{
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  "name": "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DONOVAN KING, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. King",
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    "judges": [
      "EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice",
      "WE CONCUR:",
      "PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Chief Justice",
      "RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice",
      "CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice",
      "BARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice"
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DONOVAN KING, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "OPINION\nCH\u00c1VEZ, Justice.\nDonovan King, suspected of aggravated battery, sat slumped over in a chair located in an interrogation room at the Farmington Police Department. His interrogator, Detective Paul Martinez, advised King of his rights consistent with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966), and asked if he understood his rights. King replied, \u201cYeah.\u201d Detective Martinez next asked him, \u201cDo you wish to answer any questions?\u201d King answered, \u201cNot at the moment. Kind of intoxicated.\u201d After telling King that intoxication was not a reason that King could not talk to him, Detective Martinez placed a waiver of rights form in front of King, tossed a pen in King\u2019s direction, and said, \u201cSign this for me if you wish to answer questions,\u201d indicating where King should sign. King responded, \u201cIf I wish to answer questions? Like I said[,] not at the moment.\u201d Undeterred, Detective Martinez repeated that intoxication was not a reason for not giving a statement, persisted in questioning King, and eventually elicited an incriminating statement from him.\nThe district court granted King\u2019s motion to suppress the statement because King had twice unambiguously invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent when he told Detective Martinez that he did not want to answer questions at the moment. Because King was ultimately charged with an open count of first degree murder, the State appealed the district court\u2019s ruling to this Court. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 39-3-3(B)(2) (1972) (permitting appeal by the state to the Supreme Court of decisions and orders suppressing evidence); State v. Smallwood, 2007-NMSC-005, \u00b6 11, 141 N.M. 178, 152 P.3d 821 (holding that this Court has jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals in cases in which a criminal defendant may be sentenced to life imprisonment). We affirm the district court.\nKING UNEQUIVOCALLY INVOKED HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT\nIn Miranda, the United States Supreme Court articulated a warning that law enforcement must give to a suspect before the suspect can be subjected to a custodial interrogation without compromising the suspect\u2019s privilege against self-incrimination. 384 U.S. at 478-79. The Court explained:\n[The suspect] must be warned prior to .any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can he used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.\nId. at 479. \u201cOnce warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.\u201d Id. at 473-74.\nIt is uncontested in this case that King was a suspect who was being subjected to a custodial interrogation and that he was advised of his Miranda rights. The dispositive issue is whether King \u2019 s statements that he did not want to answer questions \u201cat the moment\u201d were sufficient to invoke his constitutional right to remain silent, mandating that the interrogation cease. In addressing this issue, we defer to the district court\u2019s findings as long as the findings are supported by substantial evidence, and we review de novo the district court\u2019s application of the law to those facts. State v. Hubble, 2009-NMSC-014, \u00b6 5,146 N.M. 70,206 P.3d 579.\nA hearing was held on King\u2019s motion to suppress on December 8, 2011. Detective Martinez testified at the hearing, and the video recording and transcript of Detective Martinez\u2019s interrogation of King were admitted as State\u2019s Exhibits A and B, respectively. The district court made detailed and comprehensive findings of fact and conclusions of law. It entered an order on December 27, 2011, granting the motion to suppress. The district court made the following relevant findings:\n1. At the time of the interview that is the subject of the motion, the Defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes and was under interrogation by the Detective.\n2. At the outset of the interrogation when the Detective explained the Defendant\u2019s Miranda rights, the Defendant appears on the DVD to be physically affected by the alcohol and marijuana he testified to having consumed during the hours prior to the custodial interrogation. However, it is clear that the Defendant\u2019s mentation was rational and lucid. He was able to readily recite his date of birth, age, post office box and physical address. His remarks and questions were logical and appropriate to the situation.\n3. The DVD and Appendix A, pg. 2[,] statements 7 through 14, reveal the following exchange.\nDetective: All right. [King], listen to me. You have the right to remain silent. Listen to me \u2014 look at me bro! You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say may be used against you. You have a right to a lawyer. If you cannot afford a lawyer one will be provided free. Do you understand your rights?\n[King]: Yeah[.]\nDetective: Do you wish to answer any questions?\n[King]: Not at the moment. Kind of intoxicated. Detective: Well[,] intoxication isn\u2019t one of the reasons you can\u2019t talk to us. It\u2019s uh . . .\n[King]: It\u2019s what?\nDetective: Three o\u2019clock. Sign this for me if you wish to answer questions. Right there.\n[King]: If I wish to answer questions? Like I said[,] not at the moment.\n4. As the Detective said \u201csign this for me,\u201d he placed the waiver of rights form across the table in front of [King], tossed a pen and marked the signature line. [King] did not sign.\n7. In one form or another, the Detective told [King] to sign the form six times before [King] actually signed the waiver of rights form.\nBased on these findings, the district court concluded that (1) King had unambiguously invoked his right to remain silent; (2) King did not have to supply a reason for invoking his right to remain silent; and (3) the detective did not scrupulously honor King\u2019s right to remain silent and terminate the interrogation. The transcript and the video recording of the interrogation adequately support the district court\u2019s findings of fact. We next determine whether the district court correctly applied the facts to the law.\nThe legal analysis begins with the following passage from Miranda-.\nOnce warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.\n384 U.S. at 473-74 (footnote omitted).\nHowever, the broad statement, \u201c[i]f the individual indicates in any manner,\u201d id. at 473, has been clarified to mean that a suspect must make an unambiguous statement invoking the right to remain silent. Berghuisv. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381 (2010). The moment that the unambiguous statement is made, the interrogator must \u201cscrupulously honor\u201d the suspect\u2019s or person\u2019s right by ceasing the interrogation. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96,104 (1975) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The interrogator is not at liberty to refuse to discontinue the interrogation orto persist in repeated efforts to wear down the suspect so as to cause the suspect to change his or her mind. Id. at 105-06.\nThe State contends that King\u2019s statement that he did not want to answer questions \u201cat the moment\u201d was equivocal and implied that King would answer questions at some point later in time, perhaps when he no longer felt intoxicated. King contends that his refusal to answer questions \u201cat the moment\u201d required the police to stop the interrogation. We agree with King.\nKing clearly invoked his right to remain silent. There is nothing ambiguous about his statement, which made it clear that he did not want to speak with the police. The adverb \u201cnot\u201d is unequivocally a negative expression. In addition to this plain statement, King also refused to sign the waiver of rights form. It is obvious that Detective Martinez himself understood that King did not want to answer questions. Detective Martinez acknowledged as much when he told King that intoxication was not a reason that King could not talk to him. The State argues that \u201cDetective Martinez did not lie to [King] when he told him that \u2018intoxication was not a reason for not speaking.\u2019\u201d However, the State does not cite any authority for the proposition that a person subjected to a custodial interrogation must state a reason for his or her choice to invoke their constitutional rights, and we have found none. Thus, we presume that no such authority exists. State v. Guerra, 2012-NMSC-014, \u00b6 21, 278 P.3d 1031; McNeill v. Rice Eng\u2019g & Operating, Inc., 2010-NMSC-015, \u00b6 11, 148 N.M. 16, 229 P.3d 489 (\u201cWhere [a party has] failed to cite any contrary authority from this or any other jurisdiction, this Court will presume that no such authority exists.\u201d). The district court was correct in concluding that a person who invokes the right to remain silent does not have to offer a reason for invoking the right. All that is required is an unambiguous statement invoking the right to remain silent so that the interrogator is not left to guess whether the right was invoked. Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 382. We are left with the inescapable conclusion that Detective Martinez did not have to guess what King meant, and the detective knew that King did not want to answer questions, as further evidenced by the detective\u2019s efforts to get King to change his mind and sign the form waiving his rights.\nAlthough King\u2019s statement suggested that he might want to talk at a later time, there was absolutely no respite from the interrogation in this case. After King declined to sign the waiver of rights form and repeated that he did not want to talk \u201cat the moment,\u201d Detective Martinez immediately launched into a lecture about how intoxication is not one of the reasons for refusing to talk to the police. Detective Martinez reprimanded King, telling him that the interrogation was \u201cpretty important,\u201d King could not possibly think that the detectives were messing around, and King should be \u201cscared sober.\u201d This lecture was followed by more questioning and several requests for King to sign the waiver of rights form.\nThis is a case in which the interrogator failed to honor a decision by a person in custody to cut off questioning, by both refusing to discontinue the interrogation and by persisting in repeated efforts to wear the suspect down and cause him to change his mind. This, the Fifth Amendment does not tolerate. \u201cThe requirement that law enforcement authorities must respect a person\u2019s exercise of [the right to remain silent] counteracts the coercive pressures of the custodial setting.\u201d Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104. Detective Martinez\u2019s failure to scrupulously honor King\u2019s exercise of his right to remain silent is inconsistent with any notion of a voluntary relinquishment of the right to remain silent. Detective Martinez\u2019s actions are conclusive evidence that King\u2019s subsequent relinquishment of his right to remain silent was forced upon him by the continued interrogation, and therefore it was not a voluntary relinquishment.\nCONCLUSION\nThe district court\u2019s grant of King\u2019s motion to suppress is affirmed because King unambiguously invoked his right to remain silent and law enforcement did not scrupulously honor his right to remain silent by immediately ceasing the interrogation.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nEDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice\nWE CONCUR:\nPETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Chief Justice\nRICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice\nCHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice\nBARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Gary K. King, Attorney General Ralph E. Trujillo, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Appellant",
      "Bennett J. Baur, Acting Chief Public Defender Sergio J. Viscoli, Assistant Appellate Defender Albuquerque, NM for Appellee"
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2013-NMSC-014\nFiling Date: April 15, 2013\nDocket No. 33,395\nSTATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DONOVAN KING, Defendant-Appellee.\nGary K. King, Attorney General Ralph E. Trujillo, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Appellant\nBennett J. Baur, Acting Chief Public Defender Sergio J. Viscoli, Assistant Appellate Defender Albuquerque, NM for Appellee"
  },
  "file_name": "0017-01",
  "first_page_order": 33,
  "last_page_order": 38
}
