{ "id": 4190826, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF BRUCE C. CLINESMITH, an Adult Incapacitated Person (now deceased), RUTH CLINESMITH, Interested Party-Appellant, v. CATHE TEMMERMAN, Petitioner-Appellee, and DECADES, LLC, Conservator-Appellee Intervenor, and MOODY BIBLE INSTITUTE OF CHICAGO, Intervenor-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Clinesmith v. Temmerman", "decision_date": "2012-11-02", "docket_number": "No. 33,935; Docket No. 31,230", "first_page": "393", "last_page": "407", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2013-NMCA-024" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "1997-NMSC-051", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 17941 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 19-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/124/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "553 F.2d 420", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 970849 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/553/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 F.3d 1233", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 8961413 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1237" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/408/1233-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 N.M. 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552802 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277-78", "parenthetical": "emphasis omitted" }, { "page": "373-74", "parenthetical": "emphasis omitted" }, { "page": "278" }, { "page": "374" }, { "page": "276" }, { "page": "372" }, { "page": "278" }, { "page": "374" }, { "page": "278" }, { "page": "374" }, { "page": "278" }, { "page": "374" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731639 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294", "parenthetical": "\"To hold that orders terminating separate proceedings are final orders is to give finality a practical, rather than a technical, construction.\" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)" }, { "page": "1377", "parenthetical": "\"To hold that orders terminating separate proceedings are final orders is to give finality a practical, rather than a technical, construction.\" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)" }, { "page": "1377" }, { "page": "294-95" }, { "page": "1377-78", "parenthetical": "stating that when there is more than one claim in a petition, \"an order is ordinarily final and appealable only when both matters have been decided, subject, of course, to [Rule 1-054(B)(1" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 N.M. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 723241 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" }, { "page": "1038", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/113/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-041", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4244257 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0680-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563495 ], "weight": 17, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530" }, { "page": "638" }, { "page": "529" }, { "page": "640" }, { "page": "531" }, { "page": "638" }, { "page": "529" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "639" }, { "page": "530" }, { "page": "639-40" }, { "page": "530-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 N.M. 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5346259 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345" }, { "page": "599" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/64/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMSC-013", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 15904 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/133/0821-01" ] }, { "cite": "2002-NMCA-069", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 260671 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 15" }, { "page": "\u00b6 15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/132/0426-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMCA-025", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 827436 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "2000-NMCA-058", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1217153 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 14" }, { "page": "\u00b6 1" }, { "page": "\u00b6 16" }, { "page": "\u00b6 20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/129/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "2001-NMCA-012", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 352321 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" }, { "page": "\u00b6 14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/130/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-009", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4242308 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/145/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMCA-045", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 929193 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/137/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 N.M. 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 720225 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230" }, { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/112/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMSC-013", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3784105 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 27, 32, 39" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/143/0462-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1506, "char_count": 44108, "ocr_confidence": 0.833, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.135432583323292e-08, "percentile": 0.3818658925674817 }, "sha256": "24cd6079b5033e603bc37d02832692ada4f4c54050ca7df830be62d412da8061", "simhash": "1:da305f33688f9d4f", "word_count": 7190 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:46:09.531131+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge", "JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge", "TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge" ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF BRUCE C. CLINESMITH, an Adult Incapacitated Person (now deceased), RUTH CLINESMITH, Interested Party-Appellant, v. CATHE TEMMERMAN, Petitioner-Appellee, and DECADES, LLC, Conservator-Appellee Intervenor, and MOODY BIBLE INSTITUTE OF CHICAGO, Intervenor-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nBUSTAMANTE, Judge.\n{1} In early 2005, Bruce Clinesmith was suffering from Alzheimer\u2019s disease. The district court appointed a guardian and conservator to protect his person and assets. After the conservator was appointed, Ruth Clinesmith (Wife) and her attorney met with Mr. Clinesmith at the locked assisted care facility where he had been admitted. The conservator unsuccessfully tried to stop the meeting. During the meeting, Mr. Clinesmith executed a new estate plan giving Wife control of his estate. In response to a motion by the conservator to prevent interference with its duties, the district court voided the estate plan. This case presents two issues. Did the district court have jurisdiction over the new estate plan? This appeal was filed over five years after the district court voided the estate plan. Is the appeal timely? Answering the former question in the affirmative and the latter in the negative, we dismiss.\nI. Background\n{2} In March 2005, Mr. Clinesmith\u2019s daughter, Cathe Temmerman, filed a verified petition for the appointment of a guardian and conservator, asserting that Mr. Clinesmith suffered from dementia such that he was incapable of managing both his declining health and his estate of over $11 million. At the time the petition was filed, Mr. Clinesmith was eighty-seven years old and living with his Wife in a private residence, but after a hospital stay he was moved into the dementia/Alzheimer\u2019s unit at an elder care facility in late May 2005. Mr. Clinesmith and Wife, initially both represented by attorney Stuart Stein, opposed the petition.\n{3} Starting in 1992, Mr. Clinesmith had arranged for the bulk of his estate to go to Moody Bible Institute of Chicago (Moody). The estate was spread among three revocable trusts; two administered by Moody and the third by a commercial trust \u2014 Salomon Smith Barney. The trust provisions allowed Mr. Clinesmith to draw on the trust assets for his expenses. In separate butparallel proceedings commenced in federal court while this guardianship/conservatorship action in state court was pending, Wife attempted to gain control of the trust assets. In addition, Wife sought to have the monies held in trust for Moody transferred to her pursuant to a power of attorney signed by Mr. Clinesmith in early 2004.\n{4} In compliance with NMS A 1978, Section 45-5-407 (1998) of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC), the district court appointed a guardian ad litem on March 4, 2005, to represent Mr. Clinesmith. SeeNMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 45-1-101 to -7-612 (1975, as amended through 2012). On August 5, 2005, the district court appointed Decades, LLC, an elder care management organization, as a temporary guardian and conservator with \u201cfull\u201d powers to manage Mr. Clinesmith\u2019s assets. The same order disqualified Mr. Stein from representing Mr. Clinesmith on the ground that his interests and Wife\u2019s interests were adverse and, therefore, Mr. Stein could not represent both. The order also revoked the 2004 power of attorney granted to Wife by Mr. Clinesmith.\n{5} Disregarding the order and its effects, Mr. Stein and Wife met with Mr. Clinesmith at the elder care facility on August 18,2005, without notifying the district court, Decades, or the guardian ad litem of the meeting. Staff at the elder care facility notified Decades that Mr. Stein and Wife, along with several of Mr. Stem\u2019s staff, were meeting with Mr. Clinesmith in a private room. A social worker and an attorney representing Decades arrived at the facility shortly thereafter. The Decades staff attempted unsuccessfully to stop the meeting altogether and were unable to discuss the documents with Mr. Clinesmith.\n{6} At the meeting, Mr. Clinesmith signed a new will naming Wife as personal representative and a new trust document naming Wife as trustee. We refer to these documents as the \u201cnew estate plan.\u201d The effect of these modifications was to revoke the previous trusts and \u201ccreate a new trust with [Wife] as trustee with all the power \u2018that an absolute owner of such property would have.\u2019 \u201d In re Stein, 2008-NMSC-013, \u00b6 12, 143 N.M.462, 177 P.3d 513 (per curiam). \u201cThese documents had the additional effect of removing all of the assets belonging to [Mr. Clinesmith] from the jurisdiction of the court in the guardianship and conservatorship proceeding.\u201d Id.\n{7} Decades and Ms. Temmerman (Appellees) filed a motion and sought an emergency hearing to prevent Mr. Stein from \u201cinterfer[ing] . . . with Decades\u2019 performance of its duties and the exercise of its powers as temporary guardian and conservator of [Mr.] Clinesmith.\u201d The specific relief requested was an order\npreventing [Mr.] Stein from having any contact with Mr. Clinesmith, ordering [Mr.] Stein to produce all documents that were presented or involved in the meeting at [Mr. Clinesmith\u2019s residence in the Alzheimer\u2019s ward at an elder care facility] on August 18, 2005, ordering [Mr.] Stein to produce all documents or records pertaining to his representation of Mr. Clinesmith, and for all such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.\nAt the emergency hearing on the motion, Decades requested orally that the new estate plan be voided. Mr. Stein objected that this request was not made in writing in the motion and, therefore, he did not have notice of such request. The district court orally granted the motion and Decades\u2019 request to void or hold \u201cfrozen\u201d the new estate plan. The district court voided the new estate plan \u201cfor a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that [the court thought] that they were improperly \u2014 the signatures were improperly gained.\u201d The district court denied Mr. Stein\u2019s oral request for an interlocutory appeal of this order. The district court\u2019s order was filed on August 29, 2005. W ife did not file a motion for rehearing or reconsideration of this order. After another hearing, the district court disqualified Mr. Stein from representing Wife \u201cand [a]ll [ojther [pjersons with [interests [a]dverse to [Mr.] Clinesmith.\u201d Finally, on October 7, 2005, the district court appointed Decades as permanent guardian and conservator for Mr. Clinesmith.\n{8} Wife timely filed a notice of appeal from this order on November 4, 2005. The notice stated that she appealed \u201cfrom the final [o]rder entered ... on October 7, 2005, . . . and from all orders and rulings that preceded, led to, and produced said [o]rder.\u201d Wife then voluntarily dismissed the appeal in February 2006. Mr. Clinesmith died on May 9, 2010, and the district court accepted the recommendations of a special master and approved Decades\u2019 final report on March 4, 2011. The present appeal was timely filed on April 4,2011, over five years after entry of the October 7, 2005, order.\n{9} As a result of his conduct in this matter, Mr. Stein was disbarred for five years. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 19, 73. The Supreme Court held that Mr. Stein\u2019s conduct violated the New Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct, including, inter alia, Rule 16-402 NMRA (communication with persons represented by counsel); Rule 16-804(C) NMRA (misconduct); Rule 16-109(A) NMRA (representing a person in the same or substantially related matter in which that person\u2019s interests were materially adverse to those of a former client). In re Stein, 2008-NMSC-013, \u00b6\u00b6 27, 32, 39. Recognizing that Mr. Stein had described Mr. Clinesmith in pleadings as suffering from early stages of dementia and otherwise expressed doubt as to Mr. Clinesmith\u2019s competency, the Court wrote, \u201c[w]hatis so reprehensible to this Court is that [Mr. Stein], acknowledging that [Mr. Clinesmith\u2019s] mental capacity was in question, attempted to take money from him and transfer it to [Wife,] while purporting to represent both of them.\u201d Id. \u00b6 25.\nII. Discussion\n{10} Appellees argue that Wife failed to timely appeal and, therefore, the appeal should be dismissed. The parties appear to agree that the August 29, 2005, order invalidating the new estate plan was not a final order. While we are not convinced that this is the case, we accept this premise consistent with our interest in facilitating the right to appeal and because we do not pursue arguments the parties do not make. See Govich v. N. Am. Sys., Inc., 112 N.M. 226, 230, 814 P.2d 94, 98 (1991); Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. Corp., 2005-NMCA-045, \u00b6 15, 137 N.M. 339, 110 P.3d 1076 (\u201cWe will not review unclear arguments, or guess at what [a party\u2019s] arguments might be.\u201d). Appellees argue that the October 7 order was final because it resolved all of the issues in Ms. Temmerman\u2019s initial petition and incorporated all previous orders such that appeal of the August 29 order should have been filed within thirty days of the October 7 order.\n{11} Wife maintains that the October 7 order did not make the order voiding the new estate plan final and appealable. As we understand her argument, Wife argues that (1) the district court did not have jurisdiction to void the new estate plan because such relief was not requested in Decades\u2019 motion, or the issue could not be considered until after Mr. Clinesmith\u2019s death; and (2) because the court had no jurisdiction over the matter, any order on the new estate plan was not final and appealable. Wife argues that the August 29 order became final only after Mr. Clinesmith died and the district court adopted the special master\u2019s recommendations as to his estate on March 4, 2011. Thus, Wife argues, the appeal filed on April 4, 2011, was timely under Rule 12-201 NMRA.\n{12} We hold that the district court had the power to address the new estate plan because the district court was exercising its general civil jurisdiction and its order was within the scope of the motion. We also hold that the district court was not precluded from addressing the signing of the new estate plan prior to Mr. Clinesmith\u2019s death. We conclude further that the October 7 order incorporated the August 29 order and that both orders became final and appealable on October 7, 2005. As a result, this appeal \u2014 filed over five years later \u2014 is untimely.\nA. Standard of Review\n{13} The questions before us require that we construe the UPC and the appellate rules. Statutory interpretation is a question of law which an appellate court undertakes de novo. Grygorwicz v. Trujillo, 2009-NMSC-009, \u00b6 7, 145 N.M. 650, 203 P.3d 865 (\u201cDetermining whether [an] appeal was timely involves the interpretation of court rules, which we review de novo.\u201d); Ottino v. Ottino, 2001-NMCA-012, \u00b6 6, 130 N.M. 168, 21 P.3d 37 (\u201cWhether the district court is possessed of jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is a question of law that we review de novo.\u201d).\nB. The District Court Had Jurisdiction Over The New Estate Plan\n{14} Wife maintains that the new estate plan did not fall within the scope of the petition that prompted the August 29 or October 7 orders and, therefore, the district court could not rule on that issue. She argues additionally that, even if the new estate plan fell within the scope of the petition, the new estate plan could not be considered until after Mr. Clinesmith\u2019s death. We are not persuaded.\n1. The New Estate Plan Was Raised in the Motion\n{15} The August 29 order voided the new estate plan in response to Decades\u2019 motion to prevent interference with its duties as temporary guardian and conservator of Mr. Clinesmith\u2019s estate. That motion described Mr. Stein\u2019s meeting with Mr. Clinesmith to sign the new estate plan as \u201cinterferfing] with Decades\u2019 performance of its duties and exercise of its powers as Mr. Clinesmith\u2019s guardian and conservator . . . over Decades\u2019 clear and unequivocal objection.\u201d Decades\u2019 duties are related to the overall purpose of a conservatorship: \u201c[T]o protect the person and property of persons whose functional and decision-making capacity has become impaired.\u201d 57 C.J.S. Mental Health \u00a7 151 (2007). A conservator is \u201ca person who is appointed by a court to manage the property or financial affairs or both of a protected person}.]\u201d Section 45-5-101(A). \u201cIn the exercise of a conservator\u2019s powers, a conservator shall act as a fiduciary . . . .\u201d Section 45-5-417. Thus, a conservator has the authority and obligation to manage the financial affairs of the protected person in that person\u2019s stead.\n{16} The facts admitted by Mr. Stein at the hearing are sufficient to show that Mr. Stein (1) arranged to meet with Mr. Clinesmith about the new estate plan without notifying Decades, the district court, or the guardian ad litem of the meeting; (2) met with Mr. Clinesmith over the objections of Decades\u2019 staff who arrived after the meeting had begun; and (3) refused to discontinue the meeting or allow Decades\u2019 staff to read the documents or take over the meeting. Since Decades was appointed by the court to \u201cmanage the property or financial affairs\u201d of Mr. Clinesmith, any action by Mr. Stein to alter the disposition of Mr. Clinesmith\u2019s estate without Decades\u2019 knowledge and approval, even if it were at the request of Mr. Clinesmith himself, was an interference with Decades\u2019 duties.\n{17} To the extent Wife argues that she was denied due process of law because she had no notice of Appellees\u2019 intent to request that the new estate plan be voided and no opportunity to present evidence, we disagree. Decades\u2019 motion requested relief from Mr. Stein\u2019s interference with its duties, and Wife acknowledged Decades\u2019 motion in her response. In that response, Wife averred that \u201c[t]he meeting with the Clinesmiths, the witnesses and the two doctors [who accompanied Mr. Stein] was going fine and without incident until [a Decades staff member] came in the room.\u201d Wife acknowledged that Decades\u2019 staff tried to end the meeting and prevent Mr. Clinesmith from signing the new documents. Although Wife claimed that \u201c[t]he [m]otion is . . . silent as to what was the interference with the exercise of the powers of the [temporary [g]uardian and [temporary [c]onservator[,]\u201d the facts, recited by Wife in her response, reflect that Decades sought to prevent the meeting and the signing of documents, and that this objective was thwarted by Wife and Mr. Stein. Wife\u2019s response itself is evidence that the motion was sufficient to provide notice ofDecades\u2019 intent.\n{18} Wife\u2019s argument that she was denied the opportunity to present evidence on this issue also misses the mark. Wife does not direct this Court to the evidence she would have presented in the district court. Nevertheless, the parties appear to agree on the essential facts: that Mr. Stein arranged a meeting with Mr. Clinesmith without notifying Decades, the district court, or the guardian ad litem and that Decades staff attempted unsuccessfully to prevent the meeting and the signing of a new estate plan. These facts alone establish Mr. Stein\u2019s interference with Decades\u2019 duties as guardian and conservator, which was the basis of the August 29 order. As the district court explained:\nMr. Stein, my ruling is based on the fact that I issued an order in this case, and that you, with full knowledge of Mr. Clinesmith\u2019s incapacity, nevertheless, went and saw him on two occasions and secured a signature from him. The trust is a very big issue because that is the basis of the [ffederal [c]ourt lawsuit and that is the very thing that is being changed, and so on that basis, I don\u2019t really need to hear testimony from other people. You\u2019ve admitted the things that I needed to hear today from you.\nAdditional evidence as to Mr. Clinesmith\u2019s testamentary capacity, the specifics of who said what in the meeting, or Mr. Clinesmith\u2019s intent would not alter these undisputed facts.\n2. The District Court Had General Civil Jurisdiction\n{19} The district court had general civil jurisdiction over the conservatorship proceedings and the August 29 order was entered pursuant to that authority. The New Mexico Constitution limits jurisdiction over \u201cspecial cases and proceedings\u201d to that \u201cconferred by law.\u201d N.M. Const. art. VI, \u00a7 13. Probate proceedings are special proceedings. In re Estate of Harrington, 2000-NMCA-058, \u00b6 14, 129 N.M. 266, 5 P.3d 1070. In In re Estate of Harrington, however, this Courtheld that the UPC gives \u201cdistrict courts general civil jurisdiction in formal probate proceedings.\u201d Id. \u00b6\u00b6 17, 22; see \u00a7\u00a7 45-1-302, -302.1. In that case, the question was whether the district court sitting in probate had the authority to liquidate a business that was the subject of a will contest. In re Estate of Harrington, 2000-NMCA-058, \u00b6 1. This Court concluded that it did based on construction of the language of Section 45-1-302(B), which gives the district court power to, among other things, \u201cmake orders, judgments and decrees and to take all other action necessary and proper to administer justice in matters that come before it.\u201d Id.', In re Estate of Harrington, 2000-NMCA-058, \u00b6 16. This Court also found that the UPC\u2019s intent to \u201cpromote a speedy and efficient system for the settlement of the estate of the decedent\u201d is facilitated by vesting general civil jurisdiction in the district court in formal probate proceedings. Id. \u00b6 19 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); cf. Ottino, 2001-NMCA-012, \u00b6 14 (stating that \u201cthe district court\u2019s original jurisdiction arises from our state\u2019s constitution\u201d and explaining that \u201c[i]n this light, the statutory jurisdiction vested in our district courts for the purposes of. . . entering orders ... upon divorce ought not to be viewed as a limitation upon the courts\u2019 original jurisdiction, but as an augment to it\u201d).\n{20} In re Estate of Harrington applies to formal probate proceedings, which are different from conservatorship proceedings. See \u00a7 45-3-401(A) (\u201cA formal testacy proceeding is litigation to determine whether a decedent left a valid will.\u201d). Nevertheless, the factors that led the In re Estate of Harrington Court to its conclusion are also present in conservatorship proceedings and, therefore, we determine that district courts have general civil jurisdiction over them. We note first that \u201c[t]he [UPC] governs conservatorship proceedings.\u201d In re Conservatorship of Chisholm, 1999-NMCA-025, \u00b6 8, 126 N.M. 584, 973 P.2d 261. Thus, the general definitions and requirements of the UPC apply to conservatorship proceedings to the extent they do not conflict with specific provisions within Article 5 of the UPC, which governs protection of minors and incapacitated persons. See, e.g., \u00a7\u00a7 45-1-102, -201, -5-101. Secondly, the issues to be resolved in formal probate proceedings are similar in gravity to those addressed by conservatorship proceedings. The New Mexico Constitution reserves to district courts sitting in probate, rather than probate courts, those issues related to title or possession of real property, which are often the most significant, contested, and complex aspects of the decedent\u2019s estate. N.M. Const. art. VI, \u00a7 23; see In re Estate of Duncan, 2002-NMCA-069, \u00b6 15, 132 N.M. 426, 50 P.3d 175, rev\u2019d on other grounds by In re Estate of Duncan v. Kinsolving, 2003-NMSC-013, \u00b6 8, 133 N.M. 821, 70 P.3d 1260. This division of labor indicates the desire to give these issues the greater protections of a district court.\n{21} In many ways, the appointment of a conservator is more significant than a formal probate because the appointment deprives the protected person of the autonomy to manage his or her own estate and financial affairs. The importance of this determination is reflected in the statutory conditions for conservatorships, which require, inter alia, (1) notice to those who may have an interest in the protected person or the estate, Section 45-5-405; (2) careful consideration of the least restrictive means of managing the affairs of the protected person, Section 45-5-402.1(A); (3) appointment of a guardian ad litem, visitor, and health care professional to advise the court on the capacity of the person to be protected, Section 45-5-407(B), (C), (D); a jury trial, if requested, Section 45-5-407(P); and (4) processes for the protected person to terminate the conservatorship, Section 45-5-430.\n{22} In addition, like district courts sitting in formal probate proceedings, district courts in conservatorship proceedings exercise broad powers. S ection 45-1 -3 02, a general provision applicable to conservatorship proceedings, provides that:\nA. The district court has exclusive original jurisdiction over all subject matter relating to:\n(2) estates of missing and protected persons;\n(3) protection of incapacitated persons and minors;\n(7) governing instruments except wills.\nB. ... The district court has fullpowerto make orders, judgments and decrees and to take all other action necessary and proper to administer justice in matters that come before it.\n(Emphasis added.) In addition, Section 45-5-405.1 states that once a basis for appointment of a conservator has been established,\nA. . . . the court, without appointing a conservator, may authorize, direct or ratify any transaction necessary or desirable to achieve any security, service or care arrangement meeting the foreseeable needs of the person.\nB. ... the court, without appointing a conservator, may authorize, direct or ratify any contract, trust or other single transaction relating to the protected person\u2019s estate and financial affairs if the court finds that the transaction is in the best interests of the protected person.\nFurthermore, Section 45-5-402 provides that\nAfter the service of notice in a proceeding seeking the appointment of a conservator or other protective order and until termination of the proceeding, the court in which the petition is filed has:\nA. exclusive jurisdiction to determine the need for a conservator or other protective order;\nB. exclusive jurisdiction to determine how the estate of the protected person which is subject to the laws of New Mexico shall be managed, expended or distributed to or for the use of the protected person or any of his dependents}.]\n{23} As in In re Estate of Harrington, we look also to whether the purposes of Article 5 of the UPC \u201cwould be frustrated if we gave [it] a narrower interpretation.\u201d In re Estate of Harrington, 2000-NMCA-058, \u00b6 20. As discussed above, the goal of a conservatorship \u201cis to protect the person and property of persons whose functional and decision-making capacity has become impaired.\u201d 57 C.J.S. Mental Health \u00a7151. The facts before us here provide a prime example of why limiting the district court\u2019s authority would frustrate that purpose. A temporary conservator was appointed to manage Mr. Clinesmith\u2019s estate and financial affairs. Obviously, conduct interfering with those duties is contrary to the goal of the appointment. To hold that the district court was powerless to rectify the interference would frustrate the overarching purpose of the proceedings: the protection of Mr. Clinesmith and his financial affairs.\n{24} Finally, conservatorship proceedings require a level of judicial oversight and notice that is similar to or more stringent than that in formal probate proceedings. \u201cThe distinctions between informal and formal proceedings include the degree of notice and judicial oversight required.\u201d In re Estate of Duncan, 2002-NMCA-069, \u00b6 15. Formal proceedings are those \u201cconducted before a district judge with notice to interested persons[,]\u201d Section 45-1-201(A)(19), whereas informal proceedings are \u201cconducted without notice to interested persons.\u201d Section 45-1-201(A)(25). The UPC includes extensive notice requirements for conservatorship proceedings, not only for the initial petition for conservator, but also for other motions and petitions in the course of the proceedings. See, e.g., \u00a7\u00a7 45-5-402.1(B)(3), (C), -405, -406(A) (requiring notice to \u201c[a]ny interested person who desires to be notified before any order is made in a . . . protective proceeding\u201d who requests notice); \u00a7\u00a745-5-416(C), -430.\n{25} The UPC requires substantial judicial oversight throughout the conservatorship proceedings and continuing until the protected person\u2019s death and termination of the conservatorship. See, e.g., \u00a7\u00a7 45-5-402, - 402.1(B)(3) (giving the court \u201call the powers over the estate and financial affairs which the [protected] person could exercise if present and not under disability, except the power to make a will\u201d); \u00a7\u00a7 45-5-405.1, -407, -416(C) (stating that \u201c[u]pon notice and hearing, the court may give appropriate instructions or make any appropriate order\u201d on motions subsequent to appointment of a conservator). Thus, the UPC sets out specific procedures for appointment of a conservator for the protection of the rights of the incapacitated person. See \u00a7 45-5-402.1(A) (stating that the court\u2019s authority mustbe exercised to promote the \u201cmaximum self-reliance and independence of a protected person and [the court may] make protective orders only to the extent necessitated by the protected person\u2019s mental and adaptive limitations\u201d). Failure to follow these rules renders the proceedings invalid. See Bonds v. Joplin's Heirs, 64 N.M. 342, 345, 328 P.2d 597, 599 (1958). In fact, under these rules, conservatorship proceedings are formal by default: unlike the proceedings available for probate of a will, there is no procedure whereby a conservator may be appointed without judicial oversight.\n{26} In sum, the new estate plan was properly before the district court because it was addressed by Decades\u2019 motion and because the district court had and was exercising its general civil jurisdiction when it dealt with the motion. The finality of the August 29 and October 7 orders is not affected by any lack of jurisdiction.\n3. The District Court Had The Power to Void The New Estate Plan Prior to Mr. Clinesmith\u2019s Death\n{27} Wife argues that, notwithstanding the appointment of Decades as temporary conservator and temporary guardian, Mr. Clinesmith was entitled to make changes to his estate plan without the district court\u2019s prior approval, provided that he did so during a period of lucidity, and that, absent a probate action, the district court could not void the new estate plan. Wife further argues that the district court\u2019s reliance on the documents filed by Mr. Stein which set forth Mr. Stem\u2019s understanding that Mr. Clinesmith was suffering from \u201csome sort of memory loss or dementia\u201d did not provide a basis for the district court\u2019s order voiding the new estate plan because issues related to Mr. Clinesmith\u2019s testamentary capacity \u201cshould only be evaluated in the pending probate case.\u201d This argument is unavailing for two reasons.\n{28} First, this argument about the status of the will does not address the alteration of the trust documents, the effect of which was to give Wife power over Mr. Clinesmith\u2019s property and remove his assets from the jurisdiction of the district court in the conservatorship proceedings. In re Stein, 2008-NMSC-013, \u00b6 12. This act was in violation of the district court\u2019s authority over the property as well as the conservator\u2019s duties. See \u00a7 45-5-402(B) (\u201cAfter the service of notice in a proceeding seeking the appointment of a conservator . . . until termination of the proceeding, the court . . . has . . . exclusive jurisdiction to determine how the estate of the protected person . . . shall be managed[.]\u201d The order voiding the new estate plan was an exercise of the district court\u2019s general civil jurisdiction over conduct that contravened that authority.\n{29} Second, this argument presumes that the district court\u2019s order voiding the new estate plan was based on an assessment of Mr. Clinesmith\u2019s testamentary capacity. Wife relies on Lucero v. Lucero in support of her argument. 118 N.M. 636, 884 P.2d 527 (Ct. App. 1994), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in Chapman v. Varela, 2009-NMSC-041, 146 N.M. 680, 213 P.3d 1109. She argues that the new estate plan could not even be considered until after Mr. Clinesmith\u2019s death because \u201cnothing in the UPC prohibits] [the protected person] from executing [a] will merely because [another] was appointed to be the conservator of her property.\u201d Id. at 639, 884 P.2d at 530.\n{30} Lucero is inapposite because it pertained to probate of a will and Mrs. Lucero\u2019s testamentary capacity whereas here the proceedings were to appoint a conservator and guardian. Id. at 638, 884 P.2d at 529. The district court voided the new estate plan not because Mr. Clinesmith lacked capacity, but because \u201cthe signatures were improperly gained.\u201d The order did not prohibit Mr. Clinesmith from amending his estate plan under properly protective arrangements. Indeed, the UPC explicitly permits a conservator to \u201cfaciliat[e] execution of a new will or estate plan where the protected person has sufficient mental capacity}.]\u201d Id. at 640, 884 P.2d at 531. Had he wished to, Mr. Clinesmith could have requested Decades\u2019 assistance with hiring an attorney to prepare a new will and trust documents just as Mrs. Lucero did. Thus, unlike in Lucero, neither the hearing nor the order were directed at Mr. Clinesmith\u2019s testamentary capacity. Rather, the focus of the hearing was on Mr. Stem\u2019s behavior in light of the district court\u2019s order prohibiting him from representing Mr. Clinesmith and the appointment of a guardian ad litem and conservator for Mr. Clinesmith. Although the district court qitestioned Mr. Stein about his understanding of Mr. Clinesemith\u2019s capacity and referred to Mr. Clinesmith\u2019s capacity in the hearing, the order voiding the new estate plan was not directed at whether Mr. Clinesmith intended to amend his estate plan; rather its effect was to return Mr. Clinesmith to the status quo ante the interference. As discussed, the district court had general civil jurisdiction over these proceedings. Nothing in Lucero limits that authority in this case.\n{31} Wife contends that Lucero stands for the proposition that \u201c[t]he testamentary capacity of Bruce Clinesmith on August 18, 2005 . . . should only be evaluated in the pending probate case.\u201d Lucero does not so hold. Although the Lucero court determined that \u201c[t]he mental capacity of the disabled person was thus intentionally left open [by the UPC] for future litigation, often postmortem[,]\u201d 118 N.M. at 638, 884 P.2d at 529, it does not follow that the UPC requires that litigation of the testamentary capacity of the protected person take place only after death. Wife finds a prohibition where there is only an observation \u2014 that such analysis often takes place after death. That the UPC does not foreclose creation of a new will while under conservatorship does not have any impact on whether or when litigation over that instrument will take place.\n{32} Though Wife maintains that Lucero is \u201con all fours\u201d with the present case, it is distinguishable. In Lucero, one of the testator\u2019s sons had been appointed conservator and, at her request, he arranged for an attorney to meet with her to make a new will. The testator then died. Id. In a formal probate proceeding at which another son sought to introduce the first will, the district court ruled that appointment of a conservator created \u201ca rebuttable presumption that Mrs. Lucero lacked testamentary capacity[,]\u201d but found that \u201cat the time of execution of the [later] will, Mrs. Lucero . . . was capable of understanding, in a reasonable manner, the nature and effect of the act of executing her Last Will and Testament.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The later will was admitted to probate. Id. This Court affirmed. Id.\n{33} The procedures employed by the conservator in Lucero and the process by which the new will was made distinguish Lucero from this case. There, the conservator arranged for an attorney to meet privately (except for the witness) with Mrs. Lucero at her home. Id. at 639, 884 P.2d at 530. No one with an interest in Mrs. Lucero\u2019s estate was present, including the conservator, to whom she left a greater portion of her estate than to her other devisees. Id. at 639-40, 884 P.2d at 530-31. Here, the conservator was unaware of the meeting regarding the new estate plan until it was underway and was prevented from reviewing the documents or discussing them with Mr. Clinesmith. The meeting was attended by (1) Wife, who had a substantial interest in the new estate plan and whose interests had been declared adverse to Mr. Clinesmith\u2019s; and (2) Mr. Stein, who represented Wife and was prohibited from representing Mr. Clinesmith in any way. Because Mr. Stein was prohibited from representing Mr. Clinesmith due to the conflict of interest with Wife, no one in the meeting was representing Mr. Clinesmith\u2019s interests until the staff from Decades arrived, and they were unsuccessful in stopping the meeting or the signing of documents.\n{34} At the hearing, Mr. Stein argued that Decades\u2019 motion pertained only to future conduct and, therefore, did not address his conduct on August 18. Although Wife does not make this argument explicitly on appeal, she makes a similar one: that Decades did not ask specifically for the new estate plan to be voided and, therefore, the court was without power to do so. This argument is without merit not only because, as discussed above, the new estate plan was incorporated into the motion, but also because it assumes the district court is powerless to rectify the instances of interference that prompted the motion in the first place. The motion included a description of the conduct complained of and stated that the meeting resulted in \u201can [a]mended and [Restated [tjrust and a new [w]ill.\u201d Thus, it obviously encompassed Mr. Stein\u2019s past interference with Decades\u2019 ability to manage Mr. Clinesmith\u2019s estate. To hold that only future interference was addressed by the motion would be absurd because such an interpretation would permit the results of the interference to stand uncorrected even after they were brought to the attention of the district court. This interpretation is counter to the fundamental goals of the UPC and conservatorships.\nC. The October 7 Order Was a Final Order\n{35} Having determined that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the new estate plan and, therefore, there was no jurisdictional bar to the district court\u2019s ruling on the new estate plan, we turn to whether the October 7 order was final and appealable. Only final orders are appealable. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 39-3 -2 (1966); Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison, 113 N.M. 231, 234 n.7, 824 P.2d 1033, 1036 n.7 (1992). \u201cThe general rule in New Mexico for determining the finality of a judgment is that an order or judgment is not considered final unless all issues of law and fact have been determined and the case disposed of by the trial court to the fullest extent possible.\u201d Kelly Inn, 113 N.M. at 236, 824 P.2d at 1038 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This general rule is not inflexible. Id. It \u201cis to be given a practical, rather than a technical, construction.\u201d Id.\n{36} In this case, a detailed analysis of the practical effect of court orders is unnecessary because Section 45-3-107 of the UPC addresses this question. In the context of probate proceedings, \u201ceach proceeding before the district court or probate court is indep endent of any other pro ceeding invo lving the same estate.\u201d Id.; see In re Estate of Newalla, 114 N.M. 290, 294, 837 P.2d 1373, 1377 (Ct. App. 1992) (\u201cTo hold that orders terminating separate proceedings are final orders is to give finality a practical, rather than a technical, construction.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). An order is final if it is dispositive as to the issues raised in the petition prompting the order. In re Estate of Newalla, at 294, 837 P.2d at 1377; see \u00a7 45-1-201(A)(38) (defining \u201cpetition\u201d as \u201ca written motion or other request to the district court for an order after notice\u201d). Multiple petitions may be addressed in a single proceeding and order, and \u201cno petition is defective because it fails to embrace all matters which might then be the subject of a final order.\u201d Section 45-3-107. This rule of the UPC works in conjunction with Rule 1-054 NMRA. See \u00a7 45-1-308 (\u201cAppellate review, including the right to appellate review [and] interlocutory appeal, . . . is governed by the rules applicable to civil appeals to the [C]ourt of [A]ppeals from the district court.\u201d); Rule 1-054; In re Estate of Newalla, 114 N.M. at 294-95, 837 P.2d at 1377-78 (stating that when there is more than one claim in a petition, \u201can order is ordinarily final and appealable only when both matters have been decided, subject, of course, to [Rule 1-054(B)(1)], [which] permits a court to enter a final judgment as to fewer than all of the claims presented in an action if there is no just reason for delay\u201d). Under this rubric, the question of whether an order is final is a factual inquiry into whether the district court has fully decided the issues in the petition that prompted it.\n{37} A final order may be appealed pursuant to the Rules of Appellate Procedure. See \u00a7 45-1-308 (stating that appeals from proceedings conducted under the UPC are \u201cgoverned by the rules applicable to civil appeals to the [C]ourt of [Ajppeals from the district court\u201d). The Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that an appeal of right from the district court \u201cshall be filed . . . within thirty (30) days after the judgment or order appealed from is filed in the district court clerk\u2019s office.\u201d Rule 12-201(A)(2). This rule states a \u201cmandatory precondition[ ] to the exercise of jurisdiction,\u201d not an \u201cabsolute jurisdictional requirement.\u201d Trujillo v. Serrano, 117 N.M. 273, 277-78, 871 P.2d 369, 373-74 (1994) (emphasis omitted). Under Trujillo, this Court may review an appeal even when not timely filed, but \u201c[o]nly [in] the most unusual circumstances beyond the control of the parties.\u201d Id. at 278, 871 P.2d at 374. \u201cProcedural formalities should not outweigh basic rights where the facts present a marginal case which does not lend itself to a bright-line interpretation.\u201d Id. at 276, 871 P.2d at 372. The flexibility of this rule notwithstanding, \u201c[c]ounsel should not rely on the court\u2019s munificence when filing notices of appeal. It is incumbent upon the parties to strictly adhere to our clearly articulated rules of procedure.\u201d Id. at 278, 871 P.2d at 374.\n{38} Ms. Temmerman\u2019s petition was for the appointment of a guardian and conservator. After appointment as temporary conservator and guardian on August 5, 2005, Decades sought an order to prevent Mr. Stein from interfering with its duties in that role. That motion was granted. On September 28, 2005, the district court heard argument on the petition and reviewed reports submitted by the guardian ad litem and court visitor. The court also heard argument on other pending motions. Wife withdrew several of her motions in opposition to the petition and other motions were rendered moot as a result. Thus, all pending matters related to the petition were resolved at that hearing and memorialized in the October 7, 2005, order that appointed Decades the permanent guardian and conservator. In the context of the UPC, the October 7 order was a final order.\n{39} Wife filed a notice of appeal of the October 7 final order within the thirty-day period required by Rule 12-201. Wife filed a \u201cnotice of voluntary abandonment of appeal\u201d three months later on February 2, 2006, pursuant to NMSA 1978, \u00a7 39-3-14 (1851-1852), which provides that:\nIn all causes appealed, or in any other manner brought from any inferior court to any superior court, the party appealing, . . . may, in like manner, dismiss his appeal in the same manner as in the preceding section provided; and when said cause is dismissed, as aforesaid, the judgment in the inferior court shall remain and be in all things as valid, as if said cause had never been removed from said inferior court.\nBased on that notice, the appeal was dismissed. No other appeal was initiated until the present appeal was filed on April 4, 2011.\n{40} Wife argues that the first \u201cappeal is not preclusive of the present appeal.\u201d We agree that the mere fact of a voluntarily dismissed appeal is not by itself preclusive of a second appeal. But neither does the voluntary abandonment of an appeal confer on an appellant dispensation to avoid the deadline for filing a second appeal. Section 39-3-14 states that, upon voluntary dismissal of an appeal, it is \u201cas if said cause had never been removed from [the] inferior court.\u201d As Wife acknowledges, upon dismissal of an appeal, the parties are returned to their positions as of the entry of judgment in the lower court and retain their right to appeal the judgment subject to the statutes and rules governing appeals. See id.; Rule 12-401(B) NMRA; Rule 12-201. These rules require that an appeal be filed within thirty days. See Rule 12-201(A)(2). Wife was, therefore, obliged to file her appeal to the October 7 order within thirty days, regardless of whether the first appeal was voluntarily dismissed.\n{41} There is a dearth of New Mexico cases addressing the effect of voluntary dismissal of an appeal directly. Authority from other jurisdictions persuades us that our construction of Section 39-3-14 is correct. In United States v. Arevalo, 408 F.3d 1233, 1237 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that \u201can appellant who has voluntarily dismissed his appeal must move to reinstate within the time limits for filing a notice of appeal, or seek an extension of time from the district court to re-file the notice of appeal.\u201d (citation omitted). Accord Williams v. United States, 553 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that dismissal of an appeal \u201cplaced [appellant] in the same position as if they had never filed a notice of appeal in the first place\u201d and stating that \u201c[t]heir next notice of appeal was not filed until over a year after the judgment complained of was handed down [which was] obviously well outside the sixty-day limit\u201d).\n{42} The appellate courts\u2019 ability under Trujillo to review untimely appeals does not save this appeal. See Trujillo, 117 N.M. at 278, 871 P.2d at 374. Here, Wife does not point to any unusual circumstances that would require extension of the filing deadline, nor did she request an extension of time to file an appeal. See id.; Rule 12-201(E)(1), (2). Furthermore, the extended period between the October 7 order and the date the appeal was filed \u2014 over five years \u2014 would stretch the flexibility permitted by Trujillo well beyond its breaking point. See Trujillo, 117 N.M. at 278, 871 P.2d at 374; Chavez v. U-Haul Co. of N.M., 1997-NMSC-051, \u00b6\u00b6 19-22, 124 N.M. 165, 947 P.2d 122 (hearing an appeal where notice was filed fifty-eight minutes late, but declining to hear an appeal filed thirty days late).\nCONCLUSION\n{43} In conclusion, there was no jurisdictional bar to the district court\u2019s order voiding the plan. Since the court had jurisdiction and the October 7 order resolved all of the issues pertaining to the petition that prompted it, the order was final and appealable. Wife filed this appeal over five years after that order was filed, well beyond the thirty-day deadline, and has provided no extraordinary reason for this Court to consider the untimely appeal. We decline to do so and dismiss the appeal.\n{44} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nMICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nJONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge\nTIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge", "type": "majority", "author": "BUSTAMANTE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Peter B. Shoenfeld, P.A. Peter B. Shoenfeld Santa Fe, NM Sawtell, Wirth & Beidscheid, P.C. Peter F. Wirth Santa Fe, NM for Appellant", "Hurley, Toevs, Styles, Hamblin & Panter, P. A. Gregory W. MacKenzie Albuquerque, NM for Appellee Cathe Temmerman", "Pregenzer, Baysinger, Wideman & Sale, PC Ruth O. Pregenzer Albuquerque, NM for Conservator-Appellee Decades, LLC", "Keleher & McLeod, P.A. W. Spencer Reid Thomas C. Bird Gary J. Van Luchene Albuquerque, NM for Intervenor-Appellee Moody Bible Institute of Chicago" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Certiorari Denied, January 9, 2013,\nNo. 33,935\nIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2013-NMCA-024\nFiling Date: November 2, 2012\nDocket No. 31,230\nIN THE MATTER OF BRUCE C. CLINESMITH, an Adult Incapacitated Person (now deceased), RUTH CLINESMITH, Interested Party-Appellant, v. CATHE TEMMERMAN, Petitioner-Appellee, and DECADES, LLC, Conservator-Appellee Intervenor, and MOODY BIBLE INSTITUTE OF CHICAGO, Intervenor-Appellee.\nPeter B. Shoenfeld, P.A. Peter B. Shoenfeld Santa Fe, NM Sawtell, Wirth & Beidscheid, P.C. Peter F. Wirth Santa Fe, NM for Appellant\nHurley, Toevs, Styles, Hamblin & Panter, P. A. Gregory W. MacKenzie Albuquerque, NM for Appellee Cathe Temmerman\nPregenzer, Baysinger, Wideman & Sale, PC Ruth O. Pregenzer Albuquerque, NM for Conservator-Appellee Decades, LLC\nKeleher & McLeod, P.A. W. Spencer Reid Thomas C. Bird Gary J. Van Luchene Albuquerque, NM for Intervenor-Appellee Moody Bible Institute of Chicago" }, "file_name": "0393-01", "first_page_order": 409, "last_page_order": 423 }