{ "id": 4333403, "name": "LARRY V. LAUGHLIN, Worker-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. CONVENIENT MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. and ARGONAUT INSURANCE COMPANY, Employer/Insurer-Appellants/Cross-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Laughlin v. Convenient Management Services, Inc.", "decision_date": "2013-07-24", "docket_number": "No. 34,205; Docket No. 32,074", "first_page": "632", "last_page": "641", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2013-NMCA-088" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "121 N.M. 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566504 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMCA-010", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 12-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.M. 786", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1558829 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/120/0786-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 507", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563545 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" }, { "page": "551" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0507-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMSC-031", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 834365 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 40" }, { "page": "\u00b6 41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/125/0721-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMCA-087", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1224603 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/136/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-010", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4241870 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 20" }, { "page": "\u00b6 21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/145/0769-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMCA-116", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4245454 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/147/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 P.3d 595", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2012-NMSC-028", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4190440 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 32" }, { "page": "\u00b6 33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/2/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 N.M. 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2868760 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "802", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/89/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMCA-062", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 142234 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 20" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/123/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMCA-119", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4245474 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/147/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 N.M. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582502 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "356", "parenthetical": "holding that the worker failed to show that his injuries were aggravated and thus justified an increased award" }, { "page": "814", "parenthetical": "holding that the worker failed to show that his injuries were aggravated and thus justified an increased award" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/98/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 712", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590313 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "715", "parenthetical": "holding that substantial evidence supported the WCJ's conclusion that there was no change in the worker's physical condition" }, { "page": "512", "parenthetical": "holding that substantial evidence supported the WCJ's conclusion that there was no change in the worker's physical condition" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0712-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMCA-140", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 106477 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6 3" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/128/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMSC-028", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4003990 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/144/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 N.M. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1561309 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" }, { "page": "1016" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/119/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 N.M. 14", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1594980 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" }, { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/104/0014-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMSC-015", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 929180 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 13" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/137/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-032", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4243724 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 14" }, { "page": "\u00b6 14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMSC-004", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3783238 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/143/0258-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 933, "char_count": 25122, "ocr_confidence": 0.831, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.621887471290392e-08, "percentile": 0.28993543639030694 }, "sha256": "60c8e8d47d8a8439530fcad39b2d0c62020cee71ec2046d1e808dbe812b3cb4e", "simhash": "1:38f6eafcf2fa77c6", "word_count": 4019 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:50:37.461651+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge", "WE CONCUR:", "RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Chief Judge", "MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge" ], "parties": [ "LARRY V. LAUGHLIN, Worker-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. CONVENIENT MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. and ARGONAUT INSURANCE COMPANY, Employer/Insurer-Appellants/Cross-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nWECHSLER, Judge.\nEmployer Convenience Management Services, Inc. appeals from a compensation order entered pursuant to the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (the Act), NMSA 1978, Sections 52-1-1 to -70 (1929, as amended through 2007). Worker filed a cross-appeal, which we address in a separate memorandum opinion. In the compensation order, the Workers Compensation Judge (the WCJ) determined that Worker Larry Laughlin was not at maximum medical improvement despite previously finding that Worker had reached maximum medical improvement five months earlier in an order granting Worker a partial lump sum payment from future permanent partial disability for payment of debts, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 52-5-12(C) (2009). We hold that the WCJ did not err by determining that Worker had a \u201cchange of condition\u201d under NMSA 1978, Section 52-5-9(B)(1) (1989) by electing to undergo surgery on his work-related injury and determining that Worker was no longer at maximum medical improvement. We further hold that neither judicial estoppel nor the law-of-the-case doctrine bars Worker\u2019s change of position regarding whether he was at maximum medical improvement at the date of his formal hearing despite the WCJ\u2019s finding that he was at maximum medical improvement at the time of the lump sum order. Accordingly, we affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nWorker suffered accidents on August 22, 2008 and September 14 or 30, 2008 while working for Employer. Worker suffered injuries to both his lower back and left testicle. He filed a complaint with the Workers\u2019 Compensation Administration (the WCA) on March 3, 2009, requesting temporary total disability benefits until he reached maximum medical improvement and permanent partial disability benefits upon reaching maximum medical improvement.\nThe parties entered a recommended resolution on May 7, 2009 that provided a $5000 payment to Worker and named Dr. Benito Gallardo as Worker\u2019s authorized treating physician. Dr. Gallardo examined Worker on May 6, 2009 and found a causal connection between Worker\u2019s injuries and the accidents on August 22, 2008 and September 14 or 30, 2008. When Employer refused to provide any temporary total disability after Dr. Gallardo\u2019s report, Worker filed a second worker\u2019s compensation complaint. Employer rejected a second recommended resolution on September 29,2009, and the claim entered the adjudication process. Employer did issue worker temporary total disability benefits of $213.91 a week from July 8, 2009 through August 18, 2009 and October 21, 2009 through May 3, 2011.\nDr. Gallardo testified by deposition on September 24,2010 that Worker \u2019s back injury reached maximum medical improvement by March 4, 2010. Likewise, at his second deposition, Dr. Gallardo testified that Worker\u2019s left testicle injury had reached maximum medical improvement by January 25, 2011, at the time that Worker elected not to have surgery on his left testicle. Dr. Gallardo also stated in his second deposition that Worker was not interested in having surgery on his left testicle but that if Worker did have a surgical procedure, his left testicle injury would no longer be at maximum medical improvement. After Dr. Gallardo reported maximum medical improvement on January 25, 2011, Employer issued partial permanent disability benefits to Worker at 44% impairment commencing on May 4, 2011.\nOn June 3 0,2011, Worker filed a petition for partial lump sum payment for debts, pursuant to Section 52-5-12(C). The WCJ granted the lump sum request by order on July 20, 2011. The order granting partial lump sum payment for debts (the lump sum order) determined that Worker\u2019s injuries had reached maximum medical improvement. The WCJ found that Worker had debts of $4,200.73 and approved an advance payment of that amount to be deducted from future partial permanent disabilitybenefits. The WCJ also approved an advance payment for an amount equal to Worker\u2019s first and last month\u2019s rent, plus a damage deposit in the event that Worker entered into a written rental agreement. Worker subsequently entered into a new lease agreement, and Employer advanced an additional $1250 to Worker.\nThe WCJ held the formal hearing on Worker\u2019s claims on December 22, 2012 and issued a memorandum decision and order on February 8, 2012 regarding the effect of the prior lump sum award. The WC J determined that the Act allows for a worker to reach a status of maximum medical improvement and subsequently be removed from that status under Sections 52-5-9(B)(l) and 52-1-56 upon, among other reasons, a change in condition. The WCJ concluded that the Act contemplates that judicial estoppel would not be applicable to a previous determination that a worker is not at maximum medical improvement. Additionally, the WCJ determined that the law-of-the-case doctrine does not preclude a worker from arguing about a change of maximum medical improvement status as long as the change is asserted more than six months after the entry of the order.\nAt the formal hearing, Worker testified that he tried to delay surgery as long as possible on his injured testicle. However, he testified that he now wanted the surgical procedure. Both parties requested findings and conclusions after the December 22, 2011 formal hearing, and the WCJ issued a compensation order on March 14, 2012. Regarding the legal effect of the lump sum order of July 20, 2011, the WCJ concluded that the lump sum order did not bar Worker from arguing that he was no longer on maximum medical improvement at the formal hearing. Accordingly, the WCA found that Worker first reached maximum medical improvement as of September 10, 2010 but that \u201cWorker ceased to be on maximum medical improvement status as of December 22, 2011 when Worker indicated his willingness to be treated surgically for the [testicle injury].\u201d\nOn appeal, Employer raises three arguments regarding the WCJ\u2019s finding that W orker was no longer at maximum medical improvement because of his willingness to have surgery to treat his injured left testicle. Employer argues that the WCJ erred by determining that (1) Worker\u2019s willingness to have surgery constituted a change of condition under Sections 52-1-9(B)(1) and 52-1-56 even though his physical or medical condition had not changed since the WCJ determined he was at maximum medical improvement in the lump sum order; (2) judicial estoppel did not preclude Worker from arguing that his left testicle injury had not reached maximum medical improvement at the formal hearing; and (3) the law-of-the-case doctrine did not preclude Worker\u2019s change of position that he was no longer at maximum medical improvement.\nSTANDARD OF REVIEW\n\u201cAll workers\u2019 compensation cases are reviewed under a whole record standard of review.\u201d Moya v. City of Albuquerque, 2008-NMSC-004, 16, 143 N.M. 258, 175 P.3d 926. When our review consists of reviewing a \u201cWCJ\u2019s interpretation of statutory requirements, we apply a de novo standard of review.\u201d DeWitt v. Rent-A-Ctr., Inc., 2009-NMSC-032, \u00b6 14, 146 N.M. 453, 212 P.3d 341. We review the WCJ\u2019s application of the law to the facts de novo. Tom Growney Equip. Co. v. Jouett, 2005-NMSC-015, \u00b6 13, 137 N.M. 497, 113 P.3d 320. However, \u201c[w]here the testimony is conflicting, the issue on appeal is not whether there is evidence to support a contrary result, but rather whether the evidence supports the findings of the trier of fact.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Bagwell v. Shady Grove Truck Stop, 104 N.M. 14, 17, 715 P.2d 462, 465 (Ct. App. 1986).\nCHANGE OF CONDITION\nEmployer first argues that Worker\u2019s testimony that he now wants surgery to treat his left testicle injury does not constitute a change of condition and, therefore, the WCJ erred by ruling that Worker was no longer at maximum medical improvement as of December 22, 2011. In Employer\u2019s view, the term \u201cchange of condition\u201d refers to a change in a worker\u2019s medical or physical condition, and Worker presented no testimony that his physical condition had changed, only that he now wishes to have surgery to address the condition. Worker\u2019s response is twofold: first, he argues that the lump sum order is not a compensation order for purposes of Sections 52-5-9(B)(1) and 52-1-56 and, second, that his decision to have surgery on his left testicle is a change of condition.\nEmployerpremises his argumentthat the WCJ was required to find that Worker\u2019s physical or medical condition changed in order to determine that W orker was no longer at maximum medical improvement on Sections 52-1-56 and 52-5-9(B)(1). Section 52-1-56 provides:\nThe [WCJ] may, upon the application of the employer, worker or other person bound by the compensation order, fix a time and place for hearing upon the issue of claimant\u2019s recovery. If it appears upon such hearing that diminution or termination of disability has taken place, the [WCJ] shall order diminution or termination of payments of compensation as the facts may warrant. If it appears upon such hearing that the disability of the worker has become more aggravated or has increased without the fault of the worker, the [W CJ] shall order an increase in the amount of compensation allowable as the facts may warrant. Hearings shall not be held more frequently than at six-month intervals.\nIn relevant part, Section 52-5-9 provides:\nA. Compensation orders are reviewable subject to the conditions stated in this section upon application of any party in interest in accordance with the procedures relating to hearings. The [WCJ], after a hearing, may issue a compensation order to terminate, continue, reinstate, increase, decrease or otherwise properly affect compensation benefits provided by the . . . Act....\nB. A review may be obtained upon application of a party in interest filed with the director at any time within two years after the date of the last payment or the denial of benefits upon the following grounds:\n(1) change in condition}.]\nUnder these provisions, the Act allows for modification of compensation orders upon the aggravation of the worker\u2019s disability or upon a change of condition. Employer contends that the term \u201cchange in condition\u201d as used in Section 52-5-9(B)(l) refers only to a \u201cchange in a worker\u2019s medical or physical condition\u201d and is not broad enough to encompass a situation in which the worker elects to undergo a different treatment option without a change in his medical condition. See Fasso v. Sierra Healthcare Ctr., 119 N.M. 132, 134, 888 P.2d 1014, 1016 (Ct. App. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Hidalgo v. Ribble Contracting, 2008-NMSC-028, 144 N.M. 117, 184 P.3d 429. Employer additionally states that the case law construing Section 52-1-56 mandates that the worker\u2019s disability must increase in order to constitute a change of condition.\nWeconclude that, although a change of condition must relate to a worker\u2019s physical or medical condition, a change in condition is broad enough to encompass a situation such as in this case in which the worker\u2019s physical or medical condition will change due to a worker\u2019s election to undergo different treatment. Viewed in the context of the Act\u2019s definition of maximum medical improvement, Worker, by electing to have the surgery, had a change in his physical condition sufficient to support the WCJ\u2019s conclusion that he was not at maximum medical improvement. See DeWitt, 2009-NMSC-032, \u00b6 14 (\u201c[W]e construe the provisions of the Act together to produce a harmonious whole.\u201d). The Act defines the date of maximum medical improvement as \u201cthe date after which further recovery from or lasting improvement to an injury can no longer be reasonably anticipated based upon reasonable medical probability as determined by a health care provider.\u201d Section 52-1-24.1. The WCJ\u2019s conclusion that Worker was no longer at maximum medical improvement was based on evidence that his left testicle injury would improve with surgical treatment. This conclusion directly implicates and relates to Worker\u2019s physical condition. As such, the WCJ did not err by determining that Worker had a change of condition for purposes of Section 52-5-9(B)(1) by electing to undergo surgery on his left testicle and determining that Worker was no longer at maximum medical improvement.\nThe cases relied upon by Employer for the proposition that a change in condition must be based on an aggravation or change to Worker\u2019s physical or medical condition apart from treatment are inapposite. In Herrera v. Quality Imports, 1999-NMCA-140, \u00b6 12, 128 N.M. 300, 992 P.2d 313, this Court held that a change in the worker\u2019s educational status did not relate to the \u201cdisability\u201d or physical condition of the worker and therefore modification under Section 52-1-56 was improper based solely on a change in education status. However, Herrera expressly declined to determine whether modification would be warranted under the \u201cchange of condition\u201d provision of Section 52-5-9(B)(1). Herrera, 1999-NMCA-140, \u00b6 3. Additionally, in this case, Worker\u2019s election to have surgery was tied to his physical condition and the expected improvement of the condition by undergoing the surgery. The other cases cited by Employer address substantial evidence issues regarding whether the worker adequately showed an increase in the disability percentage and therefore justified a modification of the award and do not stand for any broad propositions limiting what constitutes a change in condition. See, e.g., Jaramillo v. Consolidated Freightways, 109 N.M. 712, 715, 790 P.2d 509, 512 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that substantial evidence supported the WCJ\u2019s conclusion that there was no change in the worker\u2019s physical condition); Holliday v. Talk of the Town Inc., 98 N.M. 354, 356, 648 P.2d 812, 814 (Ct. App. 1982) (holding that the worker failed to show that his injuries were aggravated and thus justified an increased award).\nJUDICIAL ESTOPPEL\nEmployer next argues that the WCJ erred by determining that the doctrine of judicial estoppel did not preclude Worker from arguing that his work-related injuries had not reached maximum medical improvement at the formal hearing. Employer argues that because Worker took the position that his injury had reached maximum medical improvement when he sought and received the partial lump sum payment for future PPD benefits on July 20, 2011, the district court should have determined that judicial estoppel precluded Worker from claiming that his injuries had not reached maximum medical improvement at the December 22, 2011 formal hearing. We review the proper application of judicial estoppel under an abuse of discretion standard. Keith v. ManorCare, Inc., 2009-NMCA-119, \u00b6 17, 147 N.M. 209, 218 P.3d 1257.\nThe doctrine of judicial estoppel \u201cprevents a party who has successfully assumed a certain position in judicial proceedings from then assuming an inconsistent position, especially if doing so prejudices a party who had acquiesced in the former position.\u201d Rodriguez v. La Mesilla Constr. Co., 1997-NMCA-062, \u00b6 20, 123 N.M. 489, 943 P.2d 136. The purpose of judicial estoppel is to prevent a party \u201cfrom playing fast and loose with the court during the course of litigation.\u201d Citizens Bank v. C & H Constr. & Paving Co., 89 N.M. 360, 366, 552 P.2d 796, 802 (Ct. App. 1976) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Our Supreme Court has stated that\n[tjhree elements must be addressed for a party to prevail under the doctrine of judicial estoppel. First, the party against whom the doctrine is to be used must have successfully assumed a position during the course of litigation. Second, that first position must be necessarily inconsistent with the position the party takes later in the proceedings. Finally, while not an absolute requirement, judicial estoppel will be especially applicable when the party\u2019s change of position prejudices a party who had acquiesced in the former position.\nSanta Fe Pac. Trust, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2012-NMSC-028, \u00b6 32, 285 P.3d 595 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\nIt appears that the first two elements exist in this case. Worker took the position that his injuries were at maximum medical improvement as of the July 20, 2011 order granting partial lump sum payment for debts and took the inconsistent position that he was no longer at maximum medical improvement at the formal hearing on December 22, 2011. However, under the facts and circumstances of this case, judicial estoppel does not apply. First, Employer fails to show how it was prejudiced by the change of position in this case. At the time of the interim order, Employer was aware that the matter was still in active litigation and that a final compensation order based on the formal hearing had not been entered. The interim order did not prevent Employer from contesting the maximum medical improvement date at the formal hearing. Most importantly, although the interim order required Employer to advance $4,200.73 to Worker, the funds were from Worker\u2019s future permanent partial disability benefits, and Employer received a dollar-for-dollar credit for the advance payment in the final compensation order. Our cases have generally required the party asserting judicial estoppel to make a showing of prejudice caused by the opposing party\u2019s change of position. See, e.g., Guzman v. Laguna Dev. Corp., 2009-NMCA-116, \u00b6 15, 147 N.M. 244, 219 P.3d 12 (applying judicial estoppel to bar the defendant from arguing thatworkers\u2019 compensation was the plaintiffs\u2019 exclusive remedy due to the prejudicial effect of depriving the plaintiffs of a forum because the defendant previously successfully argued in the workers\u2019 compensation administration that the claim was outside the scope of the Act).\nSecond, as we have discussed, the purpose of judicial estoppel is to prevent \u201ca party from playing fast and loose with the court during litigation.\u201d Santa Fe Pac. Trust, Inc., 2012-NMSC-028, \u00b6 33 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Nothing in the circumstances of this case indicates that Worker was trying to \u201cplay fast and loose\u201d with the WCJ by changing his position about whether his injuries had reached maximum medical improvement. At the time that Worker requested the partial lump sum payment for future PPD benefits, his position was that he was at maximum medical improvement because he had elected to not have surgery on his left testicle injury. At the formal hearing, Worker\u2019s position was that he was not at maximum medical improvement because he had elected to have the surgery. Nothing in the record indicates that Worker\u2019s change ofposition was designed to mislead the WCJ or otherwise take advantage of the system. Cf id. \u00b6 33 (stating that \u201cnothing in the record indicates that the [party opposing judicial estoppel] intentionally attempted to mislead the Court\u201d by changing its position).\nLAW OF THE CASE\nEmployer lastly argues that the law-of-the-case doctrine barred Worker from changing his position on whether he had reached maximum medical improvement at the formal hearing because the law of the case is that Worker reached maximum medical improvement by July 20, 2011. We review this issue de novo. See State ex rel. King v. UU Bar Ranch Ltd. P\u2019ship., 2009-NMSC-010, \u00b6 20, 145 N.M. 769, 205 P.3d 816 (stating that review of \u201c[w]hether law of the case applies, as well as how it applies, are questions of law subject to de novo review\u201d).\nThe doctrine of \u201claw of the case . . . relates to litigation of the same issue recurring within the same suit.\u201d Cordova v. Larsen, 2004-NMCA-087,\u00b6 10, 136 N.M. 87, 94 P.3d 830. \u201cUnder the law of the case doctrine, a decision on an issue of law made at one stage of a case becomes a binding precedent in successive stages of the same litigation.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It is based on \u201ca matter of precedent and policy; it is a determination that, in the interests of the parties and judicial economy, once a particular issue in a case is settled it should remain settled.\u201d Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, \u00b6 40, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305. The law of the case doctrine is \u201cdiscretionary and flexible and is not a doctrine of inflexible law[.]\u201d King, 2009-NMSC-010, \u00b6 21 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).\nIn its memorandum opinion accompanying the partial lump sum order for payment of debts, the WCJ stated that the order \u201cawarding partial lump sum does constitute the law of the case but that it does not preclude Worker from arguing about a change on maximum medical improvement status as long as that change is asserted more than six months after entry of the order.\u201d However, less than six months later, at the formal hearing, W orker argued that he was not at maximum medical improvement, and the WCJ agreed that Worker ceased to be at maximum medical improvement on December 22, 2011. Employer\u2019s argument is two-fold: first, Employer contends that the WCJ violated the WCJ\u2019s own determination on the law of the case because he miscalculated that six months had not passed between entry of the July 20, 2011 order and the December 22, 2011 formal hearing. Second, Employer contends that on a more general level, once the WCJ determined that Worker was at maximum medical improvement for purposes of granting the partial lump sum request, the determination becomes law of the case and is conclusively binding on the parties.\nWe first address Employer\u2019s contention that the WCJ erred by not following his own ruling that Worker\u2019s maximum medical improvement determination was law of the case for the six months subsequent to the order. The WCJ determined that the Act requires that the maximum medical improvement determination remain the law of the case for six months because Section 52-1-56 mandates that hearings regarding the diminution, termination, or increase of benefits \u201cshall not be held more frequently than at six-month intervals.\u201d However, the change in maximum medical improvement status resulted not from a hearing conducted pursuant to an application for modification based on Section 52-1-56, but instead from the evidence presented at the formal hearing on Worker\u2019s claims. We therefore decline to apply the law of the case doctrine to the determination that Worker\u2019s maximum medical improvement determination was law of the case for six months. See Trujillo, 1998-NMSC-031, \u00b6 41 (\u201cThe application of the law-of-the-case doctrine . . . is discretionary and flexible; it will not be used to uphold a clearly incorrect decision[.]\u201d).\nAddressing Employer\u2019s more general contention that once the WCJ determined that Worker was at maximum medical improvement and issued the lump sum order, the maximum medical improvement determination became law of the case, we observe that \u201c[ajlthough it would be grossly inefficient for district courts to review repeatedly their interlocutory rulings, the law-of-the-case doctrine does not prohibit the practice.\u201d State ex rel. Udall v. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd., 118 N.M. 507, 510, 882 P.2d 548, 551 (Ct. App. 1994), rev\u2019d on other grounds by 120 N.M. 786, 907 P.2d 190 (1995). For example, in Bell v. N.M. Interstate Stream Comm \u2019n, 1996-NMCA-010, \u00b6\u00b6 12-17, 121 N.M. 328, 911 P.2d 222, this Court held that the law-of-the-case doctrine did not prevent a district court from overturning its previous interlocutory order denying summary judgment after remand on appeal. Applying this principle, the WCJ did not err by determining that the law-of-the-case doctrine did not apply. Based on the facts presented at the hearing, the WCJ determined that Worker was no longer at maximum medical improvement because Worker elected to have surgery on his injury. The law-of-the-case doctrine does not require the WCJ to ignore the facts before it at the time of the formal hearing based on a previous determination of maximum medical improvement contained in an interim order when the claims raised in Worker\u2019s complaint were still pending.\nCONCLUSION\nWe hold that the WCJ did not err by determining that Worker had a change of condition for purposes of Section 52-5-9(B)(1) by electing to undergo surgery on his left testicle and determining that Worker was no longer at maximum medical improvement. We further hold that neither judicial estoppel nor the law-of-the-case doctrine bars Worker\u2019s change of position regarding whether he was no longer at maximum medical improvement at the time of his formal hearing despite the WCJ\u2019s finding that he was at maximum medical improvement at the time of the lump sum order. Accordingly, we affirm.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nJAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nRODERICK T. KENNEDY, Chief Judge\nMICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge", "type": "majority", "author": "WECHSLER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Gerald A. Hanrahan Albuquerque, NM for Worker-Appellee/Cross-Appellant", "Maestas & Suggett, P.C. Paul Maestas Albuquerque, NM for Employer/Insurer-Appellants/Cross-App ellees" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Certiorari Denied, July 24, 2013,\nNo. 34,205\nIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2013-NMCA-088\nFiling Date: May 20, 2013\nDocket No. 32,074\nLARRY V. LAUGHLIN, Worker-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. CONVENIENT MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. and ARGONAUT INSURANCE COMPANY, Employer/Insurer-Appellants/Cross-Appellees.\nGerald A. Hanrahan Albuquerque, NM for Worker-Appellee/Cross-Appellant\nMaestas & Suggett, P.C. Paul Maestas Albuquerque, NM for Employer/Insurer-Appellants/Cross-App ellees" }, "file_name": "0632-01", "first_page_order": 648, "last_page_order": 657 }