that they work in a given Sunday-to-Saturday workweek, which qualifies as a \u201cweek of seven days\u201d as required by Section 50-4-22(C).\n{13} Sinclaire argues that the MWA is a remedial statutory scheme and, therefore, it must be interpreted liberally to accomplish its purpose. See EchoStar, 2006-NMCA-047, \u00b6 7. While we agree that this is a correct statement, we do not agree that a fixed workweek thwarts the MWA\u2019s remedial purpose. Elderhostel employees are paid overtime wages earned during the Sunday-to-Saturday workweek, which is consistent with the purpose of paying a premium for hours in excess of forty in order to protect workers\u2019 health and well-being.\n{14} In addition, there is nothing in the MWA or our case law that would preclude our interpreting the MWA as being consistent with the FLSA. Indeed, we have stated in reference to the MWA and the FLSA that \u201c[w]hen two statutes cover the same subject matter, we attempt to harmonize and construe them together in a way that facilitates their operation and the achievement of their goals.\u201d N.M. Dep\u2019t of Labor v. A.C. Elec., Inc., 1998-NMCA-141, \u00b6 20, 125 N.M. 779, 965 P.2d 363. The FLSA regulations\u2019 requirement of a fixed workweek does not do violence to either the language or the purpose of Section 50-4-22(C).\n{15} We recognize that this Court has declined to follow the FLSA when we consider it to be inconsistent with state law. For example, in EchoStar, we held that the fluctuating workweek method of calculating overtime, while acceptable under the FLSA, is inconsistent with Section 50-4-22(C). Echostar, 2006-NMCA-047, \u00b6\u00b6 11-12, 17. The fluctuating workweek method permits an employer to pay an employee \u201ca fixed weekly salary plus an overtime factor of one-half of the hourly rate, which hourly rate is calculated such that it decreases as the number of hours worked increases.\u201d Id. \u00b6 1. Given the MWA\u2019s stated policy, we concluded that \u201cit makes little sense to construe the statute to lessen the financial impact on employers the more hours that employees are required to work.\u201d EchoStar, 2006-NMCA-047, \u00b6 7.\n{16} EchoStar is distinguishable because a fixed workweek does not necessarily favor the employer under all circumstances. One treatise suggests that a fixed workweek can be advantageous to the employee as well as to the employer. For example, \u201cif an employee works [thirty] hours one workweek and [fifty] hours the next, he or she must receive overtime compensation for the [ten] overtime hours worked in the second workweek, even though the average number of hours worked in the two weeks is [forty].\u201d I Ellen C. Kearns, The Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 10.III.A, at 10-8 (2d ed. 2010). This example is the flip-side ofthe situation Sinclaire complains about in the present case where the tour at issue did not coincide with Elderhostel\u2019s workweek and the overtime pay required was to Elderhostel\u2019s advantage. Thus, the fixed workweek can sometimes be more beneficial to the employee and sometimes more beneficial to the employer.\n{17} Sinclaire maintains that Elderhostel manipulated its workweek and established it so as to avoid paying the maximum amount of overtime. We are not persuaded. Sinclaire presented no evidence suggesting that Elderhostel established a Sunday-to-Saturday workweek in order to evade its obligation to pay overtime. In fact, in support of his motion for summary judgment, Sinclaire submitted one of his schedules, which showed that of thirty-two weeks Sinclaire worked, twenty-one weeks started on days other than Wednesday; of those twenty-one weeks, sixteen started on Sunday, which was the first day of Elderhostel\u2019s established workweek. Thus, for at least half the time, Sinclaire received the maximum overtime available under any calculation. The rest of the time, Sinclaire received overtime premium pay as required by Section 50-4-22(C), even if it was not as much as he would have received if the workweek had begun on Wednesday. See Abshire v. Redland Energy Servs., LLC, 822 F. Supp. 2d 874, 877 (W.D. Ark. 2011) (noting the \u201cgeneral rule\u201d that \u201can employer may establish a pay week that differs from its employees\u2019 work week if it is for a legitimate, or bona fide, business reason . . . even when a change in payroll schedule results in decreased payments of overtime compensation to [the] employees\u201d); Kerbes v. Raceway Assocs., LLC, 961 N.E.2d 865, \u00b6 29 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (noting that an employer\u2019s work schedule that does not coincide with its established workweek \u201cdoes not deny [the employee] overtime, although it may prevent him from receiving the maximum overtime to which he would be entitled if we accept his contention that a workweek is any and every consecutive seven days that he labors\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).\n{18} Although we generally agree with Sinclaire that state law can provide greater protection for employees than the FLSA, we are not convinced that Section 50-4-22(C) was intended to adopt anything inconsistent with the FLSA\u2019s definition of the workweek. It makes sense that employers should be required to establish a fixed workweek (or different fixed workweeks for different types of employees) in order to have predictability and certainty about payrolls. So long as an employer pays its employees a premium for the overtime hours worked in the established workweek, that employer is in compliance with Section 50-4-22(C).\nCONCLUSION\n{19} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\n{20} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nCYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nCELIA FOY CASTILLO, Chief Judge\nMICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge\nSinclaire claimed he was also due overtime wages for the period from mid-2005 to January 2006, during which time he claims Elderhostel mis-designated him as an independent contractor rather than an employee.\nSection 50-4-22(C) was amended in 2007 and is now Section 50-4-22(D), which states, \u201cAn employee shall not be required to work more than forty hours in any week of seven days, unless the employee is paid one and one-half times the employee\u2019s regular hourly rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty hours.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "FRY, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "The Okon Law Firm Christa M. Okon Santa Fe, NM for Appellant", "Tinnin Law Firm, P.C. Stanley K. Kotovsky, Jr. Albuquerque, NM for Appellee" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2012-NMCA-100\nFiling Date: August 13, 2012\nDocket No. 30,089\nPETER SINCLAIRE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ELDERHOSTEL, INC., a foreign corporation, Defendant-Appellee.\nThe Okon Law Firm Christa M. Okon Santa Fe, NM for Appellant\nTinnin Law Firm, P.C. Stanley K. Kotovsky, Jr. Albuquerque, NM for Appellee" }, "file_name": "0623-01", "first_page_order": 639, "last_page_order": 644 }