{ "id": 4334952, "name": "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, ex rel., CHILDREN, YOUTH and FAMILIES DEPARTMENT, Petitioner-Appellee, v. MARSALEE P., Respondent-Defendant, and STANLEY P., Respondent, and IN THE MATTER OF DA'VONDRE P., WHITLEY P., and JORDAN P., Children", "name_abbreviation": "State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Department v. Marsalee P.", "decision_date": "2013-04-09", "docket_number": "Docket No. 31,784", "first_page": "150", "last_page": "158", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2013-NMCA-062" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "2004-NMCA-083", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1224600 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b652" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/136/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMCA-079", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4002872 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/144/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "640 F.3d 1117", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 4203855 ], "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1124", "parenthetical": "holding that a child did not fit the definition of Indian child because neither the child nor the mother was enrolled in the Indian tribe" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/640/1117-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 N.M. 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 727721 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417", "parenthetical": "characterizing children not registered with the Navajo Nation as \"eligible for membership\"" }, { "page": "452", "parenthetical": "characterizing children not registered with the Navajo Nation as \"eligible for membership\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/116/0416-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMCA-045", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 929193 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/137/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 U.S.C. \u00a7 1903", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(4)" }, { "page": "(4)" }, { "page": "(4)", "parenthetical": "defining Indian child as when the child is a member of an Indian tribe or the child is eligible to be a member and is the biological child of a member" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1911", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 U.S.C. \u00a7 1902", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2007-NMCA-070", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3669122 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/141/0692-01" ] }, { "cite": "2011-NMSC-005", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4249871 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 14" }, { "page": "\u00b6 17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/149/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 U.S.C. \u00a7 1915", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(d)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 U.S.C. \u00a7 1912", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(f)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(f)" }, { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(f)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1901", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(3)" }, { "page": "(5)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 851, "char_count": 23956, "ocr_confidence": 0.849, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.339561997518647e-08, "percentile": 0.480699453906386 }, "sha256": "8394f9ed1db43b23e17fada1bcc9121929cbed326c81eaa22f790fcbf7c6f0c4", "simhash": "1:d74602b36c9b472a", "word_count": 3875 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:50:37.461651+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge", "WE CONCUR:", "LINDA M. VANZI, Judge", "J. MILES HANISEE, Judge" ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, ex rel., CHILDREN, YOUTH and FAMILIES DEPARTMENT, Petitioner-Appellee, v. MARSALEE P., Respondent-Defendant, and STANLEY P., Respondent, and IN THE MATTER OF DA\u2019VONDRE P., WHITLEY P., and JORDAN P., Children." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nWECHSLER, Judge.\nWe examine in this appeal of a parental termination order circumstances that require the district court and Petitioner Children, Youth and Families Department (the Department) to fulfill obligations under the Abuse and Neglect Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 32A-4-1 to -34 (1993, as amended through 2009). We hold that the district court erred by terminating Mother\u2019s parental rights without ensuring that the Department had complied with Section 32A-4-22(I) of the Abuse and Neglect Act, which mandates that the Department \u201cshall pursue the enrollment\u201d on behalf of children eligible for enrollment in an Indian tribe. Accordingly, we reverse the termination of Mother\u2019s parental rights and remand to the district court.\nBACKGROUND PRIOR TO PARENTAL TERMINATION TRIAL\nThe Department filed a neglect/abuse petition in August 2010 against Mother regarding three ofher children, Da\u2019Vondre P., Whitley P., and Jordan P. (collectively, the children). The Department took custody of the children on August 9, 2010 because of unsanitary living conditions and illegal drug use by Mother and the children\u2019s father.\nThe district court held a custody hearing on August 23, 2010 and filed a custody order on August 24, 2010. The Department stipulated that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1901 to 1963 (1978), applied because the children were eligible for enrollment in the Navajo Nation. The order states that \u201c[t]he children are eligible for enrollment with the Navajo Nation and are therefore subject to [ICWA].\u201d In the predispositional study, the Department acknowledged that two of the children were eligible for enrollment into the Navajo Nation \u201cif . . . [M]other . . . chooses to enroll.\u201d Additionally, the report states that all three children are \u201celigible for enrollment in the Navajo [Nation]. [Mother] is not enrolled in the [Navajo Nation].\u201d\nThe district court held an adjudicatory hearing on October 4, 2010. After the hearing, the district court entered a judgment adjudicating the children as abused and providing the Department custody of the children. In the judgment, the district court stated that the children were not subject to ICWA. Likewise, the initial judicial review order entered in January 2011 contained a statement that the children were not subject to ICWA. The district court reached an identical conclusion in its status review and change of plan hearing order filed on April 5, 2011. Despite its previous stipulation to the contrary, the Department subsequently filed a motion to terminate parental rights in which it contended that the children were not subject to ICWA.\nREQUEST FOR CONTINUANCE AND TRIAL\nAt the beginning of the termination of parental rights trial, Mother\u2019s counsel requested a continuance so that the provisions of ICWA could be followed. Before Mother arrived at trial, Mother\u2019s counsel stated that he believed that Mother and the children were now enrolled in the Navajo Nation, or at the very least, Mother was trying to get herself and the children enrolled in the Navajo Nation. As a result, Mother\u2019s counsel argued that the case was subject to the provisions of ICWA. The Department argued that, at the beginning of the case, neither Mother nor children were enrolled in the Navajo Nation and therefore ICWA did not apply.\nThe district court agreed that if Mother arrived at the hearing and had a certificate of Indian blood (CIB) issued by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), ICWA would apply, and the trial would need to be continued. The district court expressly stated that it perceived that Mother\u2019s effort to enroll in the Navajo Nation was a \u201clast minute tactic.\u201d Mother\u2019s counsel then pointed out that the custody hearing order contained the stipulation that the children were subject to ICWA. The Department responded that it had received a letter from the Navajo Nation stating that the children were not eligible for enrollment and that, as a result, the October 2010 adjudicatory order changed the initial determination that ICWA applied.\nOnce Mother arrived at the trial, the district court inquired as to whether Mother had completed enrollment. Mother disclosed that she did not have a CIB and that she had not completed enrollment but that she was pursuing enrollment for herself and the children. Mother\u2019s counsel then read into the record a letter from the Navajo Nation\u2019s tribal enrollment services that stated that Mother came to its offices to enroll herself and her six children and that Mother was eligible to enroll. The letter continued that the tribal enrollment office is waiting for additional documentation in order to process the application. Mother, who was adopted, explained that her application for enrollment had to proceed through a review board to trace her lineage to determine whether she is the child of the woman she identifies to be her biological mother and that the process takes about six weeks.\nThe district court stated that it had known since the custody hearing that Mother was eligible to enroll and was still not enrolled and that the trial would go forward without application ofICWA. The district court stated that the ICWA issue was in the same position as it was on \u201cday one,\u201d which was that Mother knew she was eligible but knew there were things she had to do in order to get enrolled. Therefore, because M other was not enrolled at the date of the trial, the district court proceeded with the trial.\nDuring the trial, Mother testified that she began the enrollment process into the Navajo Nation once she received paperwork from the state of California regarding her adoption, several months before the trial. She stated that it took six years to get the paperwork because it was a closed adoption. Mother testified that her birth certificate listed her adoptive mother as her mother and that she needed a birth certificate that listed her biological mother in order to enroll. She stated that her mother was full Navajo, that Mother was one-half Navajo, and that the children were therefore one-quarter Navajo. She further testified that she still needed her marriage license, divorce decree from her first marriage, and two of the children\u2019s birth certificates in order to complete the enrollment process.\nAt the conclusion of trial, the district court announced its ruling from the bench. Specifically regarding ICWA, the district court held that there was no evidence that Mother was enrolled with any tribe and that therefore ICWA did not apply. The district court advised Mother to continue the process of enrolling the children and that if she is successful, ICWA\u2019s placement preferences would apply. The district court then found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had not alleviated the conditions and causes that brought the children into the Department\u2019s custody. The district court terminated Mother\u2019s parental rights.\nARGUMENTS ON APPEAL\nMother filed a timely appeal and focuses her arguments on whether the district court erred in failing to apply the protections ofICWA. Particularly, Mother argues that (1) the district court erred by determining that the children were not Indian children as defined by ICWA and therefore erred by refusing to apply the substantive requirements ofICWA, including (a) making necessary findings pursuant to 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 1912(d), (e); (b) giving preferential foster care placement of the children to the children\u2019s extended family, pursuant to 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 1915; and (c) applying the higher standard of proof required by 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 1912(f) than in non-ICWA termination proceedings; (2) the Department failed in its obligation to pursue enrollment on behalf of the children pursuant to Section 32A-4-22(I) of the Abuse and Neglect Act; and (3) the district court erred in conducting the trial and terminating Mother\u2019s parental rights despite the Department\u2019s failure to comply with ICWA\u2019s notice requirement in 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 1912(a).\n\u201cThe interpretation ofICWA and its relationship to [the Abuse and Neglect Act] present questions of law that we review de novo.\u201d State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep\u2019t v. Marlene C., 2011-NMSC-005, \u00b6 14, 149 N.M. 315, 248 P.3d 863. Additionally, we review interpretations of the Abuse and Neglect Act de novo. See State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep \u2019t v. Benjamin O., 2007-NMCA-070, \u00b6 24, 141 N.M. 692, 160 P.3d 601. \u201cICWA is a remedial statute in that it was enacted to stem the alarmingly high percentage of Indian families being separated by removal of children through custody proceedings[,]\u201d and we therefore construe it liberally in order to effectuate its purpose. Marlene C., 2011-NMSC-005, \u00b6 17 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\nICWA AND THE ABUSE AND NEGLECT ACT\nGenerally\nWe begin by briefly discussing ICWA and its relationship to the New Mexico Abuse and Neglect Act, which underlies the issues in this appeal. Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 to govern proceedings for the termination of parental rights, adoptions, and foster care placement involving Indian children. See 25 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1901 to 1963. In enacting ICWA, Congress determined \u201cthat there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children and that the United States has a direct interest, as trustee, in protecting Indian children who are members of or are eligible for membership in an Indian tribe}.]\u201d 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 1901(3). Additionally, Congress found \u201cthat the [s]tates, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.\u201d 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 1901(5). As a result, ICWA is intended to \u201cpromote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture, and by providing for assistance to Indian tribes in the operation of child and family service programs.\u201d 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 1902.\nWhen ICWA appliesto atermination proceeding, it provides several minimum substantive and procedural protections that must be used as opposed to the standards used under state law. For example, before terminating a parent\u2019s parental rights to an Indian child, ICWA requires the state court to make a determination, on the record, that beyond a reasonable doubt, termination is required to prevent serious emotional or physical damage to the Indian child. 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 1912(f). When the proceedings involve foster placement, ICWA requires the state court to give preference to placement of the child with a member of the child\u2019s extended family, with the tribe, or with another Indian family. 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 1915(a). In determining whether good cause exists for placement outside of the Indian community, the state court is directed to examine the reasons given in light of \u201cthe prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community.\u201d 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 1915(d). Additionally, ICWA requires thatnotice ofthe proceeding be given to the Indian parent and the Indian tribe and that the tribe be given the opportunity to intervene in the proceedings. 25 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1911(c), 1912(a).\nThe New Mexico Abuse and Neglect Act contains several provisions designed to effectuate ICWA. For example, when the Department takes custody of a child, the Department \u201cshall make reasonable efforts to determine whether the child is an Indian child.\u201d Section 32A-4-6(C). If the Department determines that the child is an Indian child, the Abuse and Neglect Act requires that the Department give notice ofthe proceedings to the Indian tribe in accordance with ICWA. Section 32A-4-6(D). Section 32A-4-9 contains placement preferences for foster care and pre-adoptive placement of an Indian child that mirror ICWA\u2019s placement preferences. Section 32A-4-21 (B)(9) requires the Department to provide information in the predispositional report to the district court addressing whether the child is an Indian child, and if so, whether ICWA\u2019s placement preferences were followed and whether the child\u2019s treatment plan provides for maintaining the child\u2019s cultural ties. The district court is then required to make factual findings regarding these issues in its dispositional judgment. Section 32A-4-22(A)(11).\nThe Abuse and Neglect Act also contains the procedures for terminating the parental rights of an Indian child. When the Department files amotion for terminating the parental rights of an Indian child, the Department must include in its motion whether the child \u201cis subject to\u201d ICWA, and if so, it must state (1) the tribal affiliations of the parents; (2) the specific actions taken by the Department to notify the Indian tribes, including supporting documentation; and (3) the specific actions taken to comply with the placement preferences of ICWA. Section 32A-4-29(B)(7). Before terminating the parental rights of a child subject to ICWA, the district court must ensure that the termination complied with ICWA. Section 32A-4-28(E). Application\nWe first address Mother\u2019s argument that the district court erred by holding the trial without applying the substantive and procedural provisions of ICWA and the accompanying provisions in the Abuse and Neglect Act, including (a) making necessary findings pursuant to 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 1912(d), (e); (b) giving preferential foster care placement of the children to the children\u2019s extended family pursuant to 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 1915; and (c) applying the higher standard of proof required by 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 1912(f) than in non-ICWA termination proceedings. Mother argues that the children are \u201cIndian child[ren]\u201d as defined by ICWA and the Abuse and Neglect Act, and, therefore, the district court should have applied ICWA at the trial.\nICWA and the Abuse and Neglect Act define \u201cIndian child\u201d as \u201cany unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe[.]\u201d 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 1903(4); see also NMSA 1978, \u00a7 32A-1-4(K) (2009). By its express terms, the children are \u201cIndian child[ren]\u201d as defined by ICWA if (1) the children are \u201cmember[s]\u201d of the Navajo Nation, or (2) the children are \u201celigible for membership\u201d and Mother is a \u201cmember\u201d of the Navajo Nation. 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 1903(4). It is undisputed by both Mother and the Department that both Mother and the children are eligible to enroll in the Navajo Nation but are not formally enrolled. The parties do dispute, however, whether the eligibility for enrollment of Mother and the children in the Navajo Nation is sufficient to make either Mother or the children \u201cmember[s]\u201d for purposes of ICWA. Id.\nAs we have discussed, the district court premised its determination that ICWA does not apply on the failure of Mother and the children to be formally enrolled at the time of the trial. Apparently, it was the district court\u2019s view that in order to be a \u201cmember\u201d Mother or the children must be formally enrolled in the Navajo Nation. Mother argues that the district court erroneously based its refusal to apply ICWA on the fact that Mother had not yet obtained her CIB or was not formally enrolled by the Navajo Nation. Mother contends that \u201cmember,\u201d in the context of ICWA\u2019s definition of Indian child, is a flexible term, not limited to persons formally enrolled with an Indian tribe or those issued a CIB by the BIA. See Cohen\u2019s Handbook of Federal Indian Law \u00a7 11.02[2], at 827 (2005) (\u201c[T]he term \u2018member\u2019 is flexible, not limited to persons formally enrolled or possessing a [CIB] issued by the BIA.\u201d).\nMother fails to argue or explain how or why she and the children are to be considered \u201cmembers\u201d of the Navajo Nation other than arguing that the term \u201cmember\u201d is flexible. We reject Mother\u2019s argument that either she or the children are \u201cmembers\u201d of the Navajo Nation on this basis alone. See Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. Corp., 2005-NMCA-045, \u00b6 15, 137 N.M. 339, 110 P.3d 1076 (stating that we will not review unclear or undeveloped arguments). Even if we were to address Mother\u2019s argument, it appears that, at least in the context of the Navajo Nation and ICWA, enrollment with the Navajo Nation is synonymous with membership in this case. See In re Guardianship of Ashley Elizabeth R., 116 N.M. 416, 417, 863 P.2d 451, 452 (Ct. App. 1993) (characterizing children not registered with the Navajo Nation as \u201celigible for membership\u201d); see also Nielson v. Ketchum, 640 F.3d 1117, 1124 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that a child did not fit the definition of Indian child because neither the child nor the mother was enrolled in the Indian tribe).\nWe therefore proceed under the assumption that Mother and the children are not \u201cmembers\u201d of the Navajo Nation and instead are eligible to be members subject to the completion of the enrollment process. Because neither Mother nor the children are \u201cmembers\u201d of the Navajo Nation, the children do not meet either definition of \u201cIndian children]\u201d under ICWA. See 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 1903(4) (defining Indian child as when the child is a member of an Indian tribe or the child is eligible to be a member and is the biological child of a member). We must nevertheless determine the requirements of ICWA and the New Mexico Abuse and Neglect Act regarding children who are not technically Indian children under ICWA but who are eligible for enrollment as members in an Indian tribe.\nSection 32A-4-22(I)\nIn this regard, Mother argues that the Department failed in its obligation under Section 3 2A-4-22(I) of the Abuse and Neglect Act to pursue enrollment on behalf of the children who were eligible for enrollment. Section 32A-4-22(I) states that \u201c[wjhen a child is placed in the custody of the [Department, the [D]epartment shall investigate whether the child is eligible for enro llment asa memb er o f an Indian trib e and, if so, the [Djepartment shall pursue the enrollment on the child\u2019s behalf.\u201d Mother contends that the record does not reflect that the Department made any efforts in pursuing the enrollment of the children despite knowing early in the proceedings that the children were eligible for enrollment.\nAs we have discussed, the Department stipulated prior to the August 24, 2010 custody order that the children were eligible for enrollment in the Navajo Nation, and the district court memorialized this stipulation in the custody order. Likewise, the Department acknowledged in the predispositional reports adopted by the district court that the children were eligible for enrollment. Although the Department essentially argues that something happened between the custody hearing and the adjudicatory hearing that led it to believe that ICWA does not apply to the children, it acknowledges that the reason it reached the conclusion is unclear from the record. Mother testified during the adjudication that she was not currently registered with the Navajo Nation in response to a question from the Department. From this point forward, the district court\u2019s judicial review and status review orders stated that the children were not subject to ICWA. However, at the beginning of the trial, Mother disclosed to the district court that she received a letter from the Navajo Nation tribal enrollment services stating that she and the children were eligible for enrollment and that Mother was pursuing enrollment.\nDespite this information, the Department stated that it had no concerns about going forward with the trial at that time without applying ICWA. By taking this position despite knowing early in the case that the children were in fact eligible for enrollment and learning, at least at trial, that Mother had started the enrollment process, the Department failed to fulfill its obligation under Section 32A-4-22(I) that it \u201cshall pursue the enrollment on the children]\u2019s behalf.\u201d Under this circumstance, the Department should not have pursued going forward with the trial and should have agreed to the continuance requested by Mother in order to investigate the children\u2019s eligibility for enrollment and help Motherpursue enrollment if necessary.\nWe hold that the district court erred by terminating Mother\u2019s parental rights before it ensured that the Department fully complied with Section 32A-4-22(I). The district court has an affirmative obligation to make sure that the requirements ofthe Abuse andNeglect Act are followed prior to the termination of something as fundamental as the parental rights to a child. See State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep\u2019t v. Hector C., 2008-NMCA-079, \u00b6 11, 144 N.M. 222, 185 P.3d 1072 (\u201cTerminating parental rights implicates rights of fundamental importance.\u201d); cf. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep\u2019t v. Maria C., 2004-NMCA-083,\u00b652, 136 N.M. 53, 94 P.3d 796 (holding that the district court has an affirmative duty to protect a parent\u2019s due process right throughout a termination proceeding). The record is largely devoid of any attempts the Department made to facilitate the enrollment of the children prior to trial. By then, it was clear to the Department that the children were eligible, that Mother had undertaken efforts to attempt to achieve her and their enrollment, and that Mother was delayed due at least in part to a unique circumstance associated with Mother\u2019s own adoption and information recorded on one or more of her birth certificates. Thus, we are unable to ascertain the extent the Department complied with Section 32A-4-22(I)\u2019s mandate over the course of the proceedings leading up to the trial. At a minimum, the Department should not have contested the continuance requested by Mother upon learning that Mother had begun the enrollment process with the children.\nThis case illustrates the important need for district courts to ensure that the Department strictly complies with Section 32A-4-22(I). Had the Department fulfilled its obligation to pursue enrollment on behalf of the children, the children\u2019s status would have been determined by the start of the trial. Instead, the district court was faced with an untenable situation in which, on the day of the trial, the status of the children still was not conclusively determined by the Navajo Nation, the children remained merely eligible for enrollment, and the Department wished to press forward with trial by opposing Mother\u2019s request for a continuance. It was error for the district court to terminate Mother\u2019s parental rights before the Department fulfilled its obligation. Because of our disposition, we do not reach Mother\u2019s argument regarding whether the Navajo Nation was entitled to notice of the proceedings under ICWA.\nCONCLUSION\nWe hold that the district court has an affirmative obligation to ensure that the Department complies with Section 32A-4-22(1) before terminating a parent\u2019s parental rights. Because the district court terminated Mother\u2019s parental rights before the Department fulfilled its obligation under Section 32A-4-22(I), we reverse the judgment terminating Mother\u2019s parental rights.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nJAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nLINDA M. VANZI, Judge\nJ. MILES HANISEE, Judge", "type": "majority", "author": "WECHSLER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "New Mexico Children, Youth and Families Department Charles E. Neelley, Chief Children\u2019s Court Attorney Rebecca J. Liggett, Children\u2019s Court Attorney Santa Fe, NM for Appellee", "Caren I. Friedman Santa Fe, NM for Appellant", "Richard J. Austin Farmington, NM Guardian ad litem" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2013-NMCA-062\nFiling Date: April 9, 2013\nDocket No. 31,784\nSTATE OF NEW MEXICO, ex rel., CHILDREN, YOUTH and FAMILIES DEPARTMENT, Petitioner-Appellee, v. MARSALEE P., Respondent-Defendant, and STANLEY P., Respondent, and IN THE MATTER OF DA\u2019VONDRE P., WHITLEY P., and JORDAN P., Children.\nNew Mexico Children, Youth and Families Department Charles E. Neelley, Chief Children\u2019s Court Attorney Rebecca J. Liggett, Children\u2019s Court Attorney Santa Fe, NM for Appellee\nCaren I. Friedman Santa Fe, NM for Appellant\nRichard J. Austin Farmington, NM Guardian ad litem" }, "file_name": "0150-01", "first_page_order": 166, "last_page_order": 174 }