{ "id": 4191463, "name": "HELENA CHEMICAL COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARTURO URIBE, Defendant-Appellee, and PAMELA URIBE, LINDA THOMAS, individually and as representative of Thomas & Wan, L.L.P., and THOMAS & WAN, L.L.P., Defendants; consolidated with HELENA CHEMICAL COMPANY, Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. ARTURO URIBE, Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Helena Chemical Co. v. Uribe", "decision_date": "2012-09-20", "docket_number": "No. 33,875; Docket No. 31,080 consolidated with Docket No. 30,792", "first_page": "303", "last_page": "321", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2013-NMCA-017" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "592 P.2d 1311", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1316" }, { "page": "1316" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.M. 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 17690 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/124/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMCA-121", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 31" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.M. 74", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1559026 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94-95" }, { "page": "729-30" }, { "page": "94-95" }, { "page": "729-30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/120/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 N.M. 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 142244 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "1170", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/123/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMCA-109", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3692537 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/142/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "2000-NMSC-010", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 106484 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/128/0739-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMCA-013", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3784902 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/143/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 395", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731611 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403", "parenthetical": "holding that Section 30-11-1 was \"unconstitutional as applied to a charge of libel predicated on public statements that involve matters of public concern\"" }, { "page": "147", "parenthetical": "holding that Section 30-11-1 was \"unconstitutional as applied to a charge of libel predicated on public statements that involve matters of public concern\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMCA-164", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4242474 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/145/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMCA-092", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 18374 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 1, 8, 41, 43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/124/0012-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMCA-051", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4243308 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMSC-043", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3670558 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0406-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMCA-024", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 929158 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/137/0080-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMSC-046", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3671115 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 U.S. 559", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11745877 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575-86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMCA-029", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 827366 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b631" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0717-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 P.3d 129", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 N.M. 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2011-NMCERT-002", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2011-NMCA-024", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4250048 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/150/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "2002-NMSC-021", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 260688 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 17" }, { "page": "\u00b6 20" }, { "page": "\u00b6 20" }, { "page": "\u00b6 27" }, { "page": "\u00b6 27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/132/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "2001-NMCA-082", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 183132 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 36" }, { "page": "\u00b6 36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/131/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 P. 373", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "year": 1909, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "375", "parenthetical": "\"[W]here there is a fatal inconsistency between the general verdict[] and the special findings[,] the latter must control.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 N.M. 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 205977 ], "year": 1909, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "223", "parenthetical": "\"[W]here there is a fatal inconsistency between the general verdict[] and the special findings[,] the latter must control.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/15/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "955 P.2d 716", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.M. 787", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 18615 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/124/0787-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMCA-042", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 3, 9, 19" }, { "page": "\u00b6 19" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 N.M. 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2847847 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "182" }, { "page": "711" }, { "page": "183-84" }, { "page": "712" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/65/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 F.2d 47", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 760124 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "49", "parenthetical": "discussing the interpretation of Rule 49 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/440/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563434 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536" }, { "page": "1049" }, { "page": "537" }, { "page": "1050" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "2010-NMSC-047", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4250157 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/149/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMCA-037", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4242931 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/145/0797-01" ] }, { "cite": "2000-NMCA-003", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 106539 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 41-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/128/0434-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 N.M. 701", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1598981 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703-04" }, { "page": "981-82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/105/0701-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 P.3d 270", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 N.M. 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2010-NMCERT-012", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2010-NMCA-110", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4249316 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/149/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "2010-NMCA-052", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4248208 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/148/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 N.M. 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 720144 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"[A] motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence is a prerequisite to asking the trial court to consider the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a motion for judgment [notwithstanding the verdict].\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"[A] motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence is a prerequisite to asking the trial court to consider the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a motion for judgment [notwithstanding the verdict].\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/112/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 P.3d 97", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2012-NMSC-004", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4188653 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/1/0224-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 N.M. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 322344 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550" }, { "page": "276" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/122/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMSC-063", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 N.M. 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582487 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402" }, { "page": "470" }, { "page": "399" }, { "page": "467" }, { "page": "402" }, { "page": "470", "parenthetical": "recognizing that non-public defamation plaintiffs may establish liability based on ordinary negligence" }, { "parenthetical": "stating that after a pretrial conference is held, an order shall be entered reciting any action taken, and that order shall control the subsequent course of the action unless modified by a subsequent order; and explaining that such order shall be modified \"only to prevent manifest injustice\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/98/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 U.S. 130", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167825 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133-34, 155", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "138" }, { "page": "138-39,146" }, { "page": "143-44" }, { "page": "143", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "145", "parenthetical": "explaining that constitutional defenses may only be overcome by \"clear and compelling\" circumstances" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/388/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 U.S. 254", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 379234 ], "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/376/0254-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1654, "char_count": 51624, "ocr_confidence": 0.815, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.9577046793310656e-08, "percentile": 0.37117221892087143 }, "sha256": "c7c4bd4ca3794b7f17f1c8c41119b7086dee03898ee80242f0d4f1f304ac65b9", "simhash": "1:cb0ee1139a981c66", "word_count": 8412 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:46:09.531131+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge", "JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge", "J. MILES HANISEE, Judge" ], "parties": [ "HELENA CHEMICAL COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARTURO URIBE, Defendant-Appellee, and PAMELA URIBE, LINDA THOMAS, individually and as representative of Thomas & Wan, L.L.P., and THOMAS & WAN, L.L.P., Defendants. consolidated with HELENA CHEMICAL COMPANY, Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. ARTURO URIBE, Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nSUTIN, Judge.\n{1} Helena Chemical Company (Helena) filed suit against Arturo Uribe and others for prima facie tort and defamation. A jury awarded nominal damages on Helena\u2019s claims of defamation and prima facie tort. Additionally, it awarded punitive damages, as to which the district court granted a remittitur. Uribe appeals; Helena cross-appeals.\n{2} We hold that the district court did not err in entering judgment in favor of Helena on its claim of defamation and that the court properly awarded a remitted amount of punitive damages as to that claim. In regard to prima facie tort, we hold that the court erred in entering a judgment based on the jury\u2019s general verdict because the jury\u2019s answers to the special interrogatories were inconsistent with that verdict. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and the punitive damages award as it pertains to Helena\u2019s prima facie tort claim. Finally, we hold that the court did not err in reducing Helena\u2019s bill of costs. We affirm in part and reverse in part.\nBACKGROUND\n{3} Helena was a crop protection company that blended, stored, and distributed fertilizers and other nutrients to local farmers. In 1989 Helena purchased property in Mesquite, New Mexico from another crop protection company and began operations there. In 2002 Uribe moved to Mesquite into a house directly across the street from the Helena facility. Beginning in 2002 and continuing into 2008, Uribe made various Helena-related statements and presentations in the media, to the Legislature, and at Mesquite community meetings. Additionally, Uribe attempted to interfere with Helena\u2019s attempts to communicate with the public, including discouraging community members from attending Helena\u2019s open-house, which had been designed to educate the community about Helena\u2019s operations. In response to these and other of Uribe\u2019s actions, Helena filed suit for defamation and prima facie tort.\n{4} A jury awarded nominal damages of $1.00 each on Helena\u2019s claims of defamation and prima facie tort. Additionally, it awarded Helena a lump-sum of punitive damages in the amount of $75,000. Upon Uribe\u2019s motion, the court remitted the punitive damages amount to $10,000. The court attributed $5,000 of this sum to the defamation claim and $5,000 of the sum to the prima facie tort claim. Following entry of the final judgment, the court awarded costs to Helena in the amount of $9,000, an amount far below what Helena sought as recoverable costs. Additional facts and procedural occurrences are discussed, as needed, within the body of this Opinion.\n{5} Uribe argues that the district court erred in entering judgment in favor of Helena on its defamation and prima facie tort claims. In regard to defamation, he contends that the court erred by instructing the jury under the theory that Helena was a private rather than a public plaintiff; that, as a matter of law, none of his statements were defamatory; and that Helena failed to present sufficient evidence of defamation. In regard to prima facie tort, Uribe argues that the court erred in entering a judgment consistent with the general verdict in favor of Helena because the jury\u2019s answers to special interrogatories were inconsistent with that verdict. Also, in regard to prima facie tort, Uribe contends that Helena failed to present sufficient evidence to support the verdict. Uribe\u2019s final argument is that the court erred in granting an award of punitive damages.\n{6} W e affirm the district court\u2019s judgment as it relates to defamation and the corresponding punitive damages. We reverse that aspect of the court\u2019s judgment pertaining to prima facie tort including the $5,000 punitive damages associated with that claim.\n{7} Helena argues, in its cross-appeal, that the court erred in remitting the punitive damages award and also that the court erred in reducing its bill of costs. We affirm the district court\u2019s determination on these issues. A third argument, regarding the court\u2019s refusal to submit each separate defamatory claim to the jury, is not considered because it is made contingent upon our reversal of the judgment in favor of Helena on defamation.\nDISCUSSION\nI. DEFAMATION\nA. Public Figure (Jury Instruction) Issue\n{8} Uribe argues that the district court erred in \u201cfailing to issue the properjury instruction for defamation\u201d and that the court should have instructed the jury that Helena was to be treated as a public figure.\n{9} In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 n.1, 279-80 (1964), the United States Supreme Court held that \u201c[t]he constitutional guarantees [of freedom of speech and press] require ... a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with \u2018actual malice\u2019 \u2014 that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false[.]\u201d Later, in Curtis Publ\u2019g Co. v.\nButts, the Court extended its New York Times rule to include \u201cpublic figure [s] who [are] not ... public officials].\u201d Curtis Publ\u2019g Co., 388 U.S. 130, 133-34, 155 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted). \u201cNon-public\u201d (private person) defamation plaintiffs, on the other hand, may establish liability based on a \u201clesser standard\u201d of ordinary negligence. Marchiondo v. Brown, 98 N.M. 394, 402, 649 P.2d 462, 470 (1982). \u201cWhether a person is a public figure is a question of law for the court.\u201d Id. at 399, 649 P.2d at 467.\n{10} In this case, as to the allegedly defamatory communications, the jury was instructed to determine whether \u201cUribe [knew] that the communication(s) were false or negligently failfed] to recognize that they were falsef.]\u201d Thus, the instructions were consistent with a private-person standard of proof of defamation. See id. at 402, 649 P.2d at 470 (recognizing that non-public defamation plaintiffs may establish liability based on ordinary negligence). The record reflects that Uribe agreed, in a pretrial order, to this standard of proof. Nevertheless, after the close of evidence, Uribe requested the court to instruct the jury on a public-figure theory of defamation.\n{11} In its order denying the requested public-figure instructions, the district court stated the following:\n1. The [c]ourt entered its [pretrial o]rder March 25, 2010, which [pretrial o]rder was agreed to by the parties. Neither party raised an issue of treating . . . Helena as a public figure in the [pretrial ojrder.\n2. Except for possible punitive damage issues, the parties have completed the presentation of trial evidence to the jury.\n3. The parties rested on Friday, April 2, 2010.\n4. When it appeared that the [cjourt\u2019s instructions to the jury were not likely to be completed before5:00[]p[.]m[.],the [cjourt gave the jury the option to recess and return [on] Wednesday, April 7, 2010[,] for instructions and closing arguments, and the jury elected to recess.\n5. The attorneys for . . . Helena submitted a new set of proposed jury instructions by e-mail [on] Monday, April 5, 2010[,] at 4:25 p[.]m.\n6. The attorneys for . . . Uribe submitted a new set of proposed instructions by e-mail[] [on] Monday, April 5, 2010[,] at 5:50 p[.]m., after the [c]ourthad closed.\n7. In his new set of proposed instructions, . . . Uribe, for the first time since the case has been pending, raised the issue of . . . Helena as a public figure and asked the [c]ourt to instruct the jury on a theory of defamation of. . . Helena as a public figure rather than a private figure.\nCiting Rule 1-016(E) NMRA, the court concluded that \u201c[t]he [pretrial o]rder controls the course of the action and may be modified only to prevent manifest injustice.\u201d See id. (stating that after a pretrial conference is held, an order shall be entered reciting any action taken, and that order shall control the subsequent course of the action unless modified by a subsequent order; and explaining that such order shall be modified \u201conly to prevent manifest injustice\u201d). The court further concluded that Uribe\u2019s request was, \u201cin substance, a motion to amend\u201d the pretrial order, that allowing such an amendment would cause Helena to \u201csuffer manifest injustice[,]\u201d and that Uribe\u2019s request was \u201cuntimely and should be denied.\u201d\n{12} Uribe\u2019s argument in this Court is void of any discussion of whether the district court abused its discretion either by characterizing the requested instruction as a motion to amend the pretrial order or by denying the motion for the reasons stated in the order. See Fahrbach v. Diamond Shamrock, Inc., 1996-NMSC-063, 122 N.M. 543, 550, 928 P.2d 269, 276 (stating that a district court\u2019s decision whether to amend a pretrial order is reviewed for abuse of discretion). Because Uribe does not attack the court\u2019s findings and conclusions in this regard, we deem the court\u2019s order to be conclusive. Rule 12-213(A)(4) NMRA (stating that the appellant\u2019s brief in chief \u201cshall set forth a specific attack on any finding, or such finding shall be deemed conclusive\u201d).\n{13} In addition to requesting that this Court affirm the district court on the basis of its order rejecting the instructions, Helena contends that \u201cpublic figure is an affirmative defense that must be raised before trial.\u201d And that by failing to raise it earlier, Uribe waived his right to assert that Helena was a public figure. In response, Uribe cites Curtis Publ\u2019g Co. for the proposition that he was not required to assert the public-figure defense prior to trial.\n{14} Curtis Publ\u2019g Co. does not support Uribe\u2019s argument. In Curtis Publ\u2019g Co., the defendant\u2019s trial was held prior to the Supreme Court\u2019s New York Times decision. See Curtis Publ'g Co., 388 U.S. at 138. Once the New York Times decision issued, the defendant in Curtis Publ\u2019g Co. immediately filed a motion for a new trial, in which he argued that the newly recognized public-official constitutional defense should be extended to public figures. Id. at 138-39,146. When the case reached the United States Supreme Court, the plaintiff argued that the defendant had knowingly waived the New York Times-b&s&d constitutional defense. Curtis Publ\u2019g Co., 388 U.S. at 143-44. In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court noted that although \u201cconstitutional objections may be waived by a failure to raise them at a proper time,\u201d it would not hold that the defendant waived a \u201cknown right\u201d before such a right had been recognized by the Court. Id. at 143 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, because at the time of the Curtis Publ\u2019g Co. trial the Supreme Court had yet to recognize the heightened, actual-malice standard applicable to public officials, the defendant could not be deemed to have waived his right to assert the defense. Unlike the defendant in Curtis Publ'g Co., Uribe\u2019s failure to raise the public-figure defense prior to trial and certainly before the evidence closed and was ready to be submitted to the jury is not excused on the basis of its having been a previously unrecognized defense.\n{15} Uribe was required, in conformity with the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure, to plead his defenses. See Rule 1-012(B) NMRA (stating that the general rule is that \u201c[ejvery defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading . . . shall be asserted in the responsive pleading\u201d). He presents no applicable authority to show that his failure to plead the public-figure defense may be overcome so as to provide a basis for appellate reversal. Uribe\u2019s failure to plead the public-figure defense at any time before entry of the pretrial order and not until the case was ready to submit to the jury constituted \u201cclear and compelling\u201d waiver of the right to assert the defense. See Curtis Publ\u2019g Co., 388 U.S. at 145 (explaining that constitutional defenses may only be overcome by \u201cclear and compelling\u201d circumstances).\nB. Uribe\u2019s Argument That, as a Matter of Law, the Statements Were Not Defamatory\n{16} Uribe contends that the district court erred in entering judgment in favor of Helena for defamation because, as matter of law, the statements were not defamatory. He also argues that Helena failed to present sufficient evidence to prove each ofthe nine elements of defamation as set forth in UJI 13-1002(B) NMRA. Helena claims that Uribe failed to preserve these claims for appellate review. We agree.\n{17} Pursuant to Rule 12-213(A)(4), Uribe was required to include a statement in his brief in chief explaining how each issue presented was preserved in the district court and to accompany that statement with citations to the record proper. In regard to his argument that, as a matter of law, the statements were not defamatory, Uribe\u2019s briefs contain neither a statement of preservation nor citations to the record to indicate where the matter was preserved. Additionally, the record does not reflect any such preservation.\n{18} Uribe nevertheless contends that the issue was preserved in his post-trial filing of a \u201cmotion for judgment as a matter of law and judgment notwithstanding the verdict.\u201d This claim of preservation fails for two reasons. First, \u201cissues not raised until the judgment notwithstanding the verdict are too late to be the subject of review.\u201d Estate of Gutierrez ex rel. Jaramillo v. Meteor Monument, L.L.C., 2012-NMSC-004, \u00b6 31, 274 P.3d 97 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also First Nat'l Bank in Albuquerque v. Sanchez, 112 N.M. 317, 320 n.4, 815 P.2d 613, 616 n.4 (1991) (\u201c[A] motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence is a prerequisite to asking the trial court to consider the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a motion for judgment [notwithstanding the verdict].\u201d). And second, Uribe\u2019s post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law and judgment notwithstanding the verdict did not raise an issue of sufficiency of the evidence. The motion was based on other claims of error.\n{19} In sum, Uribe may have preserved some error, but not one raised in his brief in chief. Because we do not address matters that are raised for the first time on appeal, we decline to address these arguments. See Andalucia Dev. Corp., Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2010-NMCA-052, \u00b6 25, 148 N.M. 277, 234 P.3d 929 (\u201cAppellate courts will not consider issues that went unpreserved at the district court level.\u201d).\nII. PRIMA FACIE TORT\n{20} ' The jury\u2019s determinations pertaining to the issue of prima facie tort consist of (1) its answers to special interrogatories regarding prima facie tort, (2) its general verdict for Helena on prima facie tort, and (3) and its special verdict for punitive damages on prima facie tort.\n{21} The special interrogatories regarding prima facie tort read as follows:\nIn accordance with instructions contained elsewhere in these instructions, answer the following questions:\n(1) Did ... Uribe act intentionally intending to harm Helena[?]\n\u201cYes\u201d__\u201cNo\u201d __\n(2) Was . . . Uribe\u2019s intentional act a cause ofHelenaf\u2019s] .. . harm?\n\u201cY es\u201d__\u201cNo\u201d__\nTo question No. 3, check either a or b for your answer.\n(3) Was . . . Uribe\u2019s conduct justifiable or not justifiable?\na) ... Uribe\u2019s conduct was justifiable. ____\nb) ... Uribe\u2019s conduct was not justifiable. ____\nIf you answer \u201cYes\u201d to questions 1 and 2 and not justifiable to question 3, then you shall return a verdict in favor of Helena . . . and against . . . Uribe on its claim for [pjrima [fjacie [t]ort and you shall determine the amount of money that will compensate Helena . . . for Helenaf\u2019s] . . . damages in accordance with instructions as set out herein.\nIf you answer \u201cNo\u201d to either question 1 or 2 or if you answer justifiable to question 3, you will return a verdict for . . . Uribe and against Helena[.]\nThe jury answered \u201cYes\u201d to question 1 and \u201cNo\u201d to question 2. On question 3, the jury selected \u201cb\u201d \u2014 \u201cUribe\u2019s conduct was not justifiable.\u201d\n{22} The general verdict in favor of Helena on the claim of prima facie tort read as follows: \u201cWe find for . . . Helena ... in the sum of $1.00 on its claim for prima facie tort.\u201d The special verdict for punitive damages on the claim of prima facie tort read: \u201cShould ... Helena ... be awarded punitive damages on its claim of prima facie tort?\u201d The jury answered \u201cYes.\u201d\n{23} Thus, the jury\u2019s special interrogatory answers indicate that it found that Uribe had acted intentionally to harm Helena, but that Uribe\u2019s act did not cause Helena harm. Having answered \u201cNo\u201d to the question of whether Uribe\u2019s act harmed Helena, the jury was instructed to \u201creturn a verdict for . . . Uribe and against Helena[.]\u201d Nevertheless, the jury, contrary to its instructions, found \u201cfor . . . Helena ... in the sum of $ 1.00 on its claim for prima facie tort.\u201d\n{24} Because the jury answered \u201cNo\u201d to question 2 of the special interrogatories, but returned a general verdict in favor of Helena, an obvious and critical inconsistency existed between the jury\u2019s determinations. But when the jury returned its verdicts, the district court read aloud only the general verdict and the special verdict. The court did not read the jury\u2019s answers to the special interrogatories related to prima facie tort. The parties did not request the district court to read aloud the jury\u2019s answers to the special interrogatories. Thus, the inconsistency went unnoticed, and the parties proceeded to present to the jury their respective arguments regarding the amount of punitive damages. The argument lasted for approximately twenty minutes. Following the argument, the jury retired to deliberate punitive damages amounts.\n{25} The record reflects that the jury was absent from the courtroom to deliberate the punitive damages award for twenty minutes, during which time, the court requested that the parties remain in the courtroom. During this recess, the parties did not review or request to review the answers to the special interrogatories. When the jury returned its punitive damages award, and after the court read it aloud, the court asked if there was \u201canything that the parties wishfed] from the jury before they[ were] excusedf.]\u201d Both parties responded \u201cNo[.]\u201d The jury was excused. Subsequently, the following conversation ensued between the court and Uribe\u2019s counsel:\n[Court]: .. . if you wish to have copies of these tonight, we can try to get copies of them for you. Do you want them tonight?\n[Counsel]: Yeah, that would be great. If we could get them. You\u2019re talking about the special interrogatories and the verdict?\n[Court]: The verdicts. The special interrogatories and the verdicts.\n[Counsel]: Yes, your Honor. We could wait for that.\n[Counsel]: Can we just look at it?\n[Court]: Sure[.]\n[Counsel]: Your Honor, there is a conflict in this special interrogatory regarding prima facie . . . tort, because they were supposed to answer both questions yes, and they answered one yes and one no.\n[Court]: Well, you\u2019ll have to raise that by motion. There is nothing we can do about it right now.\n{26} In his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and motion for remittitur and alternatively, motion for a new trial, Uribe raised the issue of the inconsistency in the jury\u2019s verdict. He argued, among other things, that with respect to the prima facie tort instruction and verdict in particular, \u201centry of a judgment. . . would be void as a matter of law because [the verdicts were] facially, factually[,] and legally inconsistent.\u201d Helena, on the other hand, maintained that Uribe waived his right to object to any possible inconsistency by failing to object prior to the jury having been discharged.\n{27} The court noted that it had not read the prima facie tort-related special interrogatories because of their length, but nevertheless, because Uribe failed to take advantage of \u201cplenty of opportunity\u201d either to object to the court\u2019s failure to read the special interrogatories aloud, or to request such a reading, Uribe waived his right to object to the inconsistent verdict. Accordingly, the court entered a judgment for Helena consistent with the general verdict.\n{28} On appeal, Uribe contends that the district court erred in entering judgment in favor of Helena. He argues that the answers to the special interrogatories and the general verdict were \u201cfatalfly] inconsistent,]\u201d that the answers to the special interrogatories should control, and the verdict in favor of Helena on prima facie tort should be reversed. \u201cAt a minimum,\u201d Uribe contends, \u201cthis matter must be remanded for a new trial.\u201d This presents a legal issue, which we will review de novo. See Parkhill v. Alderman-Cave Milling & Grain Co. of N.M., 2010-NMCA-110, \u00b6 58, 149 N.M. 140, 245 P.3d 585 (stating that an issue of law is reviewed de novo), cert. granted, 2010-NMCERT-012, 150 N.M. 493, 263 P.3d 270.\n{29} Helena contends that the district court properly found that Uribe waived his objection to the inconsistency. Helena presents a number of authorities in support of its waiver position. We note, however, that with the exception of Thompson Drilling, Inc. v. Romig, 105 N.M. 701, 703-04, 736 P.2d 979, 981-82 (1987), and G & G Servs., Inc. v. Agora Syndicate, Inc., 2000-NMCA-003, \u00b6\u00b6 41-42, 128 N.M. 434, 993 P.2d 751, which are silent on whether the district court read the jury\u2019s answers aloud, Helena\u2019s authorities are distinguishable on the basis that the courts in those cases read the jury\u2019s answers to the special interrogatories aloud, thereby indisputably giving the parties notice of and an opportunity to object to any perceived inconsistences in the verdicts. See Guest v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2009-NMCA-037, \u00b6 36, 145 N.M. 797, 205 P.3d 844, rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 2010-NMSC-047, 149 N.M. 74, 244 P.3d 342; Ramos v. Rodriguez, 118 N.M. 534, 536, 882 P.2d 1047, 1049 (Ct. App. 1994). These authorities, inapplicable to the peculiar circumstances of this case, are not persuasive.\n{30} Uribe relies on, among other authorities, Rule 1 -049(B) NMRA that applies to general verdicts accompanied by answers to interrogatories. The rule reads, in pertinent part, that:\n[w]hen the answers [to the interrogatories] are consistent with each other but one or more is inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment may be entered in accordance with the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict, or the court may return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict or may order a new trial.\nId. Consistent with the interpretation of its federal counterpart, we interpret Rule 1-049(B) to impose a \u201cresponsibility [upon] a trial judge to resolve the inconsistency [between special interrogatories and a general verdict] in one of the three ways\u201d enumerated in the federal rule. See Elston v. Morgan, 440 F.2d 47, 49 (7th Cir. 1971) (discussing the interpretation of Rule 49 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).\n{31} In the present case, because the jury was excused before the inconsistency was noticed and discussed, the resolution of the inconsistency cannot be returned to the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict. Thus, we are left with whether to require judgment to be entered in accordance with the jury\u2019s answers to the special interrogatories or to order a new trial. We see no reasonable basis on which to order a new trial. One can only speculate about what the jury intended or whether it was confused. Any speculation will not support remand for a new trial. The inconsistency existed. While we fault Uribe\u2019s counsel for her failure to request that the court read the special interrogatory answers or otherwise review the answers on a timely basis, we hold that the court\u2019s failure to read the special interrogatories and answers aloud or at least give them to counsel to read, before excusing the jury, was a fatal error requiring reversal. Persuasive authority supports, if not requires, entry of a judgment in accordance with the jury\u2019s factual determination that Uribe\u2019s intentional act was not a cause of Helena\u2019s harm.\n{32} The purpose of special interrogatories is to test the validity of the general verdict by ascertaining whether the jury\u2019s findings on certain material issues comport with its verdict. Bryant v. H.B. Lynn Drilling Corp., 65 N.M. 177, 182, 334 P.2d 707, 711 (1959). \u201cIn other words, the response of the jury to ... particular questions of fact may show that no judgment can properly be entered in favor of a plaintiff upon a general verdict because the jury has not found in his favor upon some material issue or has found against him as to some fact fatal to his cause of action.\u201d Id. Here, the jury\u2019s conclusion that Uribe\u2019s intentional act was not a cause of Helena\u2019s harm was fatally inconsistent with its finding in favor of Helena on the claim of prima facie tort. Cf. Turpie v. Sw. Cardiology Assocs., P.A., 1998-NMCA-042, \u00b6\u00b6 3, 9, 19, 124 N.M. 787, 955 P.2d 716 (affirming the district court\u2019s judgment, consistent with the jury\u2019s answers to special interrogatories, which were fatally inconsistent with the general verdict; reasoning that \u201c[b]y definition, if the defendant did not cause the injured spouse\u2019s damages, from which flow all the damages for loss of consortium, [the] defendant\u2019s actions cannot be the proximate cause of the loss of consortium damages either\u201d); Ramos, 118 N.M. at 537, 882 P.2d at 1050 (stating that \u201ceven where there has been a determination of negligence [in a special interrogatory], liability does not follow unless such negligence has been shown to be a proximate cause of the claimed damages\u201d and noting that \u201cwhen jury questions are conditioned on an affirmative answer to a prior question, negative answers to preceding questions renders subsequent findings improper, immaterial, or devoid of legal significance\u201d). Where the answers to special interrogatories are inconsistent with the general verdict, the answers to the special interrogatories will \u201coverride the general verdict},]\u201d and the court shall enter judgment according to the answers to the special interrogatories. Bryant, 65 N.M. at 183-84, 334 P.2d at 712; see Rule 1-049(B); see also Gallegos v. Sandoval, 15 N.M. 216, 223, 106 P. 373, 375 (1909) (\u201c[W]here there is a fatal inconsistency between the general verdict[] and the special findings[,] the latter must control.\u201d). It was, therefore, error for the district court to enter judgment on the general verdict when it was fatally inconsistent with the jury\u2019s answers to the special interrogatories.\n{33} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court\u2019s judgment in favor of Helena on the issue of prima facie tort. Cf. Turpie, 1998-NMCA-042, \u00b6 19 (rejecting the plaintiff\u2019s request for a new trial where there existed inconsistencies between the verdict and the special interrogatories because \u201c[i]t [was] clear that the jury decided [that the defendants\u2019 negligence was not the proximate cause of [the decedent\u2019s] death\u201d and to grant a new trial would be to \u201csecond-guess that finding\u201d). Having reversed the prima facie tort judgment against Uribe, we have no need to discuss his remaining prima facie tort arguments.\nIII. Punitive Damages\n{34} As to punitive damages, the jury was instructed as follows:\nYou have returned a verdict for Helena ... for compensatory damages. Helena . . . seeks to recover punitive damages from . . . Uribe. If you find that the conduct of . . . Uribe was malicious, willful, reckless, wanton, fraudulent},] or in bad faith, then you may award punitive damages against him.\nMalicious conduct is the intentional doing of a wrongful act with knowledge that the act was wrongful.\nWillful conduct is the intentional doing of an act with knowledge that harm may result.\nReckless conduct is the intentional doing of an act with utter indifference to the consequences. When there is a high risk of danger, conduct that breaches the duty of care is more likely to demonstrate recklessness.\nWanton conduct is the doing of an act with utter indifference to or conscious disregard for a person\u2019s rights.\nPunitive damages are awarded for the limited purposes of punishment and to deter others from the commission of like offenses. The amount of punitive damages must be based on reason and justice taking into account all the circumstances, including the nature and enormity of the wrong and such aggravating and mitigating circumstances awarded, if any, must be reasonably related to the injury and to any damages given as compensation and not disproportionate to the circumstances.\nA. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support an Award of Punitive Damages\n{35} \u201c[W]e review the findings underlying the jury\u2019s award of punitive damages to determine whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence.\u201d Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Diamond D Constr. Co., 2001-NMCA-082, \u00b6 36, 131 N.M. 100, 33 P.3d 651. \u201cSubstantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d Id. If supported by substantial evidence, a punitive damages award will be upheld. Alcen v. Plains Elec. Generation & Transmission Coop., Inc., 2002-NMSC-021, \u00b6 17, 132 N.M. 401, 49 P.3d 662. We resolve all disputed facts in favor of the jury\u2019s findings and indulge all reasonable inference in favor of the verdict, while disregarding all inferences to the contrary. Diamond D Constr. Co., 2001-NMCA-082, \u00b6 36. We review de novo whether the punitive damages award was reasonable. Grassie v. Roswell Hosp. Corp., 2011-NMCA-024, \u00b6 48, 150 N.M. 283, 258 P.3d 1075, cert. denied, 2011-NMCERT-002, 150 N.M. 617, 264 P.3d 129.\n{36} Uribe contends that there was insufficient evidence to support an award of punitive damages as to prima facie tort and defamation. Because we reverse the court\u2019s judgment as to prima facie tort, we limit our consideration of this issue to whether sufficient evidence existed to support a punitive damages award on the defamation claim. We hold that sufficient evidence existed.\n{37} Contrary to Uribe\u2019s appellate position, that there existed no evidence at trial that he made the defamatory statements with malice and with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, the jury was permitted, pursuant to the punitive damages instruction, to award punitive damages if it found that Uribe\u2019s conduct was malicious, willful, reckless, wanton, fraudulent, or in bad faith. Uribe fails to show why the jury could not reasonably infer such conduct from the evidence presented at trial. Moreover, Helena claims, and by failing to respond to the claim Uribe effectively concedes that, at the very least, the evidence showed that Uribe \u201cacted with utter indifference to the consequences or rights of others.\u201d See Delta Automatic Sys., Inc., v. Bingham, 1999-NMCA-029, \u00b631, 126 N.M. 717, 974 P.2d 1174 (explaining that failure to respond, in a reply brief, to arguments raised in an answer brief constitutes a concession of the matter). There is no basis for reversal.\nB. The Parties\u2019 Arguments Concerning the Amount of the Punitive Damages Award\n{38} Upon Uribe\u2019s motion, the district court remitted the punitive damages award from the jury\u2019s finding of $75,000 to $10,000. In so doing, the court employed the analysis that was set forth in BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575-86 (1996), and which has been applied in a number of New Mexico cases, including Alcen, 2002-NMSC-021, \u00b6 20. Pursuant to BMW of N. Am.,\ncourt\u2019s assessing a punitive damages award[] . . . should consider three criteria: 1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant\u2019s misconduct; 2) the disparity between the harm (or potential harm) suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and 3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.\nAken, 2002-NMSC-021, \u00b6 20. Because we reverse the court\u2019s judgment in favor of Helena on the issue of prima facie tort, the $5,000 punitive damages award that corresponds to that claim is likewise reversed and will not be considered in the ensuing analysis.\n{39} Both parties argue that the sum of $5,000 in punitive damages on the defamation claim was an improper award. Uribe argues that \u201cpunitive damages in the amount of 5,000 times the actual damages is entirely unreasonable\u201d and that the award \u201cfar exceeds any reasonable relation to the [nominal] amount of damages awarded.\u201d He requests that we reverse the award of punitive damages altogether or, in the alternative, reduce it to $3.00, representing an award of three times the amount of actual damages. Helena, on the other hand, argues that the district court erred in remitting the punitive damages award and that the jury\u2019s punitive damage award should stand. Our review of the constitutionality of a punitive damages award is de novo. Chavarria v. Fleetwood Retail Corp., 2006-NMSC-046, \u00b6 36, 140 N.M. 478, 143 P.3d 717. Our de novo review is essentially one for reasonableness. Id.\n{40} The record reflects the following district court analysis of the BMW of N. Am. factors. First, in regard to the degree of reprehensibility of Uribe\u2019s misconduct, the court reviewed the jury\u2019s answers to the special interrogatories on defamation. The court specifically noted the jury\u2019s answers to a number of questions that pertained to defamation, including:\nDid . . . Uribe publish the communications ?\nYes.\nDid the communications contain a statement of fact?\nYes.\nWere the communications defamatory?\nYes.\nDid the person understanding or receiving the communication understand them to be defamatory?\nYes.\nDid . . . Uribe know that the communications were false or negligently failed to recognize they were false?\nYes.\nDid the communicationfs] cause actual injuries to Helena[\u2019s] . . . reputation?\nYes.\nThe court stated that the jury\u2019s \u201cYes\u201d answers to those questions \u201cshow[ed] that the jury felt that there was reprehensible conduct on the part of. . . Uribe.\u201d\n{41} The court also discussed a number of additional factors that bear on the issue of reprehensibility, including:\nwhether the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit}.]\nBogle v. Summit Inv. Co., LLC, 2005-NMCA-024, \u00b6 34, 137 N.M. 80, 107 P.3d 520 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Specifically, the court found that Helena suffered an economic, rather than physical harm; that the answers to the interrogatories indicated that the jury found that \u201c[t]he [tortious] conduct [evinced] an indifference or a reckless disregard for the health or safety of others\u201d; that Helena did not \u201cclearly prove[]\u201d that it had \u201cfinancial vulnerability\u201d; that \u201cthere, clearly, [were] repeated actions\u201d; and that Uribe \u201cdid what he did as a result of intentional malice.\u201d The court determined that \u201cthere [were] sufficient jury findings to find that there was a degree of reprehensibility that could justify an award of substantial punitive damages.\u201d\n{42} As to the second BMW of N. Am. factor, the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award, the court stated, \u201c[y]ou have one dollar for each of the plaintiff\u2019s torts or two dollars total with a total of $75,000 in punitive damagefs] awards. . . . [I]t does seem like there is a gross disparity that would not be justified in the end.\u201d Additionally, the court found that \u201cthe punitive damages are so far in excess of what would be reasonable, that the [c]ourt should remit.\u201d Accordingly, the court held that it would \u201cremit to the amount of $5,000 for each of the torts prove[d] ... so that the total punitive damages would be $10,000.\u201d The court did not analyze the third BMW ofN. Am. factor.\n{43} Our review of the district court\u2019s analysis of the BMW of N. Am. factors leads us to conclude that the award of $5,000 in punitive damages on the defamation claim was reasonable. As to the first factor, the court considered Uribe\u2019s conduct reprehensible to a degree sufficient to justify an award of \u201csubstantial punitive damages.\u201d Uribe has not provided any persuasive- argument to show that the degree of reprehensibility of his conduct did not justify the court\u2019s decision to award $5,000 in punitive damages. Nor are we persuaded, as Helena maintains, that an award of punitive damages in the amount of $5,000 is insufficient in light of the degree of reprehensibility of Uribe\u2019s conduct. The district court having heard the evidence and having reviewed the jury\u2019s findings found that $5,000 was sufficiently punitive as to the defamation claim, and we believe that finding to be reasonable. See Chavarria, 2006-NMSC-043 \u00b6 36 (stating that our review is essentially one for reasonableness).\n{44} This Court has recognized that although the second BMW of N. Am. factor requires consideration of the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages, it nevertheless remains \u201cthe general rule in New Mexico ... that a punitive damages award can be justified even when supported only by an award of nominal damages.\u201d Akins v. United Steelworkers of Am., 2009-NMCA-051, \u00b6 34, 146 N.M. 237, 208 P.3d 457 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In Garcia v. Coffman, 1997-NMCA-092, \u00b6\u00b6 1, 8, 41, 43, 124 N.M. 12, 946 P.2d 216, this Court upheld a $50,000 punitive damages award supported by a $ 1.00 nominal damage award, and in so doing, we rejected the argument that the BMW of N. Am. ratio factor was controlling.\n{45} In Coffman, we explained that \u201cthe harm likely to result [from the defendants\u2019 egregious conduct] is as much a consideration as the harm that actually occurred\u201d and \u201cthat a high ratio of punitive damages to actual damages could be justified if a particularly egregious act resulted in a small amount of economic damage.\u201d Id. \u00b6 41. Here, the district court\u2019s conclusion that Uribe\u2019s conduct was sufficiently reprehensible to justify a substantial punitive damages award is as much a consideration as is the amount of actual harm suffered by Helena. Because this Court does not \u201cevaluate the propriety of a punitive damages award according to a mathematical formula that compares punitive damages to economic damages[,]\u201d id., we see no basis on which to disturb the district court\u2019s $5,000 punitive damages award on the claim of defamation.\n{46} As to Helena\u2019s argument that the court erred in determining that the disparity between the harm and the punitive damages award justified its decision to remit, we are not persuaded. First, Helena\u2019s argument that the United States and New Mexico Supreme Courts have rejected a \u201cbright-line ratio\u201d that punitive damages are not to exceed is unavailing in this case where there was no indication that the district court even applied a ratio or tried to fit one into its analysis. Second, Helena\u2019s authorities do not support the proposition that this Court should substitute its judgment for that of the district court in determining the amount of punitive damages that was justified by Uribe\u2019s conduct. And we decline to do so. See Jolley v. Energen Res. Corp., 2008-NMCA-164, \u00b6 31, 145 N.M. 350, 198 P.3d 376 (explaining that our review of the BMW ofN. Am. factors \u201cis not truly [a] de novo review [and because o]ur task is limited to determining whether the amount of the award is grossly excessive and therefore within or beyond the outer limits of due process[,] ... we do not ourselves determine the actual award of punitive damages\u201d).\n{47} The third BMW of N. Am. factor, which calls for comparing civil and criminal penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases can be of no benefit to Uribe or to Helena. The parties offer no examples of civil penalties for comparison purposes. Helena offers a comparison between criminal libel, a misdemeanor and the tort of defamation, a comparison that was also noted by our Supreme Court in Aken. 2002-NMSC-021, \u00b6 27; see NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-11-1 (1963). Helena contends that because the crime of criminal libel carries a possible jail sentence of one year, the jury\u2019s original punitive damages award was reasonable. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 31-19-1 (A) (1984) (stating the possible penalties for a misdemeanor); see also Alcen, 2002-NMSC-021, \u00b6 27 (explaining that \u201c[t]he possibility of a jail sentence justifies a substantial punitive damages award\u201d). It is unclear whether Uribe\u2019s defamatory conduct would have constituted criminal libel, insofar as his statements may arguably have been considered \u201cmatters of public concern.\u201d See State v. Powell, 114 N.M. 395, 403, 839 P.2d 139, 147 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that Section 30-11-1 was \u201cunconstitutional as applied to a charge of libel predicated on public statements that involve matters of public concern\u201d). This public concern issue was not raised below, and we will not, on appeal, address it. Accordingly, we will not attempt a direct comparison between the amount of punitive damages in this case and the possible jail time that Uribe could have faced had he been convicted of criminal libel. We conclude that the third BMW ofN. Am. factor provides no basis for reinstating the jury\u2019s substantially higher punitive damages award or for reducing the amount of the court\u2019s remitted award.\n{48} In sum, neither party has provided justification for modifying or reversing the district court\u2019s punitive damages award as to the defamation claim. We believe the court acted reasonably in remitting the award, and we believe the amount of the award is reasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court awarding Helena punitive damages in the amount of $5,000.\nIV. The District Court\u2019s Reduction of Helena\u2019s Cost Bill\n{49} Rule 1 -054(D)(4) NMRA sets out the procedure for recovery of costs. It reads as follows:\nWithin fifteen ... days after filing of the final judgment, the party recovering costs shall file with the clerk of the district court an itemized cost bill, with proof of service of a copy on opposing counsel. Any party failing to file a cost bill within fifteen . . . days after the filing of the final judgment shall be deemed to have waived costs. If no objections are filed within ten . . . days after service of the cost bill, the clerk of the district court shall tax the claimed costs which are allowable by law. The judge shall settle any objections filed.\nId.\n{50} On August 2, 2010, before entry of judgment, Helena filed a bill of costs with the clerk of the district court. On August 20, 2010, there having been no objection by Uribe, the court clerk taxed costs in the amount of $89,018.13. On September 1, 2010, the district court held a hearing on Helena\u2019s post-trial motions, including the issue of entry of a final judgment. At that hearing, Uribe\u2019s counsel stated that it had received copy of the proposed final judgment, and although counsel agreed with \u201cthe majority of the final judgment},]\u201d counsel expressed that she did \u201chave a problem with [including] the amount of . . . taxable court costs in the final judgment.\u201d Additionally, Uribe\u2019s counsel explained that she would \u201cbe seeking a reduction of those costs}.]\u201d\n{51} In response, Helena argued, pursuant to Rule 1-054(D)(4) that by failing to object within ten days of the filing of the cost bill, Uribe had waived any objection thereto. Uribe\u2019s counsel explained \u201c}s]ince the judgment had} not] been entered,... the filing of the cost [bill] would be premature\u201d because \u201cyou have to have a judgment before you submit a cost bill.\u201d The court rejected Helena\u2019s argument. Accordingly, the court quashed the clerk\u2019s entry of costs and held Helena was not required to re-submit its bill of costs, but that the bill of costs would \u201cbe considered entered [at] the same time as the judgment,\u201d and the ten-day objection period would run from the date of the entry of the final judgment. Subsequently, at a hearing on Uribe\u2019s objections to Helena\u2019s bill of costs, the court awarded costs of $9,000, an amount that reflected approximately ten percent of Helena\u2019s bill of costs.\n{52} On appeal, Helena contends that the district court erred in ruling that the bill of costs may only be effective following entry of a final judgment. Helena argues that the court\u2019s ruling was the result of its erroneous interpretation of Rule 1-054. In Helena\u2019s view, Rule 1-054(D)(4) \u201cestablishes a clear and definite outer limit for filing a cost bill; [but] the rule\u2019s silence as to how . . . early a prevailing party may file its cost bill, indicates a party is not prohibited from filing prior to final judgment.\u201d Helena requests that this Court hold that Uribe failed to timely object to the cost bill and that we reinstate the court clerk\u2019s original cost taxation of August 20, 2010. Additionally, Helena argues, in the alternative, that the district court erred in reducing the costs award from Helena\u2019s requested $89,018.13 to $9,000.\n{53} We review Helena\u2019s argument regarding the court\u2019s interpretation of Rule 1-054 de novo. See H-B-S P\u2019ship v. AIRCOA Hospitality Servs., Inc., 2008-NMCA-013, \u00b6 5, 143 N.M. 404, 176 P.3d 1136 (stating that the interpretation of the Rules of Civil Procedure is a question of law, reviewed de novo). We review the court\u2019s decision regarding the amount of costs for an abuse of discretion. See Key v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 2000-NMSC-010, \u00b6 7, 128 N.M. 739, 998 P.2d 575. A court abuses its discretion when its decision is contrary to logic and reason or if its decision is premised on a misapprehension of the law. See Paz v. Tijerina, 2007-NMCA-109, \u00b6 8, 142 N.M. 391, 165 P.3d 1167. \u201cWhen there exist reasons both supporting and detracting from a trial court decision, there is no abuse of discretion.\u201d Alverson v. Harris, 123 N.M. 153, 158, 935 P.2d 1165, 1170 (Ct. App. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n{54} The district court did not err in its interpretation of Rule 1-054(D)(4) or in its related ruling that, with respect to a prematurely filed bill of costs or the clerk\u2019s taxation of such costs before a judgment awarding costs is entered, the court has authority to consider anew the issue of the amount of costs. Although there exists a presumption that the prevailing party will be awarded costs, the losing party may, based on a showing of bad faith, misconduct, unjustness, or other circumstances, overcome the presumption. Marchman v. NCNB Texas Natl Bank, 120 N.M. 74, 94-95, 898 P.2d 709, 729-30 (1995). \u201cAdditionally, the [district] court, upon a showing of equitable grounds, may restrict, apportion, or disallow costs[.]\u201d Marshall v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 1997-NMCA-121, \u00b6 31, 124 N.M. 381, 951 P.2d 76. Thus, whether to award costs to the prevailing party is ultimately a matter within the discretion of the district court. Marchman, 120 N.M. at 94-95, 898 P.2d at 729-30; see also Rule 1-054(C) (\u201c[E]very final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled[.]\u201d). Because, at the time that Helena filed its bill of costs with the district court clerk, the court had yet to issue a final judgment stating that costs would be awarded to Helena, the court properly concluded that the filing was premature. Therefore, we agree with the district court\u2019s decision to quash the court clerk\u2019s taxation of costs and to allow Uribe ten days from the entry of the final judgment to object to Helena\u2019s bill of costs.\n{55} Helena\u2019s reliance on Trimble Cattle Co. v. Henry & Horne, 592 P.2d 1311, 1316 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979), is unpersuasive. In Trimble Cattle, the court held that an Arizona rule of procedure, similar to Rule 1-054(D)(4), did not \u201cforbid the filing and service of a statement of costs prior to the entry of the formal written judgment^ but rather; it defines] the outer time limit which the parties have to file their statements of costs.\u201d Id. at 1316. Even were we to adopt the Arizona court\u2019s reasoning, we would nevertheless reject Helena\u2019s contention. Helena provides no authority or argument to show that the court could not, within its discretion, or for equitable purposes, quash the court clerk\u2019s taxation of costs, and independently consider any objections as to which the court was previously unaware. Under these circumstances, we decline to hold that the district court erred.\n{56} In regard to the court\u2019s reduction of costs, the record reflects that the court\u2019s decision was based on four findings: (1) that courtcostsof$89,000 for $2.00 compensation to Helena was so far beyond \u201cwhat[ was] reasonable under the circumstances of this particular case\u201d that it almost \u201cshock[ed] the conscience\u201d of the court; (2) that Uribe had \u201cvery little assets\u201d; (3) that Helena\u2019s expert fees were excessive; and (4) that there existed a great disparity of wealth between the parties.\n{57} Helena argues that the district court abused its discretion in finding that Uribe established his inability to pay and that the court improperly held that Helena\u2019s costs were excessive. In regard to both contested findings, Helena argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the court\u2019s conclusions. We disagree.\n{58} Uribe testified that his total income in 2009 was $18,500. Uribe\u2019s testimony constituted sufficient evidence to support the court\u2019s inference that Uribe had \u201cvery little assets.\u201d Additionally, Uribe presented evidence in support of the court\u2019s finding that Helena\u2019s expert fees were excessive. Specifically, Uribe argued in the district court that Helena was \u201ctrying to get close to $64,000 in costs for three expert witnesses[,]\u201d many of which costs were \u201cnot necessarily related\u201d to preparation for depositions or trial. Among other things, Uribe pointed, for example, to one expert\u2019s having spent \u201cclose to $13,000 just in coming to trial[,]\u201d including \u201ceight hours for testimony, when clearly his testimony was not any longer than three hours, probably closer to one hour.\u201d Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support the court\u2019s determination that the expert witness fees were excessive. Further, the court was entitled to use its discretion to reduce the costs based on equitable grounds. The court did not abuse its discretion by reducing the award of costs.\nCONCLUSION\n{59} In regard to prima facie tort, the judgment of the district court against Uribe and its concomitant award of $5,000 punitive damages is reversed. We remand with instructions to enter judgment in Uribe\u2019s favor dismissing the prima facie tort claim with prejudice on the ground that Helena failed to provide sufficient evidence to sustain the claim, the consequences of which are that Uribe was not liable in prima facie tort and not liable for nominal or punitive damages regarding that claim. In all other respects, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.\n{60} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nJONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nJAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge\nJ. MILES HANISEE, Judge", "type": "majority", "author": "SUTIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Jackson Walker L.L.P. Robert L. Soza, Jr. Elena P. Villase\u00f1or San Antonio, TX", "The Simons Law Firm L.L.P. Frank M. Bond Faith Kalman Reyes Santa Fe, NM for Appellant", "Freedman Boyd Hollander Goldberg Ives & Duncan P.A. Sara Berger Albuquerque, NM for Appellee" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Certiorari Denied, December 5, 2012,\nNo. 33,875\nIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2013-NMCA-017\nFiling Date: September 20, 2012\nDocket No. 31,080 consolidated with Docket No. 30,792\nHELENA CHEMICAL COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARTURO URIBE, Defendant-Appellee, and PAMELA URIBE, LINDA THOMAS, individually and as representative of Thomas & Wan, L.L.P., and THOMAS & WAN, L.L.P., Defendants. consolidated with HELENA CHEMICAL COMPANY, Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. ARTURO URIBE, Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee.\nJackson Walker L.L.P. Robert L. Soza, Jr. Elena P. Villase\u00f1or San Antonio, TX\nThe Simons Law Firm L.L.P. Frank M. Bond Faith Kalman Reyes Santa Fe, NM for Appellant\nFreedman Boyd Hollander Goldberg Ives & Duncan P.A. Sara Berger Albuquerque, NM for Appellee" }, "file_name": "0303-01", "first_page_order": 319, "last_page_order": 337 }