{ "id": 4190939, "name": "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HARLA WEBB, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Webb", "decision_date": "2012-12-12", "docket_number": "No. 33,983; Docket No. 31,577", "first_page": "428", "last_page": "435", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2013-NMCA-027" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "2000-NMCA-029", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 106520 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/128/0806-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 N.M. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 727725 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" }, { "page": "1175" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/116/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 N.M. 778", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 711408 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "780", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he intent of the Legislature in enacting Section 30-6-3 ... was to extend the broadest possible protection to children, who may be led astray in innumerable ways.\"" }, { "page": "584", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he intent of the Legislature in enacting Section 30-6-3 ... was to extend the broadest possible protection to children, who may be led astray in innumerable ways.\"" }, { "page": "780" }, { "page": "584" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/103/0778-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMCA-081", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 257774 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/127/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMCA-031", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4242453 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 56, 61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/145/0733-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMSC-010", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3784610 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/143/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMSC-004", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 929169 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/137/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 P.3d 514", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2011-NMCERT-008", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2011-NMCA-081", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4249841 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 17" }, { "page": "\u00b6 20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/150/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "2010-NMCA-041", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4248289 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 3, 21, 24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/148/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "2013-NMCERT-003", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "year": 2012, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 P.3d 418", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "year": 2012, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2012-NMCA-080", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4188598 ], "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/2/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-035", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4244712 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 16, 22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0434-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMSC-001", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 827383 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "2011-NMSC-003", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4248753 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 5" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/149/0185-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1001, "char_count": 22036, "ocr_confidence": 0.829, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.77579275919505e-08, "percentile": 0.4150014151404194 }, "sha256": "462f454aeaa4890f95126b2ef5c2fed51a213dcb9ff3db28d496869d4e1a13fa", "simhash": "1:d796f733278a014d", "word_count": 3564 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:46:09.531131+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge", "MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge", "MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge" ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HARLA WEBB, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nGARCIA, Judge.\n{1} Defendant Har\u00eda Webb signed the written consent form to allow a piercing to occur on a minor without obtaining authorization or permission from the minor\u2019s parent or legal guardian. Though the piercing was successful, the minor sustained serious injuries as a result of an accidental fall in the tattoo parlor. Defendant appeals her convictions for child abuse by endangerment without great bodily harm and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. We affirm Defendant\u2019s conviction for contributing to the delinquency of a minor but reverse her conviction for child abuse by endangerment because the State did not present sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that Defendant\u2019s conduct created a substantial and foreseeable risk of harm.\nBACKGROUND\n{2} On May 20, 2009, Defendant picked up her daughter, Steffanie, and two of her daughter\u2019s friends, including fifteen-year-old Nicole, from Ruidoso Middle School. Defendant and Nicole were not related and had never previously met. Steffanie and Nicole had arranged for Nicole to be picked up by Defendant because Steffanie was going to get her belly button pierced and Nicole wanted to get her tongue pierced.\n{3} Defendant drove the girls to Tre\u2019s Tattoo Studio in Ruidoso. Nicole told Defendant that her mother, Jennifer \u201cMichelle\u201d Pino, had given her permission to have her tongue pierced, but this was not true. Nicole had sufficient cash to pay for the piercing, which Defendant believed meant that Nicole\u2019s mother had given her permission. Defendant did not contact Nicole\u2019s mother.\n{4} WhentheyarrivedatTre\u2019sTattoo Studio, the owner, Joe \u201cTre\u201d Garcia, provided Steffanie and Nicole with a piercing record and release form (Release Form). Nicole completed the top portion of the Release Form, providing her name, contact information, age, and date of birth. She indicated that she did not have any allergies, history of bleeding, or blood borne irregularities. In accordance with New Mexico law, 16.36.5.11 NMAC (5/16/2008), the Release Form required a parent or legal guardian to consent to a minor\u2019s piercing. The Release Form states:\nA person may not perform a piercing on a minor without the consent of the minor\u2019s parent or legal guardian, and an establishment may not perform a piercing on a minor under the age of 18 unless the minor is accompanied by a (Parent or Legal Guardian). I authorize the piercing described to be performed on my child.\nDefendant printed her name and signed as Nicole\u2019s parent or legal guardian.\n{5} There was conflicting testimony surrounding Defendant\u2019s act of signing Nicole\u2019s Release Form. Garcia testified that he asked Defendant whether Steffanie and Nicole were her daughters and Defendant answered, \u201cYes.\u201d He said that if Defendant had told him that she was not related to Nicole, he would not have performed the piercing. Defendant testified that she did not present herself as Nicole\u2019s mother or guardian. She said she signed the Release Form because Garcia told her to sign it and she \u201cdidn\u2019t think it was that big of a deal.\u201d\n{6} Nicole received a tongue piercing without complications. She then sat on a chair to watch Steffanie receive her piercing. Before Steffanie received her piercing, Nicole passed out and hit the tile floor face first. She was unconscious for approximately ten to fifteen seconds. When she woke up, she looked in the mirror and saw blood \u201cgushing everywhere.\u201d She noticed one of her teeth was missing and two were damaged. She had bruising on her face and body and was \u201cin a lot of pain.\u201d\n{7} Nicole testified that Defendant did not offer to call 911 or take her to the hospital. Garcia testified that Defendant did not try to help Nicole in any way and told Garcia that it was a good thing she was taking Nicole to the dentist the next day. Defendant testified that she wanted to call 911 or take Nicole to the hospital but Nicole said she was okay. Defendant testified that Nicole appeared to have \u201ca couple chipped teeth\u201d but \u201cseemed fine.\u201d\n{8} Defendant left the tattoo parlor with the children and drove Nicole home. When they arrived at Nicole\u2019s house, Steffanie walked Nicole to her front door but did not go inside. Defendant did not exit the car and did not inform anyone about the piercing or the accident. Nicole told her mother\u2019s boyfriend that she fell down. When Nicole\u2019s mother arrived home from work, she observed bruises on Nicole\u2019s face and damage to Nicole\u2019s mouth and teeth. Nicole told her mother she had passed out after school. Nicole\u2019s mother made an emergency dental appointment for the next morning. Later that night, Nicole told her mother the truth about her fall and the piercing. Nicole\u2019s mother called Steffanie\u2019s cell phone and asked to speak to Defendant. Defendant did not come to the phone and did not return the phone call.\n{9} On May 21, Nicole\u2019s mother took Nicole to a dentist in Alamogordo. The damage to Nicole\u2019s teeth was more extensive than anyone suspected. As of October 2011, Nicole had received three root canals and four sets of temporary teeth and still needed additional treatment. She received penicillin during the course of her treatment and discovered, for the first time, that she was allergic to the drug. Because she missed so many days of school, Nicole was forced to drop out and, at the time of the trial, was working to obtain her GED. She testified her mouth was \u201calways in pain.\u201d\n{10} Garcia was the only witness who testified about the risks of tongue piercing. He testified as follows:\nQ: Now, are there any risks involved?\nA: Not really. It\u2019s rare that. . . you hear a lot of. . . people . . . say that you\u2019ll hit a vein. You won\u2019t. Your veins run on the side of your tongue. In the rare occasion, every one in 100, one in 150, has that vein in the middle and you can\u2019t do it.\nQ: Okay. What about for infections and things of that nature? Is there a risk?\nA: We tell you how to take care of it... . If you don\u2019t take care of it, it\u2019s gonna get infected, like anything else.\nQ: So, ... so you\u2019re saying, there is a risk?\nA: Oh, yes, ma\u2019am. There\u2019s a risk with anything, with an ear piercing, a tattoo, . . . eyebrow piercing, a tongue piercing, all of it.\nQ: Okay. Alright, so are there any other types of risk involved?\nA: Just infection. Infection is the main risk.\nHe testified that in his approximately twenty years of doing piercings, he had never seen someone faint from a piercing before Nicole.\n{11} Defendant was charged by way of criminal information with three counts: (1) abandonment of a child resulting in great bodily harm; (2) forgery; and (3) contributing to the delinquency of a minor (CDM). The State filed a nolle prosequi on the forgery count prior to trial. A jury trial was held on November 18, 2010. Defense counselmoved for a directed verdict at the close of the State\u2019s case. The district court denied the motion. Defense counsel renewed the motion at the close of the evidence and the court again denied the motion.\n{12} The jury was instructed on child abuse with and without great bodily harm. To find Defendant guilty of child abuse without great bodily harm, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, inter alia:\n1. [Defendant] caused Nicole . . . to be placed in a situation which endangered the life or health of Nicole;\n2. [Defendant acted with reckless disregard and without justification. To find that [Defendant] acted with reckless disregard, you must find that . . . [Defendant knew or should have known [D]efendant\u2019s conduct created a substantial and foreseeable risk, . . . [Defendant disregarded that risk and [Defendant was wholly indifferent to the consequences of the conduct and to the welfare and safety ofNicole [.]\n{13} The jury was instructed that, to find Defendant guilty of CDM, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, inter alia:\n1. [Defendant took the child to have a piercing and signed the consent for the procedure without conferring with [Nicole\u2019s] parent and/or . . . [Defendant did not seek medical treatment for the child and/or notify [Nicole\u2019s] parent of [Nicole\u2019s] injuries.\n2. This caused and/or encouraged Nicole ... to refuse to obey the reasonable and lawful commands or directions of her parent a person who had lawful authority over Nicole . . . [OR] conduct herself in a manner injurious to her morals and/or health and/or welfare of Nicole.\nThe jury found Defendant guilty of child abuse without great bodily harm and CDM.\nDISCUSSION\n{14} On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction. \u201c[0]ur review for sufficiency of the evidence is deferential to the jury\u2019s findings.\u201d State v. Garcia, 2011-NMSC-003, \u00b6 5, 149 N.M. 185, 246 P.3d 1057. We review direct and circumstantial evidence \u201cin the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, indulging all reasonable inferences and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the verdict.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We must, however, scrutinize \u201cthe evidence and supervision ofthe jury\u2019s fact-finding function to ensure that, indeed, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential facts required for a conviction.\u201d State v. Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, \u00b6 19, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\nA. Child Abuse by Endangerment\n{15} Defendant was convicted of child abuse by endangerment pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 30-6-l(D)(l) (2009), which defines the offense as \u201cknowingly, intentionally or negligently, and without justifiable cause, causing or permitting a child to he . . . placed in a situation that may endanger the child\u2019s life or health}.]\u201d \u201c[T]he legislative purpose that animates [this] statute [is] to punish conduct that creates a truly significant risk of serious harm to children[,]\u201d it \u201cwould be reserved for the most serious occurrences, not for minor or theoretical dangers.\u201d State v. Chavez, 2009-NMSC-035, \u00b6\u00b6 16, 22, 146 N.M. 434, 211 P.3d 891. Prior to Chavez, we reviewed convictions under this statute to determine whether the State had proved the defendant\u2019s conduct created a \u201creasonable probability or possibility\u201d of endangerment. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 16, 17 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In Chavez, the Supreme Court rejected this test and held that, to support a conviction, the state must prove the defendant\u2019s conduct \u201ccreated a substantial and foreseeable risk of harm.\u201d Id. \u00b6 22 (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).\n{16} Since Chavez, we have upheld a conviction for child abuse by endangerment where a defendant, while intoxicated, drove a vehicle with his nine-year-old child as a passenger. See State v. Orquiz, 2012-NMCA-080, \u00b6 8, 284 P.3d 418, cert. quashed, 2013-NMCERT-003, ___P.3d ___, (No. 33,677, March 29, 2012). We have also upheld a conviction for child abuse by endangerment where a reasonable jury could have found a defendant was aware that her son was being abused by her boyfriend and continued to leave her son in the boyfriend\u2019s care, ultimately resulting in her son\u2019s death by abuse. Statev. Vasquez, 2010-NMCA-041, \u00b6\u00b6 3, 21, 24, 148 N.M. 202, 232 P.3d 438.\n{17} Defendant contends the State failed to present any evidence that her conduct created a substantial and foreseeable risk of harm to Nicole. The State argues that Defendant\u2019s conduct of signing the Release Form created a substantial and foreseeable risk of harm to Nicole from the piercing itself and from the possibility of an infection. The State also argues that Defendant\u2019s lack of knowledge about the tongue piercing procedure and about Nicole\u2019s medical history, in particular her allergy to penicillin, created a substantial and foreseeable risk of harm to Nicole.\n{18} We consider the following factors in analyzing whether a defendant\u2019s conduct supports criminal liability for child abuse by endangerment: \u201c(1) the gravity of the risk created by the defendant, (2) whether the underlying conduct violates a statute, and (3) the likelihood of harm to the child.\u201d State v. Gonzales, 2011-NMCA-081, \u00b6 17, 150 N.M. 494, 263 P.3d 271, cert. granted, 2011-NMCERT-008, 268 P.3d 514. While the likelihood that harm will occur is \u201cno longer a determinative factor ... it still remains an important consideration when evaluating the magnitude of the risk.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n{19} Defendant provided written consent for Nicole to receive a tongue piercing. The State first argues the piercing itself constituted a substantial and foreseeable risk of harm from Defendant\u2019s conduct. While it was certainly foreseeable that Nicole would receive a piercing based on Defendant\u2019s act of signing the Release Form, we are not persuaded by the evidence presented in this case that piercing is the type of most serious occurrence from which our Legislature intended to protect children. In reaching this conclusion, we reject the State\u2019s argument that this case is analogous to the dangers identified in State v. Graham, 2005-NMSC-004, 137 N.M. 197, 109 P.3d 285.\n{20} In Graham, our New Mexico Supreme Court held there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant\u2019s conviction for child abuse by endangerment where, during a lawful search of a house in which two infants were present, police officers found a marijuana roach on the living room floor and a marijuana bud in a crib. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 2, 15 (applying the less stringent test utilized before the standard was changed in the Chavez decision). The Graham Court explained: \u201cGiven the illegality of the [marijuana] and the Legislature\u2019s determination that the substance is particularly dangerous to minors, we believe it is within the jurors\u2019 experience to decide whether the amount of accessible marijuana endangered the health of [the young children].\u201d Id. \u00b6 12. Unlike marijuana, body piercing is not illegal. The State directs us to Subsection(C)(7) of Regulation 16.36.5.11 of the Administrative Code, which requires body art establishments to maintain written proof of the presence and consent of a parent or legal guardian for procedures performed on clients who are minors. This suggests, at most, that body piercing is an adult activity unless consent is provided. It does not suggest that piercing, in and of itself, is illegal or presents a foreseeable risk of serious harm to children. As such, Graham is inapposite and applied a standard for foreseeable endangerment that is no longer utilized by our courts.\n{21} The State next argues that infection was a substantial and foreseeable risk of harm from Defendant\u2019s conduct. While the State may have attempted to establish that infection constituted a substantial risk, it failed to do so based upon the evidence presented in this case. The only witness who testified regarding the risk of infection was Garcia, the owner of the tattoo parlor. Garcia testified that \u201c[i]nfection is the main risk\u201d of tongue piercing but he did not quantify the risk in any way and, in fact, seemed to minimize it. Even assuming that the level of risk from post-piercing infection could be established with empirical or scientific evidence, there was no such evidence here.\n{22} The State also argues that Defendant\u2019s conduct supports criminal liability because Defendant lacked knowledge about tongue piercing and about Nicole\u2019s medical history, in particular, her allergy to penicillin. We are not persuaded. Defendant did not perform the piercing; rather, she signed the consent form allowing Nicole to be pierced by Garcia. Whether Defendant\u2019s actions endangered Nicole\u2019s life or health within the meaning of the statute does not depend on Defendant\u2019s knowledge of tongue piercing. The evidence established that Garcia had sufficient knowledge and experience to perform this type of piercing. As for the allergy, at the time Nicole received the piercing, neither Nicole nor her mother knew that Nicole was allergic to penicillin. The child endangerment statute \u201cevinces a legislative intent to use the concept of criminal negligence ... as the standard for negligent child abuse.\u201d State v. Schoonmaker, 2008-NMSC-010, \u00b6 44, 143 N.M. 373, 176 P.3d 1105. In order to be criminally negligent, a defendant need not be subjectively aware of a risk, but the risk must be one of which \u2018\u201che should be aware.\u2019\u201d Id. \u00b6 43 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Model Penal Code \u00a7 2.02(c) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1962)). \u201cThe risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor\u2019s failure to perceive it, . . . involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor\u2019s situation.\u201d Id. (emphasis omitted). No one could have foreseen that Nicole would have or develop an allergy to penicillin, which would complicate her treatment. Defendant cannot be convicted for child abuse for failing to perceive a risk to Nicole of which nobody was aware.\n{23} The State did not present sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that Defendant\u2019s conduct created a substantial and foreseeable risk of serious harm to Nicole. As we explained in Gonzales, \u201cit is the endangerment and not the resulting injury that constitutes the offense}.]\u201d 2011-NMCA-081, \u00b6 20. Thus, to support liability, \u201cthere must be an actual or imputed foreseeability of danger directed toward the children who might be injured as a result of Defendant\u2019s acts.\u201d Id. There was no such foreseeability of serious injury established in this case. Accordingly, we reverse Defendant\u2019s conviction for child abuse by endangerment.\nB. Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor\n{24} Defendant was also convicted of CDM pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 30-6-3 (1990), which defines the offense as \u201ccommitting any act or omitting the performance of any duty, which act or omission causes or tends to cause or encourage the delinquency of any person under the age of eighteen years.\u201d Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to show that she \u201ccause[d] and/or encourage[d] Nicole to deceive her mother.\u201d We disagree.\n{25} In State v. Dietrich, we rejected the defendant\u2019s argument that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for CDM because the minor, an admitted heroin user, never testified that the defendant encouraged him to use alcohol or drugs. 2009-NMCA-031, \u00b6\u00b6 56, 61, 145 N.M. 733, 204 P.3d 748. We held that the minor\u2019s testimony that the defendant \u201cprovided and purchased drugs and alcohol for [the minor] satisfies the element of causing [the minor] to engage in underage drinking/drug use whether or not [the defendant encouraged such use.\u201d Id. \u00b6 61 (alteration, internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly here, the jury could find that Defendant\u2019s act of transporting Nicole to the tattoo parlor and signing the Release Form caused or encouraged Nicole to deceive her mother by obtaining a piercing without permission even though Defendant did not actively encourage the piercing.\n{26} \u201cThe purpose of the CDM statute is to protect children from harmful adult conduct.\u201d State v. Barr, 1999-NMCA-081, \u00b6 17, 127 N.M. 504, 984 P.2d 185 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also State v. Pitts, 103 N.M. 778, 780, 714 P.2d 582, 584 (1986) (\u201c[T]he intent of the Legislature in enacting Section 30-6-3 ... was to extend the broadest possible protection to children, who may be led astray in innumerable ways.\u201d). Our New Mexico Supreme Court has \u201cconsistently rejected narrow constructions of the statute that would limit its usefulness in protecting children.\u201d Pitts, 103 N.M. at 780, 714 P.2d at 584. \u201cWe always have relied on juries to determine what acts constitute contributing to delinquency in a particular case.\u201d State v. Trevino, 116 N.M. 528, 531, 865 P.2d 1172, 1175 (1993).\n{27} Even though Nicole told Defendant that her mother had given her permission for a tongue piercing, it was for the jury to determine whether Defendant\u2019s failure to confirm this with Nicole\u2019s mother or require Nicole\u2019s mother to sign the Release Form was reasonable under the circumstances. See State v. Romero, 2000-NMCA-029, \u00b6 31, 128 N.M. 806, 999 P.2d 1038 (\u201c[Wjhere the State seeks to convict a defendant of CDM for causing or encouraging a minor to refuse to obey the reasonable and lawful command or direction of the minor\u2019s parent. . . the State must prove . . . that the defendant knew or by the exercise of reasonable care should have known of such command or direction.\u201d). The State introduced sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that Defendant knew or should have known that Nicole\u2019s mother had not consented to the piercing. Defendant testified that she believed Nicole had her mother\u2019s permission because she had sufficient cash to pay for the piercing, but it was for the jury to determine whether this was reasonable. Defendant did not contactNicole\u2019s mother, or any other member of Nicole\u2019s family, even after the accident. The jury could have inferred from this conduct that Defendant knew she had acted without permission. Accordingly, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant\u2019s conviction for CDM.\nCONCLUSION\n{28} We affirm Defendant\u2019s conviction for contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Because we conclude the evidence was insufficient to supportDefendant\u2019s conviction for child abuse by endangerment, we reverse Defendant\u2019s conviction on that count and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.\n{29} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nTIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nMICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge\nMICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge", "type": "majority", "author": "GARCIA, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary K. King, Attorney General Olga Serafimova, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM Sri Mullis, Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM for Appellee", "Jacqueline L. Cooper, Chief Public Defender Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellant" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Certiorari Denied, February 7, 2013,\nNo. 33,983\nIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2013-NMCA-027\nFiling Date: December 12, 2012\nDocket No. 31,577\nSTATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HARLA WEBB, Defendant-Appellant.\nGary K. King, Attorney General Olga Serafimova, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM Sri Mullis, Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM for Appellee\nJacqueline L. Cooper, Chief Public Defender Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellant" }, "file_name": "0428-01", "first_page_order": 444, "last_page_order": 451 }