{ "id": 4335281, "name": "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRIAN HICKS, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Hicks", "decision_date": "2013-04-03", "docket_number": "No. 34,053; Docket No. 30,370", "first_page": "40", "last_page": "46", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2013-NMCA-056" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "117 P.3d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "case_ids": [ 1565708 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/idaho/141/0736-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 N.M. 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 725505 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550", "parenthetical": "\"While it is true that reasonable suspicion does not provide carte blanche, it does allow detention sufficient to verify or dispel the circumstances giving rise to the suspicion.\"" }, { "page": "877", "parenthetical": "\"While it is true that reasonable suspicion does not provide carte blanche, it does allow detention sufficient to verify or dispel the circumstances giving rise to the suspicion.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/115/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "790 N.W.2d 775", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 7082063 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "782" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/790/0775-01" ] }, { "cite": "918 N.E.2d 316", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 7209191 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322", "parenthetical": "alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/918/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-046", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4245815 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/147/0134-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMCA-002", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4243835 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 1" }, { "page": "\u00b6 25" }, { "page": "\u00b6 25" }, { "page": "\u00b6 22" }, { "page": "\u00b6 26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "2011-NMSC-009", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4249607 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 51" }, { "page": "\u00b6 51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/149/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMSC-006", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 322282 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 21" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 39-40" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 41-43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/122/0777-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMSC-041", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4002999 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/144/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 P.3d 158", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 P.3d 515", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2012-NMCA-004", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4188137 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/1/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "2010-NMCA-027", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4245178 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/147/0761-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMCA-111", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4245091 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/147/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "2001-NMSC-017", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 352577 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 15" }, { "page": "\u00b6 15" }, { "page": "\u00b6 21" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/130/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "2011-NMCA-001", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4248673 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 9, 11" }, { "page": "\u00b6 15" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6 16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/149/0125-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 803, "char_count": 18909, "ocr_confidence": 0.824, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.853133913962961e-08, "percentile": 0.41775891181300534 }, "sha256": "57965889ffb07e7485c8949cbd242489aa15bf348bfa76b2d4fcc71e69c49523", "simhash": "1:370233360ec94763", "word_count": 2952 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:50:37.461651+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge", "WE CONCUR:", "JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge", "MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge" ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRIAN HICKS, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nWECHSLER, Judge.\nThis case presents the question of whether an officer\u2019s knowledge that the registered owner of a vehicle has a revoked license provides reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle when the officer makes no effort to determine, prior to the stop, whether the driver of the vehicle is the registered owner. The State appeals from the district court\u2019s grant of Defendant Brian Hicks\u2019s motion to suppress. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 39-3-3(B)(2) (1972) (permitting the state to take an interlocutory appeal from an order granting a defendant\u2019s motion to suppress). The State contends that the district court erred in concluding that the stop of Defendant\u2019s vehicle was not supported by reasonable suspicion and thus violated the New Mexico Constitution. In State v. Candelaria, which was decided after the district court\u2019s decision in this case, we held that a stop effected on the basis of similar information did not violate the United States Constitution because it was supported by reasonable suspicion. 2011-NMCA-001^ 15, 149 N.M. 125, 245 P.3d 69. We now hold that the same result is warranted under the New Mexico Constitution. Accordingly, we reverse.\nBACKGROUND\nDefendant was charged by criminal information with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DWI), a fourth or subsequent offense, and driving with a suspended or revoked license. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing inter alia that the stop of his vehicle was not supported by reasonable suspicion because the arresting officer did not confirm, prior to the stop, that Defendant was the registered owner of the vehicle. The parties stipulated to the following facts at the suppression hearing:\n1. ... Defendant\u2019s motor vehicle was being driven in San Juan County, New Mexico.\n2. Officer [Matt] Costen observed the motor vehicle and \u201cran\u201d the license plate of the vehicle through the New Mexico Motor Vehicle Department (\u201cMVD\u201d).\n3. The information from the MVD came back with the fact that the driving privileges of the registered owner of the motor vehicle had been revoked.\n4. Officer Costen made no effort to visually observe the driver prior to the stop.\n5. Based on the revocation information from the MVD, Officer Costen stopped the motor vehicle.\n6. Upon contacting the driver, Officer Costen discovered that.\n. . Defendant was driving the vehicle, that. . . Defendant was the owner of the vehicle who had a revoked license [,] and that Defendant appeared intoxicated.\nThe district court orally granted Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. The State filed a motion to reconsider. The State noted that there did not appear to be any New Mexico case law on point, but cited numerous cases from other jurisdictions supporting its position that the stop of Defendant\u2019s vehicle was supported by reasonable suspicion and thus did not violate the United States or New Mexico Constitutions. In response, Defendant argued the stop violated the New Mexico Constitution because New Mexico affords greater protection than the United States Constitution against unreasonable searches and seizures involving automobiles.\nThe district court denied the State\u2019s motion. In a written order, dated March 25, 2010, the district court acknowledged that \u201c[c]ase law from other [sjtates could be construed to mean that Officer Costen had . . . reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant\u2019s vehicle.\u201d However, the district court held that the stop violated the New Mexico Constitution. The district court quoted State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017, \u00b6 15, 130 N.M. 386, 25 P.3d 225, for the proposition that the New Mexico Constitution affords an \u201cextra layer of protection from unreasonable searches and seizures involving automobiles.\u201d The district court noted it might have upheld the stop if the officer had observed the driver before stopping the vehicle to determine whether he matched the basic description of the registered owner.\nMOTION TO SUPPRESS\nIn reviewing a motion to suppress, \u201c[w]e review factual determinations by the [district] court under a substantial evidence standard and legal questions de novo.\u201d State v. Brusuelas, 2009-NMCA-111, \u00b6 5, 147 N.M. 233, 219 P.3d 1 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The question on appeal is whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant\u2019s vehicle solely on the basis of information that the registered owner of the vehicle had a revoked license. Because this is a'legal question, our review is de novo. See id.\nThe State contends that Candelaria is controlling. In Candelaria, we considered whether a traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution when, at the time they effected the stop, the police officers \u201cknew only that the [vehicle] was registered to [a person], whose license had been suspended.\u201d 2011-NMCA-001, \u00b6\u00b6 9, 11. We recognized this question as one of first impression in New Mexico and elected to follow \u201can overwhelming majority of jurisdictions\u201d in holding the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion and thus did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 11, 13. Defendant contends that Candelaria is not controlling because, in addition to knowing that the registered owner\u2019s license had been suspended, the police officers in Candelaria observed the vehicle under suspicious circumstances prior to the stop.\nIt is true that, in Candelaria, the police officers observed the vehicle in which the defendant was driving \u201cunder suspicious circumstances.\u201d Id. \u00b6 1. Specifically, the police observed that, after they pulled into a parking lot, the vehicle \u201csped away.\u201d Id. \u00b6 2. A careful reading of Candelaria reveals this distinction is one without a difference, however, as we did not consider the \u201csuspicious circumstances\u201d in concluding the officers had reasonable suspicion to effect the stop. We explained:\nWhen police observe a vehicle registered to an owner whose license has been suspended, it is reasonable to conclude that the driver is the registrant \u2014 that is, until officers become aware of facts to contradict their assumption. The concept of reasonable suspicion has always embraced a certain degree of uncertainty. In the case before us, because [the officers] were aware of no facts to contradict their inference that [the person] was driving the car for which he was the registered owner, we follow the approach of the majority of jurisdictions and hold that police possessed reasonable suspicion to [e]ffect a traffic stop.\nId. \u00b6 15. We noted that \u201c[o]ur holding should come as no surprise\u201d because \u201cNew Mexico\u2019s civil law has long recognized a presumption that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the registered owner of a vehicle is that vehicle\u2019s driver.\u201d Id.\nIn deciding Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, the district court did not have the benefit of our decision in Candelaria. Without any clear authority from either this Court or our Supreme Court, the district court declined to follow the out-of-state cases cited by the State and held that suppression was warranted under the New Mexico Constitution. On appeal, Defendant focuses entirely on distinguishing Candelaria, which is premised on a federal constitutional analysis. Defendant does not argue the district court\u2019s decision should be upheld under the New Mexico Constitution. We nonetheless consider the issue because it was the express basis for the district court\u2019s ruling. We do not normally consider arguments that are not developed on appeal. See State v. Fuentes, 2010-NMCA-027, \u00b6 29, 147 N.M. 761, 228 P.3d 1181 (explaining that this Court does not review unclear or undeveloped arguments); see, e.g., State v. Dickert, 2012-NMCA-004, \u00b6 46, 268 P.3d 515 (declining to address argument inadequately developed by the defendant), cert. denied, 2011 -NMCERT-012, 291 P.3d 158. However, because the order being appealed from is based on a state constitutional analysis, we will review the issue under the New Mexico Constitution.\nThe United States and New Mexico Constitutions \u201cprovide overlapping protections against unreasonable searches and seizures}.]\u201d State v. Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, \u00b6 12, 144 N.M. 371,188 P.3d 95; seeU.S. Const, amend. IV (guaranteeing \u201c[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures\u201d); N.M. Const. art. II, \u00a7 10 (\u201cThe people shall be secure . . . from unreasonable searches and seizures}.]\u201d). Our Supreme Court has adopted an interstitial approach for reviewing constitutional questions under federal and state law. See State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, \u00b6 21, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1. Under this approach, we first ask \u201cwhether the right being asserted is protected under the federal constitution. If it is, then the state constitutional claim is not reached. If it is not, then the state constitution is examined.\u201d Id. \u00b6 19.\nWe have already determined that, under Candelaria, Defendant\u2019s rights are not protected under the United States Constitution. We now examine Defendant\u2019s rights under the New Mexico Constitution. Gomez instructs that we may \u201cdiverge from federal precedent for three reasons: a flawed federal analysis, structural differences between state and federal government, or distinctive state characteristics.\u201d 1997-NMSC-006^ 19. We find no flaws in the federal analysis undertaken in Candelaria; nor do we perceive any structural differences between state and federal government relevant to the question presented. If we were to reach a different result, it would be because of distinctive state characteristics.\n\u201cIt is well-established that Article II, Section 10 provides more protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment.\u201d State v. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, \u00b6 51, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861. Our Supreme Court has specifically recognized that \u201c}t]he extra layer of protection from unreasonable searches and seizures involving automobiles is a distinct characteristic of New Mexico constitutional law.\u201d Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017, \u00b6 15.\nIn Cardenas-Alvarez, the case relied upon by the district court in the present case, our Supreme Court held that a federal agent violated the New Mexico Constitution by referring the defendant to a secondary inspection area after a traffic stop at a permanent border checkpoint in the absence of reasonable suspicion. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 3, 21. Our Supreme Court held that the agent\u2019s actions did not violate the United States Constitution because \u201c[ujnder federal law, [the defendant's detention constituted a routine border checkpoint stop and therefore need not have been supported by suspicious circumstances.\u201d Id. \u00b6 7. Importantly, our Supreme Court did not hold that reasonable suspicion was present under federal law and lacking under state law; instead, it held that reasonable suspicion was required under state law and not required under federal law. See id. \u00b6 49 (Baca, J., concurring in the result).\nIn State v. Ochoa, we refused to follow the lead of the United States Supreme Court in upholding pretextual traffic stops. 2009-NMCA-002, \u00b6 1, 146N.M.32, 206 P.3d 143. We \u201cdeparted] from federal constitutional law . . . because we [found] the federal analysis unpersuasive and incompatible with our state\u2019s distinctively protective standards for searches and seizures of automobiles.\u201d Id. \u00b6 12. We were especially concerned about the mechanical nature of the federal rule because our Constitution requires \u201cthat searches and seizures be reasonable based on the particular facts of each case.\u201d Id. \u00b6 26. We noted that at least two other states, Washington and Delaware, had interpreted their state constitutions to provide greater protection than the federal constitution in the context of pretextual traffic stops. See id. \u00b6\u00b6 27-28.\n\u201cThe fact that we have departed from the analysis used to determine whether a violation of the Fourth Amendment occurred in certain contexts, however, does not require us to do so in all contexts.\u201d Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, \u00b6 51. We must conduct a \u201cde novo review of the law[.]\u201d Id. In the context of a non-pretextual traffic stop, we require that, to satisfy Article II, Section 10, a police officer must have \u201creasonable suspicion of criminal activity or probable cause that the traffic code has been violated.\u201d Ochoa, 2009-NMCA-002, \u00b6 25. Driving with a revoked license is a criminal offense. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 66-5-39(A) (1993) (\u201cAny person who drives a motor vehicle on any public highway of this state at a time when his privilege to do so is suspended or revoked and who knows or should have known that his license was suspended or revoked is guilty of a misdemeanor [.]\u201d). Thus, the standard in this case is reasonable suspicion.\n\u201cIn determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, we examine the totality of the circumstances.\u201d Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017, \u00b6 21. \u201cReasonable suspicion must be based on specific articulable facts and the rational inferences that may be drawn from those facts.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). \u201cUnsupported intuition and inarticulate hunches are not sufficient.\u201d State v. Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, \u00b6 43, 147 N.M. 134, 217 P.3d 1032 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). \u201cThe purpose of requiring objectively reasonable suspicion based on the circumstances is to prevent and invalidate police conduct based on hunches, which are, by definition, subjective.\u201d Ochoa, 2009-NMCA-002, \u00b6 25 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\nIn this case, the officer stopped Defendant\u2019s vehicle after learning that the license of the registered owner of the vehicle had been revoked. The officer did not have a subjective hunch that Defendant was breaking the law; rather, he had a particularized suspicion that D efendant was breaking the law by driving with a revoked license. The officer could have been incorrect; he could have discovered that Defendant was not the registered owner and was not otherwise breaking the law. But, as we noted in Candelaria, and we believe equally applicable under a state constitutional analysis, \u201c[t]he concept of reasonable suspicion has always embraced a certain degree of uncertainty.\u201d 2011-NMCA-001, \u00b6 15.\nIn Gomez, our Supreme Court determined that the New Mexico Constitution provides broader protection for warrantless searches of automobiles, holding that they required a showing of exigent circumstances. 1997-NMSC-006, \u00b6\u00b6 39-40. In Ochoa, we said that the Gomez Court \u201cdetermined that where there is no reasonable basis to believe that the delay in obtaining a search warrant will jeopardize legitimate law enforcement interests, there is no justification for an exception to the warrant requirement.\u201d Ochoa, 2009-NMCA-002, \u00b6 22 (citing Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, \u00b6\u00b6 41-43). In this case, we believe that it would potentially jeopardize legitimate law enforcement interests to require police officers to determine, prior to effecting a traffic stop, whether the driver of a vehicle matches the basic description of the registered owner. In upholding a stop similar to the stop at issue here, the Indiana Supreme Court explained:\nWe agree with the [sjtate that requiring the officer to verify the driver of the vehicle strikes against basic principles of safety because it puts the onus on the officer to maneuver himself into a position to clearly observe the driver in the midst of traffic. In addition, we acknowledge the difficulty that the driver verification requirement would impose on officers during late night hours and in situations where car windows are darkly tinted}.]\nArmfield v. State, 918 N.E.2d 316, 322 (Ind. 2009) (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted); see also State v. Vance, 790 N.W.2d 775, 782 (Iowa 2010) (\u201c[T]o forbid the police from relying on such an inference [that the driver of a vehicle is the registered owner] would seriously limit an officer\u2019s ability to investigate suspension violations because there are few, if any, additional steps the officer can utilize to establish the driver of a vehicle is its registered owner.\u201d). Armfield and Vance were based on the United States Constitution, but we believe the policy considerations underlying these decisions are relevant to this case. Requiring police officers to do more than what the officer did here could potentially jeopardize the legitimate law enforcement interest of removing drivers with revoked or suspended licenses from our roadways.\nWe agree with the State that the best and least intrusive way for the officer to confirm or dispel his suspicion that the driver of the vehicle he observed had a revoked license was through an investigatory traffic stop. See State v. Affsprung, 115 N.M. 546, 550, 854 P.2d 873, 877 (Ct. App. 1993) (\u201cWhile it is true that reasonable suspicion does not provide carte blanche, it does allow detention sufficient to verify or dispel the circumstances giving rise to the suspicion.\u201d). In holding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant\u2019s vehicle, we are not adopting a bright-line rule of the type we criticized in Ochoa. 2009-NMCA-002, \u00b6 26. Instead, consistent with our precedent, we base our conclusion on the totality of the circumstances presented in this case. Notably, and unlike in Ochoa, we have not located any case in which a state court has concluded that, under its constitution, an officer lacks reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle on the basis of the same limited information the officer here possessed. In Candelaria, we explained that we found only one case \u201cthat still bears the force of law\u201d supporting the argument that reasonable suspicion is lacking on these facts. 2011-NMCA-001, \u00b6 12. That case, State v. Cerino, 117 P.3d 876, 878 (Idaho Ct. App. 2005), was premised on a federal constitutional analysis.\nWe conclude that, in this circumstance, the result under the New Mexico Constitution is the same as under the United States Constitution. Like the officers in Candelaria, the officer here \u201cpossessed reasonable suspicion to believe that [Defendant\u2019s] vehicle, as well as its occupant . . . were subject to seizure.\u201d 2011-NMCA-001, \u00b6 16. Accordingly, the stop of Defendant\u2019s vehicle did not violate the New Mexico Constitution.\nCONCLUSION\nWe reverse the district court\u2019s grant of Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nJAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nJONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge\nMICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge", "type": "majority", "author": "WECHSLER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary K. King, Attorney General Santa Fe, NM M. Anne Kelly, Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM for Appellant", "Bennett J. Baur, Acting ChiefPublic Defender W ill O \u2019Connell, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellee" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Certiorari Denied, April 3, 2013,\nNo. 34,053\nIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2013-NMCA-056\nFiling Date: February 18, 2013\nDocket No. 30,370\nSTATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRIAN HICKS, Defendant-Appellee.\nGary K. King, Attorney General Santa Fe, NM M. Anne Kelly, Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM for Appellant\nBennett J. Baur, Acting ChiefPublic Defender W ill O \u2019Connell, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellee" }, "file_name": "0040-01", "first_page_order": 56, "last_page_order": 62 }