{ "id": 4191322, "name": "LAUREL C. EDENBURN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH and DEBORAH BUSEMEYER, Appointed Custodian of Records in the Department of Health, Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Edenburn v. New Mexico Department of Health", "decision_date": "2012-12-11", "docket_number": "No. 33,992; Docket No. 31,285", "first_page": "667", "last_page": "681", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2013-NMCA-045" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "Kan. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 45-221", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Kan. Stat. Ann.", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(20)", "parenthetical": "exempting \"[n]otes, preliminary drafts, research data in the process of analysis, unfunded grant proposals, memoranda, recommendations or other records in which opinions are expressed or policies or actions are proposed\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2010-NMSC-051", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4249645 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/149/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 N.M. 737", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582493 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "741" }, { "page": "1192" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/98/0737-01" ] }, { "cite": "452 U.S. 394", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1313660 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398", "parenthetical": "\"Nor are the res judicata consequences of a final, unappealed judgment on the merits altered by the fact that the judgment may have been wrong or rested on a legal principle subsequently overruled in another case.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/452/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMCA-073", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 15682 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" }, { "page": "\u00b6 13" }, { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/133/0721-01" ] }, { "cite": "2011-NMSC-011", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4249767 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 38" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/150/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMCA-137", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3670599 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0630-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMSC-040", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 827393 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" }, { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 U.S. 86", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 355584 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/509/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563455 ], "weight": 23, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398", "parenthetical": "rejecting the \"bright-line rule of retroactivity in all civil cases\" set out in Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993)" }, { "page": "1383", "parenthetical": "rejecting the \"bright-line rule of retroactivity in all civil cases\" set out in Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993)" }, { "page": "398" }, { "page": "1383" }, { "page": "399" }, { "page": "1384" }, { "page": "401-02" }, { "page": "1386-87" }, { "page": "401" }, { "page": "1386" }, { "page": "400" }, { "page": "1385" }, { "page": "400" }, { "page": "1385", "parenthetical": "stating that although a new rule was announced, the first factor weighed in favor of the presumption because a tortfeasor could not be said to rely on the \"claimed absence of potential liability for [his] conduct\"" }, { "page": "398" }, { "page": "1383", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "397" }, { "page": "1382" }, { "page": "402" }, { "page": "1387" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 688", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566481 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "691" }, { "page": "454" }, { "page": "690" }, { "page": "453" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 P.3d 364", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2012-NMCA-104", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4189957 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/2/0667-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMCA-022", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 929164 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 23" }, { "parenthetical": "alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/137/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 N.M. 672", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5329661 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675" }, { "page": "611" }, { "page": "675-76" }, { "page": "611-12" }, { "page": "675" }, { "page": "611" }, { "page": "675-76" }, { "page": "611-12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/82/0672-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMCA-102", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 77157 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 16" }, { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 N.M. 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1577390 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" }, { "page": "337" }, { "page": "334" }, { "page": "257" }, { "page": "333" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/96/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMCA-057", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4243270 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 8, 11" }, { "page": "\u00b6 7" }, { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 790", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2868698 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "797", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "1243", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "797" }, { "page": "1243" }, { "page": "797" }, { "page": "1243" }, { "page": "797" }, { "page": "1243" }, { "page": "797" }, { "page": "1243" }, { "page": "797" }, { "page": "1243" }, { "page": "797" }, { "page": "1243" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0790-01" ] }, { "cite": "2010-NMCA-080", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4246694 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 3" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/148/0877-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 P.3d 853", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2012-NMSC-026", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4190412 ], "weight": 23, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 38" }, { "page": "\u00b6 16" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 35, 38" }, { "page": "\u00b6 49" }, { "page": "\u00b6 49" }, { "page": "\u00b6 13" }, { "page": "\u00b6 16" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "\u00b6 26" }, { "page": "\u00b6 3" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 34-43" }, { "page": "\u00b6 40" }, { "page": "\u00b6 38" }, { "page": "\u00b6 40" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 42, 43" }, { "page": "\u00b6 16" }, { "page": "\u00b6 16" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 12-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/2/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 Mo. L. Rev. 279", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Mo. L. Rev.", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1593, "char_count": 46382, "ocr_confidence": 0.817, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.8172472706271035e-08, "percentile": 0.3028122488994532 }, "sha256": "0d444fa5d7ea7fec2ae54c3560652fc0b172e4b31f2e1ba72d3f6dc1e70f15f9", "simhash": "1:3f40bf0b9ec138be", "word_count": 7387 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:46:09.531131+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge", "CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge", "MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge" ], "parties": [ "LAUREL C. EDENBURN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH and DEBORAH BUSEMEYER, Appointed Custodian of Records in the Department of Health, Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nBUSTAMANTE, Judge.\n{1} Appellant\u2019s motion for rehearing is granted. The opinion filed in this case on July 31, 2012, is withdrawn and this Opinion is substituted in its place. In addition to briefs by the parties on the motion for rehearing, the Court received briefs from amici New Mexico Foundation for Open Government (NMFOG) and the New Mexico Attorney General.\n{2} Appellant, Laurel C. Edenburn, sought to obtain records from Appellee, the New Mexico Department of Health (DOH). After receiving some materials but being denied others, Appellant filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to force DOH to disclose the withheld material. DOH moved for and was granted summary judgment. We reverse.\nI. BACKGROUND\n{3} Edenburn\u2019s first request letter was sent\u00f3n August 20,2007. It requested access to seven categories of information related to the T itle V Abstinence Education Block Grant program managed by DOH. The letter referenced New Mexico\u2019s Inspection of Public Records Act (IPRA). See NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 14-2-1 to -12 (1947, as amended through 2011). The letter was received on August 24, and DOH responded on that day, stating that the request was received and a response would be provided \u201cwithin [fifteen] days in accordance with the [IPRA], unless we encounter difficulties in retrieving the [material].\u201d See \u00a7 14-2-11 (setting forth requirements for denials of written requests). On September 10, seventeen days after receipt, DOH requested an extension \u201con your [IPRA]\u201d request to September 15. On September 14, DOH notified Edenburn by email that the records would be available for inspection on September 18. Edenburn inspected them at the DOH offices. DOH notified Edenburn on September 21 that there \u201cmay be additional documents which may be responsive to your Public Records Request,\u201d and requested an extension to \u201cprovide careful review with the expectation of providing [Edenburn] with any responsive documents no later than the first week of October 2007.\u201d On October 10, Edenburn notified DOH that no additional documents had been received and she requested a number of documents that were not included in the inspection. DOH provided an additional set of documents to Edenburn on October 25.\n{4} On November 2, Edenburn sent two letters to DOH referencing IPRA and identifying documents still not received. One of these letters requested copies of an email string and a draft letter, which are the subjects of the present enforcement action. For the sake of clarity, we will refer to these as the \u201cemail string\u201d and the \u201cdraft letter.\u201d The request was received by D OH on November 7. DOH responded fourteen days later, stating that these two items were protected by executive privilege and would not be produced. Edenburn requested additional information about the basis for executive privilege on November 28, including which officials were involved in \u201csending or receiving\u201d these items, whether the items were related to \u201claw or policymaking,\u201d and, if so, the laws or policies to which they related, and whether the items were \u201cdeliberative in nature.\u201d On December 4, Edenburn sent another letter, stating that \u201crelative to handling my [November 2] request for public records, the [DOH] has not complied with the terms of Section 14-2-11 of [IPRA].\u201d See \u00a7 14-2-11 (stating that denial of access to public records must be made within fifteen days of receipt of the request and include the names of the persons responsible for the denial and a description of the records sought). DOH responded on January 4, 2008. This letter stated that the email string was \u201cdeliberative and predeterminative in nature and was written before any final determinations were made.\u201d It also clarified that the draft letter was not subject to executive privilege, but would not be produced because it was a draft and \u201ctherefore [is] not subject to public records status.\u201d\n{5} Edenburn filed a complaint to enforce the provisions of IPRA and for writ of mandamus or injunction on February 19, 2009. An amended complaint was filed on June 4,2009, to change the name of the nominal defendant and add a request for attorney fees and costs. The complaint refers to Edenburn\u2019s letter of November 2, 2007, in which she requested access to inspect the DOH\u2019s records, including those previously withheld. The complaint alleges that \u201c[DOH has] failed to comply with Section 14-2-11(B) ... in that [DOH] failed to set forth the names and titles or positions of each person responsible for the denial . . . within fifteen (15) days after the request was received.\u201d In addition, the complaint alleges that \u201c[DOH] should be required to pay damages to [Edenburn] not to exceed $100[] per day for each day [DOH] is not in compliance until a written denial is issued.\u201d DOH moved for summary judgment. DOH\u2019s motion was granted by two separate orders. The district court found that (1) the \u201crule of reason\u201d applied to the draft letter and, under that rule, \u201ccountervailing public policy protects drafts such as this document from disclosure\u201d; and (2) the email string was protected from disclosure by the deliberative process privilege, a form of executive privilege. See generally Russell L. Weaver & James T.R. Jones, The Deliberative Process Privilege, 54 Mo. L. Rev. 279 (1989). The district court did not conduct an in camera review of either document. The district court denied Edenburn\u2019s claim for statutory damages. This appeal followed.\nII. DISCUSSION\nA. The Republican Party Decision\n{6} The primary question before the Court in this case is whether summary judgment was properly granted. We determine that it was not. We base this decision on the New Mexico Supreme Court\u2019s ruling in Republican Party of New Mexico v. New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Department (Republican Party II), 2012-NMSC-026, 283 P.3d 853, which was decided after the present appeal was filed. In Republican Party II, the issue was whether the deliberative process privilege applied to prevent disclosure of documents in the context of a request for public records by plaintiffs who were \u201cresearch[ingj whether undocumented aliens were voting in federal, state, and local elections in New Mexico.\u201d Republican Party of N.M. v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep\u2019t (Republican Party I), 2010-NMCA-080, \u00b6 3, 148 N.M. 877, 242 P.3d 444 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Republican Party of New Mexico sought records relating to driver\u2019s licenses issued to \u201cindividuals who are not citizens or legal residents of the United States.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court held that the privilege applied and that the documents sought were properly withheld. Id. \u00b6 36. On certiorari, the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed. Republican Party II, 2012-NMSC-026, \u00b6 38. Several holdings in that case are dispositive of the matter before us because they eliminate the bases on which D OH relied to withhold the email string and draft letter, and on which the district court\u2019s ruling rested. We first summarize the relevant holdings of Republican Party II, and then apply them to this case. Next, we address whether Republican Party IPs holdings apply retroactively or prospectively. Finally, we address the issue of damages.\n{7} First, our Supreme Court negated the \u201crule of reason\u201d analysis adopted in State ex rel. Newsome v. Alarid, 90 N.M. 790, 797, 568 P.2d 1236, 1243 (1977) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), as a \u201cnon-statutory exception to disclosure.\u201d City of Farmington v. The Daily Times, 2009-NMCA-057, \u00b6\u00b6 8, 11, 146 N.M. 349, 210 P.3d 246, overruled by Republican Party II, 2012-NMSC-026. It stated that, instead, \u201ccourts now should restrict their analysis to whether disclosure under IPRA may be withheld because of a specific exception contained within IPRA, or statutory or regulatory exceptions, or privileges adopted by this Court or grounded in the constitution.\u201d Republican Party II, 2012-NMSC-026, \u00b6 16.\n{8} Second, our Supreme Court held that \u201cno deliberative process privilege exists under New Mexico law.\u201d Id. \u00b6 42. The Court recognized that the term \u201cexecutive privilege\u201d includes several different types of privilege, including the deliberative process privilege and the executive communications privilege. Id. \u00b6 18. Although the communications privilege \u201cis required by the Constitution of the State of New Mexico, specifically the separation of powers clause contained in Article III,\u201d the deliberative process privilege is rooted in the common law. Id. \u00b6 35 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted); see N.M. Const. art. III, \u00a7 1. Because New Mexico recognizes only those privileges \u201crequired by the Constitution, the Rules of Evidence, or other rules of this Court,\u201d such a common law privilege is not recognized. Republican Party II, 2012-NMSC-026, \u00b6\u00b6 35, 38 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court stated, \u201cAllowing the executive to resist disclosure on the basis of a common law deliberative process privilege not otherwise recognized under our state\u2019s constitution would frustrate IPRA\u2019s guiding purpose of promoting government transparency.\u201d Id. \u00b638.\n{9} Third, the Court held that the communications privilege is itself limited. It applies only to communications \u201cconnected to the chief executive\u2019s decisionmaking, as opposed to other executive branch decisionmaking,\u201d and only to those \u201cto or from individuals in very close organizational and functional proximity to the Governor.\u201d Id. \u00b6\u00b6 44-46 (alteration, emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). And \u201cthe privilege . . . [is] reserved to the constitutionally-designated head of the executive branch \u2014 the Governor.\u201d Id. \u00b6 47. Consequently, only the Governor may assert the privilege. Id.\n{10} Finally, the Supreme Court addressed how an assertion of the communications privilege should be evaluated in the context of IPRA and refined the procedures set out in earlier cases and different contexts. The procedures for evaluating \u00e9xecutive privilege, first articulated in State ex rel. Attorney General v. First Judicial District Court of New Mexico, 96 N.M. 254, 261, 629 P.2d 330, 337 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by Republican Party II, 2012-NMSC-026, required the court to \u201cbalance the public\u2019s interest in preserving confidentiality to promote intra-governmental candor with the individual\u2019s need for disclosure of the particular information sought.\u201d Id. at 258, 629 P.2d at 334. Under First Judicial\u2019s approach, the agency must first show that the privilege applies. Id. Next, the requester must \u201cshow good cause for the production of the requested information.\u201d Id. If good cause is shown, then \u201cthe court must then conduct an in camera examination of the requested material,\u201d and \u201cbe satisfied that the . . . material would be admissible in evidence and that it is otherwise unavailable\u201d to the requester. Id. If \u201cthese prerequisites are met,\u201d the materials must be disclosed \u201cprovided that the public\u2019s interest in preserving confidentiality does not outweigh the specific needs of the movant.\u201d Id.\n{11} The Republican Party II Court distinguished First Judicial, noting that it \u201cinvolved a discovery dispute, not a public records request.\u201d Republican Party II, 2012-NMSC-026, \u00b6 49. The Court held that \u201ca party requesting public records under IPRA need not assert any particular need for disclosure.\u201d Id.', see \u00a7 14-2-8(C) (\u201cNo person requesting records shall be required to state the reason for inspecting the records.\u201d). In addition, the Court held that First Judicial\u2019s final balancing of the interests of the movant and the public\u2019s interest in confidentiality \u201cdoes not apply to claims of executive privilege under IPRA.\u201d Republican Party II, 2012-NMSC-026, \u00b6 49. \u201cInstead, courts considering the application of executive privilege to an IPRA request must independently determine whether the documents at issue are in fact covered by the privilege, and whether the privilege was invoked by the Governor, to whom the privilege is reserved.\u201d Id.\n{12} The overriding message of Republican Party II is that \u201cevery citizen has a fundamental right to have access to public records.\u201d Bd. of Comm'rs of Do\u00f1a Ana Cnty. v. Las Cruces Sun-News, 2003-NMCA-102, \u00b6 16, 134 N.M. 283, 76 P.3d 36 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Republican Party II, 2012-NMSC-026; see \u00a7 14-2-1 (A). The purpose of IPRA is \u201cto ensure ... that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of public officers and employees.\u201d Section 14-2-5. \u201cThis right is limited only by the Legislature\u2019s enumeration of certain categories of records that are excepted from inspection.\u201d Republican Party II, 2012-NMSC-026, \u00b6 13.\n1. Email String\n{13} DOH argued in the district court that the deliberative process privilege applied to the email string because it was between DOH employees and was \u201cpart of the internal decision-making process surrounding the DOH\u2019s determination of permissible and appropriate uses of remaining available federal funding for the 2007 fiscal year.\u201d Because New Mexico does not recognize the deliberative process privilege, that privilege cannot prevent disclosure. To the extent that DOH relies on the communication privilege in First Judicial, that privilege does not apply either. DOH does not assert that the email string was a communication involving the Governor, nor was the privilege asserted by the Governor. The email string is disclosable under IPRA.\n2. Draft Letter\n{14} IPRA defines public records as\nall documents, papers, letters, books, maps, tapes, photographs, recordings and other materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics, that are used, created, received, maintained or held by or on behalf of any public body and relate to public business, whether or not the records are required by law to be created or maintained.\nSection 14-2-6(F).\n{15} The parties do not dispute that the requested letter was a draft. Thus, there is no dispute of a material issue of fact; rather, the only question is whether draft documents fall within IPRA\u2019s definition of public records. It appears that the district court resolved this question in the affirmative and then applied the \u201crule of reason\u201d to conclude that public policy against disclosure outweighed the general presumption in favor of public access to public records.\n{16} DOH argues that draft documents are not public records and points to Sanchez v. Board of Regents of Eastern New Mexico University, 82 N.M. 672, 486 P.2d 608 (1971), the Office of the New Mexico Attorney General\u2019s Inspection of Public Records Act Compliance Guide (6th ed. 2009) (Guide), and \u201cnumerous regulations\u201d in the New Mexico Administrative Code for support. We agree with both NMFOG and the Attorney General that these sources do not support DOH\u2019s position and that draft documents are public documents within IPRA\u2019s reach.\n{17} We note first that DOH\u2019s position is belied by the broad language of the statute. Under IPRA, public records include \u201call documents . . . used, created, received, maintained or held by or on behalf of any public body and relate to public business, whether or not the records are required by law to be created or maintained.\u201d Section 14-2-6(F); see The Daily Times, 2009-NMCA-057, \u00b6 7 (stating that, under IPRA, public records are \u201cbroadly defined\u201d). IPRA provides for eight exceptions to this definition, which further refine the definition of \u201cpublic record\u201d and highlight the broadness of the basic definition reflecting the general presumption in favor of public access to records. See Las Cruces Sun-News, 2003-NMCA-102, \u00b6 11 (\u201cEach inquiry starts with the presumption that public policy favors the right of inspection.\u201d). In addition, unlike open records statutes in some other states, IPRA\u2019s definition does not exclude draft documents. DOH provides no argument based on the language of the statute that demonstrates that drafts are excluded from this broad definition.\n{18} DOH argues that Sanchez, decidedin 1971, \u201cremains good law\u201d and stands for the proposition that \u201cpreliminary, non-final material\u201d is not a public record. In Sanchez, the Court held that a list of proposed salaries for university staff was exempt from disclosure because \u201cno useful purpose would be served by disclosing preliminary contractual negotiations between the board and its . . . employees.\u201d 82 N.M. at 675, 486 P.2d at 611. Both NMFOG and the Attorney General argue that Sanchez is no longer good law because it pertained to a \u201cversion of IPRA that no longer exists\u201d and because its reasoning rested on \u201can early application of the \u2018rule of reason.\u2019 \u201d We agree that Sanchez is not controlling here.\n{19} First, Sanchez\u2019s holding relied on the Public Records Act, which defined \u201cpublic records\u201d differently than both the version of IPRA in place at the time and the current iteration of IPRA. Compare the Public Records Act, NMSA 1978, \u00a7 14-3-2 (G) (2005), with IPRA, NMSA 1953, \u00a7 71-5-1 (Supp. 1975) and \u00a7 14-2-6(F). In fact, the version of IPRA in place when Sanchez was decided did not even include a definition of public records. See \u00a7 71-5-1; Newsome, 90 N.M. at 797, 568 P.2d at 1243. In Newsome, the Courtmade clear that the two statutes were distinct because they had different purposes. 90 N.M. at 797, 568 P.2d at 1243. It held that the purpose of the Public Records Act was \u201cto establish a system for preserving records,\u201d and that \u201c[the Public Records Act and IPRA] have no relationship to each other for purposes of decision [on disclosure of personnel records].\u201d Id. The Sanchez holding does not address today\u2019s IPRA.\n{20} Second, the Sanchez decision hinged in large part on the lack of \u201cfinality\u201d of the list. Sanchez, 82 N.M. at 675-76, 486 P.2d at 611-12. The Court wrote, \u201c[w]e do not consider \u2018thought processes,\u2019 that is, the offer of a contract, such a public record as would require public inspection.\u201d Id. at 675, 486 P.2d at 611. The Court reasoned,\nWe would deny the right to inspect these records of the Board of Regents on the subject of salary contract negotiations before the task was completed. It would not seem fair that the general public should know the contents of an offer of salary to an individual conceivably prior to the receipt of the offer by the contemplated employee. . . . [W]e would not take away the right of the [petitioners to know about salary matters, but would merely suspend or defer the privilege of inquiry until the Board ofRegents reaches its final conclusion, i.e., the culmination of the contract between the board and the individual.\nId. at 675-76, 486 P.2d at 611-12. We agree with the Attorney General that \u201c[t]he [C]ourt in Sanchez balanced the competing interests apparent in that case and decided that the right to know was outweighed by policy considerations.\u201d Although not called so by the Sanchez Court, this analysis is essentially the \u201crule of reason,\u201d later recognized in Newsome, 90 N.M. at 797, 568 P.2d at 1243. This rule \u201crequires the district court to balance \u201cthe fundamental right of all citizens to have reasonable access to public records against countervailing public policy considerations which favor confidentiality and nondisclosure.\u201d The Daily Times, 2009-NMCA-057, \u00b6 8 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In Newsome, the Court wrote that \u201c[u]ntil the Legislature gives us direction [as to draft documents], the courts will have to apply the \u2018rule of reason\u2019 to each claim for public inspection as they arise.\u201d 90 N.M. at 797, 568 P.2d at 1243. In Republican Party II, the Supreme Court held that subsequentmodification ofIPRA rendered the \u201crule of reason\u201d obsolete: \u201c[t]he Legislature has since responded to the [Newsome] Court\u2019s request, obviating any need that existed for application of the \u2018rule of reason,\u2019 by enumerating specific exceptions to disclosure^]\u201d 2012-NMSC-026, \u00b6 16. Thus, as the Attorney General argues, Sanchez is \u201climited to its facts as a rule of reason analysis, .... It is not a proclamation that draft documents are always exempt from IPRA.\u201d\n{21} DOH next points to the Attorney General\u2019s Guide and states that it is \u201charmonious with Sanchez.\u201d The Guide states,\nEven if related to the performance of their public duties, notes and other materials prepared or collected by public employees solely for their own use may not be public records. These preliminary materials do not share the degree of finality suggested by the terms \u201cdocuments,\u201d \u201cpapers\u201d and \u201cletters\u201d in the definition of public records, and generally are not intended to perpetuate, formalize or communicate information for or on behalf of the public agency. . . . Thus, such materials generally will not be considered public records, provided employees create or use them solely for their own convenience and unless the materials are expressly referenced in or attached to a clearly public document, such as a final report.\nGuide, at 29. DOH\u2019s reliance on the Attorney General\u2019s Guide is misplaced. First, the Guide is not binding on courts. Second, this language does not mean that draft documents are exempt from IPRA. Rather, as the Attorney General asserts, the passage \u201cclarifies] that only notes and other materials prepared solely for an employee\u2019s own use might not be subject to IPRA .... This necessarily means that . . . some drafts are public records subject to [IPRA].\u201d\n{22} Third, the Guide states in the same paragraph that\nlike information protected by the executive privilege . . ., dissemination [of drafts] could easily lead to misinformation or false conclusions about the public entity\u2019s business. Anticipation of disclosure could unnecessarily hamper a public employee\u2019s ability to do his or her job by discouraging or tempering the employee\u2019s taking of notes, keeping research materials or experimenting with creative ideas in preliminary drafts of memoranda and letters. An agency\u2019s effectiveness would be significantly undermined if its employees, worried that every scrap of paper recording their own impressions or notes could be disclosed publicly, limited what they wrote down in the course of performing their duties.\nId. (emphasis added). This explanation for why draft documents prepared for an employee\u2019s own use should not be disclosed echoes the reasoning behind the deliberative process privilege, which \u201chas been developed with the stated purpose of protecting the frank and open discussions of ideas and the confidentiality of the give-and-take that occurs among agency members in the formulation of policy.\u201d Republican Party II, 2012-NMSC-026, \u00b6 26 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This privilege was rejected by the Supreme Court. Id. \u00b6 38. Like Sanchez, the Guide does not support DOH\u2019s argument that draft documents are not public records.\n{23} DOH\u2019s third argument is that draft documents fall within IPRA\u2019s catch-all exception (\u201cas otherwise provided by law\u201d) because there are regulations exempting draft documents in the New Mexico Administrative Code. See \u00a7 14-2-1 (A)(8). It cites to numerous provisions of the Code in support of its contention that \u201c[t]he general scheme established in the Administrative Code is that draft material... is considered anon-record.\u201d See, e.g., 1.13.3.7(Z) NMAC (6/30/2008); 1.1 8.308.7(H) NMAC (4/30/2012); 1.18.665.7(M) NMAC (12/20/2010). The cited regulations derive from the Public Records Act. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 14-3-1 to -25 (1959, as amended through 2011); 1.13.3.3 NMAC (6/3 0/200 8) (citing the Public Records Act as the statutory authority for this regulation); 1.18.308.3 NMAC (4/30/2008) (same); 1.18.665.3 NMAC (7/15/2010) (same). This argument is unavailing because a document\u2019s designation as a \u201cnon-record\u201d for the purposes of the Public Records Act has no impact on its status as a public record under IPRA.\n{24} The Public Records Act was enacted approximately twelve years after IPRA. See Crutchfield v. N.M. Dep\u2019t of Taxation & Revenue, 2005-NMCA-022, \u00b6 23, 137 N.M. 26, 106 P.3d 1273. \u201c[W]e presume that the Legislature was informed as to existing law, and that the Legislature did not intend to enact a law inconsistent with any existing law.\u201d Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Under this principle, we infer that the Legislature did not intend to create a conflict between the two statutes, as did the Newsome Court when it rejected explicitly any overlap between the Public Records Act and IPRA. Newsome, 90 N.M. at 797, 568 P.2d at 1243. There is no conflict between the IPRA and the Public Records Act definitions because the two statutes serve different purposes. The regulations DOH cites govern whether and how long an agency must retain a document, but do not address whether that document is a public record under IPRA while it is retained. The Guide provides an instructive example: \u201c[ujntil it is erased, a tape recording of a board meeting is used, maintained or held by or on behalf of the board and, therefore, constitutes a public record. During this time, even if it is very short, the tape is subject to inspection.\u201d Guide, at 28; see State ex rel. Toomey v. City of Truth or Consequences, 2012-NMCA-104, \u00b6 28, 287 P.3d 364.\n{25} To the extent DOH argues that the Legislature implicitly endorsed exemption of draft documents from public records by its failure to amend IPRA to address draft documents explicitly, we disagree. DOH argues that the Legislature was aware of the \u201clongstanding\u201d regulations exempting drafts from public records and therefore incorporated those regulations into IPRA when it did not reject them. We agree with NMFOG that the fact that the Legislature did not address the regulations promulgated pursuant to the Public Records Act in amendments to IPRA is \u201cboth unsurprising and uninformative.\u201d As discussed, the Public Records Act and IPRA are very different statutes with different purposes. There was no reason for the Legislature to address a conflict that does not exist.\n{26} Finally, we note that a regulation may prohibit the release of records under IPRA but only when it has the force of law.\nIn most cases, a regulation or ordinance, by itself, may not be used to deny access to public records because it is not a \u201claw\u201d for purposes of the \u201cotherwise provided by law\u201d exception. However, according to the New Mexico Supreme Court, a regulation making certain records private may be proper if the regulation is authorized by a statute and is necessary to carry out the statute\u2019s purposes. See City of Las Cruces v. Public Employee Labor Relations Bd., 121 N.M. 688, 917 P.2d 451 (1996).\nGuide, at 21. In Public Employee Labor Relations Board, the authorizing statute in question protected \u201cthe rights of public employees to collective bargaining and [ensured] that their choice to do so remains private,\u201d 121 N.M. at 691, 917 P.2d at 454, because the authorizing statute specifically prohibited discouraging, interfering with, restraining, or otherwise impeding employees\u2019 rights to organize. Id. at 690, 917 P.2d at 453. Therefore, a regulation preventing disclosure of a petition for representation was consistent with legislative intent and covered by the \u201cas otherwise provided by law\u201d exception in IPRA. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In this case, the purpose of the Public Records Act is \u201cto establish a system for preserving records.\u201d Newsome, 90 N.M. at 797, 568 P.2d at 1243. This purpose is solely organizational. See \u00a7 14-3-6 (\u201cThe administrator shall establish a records management program for the application of efficient and economical management methods to the creation, utilization, maintenance, retention, preservation and disposal of official records.\u201d). Unlike the statute in Public Employee Labor Relations Board, there is nothing in the Public Records Act that gives a regulation designating draft documents as \u201cnon-records\u201d the force of law in the sphere governed by IPRA. DOH does not direct us to any regulation with the force of law that prohibits release of the draft letter in this case. We conclude that the draft letter should be disclosed.\nB. Analysis of Retroactivity\n{27} The Supreme Court did not indicate explicitly whether Republican Party II would apply retroactively or prospectively. When such a statement is lacking, there is \u201ca presumption of retroactivity for a new rule imposed by a judicial decision in a civil case.\u201d Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 118 N.M. 391, 398, 881 P.2d 1376, 1383 (1994) (rejecting the \u201cbright-line rule of retroactivity in all civil cases\u201d set out in Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993)). This presumption, however, \u201cmay be overcome by a sufficiently weighty combination of one or more . . . factors.\u201d Beavers, 118 N.M. at 398, 881 P.2d at 1383. These factors are: \u201c(1) whether the case creates a new principle of law that has been relied upon[,] (2) the prior history of the rule[,] and (3) the inequity of retroactive application.\u201d Stein v. Alpine Sports, Inc., 1998-NMSC-040, \u00b6 9, 126 N.M. 258, 968 P.2d 769 (emphasis omitted). Reliance on the old rule is an important aspect of both the first and third factors. See Beavers, 118 N.M. at 399, 881 P.2d at 1384. This inquiry hinges partially on the degree of reliance: \u201c[t]he greater the extent a potential defendant can be said to have relied on the law as it stood at the time he or she acted, the more inequitable it would be to apply the new rule retroactively.\u201d Id. at 401-02, 881 P.2d at 1386-87.\n{28} DOH justified withholding the email string and draft letter on different grounds. It withheld the email string on the basis that it was covered by the deliberative process privilege and the draft letter on the ground that drafts are not subject to IPRA at all. Amicus Attorney General argues that Republican Party IPs holding regarding the deliberative process privilege should be applied prospectively. In contrast, DOH does not address retroactivity of Republican Party IPs holding regarding the deliberative process privilege. DOH instead focuses its retroactivity argument on whether a decision regarding whether draft documents fall within IPRA\u2019s purview should be applied retroactively. DOH\u2019s rationale for exempting draft documents from IPRA appears to rest in large part on \u201cpublic policy concerns that weigh against requiring disclosure of the draft . . . letter.\u201d In other words, it suggests a \u201crule of reason\u201d analysis for why drafts should not be disclosed. It also relies on \u201cthe same principles upon which [the deliberative process] privilege is grounded.\u201d We address each of these issues.\n1. The Deliberative Process Privilege\n{29} The preliminary inquiry in a retroactivity analysis is whether the case in question announced a new rule. Stein, 1998-NMSC-040,K 14. The Attorney General argues that \u201c[tjhere is little doubt that the decision in Republican Party II overruled a clear precedent, namely the use of executive privilege to shield documents from production under IPRA.\u201d He states that \u201c[b]efore Republic [ an] Party II, State agencies \u2014 including [DOH] \u2014 frequently relied on the executive privilege as a basis for withholding documents from production under IPRA.\u201d We do not agree that Republican Party II stated a new rule regarding the deliberative process privilege or overruled precedent on that issue.\n{30} Republican Party II was the Supreme Court\u2019s \u201cfirst occasion to consider executive privilege in the context of a public records request.\u201d 2012-NMSC-026, \u00b6 3. The Court \u201ch[e]ld emphatically that no deliberative process privilege exists under New Mexico law.\u201d Id. \u00b6 42. In doing so, the Court examined First Judicial, in which the Court considered executive privilege in the civil discovery context. Republican Party II, 2012-NMSC-026, \u00b6\u00b6 34-43; see First Judicial, 96 N.M. at 257, 629 P.2d at 333. The Court determined that although First Judicial \u201cused language consistent with both an executive communications privilege and a deliberative process privilege,\u201d it did not actually endorse the latter. Republican Party II, 2012-NMSC-026, \u00b6 40. In fact, First Judicial \u201crejected] . . . common law privileges\u201d such as the deliberative process privilege. Republican Party II, 2012-NMSC-026, \u00b6 38. Thus, the Supreme Court clarified that that privilege has never existed in New Mexico and that the only privilege addressed in First Judicial was the executive communications privilege. Republican Party II, 2012-NMSC-026, \u00b6 40. The Court \u201cdisavowed] First Judicial to the extent that it could be read to support the adoption of the deliberative process privilege,\u201d but did not overrule it as to its recognition of \u201ca limited form of executive privilege derived from the constitution.\u201d Republican Party II, 2012-NMSC-026, \u00b6\u00b6 42, 43.\n{31} We conclude that Republican Party II did not announce a new rule regarding the deliberative process privilege. Thus, we need not assess any other Beavers factors. Republication Part IPs holding is retroactive. DOH improperly withheld the email string and the draft letter to the extent that DOH withheld the letter based on a rationale grounded in the deliberative process privilege.\n2. The Rule of Reason\n{32} Next we address DOH\u2019s arguments regarding retroactive or prospective application of Republican Party II to withholding of draft documents. T o the extent that DOH and amici argue that this Court\u2019s holding in the present case regarding the draft letter states a new rule, we disagree. Republican Party II overruled cases applying the \u201crule of reason\u201d to justify withholding records and stated that \u201ccourts now should restrict their analysis to whether disclosure under IPRA may be withheld because of a specific exception contained within IPRA, or statutory or regulatory exceptions, or privileges adopted by this Court or grounded in the constitution.\u201d 2012-NMSC-026, \u00b6 16. We are bound by this admonition. Thus, our holding that there is no specific exception, statute, regulation, or privilege exempting draft documents is not a new rule \u2014 it is an application of the rule set out in Republican Party II. Consequently, our analysis is of the retroactivity of that rule.\n{33} The first Beavers factor has two parts. The first is whether the case to be applied announced a new rule. Stein, 1998-NMSC-040, \u00b6 10. It is clear that Republican Party IIexpressly overruled cases in which the \u201crule of reason\u201d was endorsed and limited the scope of what documents are exempt from IPRA. 2012-NMSC-026, \u00b6 16. The second part of the first factor is the degree to which DOH relied on the precedent overruled by Republican Party II. Padilla v. Wall Colmonoy Corp., 2006-NMCA-137, \u00b6 14, 140 N.M. 630, 145 P.3d 110. DOH argues that \u201cthere has been widespread understanding by public bodies such as the [DOH] that preliminary drafts are non-records.\u201d It argues that this understanding derives from IPRA\u2019s \u201cas otherwise provided by law\u201d exception, Sanchez, and the Attorney General\u2019s Guide.\n{34} We begin our assessment of reliance by noting that reliance cannot be shown by simply stating that the law before the new rule was different. \u201c[W]e have difficulty with the circular argument that the rule is not retroactive because pre-rule conduct was lawful \u2014 i.e., because the rule is not retroactive.\u201d Beavers, 118 N.M. at 401, 881 P.2d at 1386. Instead, we must delve into the \u201cdegree of reliance that persons affected . . . by the rule may have placed on the state of the law antedating the rule.\u201d Id. For example, in Beavers, the Court concluded that in the context of an intentional tort case \u201cit is hard to imagine that a potential defendant plans his or her conduct with rules of liability or nonliability in mind.\u201d Id. at 400, 881 P.2d at 1385. In contrast, here, it is reasonable and likely that DOH or another agency sought information on \u201cthe state of the law\u201d in order to act in accordance with it. As we have discussed, however, the sources on which DOH claims to have relied do not declare that draft documents are exempt from IPRA. As we noted above, the Administrative Code addresses the Public Records Act, not IPRA. The Attorney General\u2019s Guide is careful to distinguish documents for personal use from draft documents subject to IPRA. And Sanchez dealt with a version of IPRA that has been superseded, as acknowledged over thirty years ago in Newsome. Reliance on these sources to withhold documents simply because they are drafts is therefore misplaced. Although we recognize that a new rule was announced, we determine that the first factor weighs in favor of retroactivity. See Beavers, 118 N.M. at 400, 881 P.2d at 1385 (stating that although a new rule was announced, the first factor weighed in favor of the presumption because a tortfeasor could not be said to rely on the \u201cclaimed absence of potential liability for [his] conduct\u201d).\n{35} We turn now to the second Beavers factor, in which we assess \u201cwhether retrospective operation will further or retard\u201d the purposes of the new decision. 118 N.M. at 398, 881 P.2d at 1383 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Supreme Court was clear that its holding was required by the Legislature\u2019s intent to promote open government. See \u00a7 14-2-5; Republican Party II, 2012-NMSC-026, \u00b6\u00b6 12-13. The purposes of Republican Party IPs holdings are, therefore, coextensive with the purpose of IPRA itself, which is \u201cto ensure that New Mexicans have the greatest possible access to their public records.\u201d San Juan Agric. Water Users Ass\u2019n v. KNME-TV, 2011-NMSC-011, \u00b6 38, 150 N.M. 64, 257 P.3d 884. Since, after Republican Party II, a requester could simply renew his or her request for previously withheld documents in order to access them, retroactive application is not necessary to this overarching goal. We imagine that some cases currently in litigation may be resolved this way.\n{36} We do not end our analysis there, however, because to do so ignores the function of IPRA\u2019s enforcement actions in achieving open government. These provisions serve to promote open government for all, not just for individual litigants, and are integral to the statute\u2019s purpose. See \u00a7\u00a7 14-2-11, -12.; San Juan Agric. Water Users Ass\u2019n, 2011-NMSC-011, \u00b6 12 (\u201cIPRA includes remedies to encourage compliance and facilitate enforcement. ... By giving enforcement power to any person whose written request has been denied, IPRA\u2019s provisions create \u2018private attorneys general\u2019 for \u2018more effective and efficient enforcement\u2019 of IPRA than would be possible if only the attorney general. . . could enforce the statute.\u201d). In addition, it ignores an abiding principle that underlies the presumption of retroactivity: that similarly situated people should be treated similarly. See Beavers, 118 N.M. at 397, 881 P.2d at 1382. A finding of pure prospective application would deprive current litigants of their right under IPRA to seek damages, costs, and attorney fees. We are persuaded that the second factor is not strong enough to overcome the presumption of retroactivity.\n{37} Finally, DOH argues that \u201c[rjetro active application may also place some agencies in the untenable position of facing claims that they erroneously responded to previous IPRA requests\u201d when they responded in good faith based on the cases and regulations addressed above. DOH argues that \u201cretroactive application creates the potential for unforeseen liability for civil damages . . . going back several years.\u201d But the practical impact of retroactive application appears to be limited. The universe of litigants is limited to five categories. First, there are those who will request records after Republican Party II. These requesters will have the benefit of that decision regardless of whether it applies retroactively or prospectively. Beavers, 118 N.M. at 397 n.7, 881 P.2d at 1382 n.7. Second are those who requested records, were denied, and lost an enforcement action. Litigants are entitled to damages under IPRA only when they prevail in an enforcement action. Section 14-2-12(D) (\u201cThe court shall award damages, costs and reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees to any person whose written request has been denied and is successful in a court action to enforce the provisions ofthe [IPRA].\u201d (emphasis added)); Derringer v. State, 2003-NMCA-073, \u00b6 10, 133 N.M. 721, 68 P.3d 961. These claims are likely precluded by res judicata. See Federated Dep\u2019t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981) (\u201cNor are the res judicata consequences of a final, unappealed judgment on the merits altered by the fact that the judgment may have been wrong or rested on a legal principle subsequently overruled in another case.\u201d); Whenry v. Whenry, 98 N.M. 737, 741, 652 P.2d 1188, 1192 (1982). Even if they are not, requesters are more likely to simply request the record again than to seek to re-open litigation. In any case, an agency could forestall an enforcement action by providing the requested records. See Derringer, 2003-NMCA-073, \u00b6 13 (\u201cOur question is whether [IPRA] allows damages when a lawsuit is filed nearly a year after compliance [by the agency]. We have determined that it does not.\u201d).\n{38} The third category consists of those who requested records over four years ago, were denied, and did not initiate an enforcement action. Enforcement actions by this group are barred by the statute of limitations. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 37-1-4 (1880). Fourth are those who requested documents less than four years ago, were denied, and have not yet filed suit. Again, an agency could prevent a suit by providing the records. The risk of \u201cunforeseen liability\u201d for claims by these four types of requesters is minimal.\n{39} Finally, there are those whose enforcement actions are ongoing, including Appellant. In these cases it may be possible for an agency to avoid some damages by immediately providing the requested draft records and thereby coming into compliance with the new rule. See Derringer, 2003-NMCA-073, \u00b6 10. DOH argues that retroactive application \u201cwill likely have substantially unfair and inequitable impact on government agencies that have relied on the interpretation of the IPRA in the past.\u201d The Attorney General argues that \u201c[i]t is . . . inequitable to retroactively apply money damages to [DOH] conduct that was entirely legal and proper at the time it was undertaken.\u201d We are not convinced that retroactive application would result in an inequity, since we have determined that the sources on which DOH relied did not support its position regarding drafts and Republican Party II held that New Mexico has never recognized the deliberative process privilege. Furthermore, the pool of possible litigants on these issues appears to be relatively small. If there were inequity to DOH, it is counterbalanced by the inequity that would occur were we to apply the new rule purely prospectively because Appellant incurred costs to pursue her rights under IPRA. As discussed, the IPRA enforcement provisions permit requesters to litigate on behalf of all citizens, which serves IPRA\u2019s goals of open government. See \u00a7\u00a7 14-2-11, -12; San Juan Agric. Water Users Ass\u2019n, 2011-NMSC-011, \u00b6 12. If Appellant were denied the opportunity to pursue these damages, these purposes of IPRA would be undermined. Therefore, even if there were inequity to DOH, this factor weighs in favor of retroactivity because it serves the purposes of IPRA and because state agencies \u201c[are] in a better position to ensure meaningful compliance with the law\u201d and, therefore, \u201cit [is] more equitable to let the financial detriments be borne by [DOH]\u201d than by Appellant, \u201cwho [is] the Legislature\u2019s intended beneficiar[y].\u201d Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2010-NMSC-051, \u00b6 29, 149 N.M. 162, 245 P.3d 1214.\n{40} We conclude that \u201c[t]he three factors ... do not . . . outweigh the presumption of retroactivity associated with a judicial decision\u201d regarding IPRA\u2019s application to draft documents. Beavers, 118 N.M. at 402, 881 P.2d at 1387. DOH is liable for wrongful withholding of the draft letter.\nC. Damages, Costs, and Attorney Fees\n{41} Given that we are reversing the judgment in favor of DOH and remanding for further proceedings, we determine that it is premature to address the issue of damages, fees, and costs. The district court did not consider these issues on their merits given its prior ruling. It is best to allow the district court to rule on them in the first instance in light of our decision.\nIII. CONCLUSION\n{42} We reverse the district court as to both the email string and draft letter because neither the deliberative process privilege nor the rule of reason, on which its grant of summary judgment was based, are recognized in New Mexico. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.\n{43} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nMICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nCYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge\nMICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge\nFor ease of reference we will refer to both Appellees throughout the Opinion as \u201cDOH.\u201d\nSee Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 l-210(b)(l) (West 2001) (exempting \u201c[p]reliminary drafts or notes provided the public agency has determined that the public interest in withholding such documents clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure\u201d); 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 140/7(f) (West 2011) (exempting \u201c[preliminary drafts, notes, recommendations, memoranda and other records in which opinions are expressed, or policies or actions are formulated\u201d); Kan. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 45-221(a)(20) (West 2011) (exempting \u201c[n]otes, preliminary drafts, research data in the process of analysis, unfunded grant proposals, memoranda, recommendations or other records in which opinions are expressed or policies or actions are proposed\u201d).", "type": "majority", "author": "BUSTAMANTE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Becht Law Firm Paul F. Becht Albuquerque, NM for Appellant", "Long, Pound & Komer, P.A. Mark E. Komer Santa Fe, NM for Appellees", "Gary K. King, Attorney General Mark Reynolds Scott Fuqua Santa Fe, NM for Amicus Curiae New Mexico Attorney General", "Rodey, Diclcason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A. Charles K. Purcell Albuquerque, NM for Amicus Curiae New Mexico Foundation for Open Government" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Certiorari Denied, February 26, 2013,\nNo. 33,992\nIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2013-NMCA-045\nFiling Date: December 11, 2012\nDocket No. 31,285\nLAUREL C. EDENBURN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH and DEBORAH BUSEMEYER, Appointed Custodian of Records in the Department of Health, Defendants-Appellees.\nBecht Law Firm Paul F. Becht Albuquerque, NM for Appellant\nLong, Pound & Komer, P.A. Mark E. Komer Santa Fe, NM for Appellees\nGary K. King, Attorney General Mark Reynolds Scott Fuqua Santa Fe, NM for Amicus Curiae New Mexico Attorney General\nRodey, Diclcason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A. Charles K. Purcell Albuquerque, NM for Amicus Curiae New Mexico Foundation for Open Government" }, "file_name": "0667-01", "first_page_order": 683, "last_page_order": 697 }