{ "id": 4191502, "name": "JAMES RODRIGUEZ, Individually and as Representative of the Estates of JANELL L. RODRIGUEZ and DAVID RODRIGUEZ, Deceased, LEANN AGUILAR, DOMENIC A. RODRIGUEZ, JUAN M. TERRAZAS, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of VIVIANA E. TERRAZAS, Deceased, LUDIVINA TERRAZAS ENRIQUEZ, and BILLY J. TRUJILLO, as Next Friend of ISAIAH TRUJILLO, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DEL SOL SHOPPING CENTER ASSOCIATES, L.P., a/k/a DEL SOL SHOPPING CENTER, BGK PROPERTIES, INC., BGK REALTY, INC., BGK PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, L.L.C., and BGK EQUITIES III, INC., Defendants-Appellees; and MARIA C. BUSTAMANTE, as Representative of the Estate of MICHAEL SOLCHENBERGER, and his wife LYDIA SOLCHENBERGER, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BGK PROPERTIES, INC., DEL SOL SHOPPING CENTER ASSOCIATES, L.P., and CONCENTRA HEALTH SERVICES, INC., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Rodriguez ex rel. Trujillo v. Del Sol Shopping Center Associates, L.P.", "decision_date": "2013-01-28", "docket_number": "No. 33,949; No. 33,896; Docket No. 30,421 consolidated with No. 30,578", "first_page": "336", "last_page": "352", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2013-NMCA-020" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "121 N.M. 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566557 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139" }, { "page": "20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 So.2d 901", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9900999 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "904" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/128/0901-01" ] }, { "cite": "856 N.E.2d 1048", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1059-60", "parenthetical": "duty of ordinary care includes the duty to protect patrons inside buildings from runaway vehicles" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 S.W.2d 906", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10180471 ], "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "909", "parenthetical": "\"doctrine of unforeseeable consequences is likewise deemed applicable here\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/308/0906-01" ] }, { "cite": "748 P.2d 1008", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10404247 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1009", "parenthetical": "\"While [the ajppellee is indeed under a duty to use reasonable care with respect to his customers, the accident herein was not foreseeable, and [the ajppellee is not an absolute insurer of his customers' safety.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/748/1008-01" ] }, { "cite": "512 So.2d 708", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7573196 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "709", "parenthetical": "\"no duty owed by a convenience store owner, to persons inside the store, to erect barriers in order to prevent vehicles from driving through the store's plate glass window\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/512/0708-01" ] }, { "cite": "514 N.E.2d 100", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101", "parenthetical": "no duty to protect from out-of-control automobile that crashed into restaurant from adjacent road \"because the harm was not reasonably foreseeable\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "570 A.2d 1203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 7393980 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1203", "parenthetical": "no duty to protect patron standing inside store from vehicles, despite store's location at base of hill and three previous similar accidents" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/570/1203-01" ] }, { "cite": "602 So.2d 895", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7507204 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "896", "parenthetical": "no duty to protect 10-year-old decedent from car that backed through restaurant from adjacent parking lot because \"harm was not reasonably foreseeable\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/602/0895-01" ] }, { "cite": "618 N.E.2d 10", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 10836358 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/618/0010-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 N.M. 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 322293 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/122/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMSC-062", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 19" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "566 N.E.2d 1365", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1369" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1998-NMSC-028", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 834357 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/125/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 N.M. 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2762294 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/84/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 N.M. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5346679 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382" }, { "page": "617" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/71/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "280 S.E.2d 202", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 2155347 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203", "parenthetical": "\"[N]o liability results from lack of a safety barrier unless that condition contributed to the loss of control.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sc/276/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMCA-133", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 106512 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/128/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563538 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "2" }, { "page": "320", "parenthetical": "barroom attack following previous altercation and manager's assurance to the victim that he \"would monitor the situation\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 N.M. 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5346598 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" }, { "page": "973" }, { "page": "188" }, { "page": "972", "parenthetical": "barroom attack with glass bottle by patron known to have insulted and argued with another patron earlier that evening" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/71/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMSC-033", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3671133 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 N.W.2d 681", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 321594 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "686", "parenthetical": "\"We agree that liability cannot be predicated on the fact that out of the many thousands of vehicles which use parking areas in a normal way, one or two may occasionally jump the curb and expose pedestrians as well as tenants to the remote possibility of injury.\"" }, { "page": "686" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/minn/276/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 S.E.2d 490", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2011-NMSC-036", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4250467 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/150/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 134", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563615 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139" }, { "page": "771", "parenthetical": "\"A landowner or occupier of premises must act as a reasonable man in maintaining his property in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to another, the seriousness of the injury, and the burden of avoiding the risk.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0134-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 P.3d 1172", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Foreseeability is one factor to consider when determining duty, however, '[pjolicy is the principal factor in determining whether a duty is owed and the scope of that duty.'\" (alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 N.M. 649", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Foreseeability is one factor to consider when determining duty, however, '[pjolicy is the principal factor in determining whether a duty is owed and the scope of that duty.'\" (alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2011-NMCERT-004", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "year": 2012, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2007-NMCA-122", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3691625 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/142/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 N.M. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 727684 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631", "parenthetical": "\"The existence and scope of duty, as questions of law, should not be scrutinized with such specificity that the factual issue of negligence is subsumed.\"" }, { "page": "359", "parenthetical": "\"The existence and scope of duty, as questions of law, should not be scrutinized with such specificity that the factual issue of negligence is subsumed.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/116/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMCA-059", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4243602 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 7-8" }, { "page": "\u00b6 14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 N.M. 609", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1561326 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "612-13", "parenthetical": "declaring for the first time - with Justice Ransom at last having the opportunity to serve as author for the majority - that \"policy determines duty\"" }, { "page": "389-90", "parenthetical": "declaring for the first time - with Justice Ransom at last having the opportunity to serve as author for the majority - that \"policy determines duty\"" }, { "page": "612" }, { "page": "389" }, { "page": "612" }, { "page": "389", "parenthetical": "\"Courts should make policy . . . only when the body politic has not spoken and only with the understanding that any misperception of the public mind may be corrected shortly by the [Ljegislature.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/119/0609-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMCA-018", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3669729 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/141/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMCA-002", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 77190 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 7" }, { "page": "\u00b6 23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0789-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 N.M. 623", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552530 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "626", "parenthetical": "\"The owner's duty to protectpatrons extends to all foreseeable harm . . . .\" (emphasis added)" }, { "page": "382", "parenthetical": "\"The owner's duty to protectpatrons extends to all foreseeable harm . . . .\" (emphasis added)" }, { "page": "626" }, { "page": "382" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "626" }, { "page": "382" }, { "page": "624" }, { "page": "380", "parenthetical": "barroom shooting by patron known to be violent, armed, and arguing with another patron" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0623-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 N.M. 644", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 715097 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "649", "parenthetical": "\"[Ojnce a duty is established, the foreseeability of harm governs the scope of that duty.\" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)" }, { "page": "619", "parenthetical": "\"[Ojnce a duty is established, the foreseeability of harm governs the scope of that duty.\" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)" }, { "page": "649" }, { "page": "619", "parenthetical": "second alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/111/0644-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 N.M. 59", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 716977 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "67", "parenthetical": "Ransom, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "44", "parenthetical": "Ransom, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "38", "parenthetical": "\"In determining duty, it must be determined that the injured party was a foreseeable plaintiff - that he was within the zone of danger created by [the] respondent's actions; in other words, to whom was the duty owed?\"" }, { "page": "62" }, { "page": "39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/110/0059-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 N.M. 566", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 723250 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572", "parenthetical": "Ransom, C.J., specially concurring" }, { "page": "651", "parenthetical": "Ransom, C.J., specially concurring" }, { "page": "569-70" }, { "page": "648-49", "parenthetical": "recognizing that New Mexico's duty analysis \"limits a tortfeasor's liability to the foreseeable plaintiff and excludes it where the plaintiff is unforeseeable\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/113/0566-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 N.M. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 716910 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/110/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 N.M. 538", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1588586 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541", "parenthetical": "\"If it is found that a plaintiff, and injury to that plaintiff, were foreseeable, then a duty is owed to that plaintiff by the defendant.\"" }, { "page": "825", "parenthetical": "\"If it is found that a plaintiff, and injury to that plaintiff, were foreseeable, then a duty is owed to that plaintiff by the defendant.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/100/0538-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 N.M. 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2804833 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262", "parenthetical": "\"We recognize that proximate cause is a question of fact to be determined by the factfinder.\"" }, { "page": "787", "parenthetical": "\"We recognize that proximate cause is a question of fact to be determined by the factfinder.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/77/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMCA-119", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3671828 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0596-01" ] }, { "cite": "162 N.E. 99", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "weight": 3, "year": 1928, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he orbit of the danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance would be the orbit of the duty.\"" }, { "page": "102, 103", "parenthetical": "\"[Bjecause of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2003-NMSC-018", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 77160 ], "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" }, { "page": "\u00b6 9", "parenthetical": "\"The Court of Appeals has similarly recognized that duty requires analysis of both foreseeability and policy.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"The Court of Appeals has similarly recognized that duty requires analysis of both foreseeability and policy.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"The Court of Appeals has similarly recognized that duty requires analysis of both foreseeability and policy.\"" }, { "page": "\u00b6 42" }, { "page": "\u00b6 40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0043-01" ] }, { "cite": "2010-NMSC-017", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4247821 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/148/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731649 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "454", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" }, { "page": "601", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" }, { "page": "459" }, { "page": "606", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he issue of duty . . . turn[s] on the question of foreseeability.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "2010-NMSC-043", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4246380 ], "weight": 12, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 15" }, { "page": "\u00b6 14" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 18, 21" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 14, 18" }, { "page": "\u00b6 14" }, { "page": "\u00b6 14" }, { "page": "\u00b6 41" }, { "page": "\u00b6 14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/148/0646-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 2234, "char_count": 51135, "ocr_confidence": 0.816, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.8172472706271035e-08, "percentile": 0.30281244196090196 }, "sha256": "192cf51eebf3ddfd136de95271444958a2dd9c8ea156e18ed1ef436194ee06a8", "simhash": "1:154329013556a558", "word_count": 8113 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:46:09.531131+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "J. MILES HANISEE, Judge", "JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge", "RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge" ], "parties": [ "JAMES RODRIGUEZ, Individually and as Representative of the Estates of JANELL L. RODRIGUEZ and DAVID RODRIGUEZ, Deceased, LEANN AGUILAR, DOMENIC A. RODRIGUEZ, JUAN M. TERRAZAS, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of VIVIANA E. TERRAZAS, Deceased, LUDIVINA TERRAZAS ENRIQUEZ, and BILLY J. TRUJILLO, as Next Friend of ISAIAH TRUJILLO, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DEL SOL SHOPPING CENTER ASSOCIATES, L.P., a/k/a DEL SOL SHOPPING CENTER, BGK PROPERTIES, INC., BGK REALTY, INC., BGK PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, L.L.C., and BGK EQUITIES III, INC., Defendants-Appellees. and MARIA C. BUSTAMANTE, as Representative of the Estate of MICHAEL SOLCHENBERGER, and his wife LYDIA SOLCHENBERGER, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BGK PROPERTIES, INC., DEL SOL SHOPPING CENTER ASSOCIATES, L.P., and CONCENTRA HEALTH SERVICES, INC., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nHANISEE, Judge.\n{1} On March 17,2006, a pick-up truck in the parking lot of Del Sol Shopping Center (Del Sol) in Santa Fe suddenly accelerated \u2014 due to a combination of driver and vehicle failure \u2014 and hurtled through one of Del Sol\u2019s side-by-side business-front glass walls and into the Concentra Medical Clinic (Concentra). Tragically, a mother and her son were struck and killed inside, along with a medical receptionist assisting them at the time. Six other Concentra patients were also seriously injured by the runaway truck. The legal aftermath of the calamity included separate premises liability actions filed by the decedents\u2019 estates, the surviving victims and their families (collectively, Plaintiffs). Each lawsuit alleged that the owners and operators of Del Sol (collectively, Defendants) negligently contributed to the occurrence by, among other things, failing to adequately post traffic signage and erect additional physical barriers between the parking lot and shopping center. Two district courts granted Defendants\u2019 motions for summary judgment, each declaring that Defendants had no duty to protect Plaintiffs inside the building from criminally reckless drivers because the sequence of events was unforeseeable as a matter of law. We previously consolidated Plaintiffs\u2019 appeals from the separate orders of summary judgment and now affirm. We do so, however, not based on the foreseeability-driven duty analysis employed by the district courts, but based on the policy-driven duty analysis advanced by the Restatement (Third) of Torts and Plaintiffs, and recently embraced by our New Mexico Supreme Court in Edward C. v. City of Albuquerque, 2010-NMSC-043, \u00b6 15, 148 N.M. 646, 241 P.3d 1086.\nStandard of Review\n{2} At the outset, we acknowledge that under New Mexico law summary judgment is \u201cto be used with great caution,\u201d and is proper in only two circumstances: (1) \u201cwhen there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,\u201d or (2) \u201cwhen the material facts are not in dispute and the only question to be resolved is the legal effect of the facts.\u201d Monett v. Do\u00f1a Ana Cnty. Sheriff\u2019s Posse, 114 N.M. 452, 454, 840 P.2d 599, 601 (Ct. App. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The issue presented here is of the latter type, which compels our resolution of the legal question of duty in the context of the established material facts. Accordingly, we apply de novo review. See Cable v. Wells Fargo Bank N.M., N.A. (In re Cable Family Trust), 2010-NMSC-017, \u00b6 9, 148 N.M. 127, 231 P.3d 108 (\u201cAn appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment presents a question of law and is reviewed de novo.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Herrera v. Quality Pontiac, 2003-NMSC-018, \u00b6 6, 134 N.M. 43, 73 P.3d 181 (stating that \u201c[wjhether a duty exists is a question of law\u201d to be reviewed de novo).\nI. BACKGROUND\n{3} Undisputed evidence demonstrates that Rachel Ruiz \u2014 who had been advised not to operate motor vehicles by physicians treating her seizure disorder \u2014 was nonetheless driving the pick-up truck that crashed into Del Sol and Concentra. Ms. Ruiz was also aware that the truck had previously experienced mechanical failure, including both sudden acceleration and loss of brake controls. While driving the truck and simultaneously disregarding her own and its pre-known conditions, Ms. Ruiz steered into Del Sol\u2019s parking lot from St. Michael\u2019s Drive. She reportedly intended to make an in-person dental appointment at \u201cPerfect Teeth,\u201d one of the many adjacent tenant businesses located within Del Sol.\n{4} As Ms. Ruiz drove along a 600-foot entrance straightaway within the Del Sol parking lot, the truck\u2019s accelerator apparently became stuck while depressed and its brakes failed to engage. Ms. Ruiz maintained she then experienced a \u201cbaby seizure,\u201d causing her to abruptly lose consciousness. The unbridled truck continued accelerating, veered slightly to the left, and vaulted the perpendicular six-inch curb at the end of the straightaway. Its leftward drift caused the truck to narrowly miss a concrete overhang support pillar centered directly at the end of the straightaway. It then sped across a ten-foot wide pedestrian sidewalk, snapped a metal handrail, and crashed through Concentra\u2019s floor-to-ceiling glass wall. It finally came to rest \u2014 after striking Plaintiffs \u2014 more than twelve feet into Concentra\u2019s reception area.\n{5} The legal aftermath of the tragedy resulted in these current lawsuits and separate criminal proceedings, during which Ms. Ruiz pleaded no contest to three counts of vehicular homicide and six counts of great bodily injury by vehicle, and was imprisoned. These appeals follow the issuance of separate written orders of summary judgment by district court judges who first held hearings and considered pleadings, exhibits, and arguments of counsel. We review the propriety of those determinations below.\nCurrent State of New Mexico\u2019s Legal Duty Analysis\n{6} The core question presented in this appeal is what, if any, duty is owed by Defendants in the context of the facts recited above. Before answering, we briefly summarize the evolution ofNew Mexico\u2019s legal duty analysis, and state what we consider to be the current test. The Solchenberger Plaintiffs assert in their brief-in-chief that New Mexico law has been \u201cinconsistent regarding the role of foreseeability in duty determinations.\u201d To this end, they cite with chronologic specificity our jurisprudence following the seminal case on this topic, Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). Our own review of these cases has likewise discerned vacillation between the different constructions by which duty can be recognized and measured. The Palsgraf debate, written by Chief Judge Cardozo on behalf of the majority and with Judge Andrews penning the dissent, specifically addressed the application of foreseeability within the legal question of duty, and underscored the tension between the differing roles of judges and juries in resolving negligence-based lawsuits. In short, Judge Cardozo prevailed in his effort to incorporate foreseeability within the strictly legal determination of duty. See Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100 (\u201c[T]he orbit of the danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance would be the orbit of the duty.\u201d). He did so despite the separate application of foreseeability within the element of causation \u2014 a quintessential question of fact resolved by juries. See Johnstone v. City of Albuquerque, 2006-NMCA-119, \u00b6 20, 140 N.M. 596, 145 P.3d 76 (\u201c[A]ny consideration of foreseeability of injury is intertwined with the concept of proximate causation of that injury.\u201d); Baker v. Fryar, 77 N.M. 257, 262, 421 P.2d 784, 787 (1966) (\u201cWe recognize that proximate cause is a question of fact to be determined by the factfinder.\u201d). Judge Andrews advocated the divergent viewpoint in his dissent, maintaining that \u201c[djue care is a duty imposed on each one of us to protect society from unnecessary danger,\u201d and that any limitation of duty should be derived from matters of effective policy rather than the more nebulous legal notion of foreseeability. See Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 102, 103 (\u201c[Bjecause of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics.\u201d).\n{7} Our New Mexico Supreme Court first asserted its adoption of the Palsgraf majority\u2019s \u201cforeseeable plaintiff\u2019 test for determining duty in Ramirez v. Armstrong. 100 N.M. 538, 541, 673 P.2d 822, 825 (1983) (\u201cIf it is found that a plaintiff, and injury to that plaintiff, were foreseeable, then a duty is owed to that plaintiff by the defendant.\u201d), overruled in part by Folz v. State, 110 N.M. 457, 797 P.2d 246 (1990). But Ramirez\u2019s imprecise phrasing of the express Palsgraf holding was later criticized by New Mexico Supreme Court Chief Justice Ransom in a particularly enduring special concurrence. See Solon v. WEK Drilling Co., 113 N.M. 566, 572, 829 P.2d 645, 651 (1992) (Ransom, C.J., specially concurring) (\u201cChief Judge Cardozo held in Palsgraf that there can be no duty in relation to another person absent foreseeability ..., it does not follow that duty necessarily is present if risk of injury to that other person is foreseeable from one\u2019s acts and omissions. ... It is unfortunate that in Ramirez . . . this Court stated [otherwise].\u201d). Chief Justice Ransom additionally wrote that \u201cthe crux of the duty analysis that is required . . . is not a factual foreseeability determination, but rather it is a legal policy determination.\u201d Id.; accord Calkins v. Cox Estates, 110 N.M. 59, 67, 792 P.2d 36, 44 (1990) (Ransom, J., dissenting) (\u201cMore often, duty as a matter of law turns not on an absence of the fact issue of foreseeability, but rather the policy issue of whether it is reasonable to impose a duty to avoid a risk of injury which, although foreseeable, is remote.\u201d). Despite these protests, our appellate courts incorporated the primary determination of foreseeability into the legal question of duty. Calkins, 110 N.M. at 61, 792 P.2d at 38 (\u201cIn determining duty, it must be determined that the injured party was a foreseeable plaintiff \u2014 that he was within the zone of danger created by [the] respondent\u2019s actions; in other words, to whom was the duty owed?\u201d); Solon, 113 N.M. at 569-70, 829 P.2d at 648-49 (recognizing that New Mexico\u2019s duty analysis \u201climits a tortfeasor\u2019s liability to the foreseeable plaintiff and excludes it where the plaintiff is unforeseeable\u201d).\n{8} Justice Ransom\u2019s view has persisted, however, and even gained varying degrees of traction as our jurisprudence evolved. For example, since Calkins and Solon, New Mexico courts have applied foreseeability in the following ways:\n(1) as the primary consideration in a legal duty analysis, see, e.g., Bober v. N.M. State Fair, 111 N.M. 644, 649, 808 P.2d 614, 619 (1991) (\u201c[Ojnce a duty is established, the foreseeability of harm governs the scope of that duty.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Monett, 114 N.M. at 459, 840 P.2d at 606 (\u201c[T]he issue of duty . . . turn[s] on the question of foreseeability.\u201d); Reichert v. Atler, 117 N.M. 623, 626, 875 P.2d 379, 382 (1994) (\u201cThe owner\u2019s duty to protectpatrons extends to all foreseeable harm . . . .\u201d (emphasis added));\n(2) as a necessary element alongside policy considerations, see, e.g., Quality Pontiac, 2003-NMSC-018, \u00b6 9, 134 N.M. 43, 73 P.3d 181 (2003) (\u201cThe Court of Appeals has similarly recognized that duty requires analysis of both foreseeability and policy.\u201d); Blake v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M., 2004-NMCA-002, \u00b6 7, 134 N.M. 789, 82 P.3d 960 (\u201cDetermination of duty is based in part on whether the injury to the plaintiff was foreseeable.... [Yet], policy also determines duty.\u201d); Chavez v. Desert Eagle Distrib. Co. of N.M., LLC, 2007-NMCA-018, \u00b6 16, 141 N.M. 116, 151 P.3d 77 (\u201cThe initial step in a common law duty analysis is to determine whether a particular plaintiff and a particular harm are foreseeablef;] ... we then determine whether policy considerations preclude the imposition of a common law duty in a particular case.\u201d); and\n(3)relegated to the less resolutive status of a \u201cfalse jury issue,\u201d which is ripe for summary judgment only when a court determines that no rational trier of fact could find the victim foreseeable, see Torres v. State, 119 N.M. 609, 612-13, 894 P.2d 386, 389-90 (1995) (declaring for the first time \u2014 with Justice Ransom at last having the opportunity to serve as author for the majority \u2014 that \u201cpolicy determines duty\u201d).\n{9} Most recently, this Court \u2014 in an opinion that both district courts in the present cases credited as being legally dispositive \u2014 echoed and applied the Ramirez-born understanding that \u201cforeseeability is a critical and essential component of New Mexico\u2019s duty analysis.\u201d Romero v. Giant Stop-N-Go of N.M., Inc., 2009-NMCA-059, \u00b6\u00b6 7-8, 146 N.M. 520, 212 P.3d 408 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted) (holding that purposeful, targeted criminal behavior in the parking lot of a convenience store was unforeseeable as a matter of law). In applying Romero, both district courts in the instant case concluded that this accident \u201cwas not foreseeable\u201d as a matter of law and therefore no duty existed. The district court judge to first consider the question of duty in these parallel cases explained in his memorandum opinion and order that\n[A] finding of foreseeability would require anticipation of a remarkable confluence of events. Defendants would have had to foresee that a woman, diagnosed with a seizure disorder and advised by her doctor not to drive, would nevertheless decide to drive, that her vehicle would malfunction and the stress of the malfunctioning vehicle would cause her to suffer from a mini-seizure, which would result in her vehicle swerving, jumping a curb, crossing a ten foot covered sidewalk and missing a concrete pillar, and crashing through the front window of a business.\nJoined soon thereafter by a second district judge who reached the same result on the same legal basis, the now-combined cases serve to illustrate the fallibility of an overly foreseeability-dependent analysis by district courts tasked with determining order in a convoluted area of law, as Justice Bosson warned in his special concurrence in Quality Pontiac. 2003-NMSC-018, \u00b6 42 (\u201cWhen we attempt to define legal duty in terms of a foreseeable plaintiff, it is all too tempting to use \u2018foreseeability\u2019 as a surrogate for result-oriented conclusions.\u201d); accord Marquez v. Gomez, 116 N.M. 626, 631, 866 P.2d 354, 359 (Ct. App. 1991) (\u201cThe existence and scope of duty, as questions of law, should not be scrutinized with such specificity that the factual issue of negligence is subsumed.\u201d). This dilemma is readily apparent in this case, where minutia-specific foreseeability analysis overwhelms the ascertainability of legal duty. For \u201cif we look into the past of any given event, there is an infinite number of events, each of which is a necessary condition of the given event.. . .\u201d See H. L. A. Hart & A. M. Honor\u00e9, Causation and Responsibility, in Philosophy of Law: Classic and Contemporary Readings 307,309 (Larry May & Jeff Brown, eds., 2009) (emphasis added); see also, Edward N. Lorenz, The Essence of Chaos 181 (1995) (\u201cIf a single flap of a butterfly\u2019s wings can be instrumental in generating a tornado, so also can all the previous and subsequent flaps of its wings, as can the flaps of the wings of millions of other butterflies, not to mention the activities of innumerable more powerful creatures, including our own species.\u201d).\n{10} Fortunately, for the sake of clarity in the law and ease of analysis, the legal duty test in New Mexico appears to have achieved homeostasis, as recently written by our New Mexico Supreme Court in Edward C., 2010-NMSC-043. In reversing the Court of Appeals\u2019 judgment \u2014 \u201cthat ordinary care was the applicable standard [of duty] because [the plaintiff] and his injury were foreseeable\u201d \u2014 our Supreme Court unanimously, and for the first time, adopted an approach more consistent with the Restatement (Third) of Torts than with Palsgraf, and that \u201cdisapproves] the use of foreseeability to limit liability.\u201d Edward C., 2010-NMSC-043, \u00b6-18 (alteration omitted) (citing Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm \u00a7 7 cmt. j (2010)). The ensuing legal duty test as articulated in Edward C. now reads as follows:\nThe question of the existence and scope of a defendant\u2019s duty of care is a legal question that depends on the nature of the ... activity in question, the parties\u2019 general relationship to the activity, and public policy considerations. . . . [It] is a question [primarily] of policy to be determined with reference to legal precedent, statutes, and other principles comprising the law.\n2010-NMSC-043, \u00b6 14 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n{11} This appears generally to be the standard sought by Plaintiffs, particularly the Solchenberger Plaintiffs, who emphasized both in briefing and in oral argument the need for clarity in what has become an increasingly complex area of law. We recognize that it is not the job of an intermediate appellate court to cement or dismiss legal nuances that a higher tribunal has oft employed. Rather, it is the job of the authoring court to discount antiquated legal relics within its own body of jurisprudence, when it sees fit to do so. But, despite the lack of an express dismissal of the historic application of foreseeability to the question of legal duty in New Mexico by the Edward C. Court, we believe its import is plain enough:\nForeseeability ... is but one factor to consider when determining duty and not the principal question. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm \u00a7 7 cmt. j (2010) (disapproving the use of foreseeability to limit liability in preference for \u201carticulatfing] policies] or principle^] ... to facilitate more transparent explanations of the reasons for a no-duty [or limited-duty] ruling and to protect the traditional function of the jury as factfinder\u201d). Instead, \u201cduty is a policy question . . . .\u201d\nThe approach we take is consistent with the approach suggested by the American Law Institute. . . . The American Law Institute notes that courts can \u201crender a judgment about that category of cases\u201d under \u201cthe rubric of duty\u201d taking \u201cinto account factors that might escape the jury\u2019s attention in a particular case, such as the overall social impact of imposing a significant precautionary obligation on a class of actors.\u201d \u201cSuch a categorical determination ... has the benefit of providing clearer rules of behavior for actors who may be subject to tort liability and who structure their behavior in response to that potential liability.\u201d\n2010-NMSC-043, \u00b6\u00b6 18, 21 (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted). Incidentally, the subjugation of foreseeability into a mere factor in the analysis of legal duty, and the concomitant shift toward a policy-driven duty analysis, seems to have finally adopted the approach articulated by Justices Ransom and Bosson. We also trumpet the impact of Edward C. to promote uniformity of analysis to the legal question of duty frequently encountered by this Court and the district courts around our State, which have even since Edward C. continued to diverge based on conflicting precedent. Compare Bowen v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, No. 29,625, slip op. at 6 (N.M. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2011) (\u201c[Djetermining whether a duty exists requires two steps: the first step is to consider whether there was foreseeability as to a particular plaintiff and a particular harm, and the second step is to examine whether public policy reasons support the imposition of a duty.\u201d (citing Lessard v. Coronado Paint & Decorating Ctr., Inc., 2007-NMCA-122, \u00b6 30, 142 N.M. 583, 168 P.3d 155)), cert. granted, 2011-NMCERT-004, 150 N.M. 649, 264 P.3d 1172, with Vargas v. Cruz, No. 30,884, slip op. at 1 (N.M. Ct. App. June 19, 2012) (\u201cForeseeability is one factor to consider when determining duty, however, \u2018[pjolicy is the principal factor in determining whether a duty is owed and the scope of that duty.\u2019\u201d (alteration in original) (citing Edward C., 2010-NMSC-043, \u00b6\u00b6 14, 18)). Moreover, in cases such as these currently at bar, a definitive framework could best advance the consistent and transparent application of law to sudden and unimaginable tragedies, to the benefit of litigants, businesses seeking clear canons for responsible behavior, and judicial efficiency alike.\nII. DISCUSSION\n{12} Having clarified the current state of our legal duty analysis, we now frame the question on appeal broadly, as did our Supreme Court in Edward C., and proceed with legal analysis without any undue focus on the factor of foreseeability: What duty should owner/occupants of a shopping center in New Mexico have to protect business invitees within its buildings from vehicles that depart the confines of designated parking areas? See 2010-NMSC-043, \u00b6 14 (\u201cWhat duty should owner/occupants of a baseball stadium in New Mexico have to protect spectators from projectiles that leave the field of play?\u201d). W e note the wisdom of defining and analyzing the duty broadly within context, rather than as manifested by specific conduct, such as a duty to erect bollards, barriers, speed bumps, concrete walls, etc.:\n[Equating] the concept of \u201cduty\u201d with such specific details of conduct [posting warning signs, removing obstructions, installing traffic control devices, fixing potholes, and the like] is unwise. Attempting to define or evaluate conduct in terms of duty tends to rigidify the concept of negligence \u2014 a concept which, by definition, must vary from case to case .... [T]he problems of \u201cduty\u201d are sufficiently complex without subdividing it to cover an endless series of details of conduct. . . . [D]uty [should] remain[] constant, while the conduct necessary to fulfill it varies with the circumstances.\nBober, 111 N.M. at 649, 808 P.2d at 619 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted).\n{13} It is well established that the general duty an owner/occupier owes an invitee is one of ordinary care. See Ford v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm\u2019rs, 118 N.M. 134, 139, 879 P.2d 766, 771 (1994) (\u201cA landowner or occupier of premises must act as a reasonable man in maintaining his property in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to another, the seriousness of the injury, and the burden of avoiding the risk.\u201d); see also UJI 13-1309 NMRA (\u201cAn [owner] [occupant] owes a visitor the duty to use ordinary care to keep the premises safe for use by the visitor [, whether or not a dangerous condition is obvious].\u201d). Ordinary care is that \u201cwhich a reasonably prudent person would use in the conduct of the person\u2019s own affairs . . . [and] varies with the nature of what is being done.\u201d UJI 13-1603 NMRA. The duty of an owner/occupant to exercise ordinary care can even include the protection of visitors against acts of third parties in circumstances where knowledge of a specific danger is apparent. But whether an established duty in such an instance has been breached is a question of fact that juries are asked to resolve by considering the following instruction:\nIf an [owner] [occupant] breaches the duty to use ordinary care to keep the premises safe for use by a visitor, resulting in injury to the visitor from the acts of a third person, the [owner\u2019s] [occupant\u2019s] breach of duty is to be compared with the conduct of the third person who actually caused the injury to the visitor [, as well as with the visitor\u2019s own fault,] in order to determine the [owner\u2019s] [occupant\u2019s] proportionate degree of fault. The [owner\u2019s] [occupant\u2019s] duty to protect visitors arises from a foreseeable risk that a third person will injure a visitor and, as the risk of danger increases, the amount of care to be exercised by the [owner] [occupant] also increases. Therefore, the proportionate fault of the [owner] [occupant] is not necessarily reduced by the increasingly wrongful conduct of the third person.\nUJI 13-1320 NMRA (emphasis added). This jury instruction derives from Reichert, which recognized \u201cthe importance of the duty of the owner or operator of a place of business to prevent the harmful conduct of a third party.\u201d 117 N.M. at 626, 875 P.2d at 382. In the Reichert case, Justice Ransom was careful to note that the \u201cduty to protect visitors arises from the likelihood that a third party will injure a visitor . . . regardless of whether that harm results from intentional or negligent conduct.\u201d Id. (emphasis added).\n{14} The question here, however, is not whether Defendants bore a general duty of ordinary care to Plaintiffs \u2014 they most certainly did. The gravamen of our legal inquiry asks whether the scope of the duty of ordinary care for owner/occupiers in this circumstance incorporated the protection of invitees inside buildings from third-party vehicles uncontrollably straying from adj acent parking lots. See Provencio v. Wenrich, 2011-NMSC-036, \u00b6 16, 150 N.M. 457, 261 P.3d 1089 (\u201cIn a negligence action, . . . the court must first find an actionable duty of care and then define the nature and scope of that duty.\u201d). In answering that query, we consider (1) \u201cthe nature of the ... activity in question,\u201d (2) \u201cthe parties\u2019 general relationship to the activity,\u201d and (3) \u201cpublic policy.\u201d See Edward C., 2010-NMSC-043, \u00b6 14.\nNature of the Activity and the Parties\u2019 Relationship Thereto\n{15} The nature of the activity here \u2014 the provision of goods and services to the public within a shopping center and adjacent parking lot \u2014 bears no inherent risk of vehicle-pedestrian accidents within the related businesses. Certainly, we recognize that Defendants\u2019 facility was purposefully designed to attract the general public (and their vehicles) to both visit businesses within Del Sol and park vehicles in its parking lot. The duty of ordinary care thus required D efendants \u2014 who elected to provide a parking lot for public convenience \u2014 to construct and maintain parking facilities in an ordinarily acceptable manner. Inevitably, some of the visiting vehicles and pedestrians were likely to collide while commingling in the parking lot. But we see nothing about the nature of the activity here \u2014 awaiting medical services within Concentra Medical Clinic near Del Sol\u2019s parking area \u2014 that would unacceptably expose patrons to the risk of vehicle collisions inside the building such as the risk found to exist in Edward C., 2010-NMSC-043, \u00b6 41 (acknowledging that flying projectiles from the field of play are an inherent risk of baseball to be anticipated \u2014 even desired \u2014 by the spectator).\n{16} The absence ofapparentandinherent danger to patrons within Del Sol businesses militates against the inclusion of a duty to prevent injury from runaway vehicles within the scope of what is ordinarily owed to Del Sol patrons in this case. The combined record in these cases reflects that (1) Del Sol\u2019s parking lot is used by approximately 26,000 vehicles per day, (2) it has been in use as a shopping center for over twenty years, and (3) in that time period only three vehicles ever struck Del Sol\u2019s buildings and only one of those (Ms. Ruiz\u2019s pick-up truck) ever penetrated the building and caused more than minor damage to the premises. The sheer improbability and lack of inherent danger, as shown by those statistics, are commonly cited around the country as a basis to refuse to extend a specific duty of care to this category of accidents. See, e.g.,Eckerd-Walton, Inc. v. Adams, 190 S.E.2d 490, 492 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that the alleged act of negligence \u2014 that \u201cdefendant should have [taken precautions in] anticipation] that some negligent motorist would attempt to drive through his store\u201d \u2014 was \u201cso remote and improbable as notreasonably to be anticipated by a merchant in the exercise of ordinary care\u201d); Mack v. McGrath, 150 N.W.2d 681, 686 (Minn. 1967) (\u201cWe agree that liability cannot be predicated on the fact that out of the many thousands of vehicles which use parking areas in a normal way, one or two may occasionally jump the curb and expose pedestrians as well as tenants to the remote possibility of injury.\u201d).\n{17} Other than sharing an inherent vulnerability to intrusion by runaway vehicles with many like-situated shopping centers, we disagree that there was anything about Del Sol or its adjacent parking lot that justifies a broadened standard of care owed to visitors. Like other states, New Mexico\u2019s shopping centers run some minimal but known risk of vehicle-building collisions, as proximity to high-traffic roads and the attendant need for parking space are highly advantageous, if not necessary, components to the success of any business location.\nPublic Policy\n{18} Last, we turn to public policy. In so doing, we apply that primary barometer of legal duty, identified by Edward C., to ascertain the scope of ordinary care owed by Defendants to Plaintiffs. 2010-NMSC-043, \u00b6 14. \u201cThe existence of a duty is a question of policy to be determined with reference to legal precedent, statutes, and other principles comprising the law.\u201d Calkins, 110 N.M. at 62, 792 P.2d at 39. Because \u201cit is the particular domain of the [Legislature, as the voice of the people, to make public policy,\u201d we would normally begin our analysis by construing any applicable statutes and regulations that may apply to shopping center design and maintenance. Torres, 119 N.M. at 612, 894 P.2d at 389. Defendants contend and Plaintiffs do not refute, however, that \u201c[i]n this instance, there are no laws, codes or ordinances promulgated by the legislature, nor any governing body, that mandate the placement of barriers sufficient to prevent vehicles that leave the designated roadway from crashing through businesses in a strip mall.\u201d Similarly, nothing in the record presented by any plaintiff indicates that Defendants\u2019 parking lot was not in full compliance with applicable state and local building codes. And finally, no party cites any passage of law indicating the Legislature\u2019s stance, if it exists, with respect to liability in this instance.\n{19} To show Defendants failed to meet generally accepted norms of safety, Plaintiffs submitted an affidavit to both district courts prepared by Barrett Miller, whose asserted expertise included \u201cidentifying and controlling safety hazards involving errant vehicles, commercial parking lots, and building structures.\u201d Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Miller\u2019s assessment and recommendations, alongside referenced academic publications in the field of safety engineering, establish that Del Sol harbored several identifiable safety hazards. These were: (1) \u201c[t]he long 600-foot straightaway and \u2018T-bone\u2019 configuration of the parking lot and shopping center\u201d; (2) \u201c[t]he \u2018absence\u2019 of any traffic control devices ... at the end of the long straightaway\u201d; (3) \u201c[t]he absence of bollards to protect against errant vehicles\u201d; (4) the history of traffic patterns, \u201cincluding speeding vehicles, \u2018rolling\u2019 stops, collisions, and cars parked illegally\u201d; (5) \u201c[t]he washboard surface of the parking lot\u201d; (6) the presence of a medical care clinic and bar, \u201cwhich may attract impaired and/or careless drivers\u201d; and (7) \u201c[t]he high vehicle traffic numbers . . . per day.\u201d Among other exhibits in support of their opposition to motions for summary judgment, Plaintiffs presented several photographs of other local businesses that have installed bollards and pillars in front of their entrances and storefront glass walls.\n{20} We disagree that the proffered evidence, considered collectively, legally establishes a norm of professional safety giving rise to an expanded duty to protect. Despite Mr. Miller\u2019s hindsight identification of the many potential manners of hazard prevention, only the placement of bollards or additional barriers at short intervals from one another could have definitively prevented a runaway vehicle from crashing through Del Sol\u2019s storefronts. Neither the layout of the parking lot, its history, surface, heavy use, signage, or the nature of its surrounding businesses could have prevented the injuries and loss of life that occurred within Concentra. Rather, the tragedy depended wholly upon the presence of a faulty vehicle at the hands of an inept driver. Accordingly, the essence of Plaintiffs\u2019 assertion is that Del Sol bore at all times a duty to protect its indoor patrons \u2014 by erecting some type of impenetrable barrier between the shopping center and its adjacent parking lot \u2014 to prevent vehicle-person collisions within Del Sol\u2019s buildings. That an expert has identified certain \u201csafety hazards\u201d and recommended placement of bollards and barriers does not indicate that Del Sol\u2019s election not to employ such safety devices falls beneath professional norms of safety. Similarly, the fact that some nearby businesses have undertaken affirmative precautionary measures does not establish a newly applicable safety norm, a building code-derived regulation, or a public policy. See Hartford Ins. Co. v. Cline, 2006-NMSC-033, \u00b6 8, 140 N.M. 16, 139 P.3d 176 (\u201cThe predominant voice behind the declaration of public policy of the state must come from the [Ljegislature . . . .\u201d).\n{21} More compellingly, based on the briefs and the record developed before the district courts, we can discern no policy articulated by the Legislature, or city and county government, addressing the specific requirements of shopping center parking lot construction, or endorsing the heightened standards of safety advanced by Plaintiffs. The parties similarly have not alerted us to any regulation, code, or statute that suggests Del Sol was in any way non-compliant with the commercial building code, the international building code adopted therein, or even accepted professional norms of safety. See 14.7.2.8(A) NMAC (\u201cThis rule adopts by reference the 2009 international building code, as amended by this rule.\u201d). But nonetheless, and with an eye toward determinations of policy, we compare instances where our courts have included within the duty of ordinary care a requirement to specifically protect visitors from third-party harm. See Torres, 119 N.M. at 612, 894 P.2d at 389 (\u201cCourts should make policy . . . only when the body politic has not spoken and only with the understanding that any misperception of the public mind may be corrected shortly by the [Ljegislature.\u201d).\nNew Mexico Precedent\n{22} It is clear, as stated above, that an owner/occupier\u2019s duty is one of ordinary care. That standard can include the protection of visitors from the acts of third parties in certain circumstances:\n[Tjhe proprietor of a place of business ... is subject to liability to guests who are upon the premises and who are injured by the harmful acts of third persons if, by the exercise of reasonable care, the proprietor could have discovered that such acts were being done or about to be done, and could have protected against the injury by controlling the conduct of the other patron.\nCoca v. Arceo, 71 N.M. 186, 189, 376 P.2d 970, 973 (1962). We have, however, recognized such a \u201cduty to protect\u201d in only two contexts: (1) for bar owner/occupiers to their patrons who are injured by the intentional violent conduct of other patrons, see id.; Reichert, 117 N.M. at 626, 875 P.2d at 382; Barth v. Coleman, 118 N.M. 1, 878 P.2d 319 (1994), and (2) for private homeowners whose visitors are injured by the foreseeable criminal conduct of a third party, Chavez v. Torres, 1999-NMCA-133, 128 N.M. 171, 991 P.2d 1.\n{23} In each of these cases, the specific circumstances of the given environment were sufficient to place the defendants on notice of the specific third-party actors and their propensity to act. For example, Coca, Reichert, and Barth recognized predictable dangers when serving alcohol to patrons involved in known personal disputes. See Coca, 71 N.M. at 188, 376 P.2d at 972 (barroom attack with glass bottle by patron known to have insulted and argued with another patron earlier that evening); Reichert, 117 N.M. at 624, 875 P.2d at 380 (barroom shooting by patron known to be violent, armed, and arguing with another patron); Barth, 118 N.M. at 2, 878 P.2d at 320 (barroom attack following previous altercation and manager\u2019s assurance to the victim that he \u201cwould monitor the situation\u201d). Similarly, in Chavez this Court recognized a \u201cduty to protect\u201d owed by residential homeowners who were present and \u201cknew or should have known of the ability to control persons causing injury to a visitor and the necessity and opportunity to exercise such control.\u201d 1999-NMCA-133, \u00b6 20.\n{24} We conclude that the case at bar is distinguishable from both circumstances where our jurisprudence has recognized a duty to protect. Here, Del Sol could not have anticipated, prevented, or even reacted to Ms. Ruiz and her runaway truck, unlike a bar owner/occupier\u2019s ability to anticipate barroom violence by observing patrons over time, or a homeowner\u2019s ability to exclude guests known to be dangerous. And although Plaintiffs sought to impute knowledge of risk by presenting evidence of two previous vehicle-building collisions that occurred during the twenty years Del Sol existed, neither involved the penetration of the building\u2019s front, or more notably, resulted in injury to patrons inside. Moreover, neither incident involved the parking lot\u2019s long straightaway or directly related to Del Sol\u2019s parking lot configuration. See Cromer v. Hutto, 280 S.E.2d 202, 203 (S.C. 1981) (\u201c[N]o liability results from lack of a safety barrier unless that condition contributed to the loss of control.\u201d). Rather, the prior incidents at Del Sol were minor mishaps caused by common driver error. Thus, we can discern no basis on the facts of these cases to legally extend a \u201cduty to protect\u201d visitors from runaway vehicles into the responsiblility of ordinary care applicable to Defendants.\n{25} Furthermore, as the district courts recognized, we have refused to apply the same \u201cduty to protect\u201d in a third context \u2014 to convenience store owners whose patrons are the targets of an intentional homicidal attack. In Romero, this Court imported reasoning from a California case:\nIt was an act of terrorism that could have occurred anywhere that the intended victim happened to be. [The defendant] had no basis to foresee such event, and there was no effective action which it could reasonably have taken to prevent said act under the circumstances.. .. The shooting was a transitory act that could have been carried out at any time and place that the intended victim happened to be.\n2009-NMCA-059, \u00b6 14 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Although Romero excluded from the construct of ordinary care an obligation to protect from intentional criminal acts, its reasoning is analogous. Ms. Ruiz\u2019s truck could have collided with an object or aperson anywhere she chose to drive that day; the actual location and the persons struck were products of happenstance. And short of erecting a substantial barrier in front of all its business-front windows, there was no definitively prophylactic action Del Sol could have undertaken to ensure it was not the location at which tragedy struck. All cars cannot point away from a given inhabited building at all times, and all storefronts with roadway access cannot be expected to erect concrete barriers to guarantee the prevention of such lightning strikes of misfortune. We perceive no basis within our caselaw on which to expand liability to this category of accidents as a matter of policy, absent some guidance or directive from our Legislature.\n{26} Finally, we note the existence of two additional principles of law in our appellate jurisprudence that supplementally support our determination of policy. The first proposition \u2014 that \u201ca proprietor or store owner is not an insurer or guarantor of the safety of his [or her] business invitees\u201d \u2014 was included within a former version of our uniform jury instruction given in \u201cslip and fall\u201d cases. Hallett v. Furr\u2019s, Inc., 71 N.M. 377, 382, 378 P.2d 613, 617 (1963), overruled in part on other grounds by Proctor v. Waxler, 84 N.M. 361, 503 P.2d 644 (1972); UJI 13-1318 NMRA (prior to 1996 amendment). And while we have since deleted that language from the UJI itself, the principle remains intact within New Mexico law. Brooks v. K-Mart Corp., 1998-NMSC-028, \u00b6 10, 125 N.M. 537, 964 P.2d 98. The second principle that provides guidance is our recognition that \u201cNew Mexico has already determined where much of the burden of tort liability should lie when a motor vehicle is involved in an accident\u201d by mandating \u201cthat all residents who own and operate motor vehicles be financially responsible for damages as a result of motor vehicle accidents.\u201d Blake, 2004-NMCA-002, \u00b6 23; cf. Ziemba v. Mierzwa, 566 N.E.2d 1365, 1369 (111. 1991) (\u201cThe underlying rationale for holding a landowner liable for injuries occurring as a result of conditions on his land is that the landowner is in the best position to prevent the injury. However, in this case, we find that the truck driver was in the best position to prevent the injury. Thus the usual justification for imposing landowner liability is not present. . . .\u201d).\n{27} We conclude that these principles within our precedent additionally support our decision to circumscribe the owner/occupant\u2019s \u201cduty to protect\u201d short of vehicle-building collisions. We cannot require premises owner/occupants to anticipate, implement ways to thwart, or to otherwise shoulder the burden of financial liability for the disastrous consequences of remote mechanical and human fallibility. To do so would, in essence, require premises owners to become absolute insurers of patron safety, forcing businesses into one of three undesirable alternatives: (1) significantly revise the physical and aesthetic layout of buildings and parking lots at substantial expense, (2) retain the status quo and risk the enormous cost of catastrophic liability, or (3) close down the business premises entirely. Moreover, \u201c[t]o erect an impregnable barrier around all of the buildings would both obstruct normal pedestrian traffic and impose on the owners a burden completely out of proportion to the anticipated risk.\u201d Mack, 150 N.W.2d at 686. We believe it particularly unwise to impose such a wide reaching duty in the absence of clear guidance from our Legislature or our precedent. See Ciup v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 1996-NMSC-062, \u00b6 19, 122 N.M. 537, 928 P.2d 263 (noting that \u201c[ujnder these circumstances, we have no basis for expanding liability by recognizing a duty other than that arising under existing case law\u201d). It is not the business of the judiciary to so burden facilities across the state with accountability for conduct they cannot reasonably regulate.\nOut of State Precedent\n{28} We note that the great weight of authority from around the country has\nsimilarly refused to recognize a duty of business owners to protect their indoor patrons from vehicle collisions. See, e.g., Fawley v. Martin\u2019s Supermarkets, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 10, 13 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (\u201cThe majority of cases from other jurisdictions have likewise concluded that a store owner owes no duty to invitees to protect them from runaway vehicles in parking lots, since this kind of occurrence is not sufficiently foreseeable for a store owner to be required to protect against it.\u201d). Most have done so based on a foreseeability-driven duty analysis. Albert v. Hsu, 602 So.2d 895, 896 (Ala. 1992) (no duty to protect 10-year-old decedent from car that backed through restaurant from adjacent parking lot because \u201charm was not reasonably foreseeable\u201d); Howe v. Stubbs, 570 A.2d 1203, 1203 (Me. 1990) (no duty to protect patron standing inside store from vehicles, despite store\u2019s location at base of hill and three previous similar accidents); Glick v. Prince Italian Foods of Saugus, Inc., 514 N.E.2d 100, 101 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987) (no duty to protect from out-of-control automobile that crashed into restaurant from adjacent road \u201cbecause the harm was not reasonably foreseeable\u201d); (Carpenter v. Stop-N-Go Markets of Georgia, Inc., 512 So.2d 708, 709 (Miss. 1987) (\u201cno duty owed by a convenience store owner, to persons inside the store, to erect barriers in order to prevent vehicles from driving through the store\u2019s plate glass window\u201d); Carter v. Gambulous, 748 P.2d 1008, 1009 (Okla. Civ. App. 1987) (\u201cWhile [the ajppellee is indeed under a duty to use reasonable care with respect to his customers, the accident herein was not foreseeable, and [the ajppellee is not an absolute insurer of his customers\u2019 safety.\u201d); Watkins v. Davis, 308 S.W.2d 906, 909 (Tex. App. 1957) (\u201cdoctrine of unforeseeable consequences is likewise deemed applicable here\u201d); but see, e.g., Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1059-60 (Ill. 2006) (duty of ordinary care includes the duty to protect patrons inside buildings from runaway vehicles).\nOne of the seminal cases on this issue is often quoted as stating:\n[Ijt cannot be contended with any degree of reason or logic that the owner of a store, by permitting automobiles to park perpendicularly to the curb in front of his entrance, or by failing to erect an impregnable barrier between the entrance of his store and an adjacent area where motor vehicles are driven and parked, should have anticipated that automobiles will be negligently propelled over the curb and across the sidewalk into the entrance of his store. We are not unmindful of the obvious fact that at times operators lose control over the forward progress and direction of their vehicles either through negligence or as a result of defective mechanisms, which sometimes results in damage or injury to others. In a sense all such occurrences are foreseeable. They are not, however, incidents to ordinary operation of vehicles, and do not happen in the ordinary and normal course of events. When they happen, the consequences resulting therefrom are matters of chance and speculation. If as a matter of law such occurrences are held to be foreseeable and therefore to be guarded against, there would be no limitation on the duty owed by the owners of establishments into which people are invited to enter. Such occurrences fall within the category of the unusual or extraordinary, and are therefore unforeseeable in contemplation of the law.\nSchatz v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 128 So.2d 901, 904 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961). No matter the methodology employed, the result reached by the majority of courts addressing this issue is consistent, if not expressly referenced therein, with the sound determination of policy.\nIII. CONCLUSION\n{29} No one can deny the inexorable finality of what occurred at the Del Sol Shopping Center on March 17,2006. Thatthe most fundamental characteristic of time is its unidirectional progression is never more apparent than when our collective humanity desires something heartbreaking to be reversed. But sometimes in law, no matter how unfair the misfortune perpetrated upon innocents, or how universally just may be the corresponding calls for retribution, no legal remedy can stand against those whose only role is to own, develop, or occupy a physical space as situationally vulnerable to calamity as any other. \u201cThere are, moreover, innumerable, tremendous risks inherent in our modern-day, complex society.\u201d Madrid v. Lincoln Cnty. Med. Ctr., 121 N.M. 133, 139, 909 P.2d 14, 20 (Ct. App. 1995). Today, we hold as a matter of policy that the owners and operators of Del Sol were not assigned the duty to prevent the tragedy that occurred on its premises, or to protect its patrons from the extraordinary events arising from pervasive modern-day risks. Accordingly, we affirm the ruling of the district courts that dismissed Plaintiffs\u2019 claims against Defendants as a matter of law.\n{30} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nJ. MILES HANISEE, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nJAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge\nRODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge\nJustice Bosson specially concurred in Quality Pontiac, giving renewed voice to the criticism that New Mexico\u2019s use of foreseeability as a part of the legal duty inquiry is a \u201clegal fiction for restricting or expanding liability.\u201d 2003-NMSC-018, \u00b6 40 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Justice Bosson suggested that \u201c[pjerhaps policy issues like remoteness, aided by indications of legislative intent, are the better tools for shaping duty, and we should leave the foreseeable plaintiff for the jury.\u201d Id. \u00b6 41.\nWe note that District Judge Clay Campbell separately supported his duty determination by policy considerations. Rodriguez v. Del Sol Shopping Ctr. Assocs., L.P., No. CV-2006-01855 (1st Jud. Dist. Ct. Mar. 18, 2010) (\u201c[T]he Court determines that neither foreseeability nor considerations of policy, nor a combination of the two, can support the imposition of duty here.\u201d).\nDistrict Court Judge Sarah Singleton, in her order granting summary judgment to Defendants, advocated her own opinion that \u201cthe foreseeability analysis in the Restatement Third of Torts is the correct way to analyze foreseeability\u201d under duty. Her grant of summary judgment was thus based not upon independent legal acumen, but rather the responsibility to apply what she perceived to be binding precedent.\nCuriously, the parties on appeal did not cite Edward C., perhaps based upon its resolution of a question of duty within a uniquely narrow arena of law \u2014 baseball park liability. The facts of that case and the determination of the Court regarding the duty owed to baseball spectators are situationally distinct from the analysis of duty herein. But we conclude that the manner in which duty is defined by Edward C. is applicable, particularly given its departure from the many prior incorporations of foreseeability as the primary determinant of duty.", "type": "majority", "author": "HANISEE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Law Offices of Beatrice Lockhart Beatrice Castellano Lockhart Santa Fe, NM", "Joe Cruz Castellano, Attorney at Law Joe Cruz Castellano Santa Fe, NM", "Watts Guerra Craft L.L.P. John G. Escamilla Edinburg, TX", "Gaddy Jaramillo Lawyers David Jaramillo Albuquerque, NM", "Attorneys for Appellants James Rodriguez, et al. O\u2019Friel and Levy, P.C. Daniel J. O\u2019Friel Aimee Bevan Santa Fe, NM", "Attorneys for Appellant Maria C. Bustamante", "Madison, Harbour & Mroz, P.A. Ada B. Priest M. Eliza Stewart Albuquerque, NM", "Attorneys for Appellees BGK Properties, Inc. and Del Sol Shopping Center Associates, L.P., BGK Realty, Inc. and BGK Equities III, LLC", "Civerolo, Gralow, Hill & Curtis, P.A. Lisa Entress Pullen M. Clea Gutterson Albuquerque, NM", "Attorneys for Appellees BGK Property Management, LLC", "Rammelkamp, Muehlenweg & Cordova, P.A. Lara White Davis Albuquerque, NM", "Attorney for Appellee Concentra Health Services, Inc.", "Brown & Gay, P.C. Remo E. Gay, Jr. Melissa A. Brown Albuquerque, NM", "Attorneys for Appellee Concentra Health Services, Inc." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Certiorari Granted, January 17, 2013,\nNo. 33,949\nCertiorari Granted, January 28, 2013,\nNo. 33,896\nIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2013-NMCA-020\nFiling Date: October 12, 2012\nDocket No. 30,421 consolidated with No. 30,578\nJAMES RODRIGUEZ, Individually and as Representative of the Estates of JANELL L. RODRIGUEZ and DAVID RODRIGUEZ, Deceased, LEANN AGUILAR, DOMENIC A. RODRIGUEZ, JUAN M. TERRAZAS, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of VIVIANA E. TERRAZAS, Deceased, LUDIVINA TERRAZAS ENRIQUEZ, and BILLY J. TRUJILLO, as Next Friend of ISAIAH TRUJILLO, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DEL SOL SHOPPING CENTER ASSOCIATES, L.P., a/k/a DEL SOL SHOPPING CENTER, BGK PROPERTIES, INC., BGK REALTY, INC., BGK PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, L.L.C., and BGK EQUITIES III, INC., Defendants-Appellees. and MARIA C. BUSTAMANTE, as Representative of the Estate of MICHAEL SOLCHENBERGER, and his wife LYDIA SOLCHENBERGER, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BGK PROPERTIES, INC., DEL SOL SHOPPING CENTER ASSOCIATES, L.P., and CONCENTRA HEALTH SERVICES, INC., Defendants-Appellees.\nLaw Offices of Beatrice Lockhart Beatrice Castellano Lockhart Santa Fe, NM\nJoe Cruz Castellano, Attorney at Law Joe Cruz Castellano Santa Fe, NM\nWatts Guerra Craft L.L.P. John G. Escamilla Edinburg, TX\nGaddy Jaramillo Lawyers David Jaramillo Albuquerque, NM\nAttorneys for Appellants James Rodriguez, et al. O\u2019Friel and Levy, P.C. Daniel J. O\u2019Friel Aimee Bevan Santa Fe, NM\nAttorneys for Appellant Maria C. Bustamante\nMadison, Harbour & Mroz, P.A. Ada B. Priest M. Eliza Stewart Albuquerque, NM\nAttorneys for Appellees BGK Properties, Inc. and Del Sol Shopping Center Associates, L.P., BGK Realty, Inc. and BGK Equities III, LLC\nCiverolo, Gralow, Hill & Curtis, P.A. Lisa Entress Pullen M. Clea Gutterson Albuquerque, NM\nAttorneys for Appellees BGK Property Management, LLC\nRammelkamp, Muehlenweg & Cordova, P.A. Lara White Davis Albuquerque, NM\nAttorney for Appellee Concentra Health Services, Inc.\nBrown & Gay, P.C. Remo E. Gay, Jr. Melissa A. Brown Albuquerque, NM\nAttorneys for Appellee Concentra Health Services, Inc." }, "file_name": "0336-01", "first_page_order": 352, "last_page_order": 368 }