{ "id": 4191423, "name": "JOSEPH C. PERRY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STANLEY MOYA, Warden, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Perry v. Moya", "decision_date": "2012-11-08", "docket_number": "Docket No. 32,938", "first_page": "36", "last_page": "43", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2012-NMSC-040" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "1999-NMSC-001", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 827383 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 N.M. 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 717009 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579", "parenthetical": "holding that a prior criminal conviction was itself sufficient to support the Board of Dentistry revoking a dental license in a subsequent license revocation hearing" }, { "page": "180", "parenthetical": "holding that a prior criminal conviction was itself sufficient to support the Board of Dentistry revoking a dental license in a subsequent license revocation hearing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/110/0574-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 S.E.2d 644", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 8715807 ], "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "648" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sc/208/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "711 F.2d 267", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1870454, 3642903 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271, 278" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/711/0267-01", "/us-app-dc/228/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 N.M. 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1554468 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1928, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547-48", "parenthetical": "\"The term conviction . . . [i]n its most common use . . . signifies the finding of the jury that the prisoner is guilty.... [T]he word conviction in the broader and less technical sense . . . implies the judgment of the court.\"" }, { "page": "922", "parenthetical": "\"The term conviction . . . [i]n its most common use . . . signifies the finding of the jury that the prisoner is guilty.... [T]he word conviction in the broader and less technical sense . . . implies the judgment of the court.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/33/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMSC-003", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 15627 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 10-11, 35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/133/0059-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 921, "char_count": 20578, "ocr_confidence": 0.835, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.13771111752075121 }, "sha256": "7de159fc84b6053460fe8e5f23e17a809f6e89608bfbc2450cb63925f415e7e1", "simhash": "1:8af6d300ee9c4734", "word_count": 3278 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:46:09.531131+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice", "PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Chief Justice", "EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice", "CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice", "PAUL J. KENNEDY, Justice" ], "parties": [ "JOSEPH C. PERRY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STANLEY MOYA, Warden, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nBOSSON, Justice.\n{1} This case comes to this Court on direct appeal from an order issued by the First Judicial District Court granting a writ of habeas corpus. For reasons that follow, we reverse the district court, dismiss the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and reinstate the sanctions imposed by the New Mexico Corrections Department (NMCD).\nBACKGROUND\n{2} Joseph C. Perry, Petitioner, is a prison inmate at the Penitentiary of New Mexico. During the central events of this petition, he was serving a sentence at the Lea County Correctional Facility for battery against a household member as well as for a parole violation for fraud over $2,500. On September 2,2006, Petitioner was transported to the Otero County Detention Center for an arraignment relating to the fraud charge.\n{3} While at the Otero County Detention Center, Petitioner raped inmate Joshua Sommer. Upon discovering Petitioner\u2019s pending criminal charge for rape in the Twelfth Judicial District Court in Otero County, NMCD pursued disciplinary action against him for the same rape incident. A disciplinary hearing was scheduled for December 4, 2006, at the Lea County Correctional Facility.\n{4} According to Petitioner, at some point prior to the disciplinary hearing, Hearing Officer Sandra Miller visited him to inform him of his legal rights pertaining to the hearing. In a handwritten \u201cDeclaration/Statement\u201d submitted to the district court, Petitioner claimed he told Hearing Officer Miller that he wanted to call two inmate witnesses from the Otero County Detention Center to testify on his behalf. Petitioner stated that Hearing Officer Miller told him he could only call \u201creadily available\u201d witnesses and denied his request because it was not practical to transport the two inmates from one detention center to another. According to NMCD regulations discussed during the evidentiary hearing, if a witness is not readily available, inmates may submit written questions to the hearing officer, which the hearing officer may then provide to the witness for a written response. Petitioner claims that he was never told about this procedure for written questions nor did he have any knowledge of it.\n{5} On the scheduled date, Hearing Officer Miller conducted an inmate disciplinary hearing. She documented the proceedings and the evidence in a form entitled \u201cDisciplinary Summary of Evidence and Proceeding.\u201d The tape of this hearing cannot be located. On the summary form, Hearing Officer Miller noted that \u201cInmate Perry was advised of his right to call a readily available witness. He called no one. He Declined.\u201d Based on the incident and investigation reports, written statements from prison officials, photographs, and the victim\u2019s medical examination report, Hearing Officer Miller determined that Petitioner had committed the offenses of rape and threats to other inmates. As a result of these findings, NMCD forfeited Petitioner\u2019s earned good time (69 days) and placed him in Level VI Disciplinary Segregation at a maximum security facility for a period of 455 days.\n{6} On August 1, 2007, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the First Judicial District Court in Santa Fe County asserting five grounds for habeas relief. Just over three weeks later, on August 23, 2007, Petitioner was convicted in the Twelfth Judicial District Court in Otero County of the second-degree felony of criminal sexual penetration and the third-degree felony of bribery or intimidation of a witness, based on the same rape incident. Approximately a year later, the State filed an amended response to an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus and attached the judgment and sentence from Petitioner\u2019s Twelfth Judicial District rape conviction as an exhibit.\n{7} Due to various issues not related to this opinion, Petitioner\u2019s case lingered in the district court. On December 11, 2009, the First Judicial District Court in Santa Fe County (Petitioner by that time was serving his prison sentence at the Penitentiary of New Mexico in Santa Fe County) conducted an evidentiary hearing on the habeas petition. The central issue at the evidentiary hearing was whether NMCD had violated Petitioner\u2019s due process rights by denying him an opportunity to call witnesses or otherwise elicit written testimony at his prison disciplinary hearing. At the conclusion of the habeas hearing, the district court agreed with Petitioner\u2019s contentions. The district court found, among other things, that NMCD had failed to inform Petitioner of its procedure for submitting written questions to unavailable witnesses and failed to provide him with a written denial of his request to present witnesses at the disciplinary hearing.\n{8} On April 23, 2010, the district court issued an order granting remedies with respect to its earlier findings of due process violations. Notwithstanding Petitioner\u2019s intervening criminal convictions for rape and witness intimidation, the district court ordered NMCD to (1) restore Petitioner\u2019s good-time credits, (2) remove the disciplinary hearing findings from Petitioner\u2019s record, (3) never use findings of the disciplinary hearing against Petitioner in any way, including in present and future decisions relating to classification and placement within the prison system, and (4) never pursue the same factual allegations that were the subject of the disciplinary hearing in later proceedings against Petitioner.\n{9} The State filed a direct appeal with this Court pursuant to Rule 12-102(A)(3) NMRA (\u201cThe following appeals shall be taken to the Supreme Court. . . appeals from the granting of writs of habeas corpus . . . \u201d) and Rule 5-802(H)(1) NMRA (\u201c[I]f the writ [of habeas corpus] is granted, the state may appeal as of right pursuant to the Rules of Appellate Procedure.\u201d).\nDISCUSSION\n{10} On appeal, the parties debate whether Petitioner was aware of the procedure for submitting written questions to witnesses who could not testify in person. At the evidentiary hearing, Petitioner testified that he had no knowledge of that option, testimony the district court credited in its finding that \u201c[t]he Petitioner was not informed that there was any alternate method for presenting the testimony of the witnesses, such as submitting written questions for the witnesses to answer . . . .\u201d Additionally, the court found that Petitioner believed his witnesses would have testified that they did not hear or see him rape another inmate.\n{11} For reasons that follow, we need not examine this factual question on our own. We assume arguendo that the district court\u2019s findings are correct and that Petitioner was not fully informed of his legal options to question witnesses. We further assume that this omission by NMCD deprived Petitioner of due process in terms of Petitioner\u2019s ability to defend himself at the prison disciplinary hearing. In our view, however, the pivotal question is not one of due process, but whether the remedy the district court fashioned was appropriate under the circumstances of this case. We review the district court\u2019s choice of remedy for an abuse of discretion. See Lopez v. LeMaster, 2003-NMSC-003, \u00b6\u00b6 10-11, 35, 133 N.M. 59, 61 P.3d 185 (reviewing district court\u2019s decision issuing a remedy in a habeas corpus case for abuse of discretion).\n{12} We recognized in Lopez \u201cthat the writ [of habeas corpus] itself might be characterized as a remedy.\u201d Id. \u00b6 10. Nevertheless, the use of the writ of habeas corpus has evolved over the years in state and federal courts. See id. \u00b6\u00b6 10-11 (tracing the history of the writ of habeas corpus in New Mexico). Traditionally, a detainee used the writ of habeas corpus to secure immediate release from unlawful or unconstitutional detainment. Id. \u00b6 12. The writ is also, however, \u201cthe proper avenue to challenge the unconstitutional deprivation of good-time credits, even if it would not result in an immediate release.\u201d Id.\n{13} In Lopez, a habeas corpus case similar to Petitioner\u2019s, this Court considered the proper remedy after the district court determined that NMCD had violated an inmate\u2019s due process rights in the course of disciplinary proceedings. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 4-5, 10. In that case, an inmate, who allegedly threw a broom at another inmate, attempted to call two inmate witnesses at his prison disciplinary hearing. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 2-4. The hearing officer denied the request, stating that the testimony would be \u201cduplicative and cumulative.\u201d Id. \u00b6 4. The hearing officer found the inmate guilty, recommending that the inmate spend thirty days in disciplinary segregation and lose all good-time credits. Id. In the end, the inmate was compelled to forfeit all but thirty days of his nearly two years of accrued good-time credits. Id. The inmate filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was denied the opportunity to call witnesses in violation of his right to due process of law. Id. \u00b65.\n{14} The court granted the writ. Id. \u00b6 1. As for the remedy, the district court ordered NMCD to restore the inmate\u2019s good-time credits, strike the record of the disciplinary hearing from the inmate\u2019s file, and never pursue the same issues in a later disciplinary hearing. Id. \u00b6 1. We affirmed. Id. \u00b6 35.\n{15} The Lopez Court discussed the appropriate remedies available to a habeas court. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 12-21. In affirming, we stated that traditionally the writ provided for an equitable remedy, such that \u201ca court has some flexibility in fashioning an appropriate disposition for the circumstances of a particular case.\u201d Id. \u00b6 16; see also NMSA 1978 \u00a7 44-1-25 (1884) (stating that in habeas corpus cases, the court can \u201cdispose of such [petitioning] party as justice requires\u201d). The remedies available, however, are not limitless. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 16-17. Specifically, we stated that \u201c[t]he discretion traditionally associated with the exercise of equitable jurisdiction must be exercised within limits that permit effective appellate review. Otherwise, the rights intended to be protected by the writ could be as easily denied as protected.\u201d Id. \u00b6 17.\n{16} Typically, the appropriate remedy will be either releasing the inmate from the imposed discipline or ordering a new hearing but not barring future discipline. In Lopez we emphasized that \u201can absolute bar to further proceedings is an exceptional remedy.\u201d Id. (emphasis added). We went on to say that in cases involving the deprivation of constitutional rights, the remedies available should be narrowly tailored to the injury suffered \u201cand take into account competing interests\u201d such as the disciplinary needs of the prison system. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 21-22. Overall, we stated that\nprecluding a new hearing is an exceptional remedy, which we believe is only appropriate when the trial court is persuaded either that [NMCD] will not or cannot provide a fair hearing on remand, or that there has been such a pattern of conduct by [NMCD] that a sanction is appropriate.\nId. \u00b6 33.\n{17} In reaching our conclusion in Lopez, we reasoned that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the discipline expunged without a new hearing because the court had described on the record its concerns about the number of times NMCD had denied inmates the right to call witnesses at prison disciplinary hearings. Id. \u00b6 7-9, 28. Specifically, the district court explained that it had seen NMCD \u201cget sloppy\u201d and \u201ccut corners . . . too many times\u201d when it came to allowing prisoners to call witnesses. Id. \u00b6 8. (internal quotation marks omitted)\n{18} On review, we found that the court did not abuse its discretion in issuing an exceptional remedy because the court had essentially taken judicial notice of a pattern of misconduct by NMCD for which the court fashioned a specific and narrow remedy, both to protect the petitioner and to address systemic problems in the NMCD disciplinary process. Id. \u00b6\u00b620-22, 33. We stated \u201cthat the district court had concluded a sanction was appropriate as an exceptional remedy for exceptional circumstances.\u201d Id. \u00b6 33.\n{19} Lopez forms the backdrop for our consideration of Petitioner\u2019s habeas case. Whereas in Lopez the district court found exceptional circumstances that justified bypassing any further prison hearing on remand, here the district court made no findings charging NMCD with a pattern of misconduct. Here, unlike in Lopez, no evidence in the record suggested, nor did the judge find, that NMCD consistently or frequently denied inmates the opportunity to call witnesses at their disciplinary hearings or failed to inform them of the procedure for submitting written questions to witnesses. Rather, at least based upon this record, Petitioner\u2019s problem with posing questions to witnesses appears to be an isolated incident that, at least in the abstract, could be rectified at a fair hearing on remand.\n{20} The district court did, however, point out one salient problem with remand in this particular case that bears mention. Specifically, in its order granting the remedy the district court stated that\n[d]ue to the length of time that has elapsed and the nature of the due process violations, [NMCD] would be unable to provide a fair hearing for Petitioner. The lapse of time has already resulted in the unavailability of witnesses, as evidenced, for example, by the unavailability of [NMCD\u2019s] witness at the evidentiary hearing in this matter, and would certainly impact memories of witnesses that could be located.\nPresumably, the fact that one of Petitioner\u2019s potential witnesses had since been deported also factored into this decision.\n{21} The court\u2019s concerns are legitimate, and in the ordinary case \u2014 where discipline is imposed without the benefit of a parallel criminal conviction \u2014 those concerns might justify the extraordinary relief of \u201cprecluding a new hearing.\u201d But that is not what happened in this case.\n{22} In Petitioner\u2019s case, the purpose of a new hearing on remand would be to determine whether Petitioner committed the rape and thus violated prison rules. Ordinarily, determining a violation of prison rules would require disciplinary hearing. But in this case, Petitioner was already tried and convicted of the rape in district court. See State v. Roybal, 33 N.M. 540, 547-48, 273 P. 919, 922 (1928) (\u201cThe term conviction . . . [i]n its most common use . . . signifies the finding of the jury that the prisoner is guilty.... [T]he word conviction in the broader and less technical sense . . . implies the judgment of the court.\u201d) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 384 (9th ed. 2009) (defining conviction as \u201c[t]he act or process of judicially finding someone guilty of a crime\u201d). A jury found Petitioner guilty of rape in a criminal trial where the burden of proof was beyond a reasonable doubt, which is greater than the burden of proof in a prison disciplinary hearing. See New Mexico Corrections Department Policies, Inmate Discipline CD-090101 (A)(10) at http://corrections.state.nm.us/policies/docs/C D-090100.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). (\u201cDisciplinary hearings are administrative hearings and findings will be determined by preponderance of the evidence.\u201d).\n{23} W e know of no case holding that an inmate is entitled to a new disciplinary hearing when his guilt has already been established at criminal trial, nor would such a holding make sense. A new disciplinary hearing would be unnecessary as a matter of law or, at most, might be required perfunctorily to receive into evidence the prior judgment and sentence. See Otherson v. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 711 F.2d 267, 271, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (upholding the use of the doctrine of issue preclusion to find that petitioner\u2019s prior criminal conviction could be given preclusive effect in a later administrative proceeding and noting that the administrative body only needs to find guilt by a preponderance of the evidence); S.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. Breeland, 38 S.E.2d 644, 648 (S.C. 1946) (recognizing that a criminal conviction could be used in a later dental license revocation hearing, noting \u201c[t]he question of his guilt here is precisely the same as was determined adversely to him under circumstances most favorable to himself \u2014 that is, in a prosecution in which he could not have been convicted unless his guilt had b een shown b eyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d); see also Weiss v. N.M. Bd. of Dentistry, 110 N.M. 574, 579, 798 P.2d 175, 180 (1990) (holding that a prior criminal conviction was itself sufficient to support the Board of Dentistry revoking a dental license in a subsequent license revocation hearing); cf. New Mexico Corrections Department Policies, supra, CD-090101(A)(7) (\u201cAny act, although not specifically listed in this policy, that would be either a felony or misdemeanor under the Criminal Code of the State of New Mexico or the Laws of the United States of America will constitute a misconduct violation under criteria established by this policy.\u201d).\n{24} In focusing on Petitioner\u2019s procedural due process rights, the district court appears to have lost sight of the reason for such a hearing. The court failed to appreciate the significance of the intervening criminal convictions \u2014 not to whether due process was violated \u2014 but, pivotally, to what remedy was appropriate under the circumstances. If this were a case for declaratory and injunctive relief, for example, the court could declare the due process violation and enjoin NMCD from engaging in similar conduct in the future. If this were a case for damages, the court could consider compensation for past wrongs. In a habeas case, however, the court is limited to habeas relief directed at the discipline imposed \u2014 discipline that has been vindicated by the intervening criminal convictions. In failing to recognize the limits of habeas relief \u2014 the sole question before it \u2014 the district court clearly abused its discretion.\n{25} In doing so, the court ignored pleas of counsel to the contrary. Throughout the proceedings, the court was made aware of Petitioner\u2019s intervening criminal convictions. At the beginning of the evidentiary hearing, the State alerted the court to the importance of Petitioner\u2019s criminal convictions. Specifically, when the State mentioned that a jury had already convicted Petitioner for the \u201csame act\u201d beyond a reasonable doubt, the court responded that there is different evidence presented at a criminal trial. The court further stated that it was not there to determine whether Petitioner committed the rape, but rather to determine if NMCD had violated his due process rights at the prison disciplinary hearing even though the express purpose of the disciplinary hearing was to determine whether Petitioner had committed that same rape. The court went on to say that \u201c[Petitioner\u2019s] guilt has nothing to do with whether or not he gets to present a defense at his hearing.\u201d Later on cross-examination, when the State asked Petitioner if he had notice of the criminal case against him, Petitioner objected. The court sustained the objection, stating that \u201cinformation related to the criminal trial was separate from the information regarding the disciplinary hearing.\u201d\n{26} The court\u2019s view of the criminal convictions, though accurate perhaps with respect to the due process analysis, is simply unsustainable as it pertains to the relief the court granted to Petitioner. Ordering good time restored and the disciplinary record expunged \u2014 all because Petitioner could no longer receive a fair hearing to establish a point of evidence that had already been conclusively established by other, irrefutable means \u2014 is unexplainable in this context and constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. \u201cAn abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances of the case.\u201d State v. Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, \u00b6 41, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).\nCONCLUSION\n{27} For these reasons, we reverse the district court, dismiss Petitioner\u2019s writ of habeas corpus, and reinstate the sanctions imposed by NMCD.\n{28} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nRICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice\nWE CONCUR:\nPETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Chief Justice\nEDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice\nCHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice\nPAUL J. KENNEDY, Justice", "type": "majority", "author": "BOSSON, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary K. King, Attorney General Mark Joseph Lovato, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Appellant", "Robert E. Tangora, L.L.C. Robert E. Tangora Santa Fe, NM for Appellee" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2012-NMSC-040\nFiling Date: November 8, 2012\nDocket No. 32,938\nJOSEPH C. PERRY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STANLEY MOYA, Warden, Defendant-Appellant.\nGary K. King, Attorney General Mark Joseph Lovato, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Appellant\nRobert E. Tangora, L.L.C. Robert E. Tangora Santa Fe, NM for Appellee" }, "file_name": "0036-01", "first_page_order": 52, "last_page_order": 59 }