{ "id": 4335258, "name": "CHERYL SCHULTZ for KEVIN SCHULTZ (deceased), Worker-Petitioner, v. POJOAQUE TRIBAL POLICE DEPARTMENT, and NEW MEXICO MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Employer-Insurer-Respondents", "name_abbreviation": "Schultz v. Pojoaque Tribal Police Department", "decision_date": "2013-04-11", "docket_number": "Docket No. 33,372", "first_page": "5", "last_page": "17", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2013-NMSC-013" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "11 N.M. 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 N.M. 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580107 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "719" }, { "page": "650" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/102/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 3796", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2007-NMSC-010", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3668917 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/141/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 N.M. 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1562255 ], "weight": 35, "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366-67" }, { "page": "578" }, { "page": "362-63" }, { "page": "575-76" }, { "page": "363" }, { "page": "576" }, { "page": "364" }, { "page": "576" }, { "page": "364" }, { "page": "576" }, { "page": "364" }, { "page": "576-77" }, { "page": "364" }, { "page": "577" }, { "page": "366-67" }, { "page": "578", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks, alteration and citation omitted" }, { "page": "368" }, { "page": "579" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "368-69" }, { "page": "579" }, { "page": "369" }, { "page": "580" }, { "page": "369-70" }, { "page": "580" }, { "page": "370" }, { "page": "580", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "368-69" }, { "page": "579" }, { "page": "369" }, { "page": "570", "parenthetical": "refusing to set a rigid deadline for filing a complaint" }, { "page": "364" }, { "page": "576-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/47/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.M. 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1575591 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178", "parenthetical": "stating that \"52-1-36 ... is a tolling provision\"" }, { "page": "854", "parenthetical": "stating that \"52-1-36 ... is a tolling provision\"" }, { "page": "178" }, { "page": "854" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/95/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.M. 609", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1575531 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "610", "parenthetical": "describing Section 52-1-36 as a \"tolling provision\"" }, { "page": "552", "parenthetical": "describing Section 52-1-36 as a \"tolling provision\"" }, { "page": "610" }, { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/95/0609-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 N.M. 15", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1588658 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17", "parenthetical": "describing Section 52-1-36 as containing a tolling provision" }, { "page": "279", "parenthetical": "describing Section 52-1-36 as containing a tolling provision" }, { "page": "17" }, { "page": "279" }, { "page": "17" }, { "page": "279" }, { "page": "17" }, { "page": "279" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/100/0015-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 N.M. 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580055 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "305", "parenthetical": "citing Section 52-1-36 and stating that \"[misrepresentation that the employee will receive benefits remains the only reason the workmen's compensation limitation period is tolled\"" }, { "page": "1370", "parenthetical": "citing Section 52-1-36 and stating that \"[misrepresentation that the employee will receive benefits remains the only reason the workmen's compensation limitation period is tolled\"" }, { "page": "305" }, { "page": "1370" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/102/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 N.M. 358", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1597061 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360", "parenthetical": "recognizing that Section 52-1-36 functions as a tolling statute" }, { "page": "310", "parenthetical": "recognizing that Section 52-1-36 functions as a tolling statute" }, { "page": "360" }, { "page": "310", "parenthetical": "listing elements in the context of summary judgment" }, { "page": "310" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/107/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 P.2d 869", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 2804584, 2809305 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "871-72", "parenthetical": "recognizing that \"[t]his section of our statutes provides the only reason or excuse for tolling or extending the time within which suit must be filed\" under the Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/77/0436-01", "/nm/77/0435-02" ] }, { "cite": "77 N.M. 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2804584 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439-40", "parenthetical": "recognizing that \"[t]his section of our statutes provides the only reason or excuse for tolling or extending the time within which suit must be filed\" under the Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/77/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "246 F.2d 758", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 400254 ], "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "760", "parenthetical": "considering employee's argument that employer's conduct tolled the statute of limitations under previous codification of Section 52-1-36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/246/0758-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 N.M. 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1555058 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "405", "parenthetical": "noting that \"[pjrior to the enactment of [Section] 52-1-36, early decisions in New Mexico declined to recognize assertions of equitable estoppel or waiver as a basis for tolling the time constraints imposed by [Section] 52-1-31,\" and citing Taylor" }, { "page": "511", "parenthetical": "noting that \"[pjrior to the enactment of [Section] 52-1-36, early decisions in New Mexico declined to recognize assertions of equitable estoppel or waiver as a basis for tolling the time constraints imposed by [Section] 52-1-31,\" and citing Taylor" }, { "page": "405" }, { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/97/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 N.M. 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590363 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268", "parenthetical": "recognizing that the Legislature enacted this statute following the Taylor decision" }, { "page": "309", "parenthetical": "recognizing that the Legislature enacted this statute following the Taylor decision" }, { "page": "268" }, { "page": "309", "parenthetical": "describing the holding of Taylor" }, { "page": "269" }, { "page": "310", "parenthetical": "determining whether what is now codified as Section 52-1-36 tolled the one-year limitations period in which to file a workers' compensation complaint" }, { "page": "268" }, { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/60/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "35 N.M. 544", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1557957 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550" }, { "page": "78" }, { "page": "545" }, { "page": "76" }, { "page": "549-50" }, { "page": "78", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/35/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "977 F. Supp. 413", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 973232 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416", "parenthetical": "\"The concept of equitable estoppel is based on principles of fairness.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/977/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 N.M. 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1599035 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631" }, { "page": "1137" }, { "page": "631" }, { "page": "1137" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/105/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 N.M. 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1597185 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466", "parenthetical": "describing how the statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of an action" }, { "page": "158", "parenthetical": "describing how the statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of an action" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/107/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMCA-117", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4002350 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and alteration omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and alteration omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/144/0775-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590270 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316" }, { "page": "227" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-032", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4243724 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 P.3d 599", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2012-NMCERT-001", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "269 P.3d 14", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2012-NMCA-015", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4187453 ], "weight": 21, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 33" }, { "page": "\u00b6 25" }, { "page": "\u00b6 26" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 25-26" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 25-26" }, { "page": "\u00b6 26" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 15-16" }, { "page": "\u00b6 26" }, { "page": "\u00b6 26" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 11-12" }, { "page": "\u00b6 11" }, { "page": "\u00b6 13" }, { "parenthetical": "\"[The] one-year period of limitations shall be tolled during the time a worker remains employed by the employer by whom he was employed at the time of such accidental injury, not to exceed a period of one year.\" (emphasis added)" }, { "page": "\u00b6 26" }, { "page": "\u00b6 48" }, { "page": "\u00b6 49" }, { "page": "\u00b6 26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/1/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "2010-NMSC-034", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4246260 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 1" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/148/0692-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1368, "char_count": 38777, "ocr_confidence": 0.826, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.46765605076141e-08, "percentile": 0.28009258454836555 }, "sha256": "826930bd77f50bb6a846f3a96f3d01940675366bcdcb9f27587d35c1540ed828", "simhash": "1:ff7c6c4a9e802250", "word_count": 6337 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:50:37.461651+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice", "WE CONCUR:", "PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Chief Justice", "EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice", "CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice", "BARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice" ], "parties": [ "CHERYL SCHULTZ for KEVIN SCHULTZ (deceased), Worker-Petitioner, v. POJOAQUE TRIBAL POLICE DEPARTMENT, and NEW MEXICO MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Employer-Insurer-Respondents." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nBOSSON, Justice.\nOn August 17, 2002, Pojoaque Tribal Police Officer Kevin Schultz drowned while rescuing a twelve-year-old boy from the Rio Grande near Pilar, New Mexico. On the day of the accident, Schultz had taken the day off from work to chaperone a group of children from his church on a recreational outing. This case arose when Schultz\u2019s widow, Cheryl, filed a claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits resulting from her husband\u2019s death, but only after the statute of limitations had expired.\nNotwithstanding the late filing, Mrs. Schultz contends that the conduct of the Pojoaque Tribal Police Department (police department or employer) caused her to file after the deadline and, thus, we should consider her complaint timely filed pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-36 (1937) (as amended through 1989) of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (the Act), entitled \u201cEffect of failure of worker to file claim by reason of conduct of employer.\u201d This particular statute goes to the heart of Mrs. Schultz\u2019s appeal.\nBoth the Workers\u2019 Compensation Judge (WCJ) and the Court of Appeals decided that Mrs. Schultz\u2019s complaint was not timely filed. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nBACKGROUND\nThe Act provides a one-year statutory period within which to file a claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits following the death of a worker. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 52-l-31(B) (1987). When the filing delay is caused, \u201cin whole or in part,\u201d by the employer\u2019s conduct, then the delay \u201cshall not deprive such person of the right to compensation\u201d under the Act. See \u00a7 52-1-36. The statute provides:\nThe failure of any person entitled to compensation under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act [Chapter 52, Article 1 NMSA 1978] to give any notice or file any claim within the time fixed by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act shall not deprive such person of the right to compensation where the failure was caused in whole or in part by the conduct of the employer or insurer which reasonably led the person entitled to compensation to believe the compensation would be paid.\nSection 52-1-36 (emphasis added).\nFollowing Schultz\u2019s death, members of the police department assured Mrs. Schultz that they would take care of everything for her. Within two months of Schultz\u2019s death, the employer filed the necessary paperwork for federal death benefits. However, it was not until a meeting on July 28, 2003, between Mrs. Schultz, her financial advisor, and John Garcia, Chief of the Pojoaque Tribal Police Department, that it became clear that Mrs. Schultz might be entitled to workers\u2019 compensation benefits. At this meeting, Chief Garcia told Mrs. Schultz that he would \u201ctake care of getting the workers\u2019 compensation paperwork done.\u201d To be clear, Chief Garcia testified that he did not remember telling Mrs. Schultz this, but acknowledged that \u201cif she said that, it must be correct.\u201d Thus, we accept this representation by the Chief of Police as unrebutted for purposes of this opinion.\nDespite this representation, the employer did not file a workers\u2019 compensation claim on Mrs. Schultz\u2019s behalf. Once Mrs. Schultz realized that the employer was not going to file her claim, she filed a pro se complaint that same day, October 1, 2003 \u2014 some forty-five days after the one-year statute of limitations had run. Although it was filed late, Mrs. Schultz\u2019s complaint proceeded to an informal mediation at the Workers\u2019 Compensation Administration (the WCA). See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 52-5-5(C) (1993) (describing that \u201cevery claim shall be evaluated by the director [of the WCA] or his designee, who shall then contact all parties and attempt to informally resolve the dispute\u201d).\nThe mediator issued a recommended resolution on December 19, 2003, recommending that the complaint be dismissed without prejudice so that Mrs. Schultz could retain legal counsel to assist her during settlement negotiations. According to the mediator, Mrs. Schultz could \u201cimmediately file an amended complaint with the accompanying documents required by this Administration.\u201d Neither party filed an acceptance nor a rejection of this resolution. The WCA generated a Notice of Completion on February 13, 2004.\nAfter retaining legal counsel, Mrs. Schultz filed a second complaint with the WCA on June 18, 2004, which specifically requested modification of the first recommended resolution because she had retained an attorney. A second mediation occurred, after which the employer rejected the mediator\u2019s recommended resolution of settlement with Mrs. Schultz for a cash sum. After extensive discovery, the case proceeded to trial in 2007 before a WCJ.\nFollowing three days of trial, the WCJ entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a compensation order. The WCJ decided that Mrs. Schultz was not entitled to workers\u2019 compensation benefits on two grounds. The WCJ determined (1) that the statute of limitations barred Mrs. Schultz\u2019s claim, and (2) that even if the statute of limitations were not a bar, her husband was not acting within the course and scope of his employment when he died.\nMrs. Schultz appealed. The Court of Appeals initially dismissed her appeal as untimely. See Schultz v. Pojoaque Tribal Police Dep\u2019t, No. 28,508, slip op. at 2 (N.M. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2008). We reversed and remanded for the Court of Appeals to decide the merits of her appeal. Schultz ex rel. Schultz v. Pojoaque Tribal Police Dep 7, 2010-NMSC-034, \u00b6 1, 148 N.M. -692, 242 P.3d 259.\nOn remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the WCJ\u2019s decision, holding that the statute of limitations barred Mrs. Schultz\u2019s claim. Schultz ex rel. Schultz v. Pojoaque Tribal Police Dep \u2019t, 2012-NMCA-015, \u00b6 33, 269 P.3d 14. Finding this issue dispositive, the Court of Appeals did not address whether her husband died within the course and scope of employment. Id. \u00b6 7. We granted certiorari, Schultz v. Pojoaque Tribal Police Dep \u2019t, 2012-NMCERT-001,291 P.3d 599, to determine how Section 52-1-36 impacts a workers\u2019 compensation claim once the statute of limitations has expired.\nSTANDARD OF REVIEW\nThis Court has previously held that \u201c[i]n reviewing a WCJ\u2019s interpretation of statutory requirements, we apply a de novo standard ofreview.\u201d DeWitt v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 2009-NMSC-032, \u00b6 14, 146 N.M. 453, 212 P.3d 341.\nDISCUSSION\nApplication of Statutory Tolling\nThe Court of Appeals assumed without deciding that the employer\u2019s conduct caused Mrs. Schultz to file an untimely claim, thereby implicating Section 52-1-36. Schultz, 2012-NMCA-015, \u00b6 25. The Court then proceeded to analyze the effect of Section 52-1-36 on this case, concluding that the statute was ofno help to Mrs. Schultz. Schultz, 2012-NMCA-015, \u00b6 26. For purposes of our own analysis, we track the issues as stated by the Court of Appeals. We look first to the effect of Section 52-1-36 on this case, assuming it applies, and then we will examine the record to see whether the failure to timely file \u201cwas caused in whole or in part by the conduct of the employer.\u201d Id.\nIn examining the effect of Section 52-1-36, the Court of Appeals regarded it as a tolling statute, relying on prior opinions of our two courts. See Schultz, 2012-NMCA-015,\u00b6\u00b6 25-26 (\u201cSection 52-1-36 permits tolling when an employer\u2019s conduct reasonably leads the worker to believe that compensation will be paid.\u201d). Whether Section 52-1-36 is, in fact, a tolling statute is significant, because as the Court of Appeals described in Schultz, 2012-NMCA-015, \u00b6\u00b6 25-26, tolling extends a statute of limitations for only a limited period of time.\nTolling [is] [a]n interruption in the time a limitations period runs. Tolling interrupts the time of a period for the limitations of action under a statute of limitations, effectively adding on time to commence an action after the moment when the statute would otherwise have barred an action... . Tolling persists as long as the cause of the tolling persists, and when that cause ends, the calculation of time under the statute commences again.\n1 The Wolters Kluwer, Bouvier Law Dictionary 1645 (Desk Ed. 2012). This Court has previously stated that \u201ca statute of limitations may be tolled for a period of time, and then recommence in such a way that the remainder of the period remaining under the statute is extended by the period tolled.\u201d State v. Sanchez, 109 N.M. 313, 316, 785 P.2d 224, 227 (1989); see also State v. Hill, 2008-NMCA-117, \u00b6 9,144 N.M. 775,192P.3d770 (defining a \u201ctolling statute\u201d as \u201ca law that interrupts the running of a statute of limitations in certain situations\u201d (quoting Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1525 (8th ed. 2004) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted))).\nAn example may clarify the analysis. Assume that an employee is misled sixty days before the statute of limitations is to run. Tolling would suspend the effect of the limitations statute until the employee learns or should learn the truth. If that were to occur one month after the statute had run, the limitations period would be tolled until that time, and the employee would have sixty days thereafter in which to file, the time left in the limitations period when the misrepresentation occurred, but not a day longer.\nBecause it interpreted Section 52-1-36 to function as a tolling statute, the Court of Appeals applied a strict tolling analysis to Mrs. Schultz\u2019s late filing. Schultz, 2012-NMCA-015, \u00b6 26. The Court focused on the fateful meeting with Chief Garcia on July 28, 2003, twenty-one days before the statute of limitations was to expire. Id. The Court of Appeals assumed without deciding that on this date, the employer\u2019s conduct could reasonably have led Mrs. Schultz to believe that her claim would be filed, thereby giving her a \u201cfalse sense of security.\u201d Id. \u00b6\u00b6 25-26.\nIt is this conduct that implicates Section 52-1-36. If the statute functions as a tolling statute, then from July 28, 2003 onwards, Mrs. Schultz was operating under the assumption that the employer was going to file her claim. On October 1, 2003, she realized that the employer had not filed a claim. During this period, from July 28, 2003 until October 1, 2003, just over two months, the limitations period would be tolled. On October 1, 2003, the cause of the tolling \u2014 the employer\u2019s conduct reasonably leading Mrs. Schultz to believe that the workers\u2019 compensation claim would be filed \u2014 ceased to exist. At this point, under a strict tolling analysis, the limitations statute began running again, giving her the originally tolled twenty-one days to file the workers\u2019 compensation claim on her own.\nOf course, in this case Mrs. Schultz did not need the full twenty-one days; she filed her first workers\u2019 compensation complaint the same day she realized the employer had not filed, October 1,2003. As a result, the statute of limitations stopped running when the complaint was filed. See Bracken v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 107 N.M. 463, 466, 760 P.2d 155, 158 (1988) (describing how the statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of an action). Following the statutorily required mediation, the mediator recommended dismissal without prejudice on December 19, 2003, stating in part:\nIt is the [mjediator\u2019s evaluation, however, that under the circumstances of this case, [Mrs. Schultz\u2019s] attorney should be present during settlement negotiations for her consultation. Therefore, the [m]ediator recommends that the complaint filed on October 22, 2003, be dismissed without prejudice. [Mrs. Schultz] may immediately file an amended complaint with the accompanying documents required by this Administration.\n(Emphasis added.)\nThe dismissal without prejudice complicated the analysis for both the WCJ and the Court of Appeals. Because Mrs. Schultz did not file a rejection of the first recommended resolution nor raise the effect of the dismissal without prejudice of the first complaint, the WCJ found that \u201c[wjhen a Complaint is filed and dismissed without prejudice, and the filing date is not preserved in the document doing the dismissal, it\u2019s as if the Complaint has never been filed at all.\u201d Schultz, 2012-NMCA-015, \u00b6\u00b6 15-16.\nAccording to the Court of Appeals, the statute of limitations started running again once the mediator dismissed the case without prejudice, or at the latest, when the WCA finally closed the file on February 13, 2004. Id. At that point, under the Court of Appeals\u2019 view of tolling, Mrs. Schultz had no more than twenty-one days \u2014 the original tolling period \u2014 to file another complaint with the WCA. Id. Her second complaint, filed on June 18, 2004, fell well outside this time frame. See id. \u00b6 8. Thus, the Court of Appeals regarded the second complaint as untimely, notwithstanding Section 52-1-36. Schultz, 2012-NMCA-015, \u00b6 26.\nEstoppel\nMrs. Schultz aslcs us to construe Section 52-1-36, not as a strict tolling statute, but as an estoppel statute. Equitable estoppel \u201capplies where, as a result of the conduct of a party upon which another person has in good faith relied to his or her detriment, the acting party is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights that might have otherwise existed.\u201d 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver \u00a7 21 (2011).\nMrs. Schultz argues that Molinar v. City of Carlsbad, 105 N.M. 628, 735 P.2d 1134 (1987), supports her position that Section 52-1-36 \u201cis actually a codification of the principle of equitable estoppel.\u201d In Molinar, which concerns retirement benefits rather than workers\u2019 compensation, we determined that a city was estopped from raising the statute of limitations as a defense when the actions of its former attorney assured city employees that their case would be settled satisfactorily without the need for litigation. Id. at 631, 735 P.2d at 1137. We cited Section 52-1-36 as an example of a statute which codifies that \u201cthe conduct of a party may estop it from raising the statute of limitations as a defense.\u201d Molinar, 105 N.M. at 631, 735 P.2d at 1137.\nUnlike tolling, equitable estoppel does not appear to confine its relief to a carefully crafted number of days. It is more a matter of what is fair under the circumstances, which is why Mrs. Schultz prefers that doctrine in this case. See Anderson v. Cox, 977 F. Supp. 413,416 (W.D. Va. 1997) (\u201cThe concept of equitable estoppel is based on principles of fairness.\u201d); see also 28 Am. Jur. 2d, supra \u00a7 31 (\u201c[T]he doctrine of equitable estoppel may ... be invoked to prevent a defendant from relying on the statute of limitations.\u201d). However, we do not see the dicta in Molinar as deciding the question one way or another. Clearly, that case did not determine whether Section 52-1 -3 6 is a tolling statute or one based on equitable estoppel; the statute was cited only as an illustration. For the following reasons, based on its history and evolution, we conclude that Section 52-1-36 established its own special relief, untethered to either doctrine.\nSection 52-1-36\nSection 52-1-36 has a long history in our jurisprudence. Our Legislature first enacted the statute\u2019s predecessor in 1937 in response to a 1931 decision of this Court, Taylor v. American Employers \u2019 Insurance Co. of Boston, Massachusetts. 35 N.M. 544, 3 P.2d 76 (1931), superseded by statute as stated in Lucero v. White Auto Stores, Inc., 60 N.M. 266, 268, 291 P.2d 308, 309 (1955) (recognizing that the Legislature enacted this statute following the Taylor decision); see also 1937 N.M. Laws, ch. 92, \u00a7 13.\nIn Taylor, this Court took a strict view of the statute of limitations within the Act as it existed at the time. See 35 N.M. at 550, 3 P.2d at 78. In that case, an injured worker asserted thatthe employer\u2019s insurer led him to believe that workers\u2019 compensation would be paid. Id. at 545, 3 P.2d at 76. The worker relied on these representations and failed to file a workers\u2019 compensation complaint within the applicable limitations period. Id. This Court strictly applied the statute of limitations, finding that waiver and estoppel could not save the worker\u2019s claim, because the statute at issue was not a mere limitation on the remedy, but was a \u201climitation upon the right of action\u201d that is \u201cconditioned upon its enforcement within a prescribed period.\u201d Id. at 549-50, 3 P.2d at 78 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Lucero, 60 N.M. at 268, 291 P.2d at 309 (describing the holding of Taylor).\nSix years later, in response to our holding in Taylor, the Legislature enacted what is codified today as S ection 52-1-36. See Knippel v. N. Commc\u2019ns, Inc., 97 N.M. 401, 405, 640 P.2d 507, 511 (Ct. App. 1982) (noting that \u201c[pjrior to the enactment of [Section] 52-1-36, early decisions in New Mexico declined to recognize assertions of equitable estoppel or waiver as a basis for tolling the time constraints imposed by [Section] 52-1-31,\u201d and citing Taylor). Except for several very minor amendments, the language enacted in 1937 remains in force today. Compare 1937 N.M. Laws, ch. 92, \u00a7 13 (enacting what is now Section 52-1-36), with \u00a7 52-1-36 (containing substantively identical language).\nOver the years, courts have described Section 52-1-36 as a tolling statute. See Silva v. Sandia Corp., 246 F.2d 758, 760 (10th Cir. 1957) (considering employee\u2019s argument that employer\u2019s conduct tolled the statute of limitations under previous codification of Section 52-1-36); Stasey v. Stasey, 77 N.M. 436, 439-40, 423 P.2d 869, 871-72 (1967) (recognizing that \u201c[t]his section of our statutes provides the only reason or excuse for tolling or extending the time within which suit must be filed\u201d under the Act); Lucero, 60 N.M. at 269, 291 P.2d at 310 (determining whether what is now codified as Section 52-1-36 tolled the one-year limitations period in which to file a workers\u2019 compensation complaint); Hutcherson v. Dawn Trucking Co., 107 N.M. 358, 360, 758 P.2d 308, 310 (Ct. App. 1988) (recognizing that Section 52-1-36 functions as a tolling statute); Howie v. Stevens, 102 N.M. 300, 305, 694 P.2d 1365, 1370 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing Section 52-1-36 and stating that \u201c[misrepresentation that the employee will receive benefits remains the only reason the workmen\u2019s compensation limitation period is tolled\u201d); Ryan v. Bruenger M. Trucking, 100 N.M. 15, 17, 665 P.2d 277, 279 (Ct. App. 1983) (describing Section 52-1-36 as containing a tolling provision); Saenz v. McCormick Constr. Co., 95 N.M. 609, 610, 624 P.2d 551, 552 (Ct. App. 1981) (describing Section 52-1-36 as a \u201ctolling provision\u201d), holding modified on other grounds by Ryan, 100 N.M. at 17, 665 P.2d at 279; Owens v. Eddie Lu\u2019s Fine Apparel, 95 N.M. 176, 178, 619 P.2d 852, 854 (Ct. App. 1980) (stating that \u201c52-1-36 ... is a tolling provision\u201d), abrogation recognized on other grounds in Schultz, 2012-NMCA-015, \u00b6 26.\nAlthough our courts have used the term \u201ctolling\u201d to describe Section 52-1-36, this Court\u2019s seminal opinion interpreted Section 52-1-36 differently \u2014 without the limitations of tolling. In 1943, in Elsea v. Broome Furniture Co., this Court construed NMSA 1941, Section 57-914, the exact language that was codified in 1937. 47 N.M. 356, 366-67, 143 P.2d 572, 578 (1943); compare NMSA 1941, \u00a7 57-914, with 1937 N.M. Laws, ch. 92, \u00a7 13 (containing identical language).\nIn that case, a worker was injured on three separate occasions, from February to June 1940. Id. at 362-63,143 P.2d at 575-76. Following his third injury, the worker attempted to obtain workers\u2019 compensation benefits in August of 1940. Id. at 363, 143 P.2d at 576. After speaking with an insurance adjuster, the worker learned that he had a \u201clegitimate claim\u201d for workers\u2019 compensation and \u201cit was only a matter of time until it would be paid.\u201d Id. at 364, 143 P.2d at 576. In the intervening months, the worker contacted the insurance company to inquire about his claim and at no time was he told that his claim would not be paid. Id. at 364, 143 P.2d at 576. However, on October 27, 1941, the insurance company formally rejected the worker\u2019s claim. Id. at 364, 143 P.2d at 576-77. Sevenmonths later, almost two years after his initial efforts at collection, the worker filed suit. Id. at 364, 143 P.2d at 577.\nThe worker argued under the precursor to Section 52-1-36 that his failure to file a timely lawsuit \u201cwas caused in whole or in part by the conduct of the employer or insurer which would reasonably lead the person entitled to compensation to believe the compensation would be paid.\u201d Elsea, 47 N.M. at 366-67, 143 P.2d at 578 (internal quotation marks, alteration and citation omitted). The Elsea court refused to disturb the jury verdict in the worker\u2019s favor, which found that the worker had been \u201cmisled \u2018in whole or in part\u2019 by the conduct of the employer or insurer.\u201d Id. at 368, 143 P.2d at 579. In reaching this conclusion, the Elsea court reasoned that \u201c[t]he statute provides that it is only necessary to connect claimant\u2019s delay \u2018in whole or in part\u2019 with the conduct of the employer to excuse a failure to file claim or a suit within the time prescribed.\u201d Id. (emphasis added). This Court further stated, \u201cThe statute does not go so far as to require actual waiver by agreement or conduct which would meet the technical rules supporting estoppel. It only requires proof of such conduct as would \u2018in whole or in part\u2019 reasonably lead claimant to believe compensation would be paid.\u201d Id. at 368-69, 143 P.2d at 579.\nAside from avoiding \u201ctechnical rules\u201d in assessing the impact of employer\u2019s conduct upon the employee, the Elsea court also declined to impose a rigid time limit within which the employee must file suit. In holding that the worker\u2019s suit was timely filed, the Elsea court was \u201cnot disposed to fix any particular time short of one year after [denial of the claim] within which the action must have been filed.\u201d Id. at 369, 143 P.2d at 580.\nIn Elsea, this Court noted that various authorities had different approaches to determining how much time was appropriate for the worker to re-file a claim once the insurance company denied it. Id. at 369-70, 143 P.2d at 580. Specifically, the Elsea court noted that \u201cthe extended period under such circumstances should be only a reasonable time rather than a whole new statutory period.\u201d Id. at 370, 143 P.2d at 580 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Elaborating on what a reasonable time could mean, the Elsea court stated that \u201cthe adoption a reasonable time [approach] . . . does not mean that the statutory period of limitations might not itself be treated as a reasonable time,\u201d and in contrast, that \u201c[m]any cases hold that the time to be allowed is to be defined as a \u2018reasonable time\u2019, [sic] but which should not exceed that of the original limitation period.\u201d Id. The Elsea court did not decide which approach \u2014 an entirely new statutory period or only a reasonable amount of time not exceeding the original limitations period \u2014 was the better way to proceed. Id.\nIn the present appeal, our Court of Appeals addressed Elsea only in the context of when the one-year limitations began to run. Schultz, 2012-NMCA-015, \u00b6\u00b6 11-12. Apparently Mrs. Schultz argued to the Court of Appeals that Elsea supported her contention that the statute of limitations began to run on October 1, 2003, the day she filed her complaint, not the day Schultz died. Schultz, 2012-NMCA-015, \u00b6 11. The Court of Appeals correctly stated that it saw \u201cnothing in Elsea suggesting that the limitations period begins to run at a time other than the date of the worker\u2019s death in a case involving an alleged work-related death.\u201d Schultz, 2012-NMCA-015, \u00b6 13. Mrs. Schultz does not make that argument to this Court, but asserts instead that the Court of Appeals misunderstood her Elsea argument. Regardless, we view the holding in Elsea more broadly than did our Court of Appeals, and it informs our interpretation of Section 52-1-36.\nWe find the plain language ofSection 52-1-36 to be clear. Elsea, though admittedly somewhat cryptic, supports a charitable, non-parsimonious reading of that statute in favor of deciding a worker\u2019s claim on its merits. We observe that Section 52-1-36 has changed very little over time, despite the Act\u2019s major evolution in other ways. Compare NMSA 1978, \u00a7 52-1-47 (1990) (amended nine times), with \u00a7 52-1-36 (amended three times). Whatever the Legislature meant in drafting what is now Section 52-1-36, Elsea\u2019s interpretation of it has been good law for close to seventy years, and in that time, the Legislature has never modified the statute to mandate a stricter approach to calculating the limitations period. Nothing in Section 52-1-36 of the Act specifies that strict tolling is the only way to apply this section to an untimely workers\u2019 compensation complaint. In fact, Section 52-1-36 never uses the word \u201ctolling.\u201d\nSignificantly, when the Legislature wanted to make clear elsewhere in the Act that tolling was the appropriate remedy, it stated so in express language. For example, NMSA 1978, Section 52-l-31(A) (1987), provides that the worker has a duty to file a claim within one year for any workers\u2019 compensation payment or installment that an employer or insurer fails or refuses to pay. Section 52-l-31(A), however, allows the statutory period to be tolled if the worker remains employed where the injury occurred. Id. (\u201c[The] one-year period of limitations shall be tolled during the time a worker remains employed by the employer by whom he was employed at the time of such accidental injury, not to exceed a period of one year.\u201d (emphasis added)).\nWe have previously said that \u201cwhen the Legislature includes a particular word in one portion of a statute and omits it from another portion of that statute, such omission is presumed to be intentional.\u201d State v. Jade G., 2007-NMSC-010, \u00b6 28, 141 N.M. 284, 154 P.3d 659. Without necessarily applying that principle of statutory construction to this specific instance, its reasoning cautions circumspection; it affords us additional guidance as we consider whether Section 52-1-36 should be confined by the limits of tolling or by any other \u201ctechnical rule.\u201d See Elsea, 47 N.M. at 368-69, 143 P.2d at 579.\nAdmittedly, our prior case law has leaned in a different direction, guiding the Court of Appeals in this case to apply Section 52-1-36 as a tolling statute. But the fact that prior opinions have somehow overlooked or misconstrued Elsea\u2019s meaning does not mean that we should compound the error. Therefore, we hold that Section 52-1-36 should no longer be confined by the limits of tolling.\nAccordingly, consistent with Elsea and the language of Section 52-1-36, if an employee entitled to workers\u2019 compensation benefits fails to file a complaint or a claim within the limitation period because the conduct of the employer or insurer reasonably led the employee to believe compensation would be paid, then the employee has a reasonable time thereafter within which to file. As we stated in Elsea, we are not disposed to fix any particular time within which the worker must file, as long as the failure to file is caused in whole or in part by the conduct of the employer or the insurer. See Elsea, 47 N.M. at 369, 143 P.2d at 570 (refusing to set a rigid deadline for filing a complaint).\nHaving settled on the proper application of Section 52-1-36, we now determine (1) whether the conduct on the part of this particular employer, in whole or in part, reasonably led Mrs. Schultz to believe that workers\u2019 compensation benefits would be paid, and if so, (2) whether Mrs. Schultz\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation complaint was filed within a reasonable time thereafter.\nThe Employer\u2019s Conduct Reasonably Led Mrs. Schultz to Believe Workers\u2019 Compensation Claim Would be Filed and Benefits Would be Paid\nThe Court of Appeals assumed without deciding that the conduct of the employer following the July 28,2003, meeting with the Chief of Police reasonably led Mrs. Schultz to believe compensation would be paid. See Schultz, 2012-NMCA-015, \u00b6 26. In order to demonstrate that the conduct on the part of the employer caused a failure to file a workers\u2019 compensation complaint, the worker must show, by reasonable inference, that he believed compensation would be paid, the belief was reasonable, and the belief was based, in whole or in part, on the conduct of the employer. See Hutcherson, 107 N.M. at 360, 758 P.2d at 310 (listing elements in the context of summary judgment).\nFrom the night Schultz died, his employer assured his widow that it would \u201ctake care of everything for her.\u201d At this early stage, the employer did not state specifically that it would file a workers\u2019 compensation claim, and perhaps, as the employer stated, no one was contemplating workers\u2019 compensation benefits at that early point in time.\nTwo months after Schultz\u2019s death, the employer submitted the paperwork necessary to make Mrs. Schultz eligible for federal death benefits, which she did in fact receive. On July 17, 2003, Mrs. Schultz was notified of her benefits under the federal Public Safety Officers\u2019 Death Benefits statute, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 3796 (2006), which, as the award letter indicated, recognizes \u201cthe selfless dedication of federal, state and local public safety officers killed in the line of duty.\u201d\nThese events provide context for the July 28, 2003, meeting with Chief Garcia. At this meeting, all participants became aware thatMrs. Schultz mightbe entitled to workers\u2019 compensation benefits. The Chief testified about his surprise at hearing this, because it had never occurred to him that Mrs. Schultz might be entitled to workers\u2019 compensation. Nevertheless, Chief Garcia promised to prepare the necessary paperwork for filing a worker\u2019s compensation claim.\nBoth Mrs. Schultz and her financial advisor testified, without contradiction, that they left this meeting believing that the employer would be filing the necessary papers. Shortly after this meeting, Mrs. Schultz visited Chief Garcia to inquire about the status of her worker\u2019s compensation complaint, and he told her to be patient because \u201cthese things take time.\u201d Consistent with this conduct, the employer wrote a letter to Mrs. Schultz on October 21, 2003, stating that \u201c[y]our husband, Kevin Schultz, died in the line of duty. The Pueblo of Pojoaque will do anything necessary for you to receive survivor\u2019s benefits, workmen\u2019s compensation or any other benefits available to you and your grieving family.\u201d\nThese representations, fully documented in the record below, support Mrs. Schultz\u2019s belief that her husband\u2019s compensation would be paid, or at the very least, that she could rely on the employer to process her claim and file the necessary paperwork toward that same end. We recognize that Section 52-1-36 speaks in terms of causing the employee to believe that benefits would be paid. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude the employer\u2019s promises were the functional equivalent of saying that it would do everything within its power to see that benefits were paid. Mrs. Schultz could reasonably rely on those representations within the meaning of Section 52-1-36.\nThe employer\u2019s conduct, therefore, implicates the relief called for in Section 52-1-36, and allowed Mrs. Schultz a reasonable period of time within which to file on her own. We now turn to the reasonableness of Mrs. Schultz\u2019s conduct.\nMrs. Schultz Acted Within a Reasonable Period of Time and Her Filing Was Timely\nMrs. Schultz filed her pro se workers\u2019 compensation complaint on October 1, 2003. The statute of limitations on her claim expired on August 17, 2003. Although both the Court of Appeals and the WCJ focused on the prejudicial effect of the first mediator\u2019s dismissal without prejudice, that focus was misplaced. Mrs. Schultz\u2019s first complaint, filed on October 1, 2003, was clearly within a reasonable time after the statute of limitations expired \u2014 even under the now-discredited tolling approach. The WCA treated this complaint as timely and proceeded to mediation.\nThe WCA mediator\u2019s first recommended resolution made no mention of the statute of limitations. In fact, it appears that the dismissal without prejudice of the first recommended resolution was intended to assist Mrs. Schultz; it was intended to provide her time to consult with an attorney before entering settlement negotiations. See Schultz, 2012-NMCA-015, \u00b6 48 (Sutin, J., specially concurring) (\u201cInterestingly, the mediator presumably did not think that Mrs. Schultz\u2019s October 1, 2003, complaint was untimely filed, given that he did not recommend dismissal based on the timeliness of the complaint (which dismissal would have been a dismissal with prejudice.)\u201d).\nAdditionally, when Mrs. Schultz filed her second worker\u2019s compensation complaint on June 18, 2004, the WCA gave the complaint the same case number as the October 1,2003, complaint and labeled it with a \u2018Reopened\u2019 date stamp. When a second mediator considered the issue of the statute of limitations later in 2004, he specifically stated that \u201c[i]t is the [mjediator\u2019s evaluation that if this case proceeds to trial, a Workers\u2019 Compensation Judge will probably decide this complaint is not barred by the statute of limitations pursuant to \u00a7 52-1-36.\u201d Therefore, it is fair to conclude that the WCA considered the second complaint as a continuation or a mere reopening of the first complaint, and not as an entirely new case. Importantly, there is no dispute that the first complaint, filed on October 1, 2003, was timely.\nThe Court of Appeals placed great reliance on the mediator\u2019s words, \u201cdismissal without prejudice,\u201d concluding that Mrs. Schultz had to start all over within the constraints of the old limitation period. We conclude that the Court of Appeals misread what occurred below. We question whether a dismissal without prejudice from a mediator, following an informal mediation process conducted at the WCA, was intended to have the harsh consequences the Court of Appeals gave to this case. Legally, \u201c[t]he words \u2018without prejudice\u2019 when used in an order or decree generally indicate that there has been no resolution of the controversy on its merits and leave the issues in litigation open to another suit as if no action had ever been brought.\u201d Bralley v. City of Albuquerque, 102 N.M. 715, 719, 699 P.2d 646, 650 (Ct. App. 1985).\nYet, mediations at the WCA are \u201cinformal meetings with no transcript of the proceedings\u201d where \u201c[n]o motions practice shall be allowed.\u201d 11.4.4.10(C)(7)(c) NMAC (12/31/12). The mediator\u2019s duties include \u201cmak[ingj recommendations on all issues remaining in dispute\u201d and issuing a recommended resolution. 11.4.4.10(C)(6)(b) & (d) NMAC. Unlike a court, it does not appear that a mediator has the authority to dismiss a case without prejudice, as a judge could. See 11.4.4.10(C)(6)(a) & (c) NMAC (describing the purposes of the mediation conference and duties of the mediator, stating that the parties shall come together, \u201cattempt to settle disputed issues by discussing the facts . . . and by suggesting compromises or settlements,\u201d and also that the mediator could \u201cstate an opinion of the strength of any argument or position, and the possible results if the complaint is tried by a judge\u201d).\nNo one at the WCA entered a formal order dismissing the case without prejudice, although the recommended resolution did become binding on the parties after thirty days when neither party formally rejected or accepted the resolution. See 11.4.4.10(D)(5)(a) NMAC (\u201cFailure to timely accept or reject the recommended resolution shall conclusively bind the parties to the recommended resolution.\u201d). It appears that the use of the term \u201cdismissal without prejudice\u201d had consequences beyond what the mediator intended. As previously stated, the mediator was trying to assist Mrs. Schultz, who came to the first mediation with only her pastor, not her attorney. See Schultz, 2012-NMCA-015, \u00b6 49 (Sutin, J., specially concurring) (recognizing the harsh result of the dismissal without prejudice in this case and wondering \u201cwhy the workers\u2019 compensation process could not . . . have accommodated [Mrs. Schultz] by, instead of a dismissal without prejudice and apparently without any explanation as to the effect of the dismissal, setting a definitive date for the continuation of the mediation\u201d). Considering all the circumstances, we conclude that neither the WCA nor the mediator intended an outright dismissal or that a second complaint would have to begin anew to satisfy the limitation period.\nMoreover, even if we were to consider the second complaint as completely independent of the first, we are satisfied that it was filed within a reasonable period of time as Section 52-1-36 envisions. In Elsea, the worker took an additional seven months to file his complaint. We fail to see why a similar period of time would be unreasonable in this case. 47 N.M. at 364, 143 P.2d at 576-77.\nCONCLUSION\nWe reverse and remand to the Court of Appeals to determine whether Schultz died within the course and scope of his employment.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nRICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice\nWE CONCUR:\nPETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Chief Justice\nEDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice\nCHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice\nBARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice\nThe record indicates that there was another complaint filed on October 22,2003. It is not clear why this second complaint was filed. This complaint is the same as the one filed on October 1,2003. For purposes of this appeal, all parties have treated October 1,2003, as the date Mrs. Schultz first filed her workers\u2019 compensation complaint.\nWe expressly overrule the portions of those cases which describe or apply Section 52-1-36 as a tolling statute. See Stasey v. Stasey, 11 N.M. 436, 423 P.2d 869 (1967); Lucero v. White Auto Stores, Inc., 60 N.M. 266, 268, 291 P.2d 308, 309 (1955); Hutcherson v. Dawn Trucking Co., 107N.M. 358, 360, 758 P.2d 308, 310 (Ct. App. 1988); Howie v. Stevens, 102 N.M. 300, 305, 694 P.2d 1365, 1370 (Ct. App. 1984); Ryan v. Bruenger M. Trucking, 100 N.M. 15, 17, 665 P.2d 277, 279 (Ct. App. 1983); Knippel v. N. Commc\u2019ns, Inc., 97 N.M. 401, 405, 640 P.2d 507, 511 (Ct. App. 1982); Saenz v. McCormick Constr. Co., 95 N.M. 609, 610, 624 P.2d 551, 552 (Ct. App. 1981), holding modified on other grounds by Ryan, 100 N.M. at 17, 665 P.2d at 279; Owens v. Eddie Lu\u2019s Fine Apparel, 95 N.M. 176, 178, 619 P.2d 852, 854 (Ct. App. 1980), abrogation recognized on other grounds in Schultz, 2012-NMCA-015, \u00b6 26.", "type": "majority", "author": "BOSSON, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Academy Compensation Clinic, P.C. George Wright Weeth Albuquerque, NM for Petitioner", "Riley, Shane & Keller, P.A. Richard J. Shane Tiffany L. Sanchez Kristin J. Dalton Albuquerque, NM for Respondents" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2013-NMSC-013\nFiling Date: April 11, 2013\nDocket No. 33, 372\nCHERYL SCHULTZ for KEVIN SCHULTZ (deceased), Worker-Petitioner, v. POJOAQUE TRIBAL POLICE DEPARTMENT, and NEW MEXICO MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Employer-Insurer-Respondents.\nAcademy Compensation Clinic, P.C. George Wright Weeth Albuquerque, NM for Petitioner\nRiley, Shane & Keller, P.A. Richard J. Shane Tiffany L. Sanchez Kristin J. Dalton Albuquerque, NM for Respondents" }, "file_name": "0005-01", "first_page_order": 21, "last_page_order": 33 }