{ "id": 4335050, "name": "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KEVIN ALVERSON, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Alverson", "decision_date": "2013-08-16", "docket_number": "No. 34,235; Docket No. 32,046", "first_page": "658", "last_page": "665", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2013-NMCA-091" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "698 N. W. 2d 212", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 3622636 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226-27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/neb-app/13/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 F.2d 184", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 968298 ], "year": 1934, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/73/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 P.3d 1182", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2013-NMCERT-003", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 P.3d 613", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2012-NMCA-096", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4189191 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/2/0585-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 2271", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)", "parenthetical": "stating that the Attorney General of the United States has the exclusive authority to bring any action against any individual or person for a violation of the Atomic Energy Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "675 N.E.2d 36", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37-40", "parenthetical": "concluding that a bottle bomb was an explosive device under the Ohio Revised Code" }, { "page": "39", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "833 N.E.2d 796", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 Ohio App. 3d 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 570527 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-app-3d/162/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "2010-NMSC-032", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4246955 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 28" }, { "page": "\u00b6 28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/148/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 P.3d 622", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2012-NMSC-029", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4188995 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 29" }, { "page": "\u00b6 37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/2/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMCA-148", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 827425 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-049", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4246461 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/147/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMSC-001", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 77119 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" }, { "page": "\u00b6 10" }, { "page": "\u00b6 13" }, { "page": "\u00b6 13" }, { "page": "\u00b6 13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0768-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 853, "char_count": 20631, "ocr_confidence": 0.825, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.621887471290392e-08, "percentile": 0.289936208636102 }, "sha256": "aed09ea2c71daf55844077ad6732169f08aab0baabb3f684ea82a20cc11d3621", "simhash": "1:a72d2b17042823e3", "word_count": 3336 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:50:37.461651+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge", "WE CONCUR:", "JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge", "M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge" ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KEVIN ALVERSON, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nSUTIN, Judge.\nOwing to his possession of what the State characterized as \u201cdry ice bombs,\u201d Defendant Kevin Alverson was charged with possession of an explosive or incendiary device, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-7-19.1 (1990), a fourth degree felony. The district court dismissed the charge as a matter of law. The State appeals. We hold that the device was neither an \u201cexplosive\u201d nor an \u201cexplosive device\u201d under New Mexico law. Accordingly, we affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nIn September 2011, Officer Karl Becker of the Alamogordo Department of Public Safety made \u201cpublic contact\u201d with Defendant, who was seated in his car. Officer Becker recognized Defendant to be a person whose driver\u2019s license was suspended or revoked, a fact that he later confirmed with dispatch. Defendant consented to a vehicle search. During the search, Officer Becker found, in pertinent part, two bottles with dry ice and two partially full gallon jugs of water. Officer Becker recognized that the jugs of water were \u201ca precursor to make the dry ice generate explosive gases in the bottles.\u201d According to Officer Becker, Defendant stated that \u201che and a friend were going to go to a desert area [to] detonate them.\u201d Defendant was arrested and charged with possession of an explosive or incendiary device based on allegedly \u201cknowingly and unlawfully possessing], manufacturing,] or transporting an] explosive device, incendiary device[,] or complete combination of parts needed to make such a device, a fourth degree felony, contrary to Section 30-7-19.1 [.]\u201d\nDefendant filed a motion to dismiss the charge of possession of an explosive or incendiary device. He argued that, as a matter of law, the items found in Defendant\u2019s possession did not meet the definition of an \u201cexplosive device\u201d as defined inNMSA 1978, Section 30-7-18(B) (1990) of the Explosives Act, NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 30-7-17 to -22 (1981, as amended through 1990). He further argued that pursuant to the principles of statutory construction the items were not contemplated by the Legislature to be encompassed within the definitions of a \u201cdestructive device\u201d in NMSA 1978, Section 30-7-16(C)(1) (2001), or \u201cexplosive device\u201d in Section 30-7-18(B).\nIn opposition, the State argued, among other things, that Defendant, by his own admission, intended to make dry ice bombs and that his intent combined with the fact that he possessed the necessary components to assemble such \u201cbombs\u201d rendered Section 30-7-18(B) applicable in this case. Alternatively, the State argued that Defendant\u2019s argument raised a question of fact and that the charge should not be dismissed as a matter of law.\nAfter a hearing on Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, the district court entered an order granting the motion as a matter of law. The court explained that Sections 30-7-18 and 30-7-19.1 refer to explosives and explosive devices that are caused by \u201cchemical reactions caused by burning or by fire rather than by expansion of gases under pressure.\u201d The court found that because dry ice bombs result from the expansion of gases, rather than by fire or burning, they are not prohibited by Section 30-7-19.1. The court further found that our Legislature could have added certain language that exists in other states\u2019 statutes that addresses dry ice bombs, but chose not to include such language. Accordingly, the court found that \u201cthe dry ice bombs possessed by Defendant [were] not made illegal by . . . [Section] 30-7-19.1,\u201d and it dismissed the charge against Defendant with prejudice. The State appeals from that ruling.\nDISCUSSION\nThe issue is whether a dry ice bomb comes within the definition of an explosive device as contemplated by S ection 30-7-19.1. \u201cInterpretation of a statute is a matter of law, which we review de novo.\u201d State v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, \u00b6 9, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The appellate courts endeavor to determine and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. See State v. Johnson, 2009-NMSC-049, \u00b6 10, 147 N.M. 177, 218 P.3d 863. In doing so, we look first to the statute\u2019s plain language and interpret statutes as a whole. State v. Davis, 1998-NMCA-148, \u00b6 19, 126 N.M. 297, 968 P.2d 808. Where the statutory language \u201cis clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.\u201d Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, \u00b6 10 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Often, however, an analysis of the statutory language or its \u201cplain meaning\u201d does not end the analysis, and we must rely on other principles of statutory construction. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 12-14.\nUnder Section 30-7-19.1(A) of the Explosives Act,\n[possession of an explosive device or incendiary device consists of knowingly possessing, manufacturing!,] or transporting any explosive device or incendiary device or complete combination of parts thereof necessary to make an explosive device or incendiary device. This subsection shall not apply to any fireworks as defined in Section 60-2C-2 NMSA 1978 or any lawfully acquired household, commercial, industrial!,] or sporting device or compound included in the definition of explosive device or incendiary device in Section 30-7-18 NMSA 1978 that has legitimate and lawful commercial, industrial!,] or sporting purposes or that is lawfully possessed under Section 30-7-7 NMSA 1978.\nSection 30-7-18 provides definitions of terms used in the Explosives Act. Section 30-7-18(A) states that the term \u201c \u2018explosive\u2019 means any chemical compound or mixture or device, the primary or common purpose of which is to explode and includes but is not limited to dynamite and other high explosives, black powder, pellet powder, initiating explosives, detonators, safety fuses, squibs, detonating cord, igniter cord[,] and igniters!-]\u201d In pertinent part, Section 30-7-18(B) defines \u201cexplosive device\u201d as \u201c(1) any explosive bomb, grenade, missile!,] or similar device; [or] (2) any device or mechanism used or created to start a fire or explosion with or without a timing mechanism except cigarette lighters and matches!.]\u201d\nThe Applicability of Section 30-7-18(B)(l)\nThe State argues that a dry ice bomb is an \u201cexplosive bomb\u201d or \u201csimilar device\u201d under Section 30-7-18(B)(1). The State acknowledges that because \u201cexplosive\u201d modifies \u201cbomb\u201d in Section 30-7-18(B)(1), the definition of \u201cexplosive\u201d provided in Section 30-7-18(A) applies to Subsection (B)(1). Thus, whether a dry ice bomb is an \u201cexplosive bomb\u201d depends on whether it is an \u201cexplosive\u201d as defined by Section 30-7-18(A), and if so, whether it is also a \u201cbomb,\u201d which is a term that is undefined in the Explosives Act.\nThe State argues that \u201c[a] dry ice bomb falls within [Section 30-7-18(A)] because it is a mixture of two chemical compounds (dry ice (solid C02) and water (liquid H20)) in a closed container, and the primary or common purpose of this mixture is to create an explosion.\u201d Relying on the principle of ejusdem generis, Defendant argues that the physical expansion of compressed gas that characterizes a dry ice bomb is inconsistent with \u201cexplosive\u201d as defined by, and exemplified in, Section 30-7-18(A). The parties also disagree about whether a dry ice bomb is a \u201cbomb\u201d as that term is commonly understood.\n\u201cThe rule of ejusdem generis requires!] that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things of a particular and specific meaning, the general words are not construed in their widest extent but are instead construed as applying to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.\u201d State v. Office of Pub. Defender ex rel. Muqqddin, 2012-NMSC-029, \u00b6 29, 285 P.3d 622 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see NMSA 1978, \u00a7 12-2A-20(A) (1997) (codifying the principle of ejusdem generis as an aid to statutory construction). From the definition in Section 30-7-18(A), there is no indication that the Legislature intended \u201cexplosive\u201d to cover the dry ice and water combination that leads to the explosion of a jug or a bottle by virtue of the physical change of C02 from a solid to a gaseous state. The list of enumerated examples of \u201cexplosive\u201d in Section 30-7-18(A) share in common the element of combustion. Thus, the potential harm caused by \u201cdynamite and other high explosives, black powder, pellet powder, initiating explosives, detonators, safety fuses, squibs, detonating cord, igniter cord, and igniters\u201d all result from or cause fire. Id. It is undisputed that a dry ice bomb does not involve the use of nor does it cause fire. Because a dry ice bomb does not fit within the class of devices enumerated in Section 30-7-18(A), the principle of ejusdem generis compels a conclusion that the Legislature did not intend the term \u201cexplosive\u201d to cover the combination of dry ice and water in a closed container.\nWe need not consider whether a dry ice bomb is a \u201cbomb\u201d as that term is commonly understood. The Legislature chose to modify the term \u201cbomb\u201d in Section 30-7-18(B)(1) with the adjective \u201cexplosive.\u201d Even assuming, without deciding, that a dry ice bomb is a \u201cbomb,\u201d it nevertheless does not come within the definition of Subsection (B)(1) because it is not also an \u201cexplosive.\u201d See State v. Jackson, 2010-NMSC-032, \u00b6 28, 148 N.M. 452, 237 P.3d 754 (\u201cIt is fundamental that a statute should be so construed that no word, clause, sentence provision},] or part thereof shall be rendered surplusage or superfluous.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).\nNor do we believe that a dry ice bomb falls within the scope of Section 30-7-18(B)(1) as a \u201csimilar device\u201d to an explosive bomb, grenade, or missile. Like explosive bombs, grenades and missiles are associated with fire or combustion. Moreover, explosive bombs, grenades, and missiles are similar to one another insofar as they are commonly associated with large scale explosions and military combat. The same would not be said of a dry ice bomb. Because a dry ice bomb would not rationally be characterized as \u201csimilar\u201d to an explosive bomb, a grenade, or a missile in terms of its components, its destructive force, or its use, the principle of ejusdem generis precludes a conclusion that it comes within the ambit of \u201csimilar device\u201d under Section 30-7-18(B)(1). In sum, Subsection (B)(1) is inapplicable to this case.\nThe Applicability of Section 30-7-18(B)(2)\nThe State argues, in the alternative, that a dry ice bomb is an explosive device as set out under Section 30-7-18(B)(2) because it \u201cis a device or mechanism created to start an explosion.\u201d The State argues that unlike Subsection (B)(1), Subsection (B)(2) does not employ the use of the modifying adjective \u201cexplosive.\u201d Therefore, the State argues, in interpreting the scope of the definition provided in Subsection (B)(2), \u201cthere is no need to refer back to the meaning of the term }\u2018]explosive.[\u2019] \u201d\nThe ordinary definition of \u201cexplosion\u201d invokes the concept of bursting as the result of the expansion of gases and/or internal pressure, which, as Defendant concedes, is the reaction sought from and expected of a dry ice bomb. See Merriam-Webster Dictionary, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/explosion (last visited May 30, 2013) (defining \u201cexplosion\u201d as \u201c1: the act or an instance of exploding ... 2: a large-scale, rapid, or spectacular expansion or bursting out or forth\u201d); Merriam-Webster Dictionary, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary /explode (last visited May 30, 2013) (defining \u201cexplode\u201d or \u201cexploding\u201d as \u201c1: to burst forth with sudden violence or noise from internal energy: as [(a)]: to undergo a rapid chemical or nuclear reaction with the production of noise, heat, and violent expansion of gases ... [or (b)]: to burst violently as a result of pressure from within\u201d); see also The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, http://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html7q =explode (last visited May 30, 2013) (providing the definition of \u201cexplode,\u201d to include, \u201c[t]o release mechanical, chemical, or nuclear energy by the sudden production of gases in a confined space\u201d or \u201c[t]o burst violently as a result of internal pressure\u201d); cf. Johnson, 2009-NMSC-049, \u00b6 12 (turning to the dictionary definition of the term \u201cemployee\u201d to glean its \u201cordinary meaning\u201d). Thus, the ordinary definitions of the terms \u201cexplosion,\u201d \u201cexplode,\u201d and \u201cexploding\u201d could be construed to cover a dry ice bomb. Nevertheless, examining the foregoing meanings does not end our inquiry in this case.\nWe will not rely upon the literal meaning of the words chosen by the Legislature \u201cwhen such an application would be absurd, unreasonable, or otherwise inappropriate.\u201d Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, \u00b6 13. To read Section 30-7-18(B)(2) in the manner advocated by the State would lead to an absurd result. As indicated earlier in this Opinion, a dry ice bomb is not \u201cexplosive\u201d as defined in Section 30-7-18(A). Thus, to rely exclusively on the plain meaning of \u201cexplosion\u201d to conclude that a dry ice bomb fits within Subsection (B)(2) would be to conclude that the device at issue, though not explosive, is nevertheless an \u201cexplosive device.\u201d\nMoreover, we reject the State\u2019s suggestion that Section 30-7-18(B)(2) may be read without reference to Section 30-7-18(A). \u201c[A] statutory subsection may not be considered in a vacuum, but must be considered in reference to the statute as a whole[.]\u201d Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, \u00b6 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Reading Sections 30-7-18(A) and 30-7-18(B) in reference to one another as parts of a \u201charmonious\u201d whole, we cannot conclude that the Legislature intended the definition of \u201cexplosive device\u201d to be considered wholly unrelated to its definition of \u201cexplosive.\u201d See Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, \u00b6 13 (\u201c[W]henever possible ... we must read different legislative enactments as harmonious instead of as contradicting one another.\u201d (omission in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Had the Legislature intended to omit the concept or the definition of \u201cexplosive\u201d from Section 30-7-18(B), it could have chosen different language. That the Legislature chose to modify \u201cdevice\u201d in Section 30-7-18(B) with the earlier defined term, \u201cexplosive,\u201d cannot be ignored. See Jackson, 2010-NMSC-032, \u00b6 28 (\u201cIt is fundamental that a statute should be so construed that no word, clause, sentence provision[,] or part thereof shall be rendered surplusage or superfluous.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).\nSimilarly, viewed in the context of Section 30-7-18 as a whole, it is rational to conclude that the term \u201cexplosion\u201d in Subsection (B)(2) was intended to be construed as a derivative of or in relationship to the term \u201cexplosive.\u201d That is, in addition to the dictionary definitions of \u201cexplosion\u201d provided earlier, the term \u201cexplosion\u201d might also be used in ordinary parlance to describe what occurs as a result of the combustion of an explosive device. Thus, viewed in context of the statute and section as a whole, we do not believe that Subsection (B)(2) encompasses a dry ice bomb.\nWe are not persuaded by the State\u2019s additional arguments or authority regarding the scope of Section 30-7-18. The State argues that we should follow the lead of the Ohio Court of Appeals which determined, in two separate cases, that a bottle bomb was an \u201cexplosive device,\u201d but that it was not an \u201cexplosive.\u201d See State v. Dommer, 162 Ohio App. 3d 404, 2005-ohio-4073, 833 N.E.2d 796, at \u00b6 12 (concluding that a bottle bomb \u201cwas not an \u2018explosive\u2019 as defined\u201d by the Ohio Revised Code); In re Travis, 675 N.E.2d 36, 37-40 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that a bottle bomb was an explosive device under the Ohio Revised Code). In concluding that a bottle bomb was an explosive device, the Travis court interpreted a statutory definition of such a device that differed significantly from the definitions provided in Section 30-7-18(B). In relevant part, the Ohio Revised Code defined \u201cexplosive device\u201d as a \u201cdevice designed or specially adapted to cause physical harm to persons or property by means of an explosion\u201d and it included \u201cany pressure vessel which has been knowingly tampered with or arranged so as to explode.\u201d Travis, 675 N.E.2d at 39 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, the Ohio statute at issue in Travis was broader than Section 30-7-18(B), and its applicability depended, in part, on the purpose of the device. Owing to the lack of similarity between the Ohio statute and Section 30-7-18(B), Travis does not provide persuasive authority for the State\u2019s argument. Additionally, the State warns against the danger of a ejusdem generis analysis in this case by arguing that limiting the definitions of Section 30-7-18 to \u201creactions caused by burning or fire\u201d cannot have been the Legislature\u2019s intent because, under that interpretation, \u201cthe possession of atomic bombs\u201d would be legal under Section 30-7-19.1. We do not find this line of reasoning persuasive. We do not believe that the New Mexico Legislature intended the Explosives Act to cover the \u201cpossession\u201d of atomic weaponry. It is unlikely that possession of an atomic bomb would be the subject of a state-level prosecution. Atomic energy is the purview of the federal government. See 42 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 2271(c) (West 2013) (stating that the Attorney General of the United States has the exclusive authority to bring any action against any individual or person for a violation of the Atomic Energy Act).\n{20} The State also argues that the Legislature did not need to include specific language about dry ice bombs in the Explosives Act to indicate that such a device was prohibited. The appellate courts recognize that, when drafting a statute, the Legislature cannot predict all of its possible applications. Cf. Martinez v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Ass\u2019n of N.M., 2012-NMCA-096, \u00b6 11, 286 P.3d 613 (recognizing that \u201clegislatures cannot predict all possible applications when drafting a statute\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. quashed, 2013-NMCERT-003, 300 P.3d 1182. It is for that reason that we rely on principles of statutory construction. And as earlier indicated in this Opinion, we do not believe that dry ice bombs fall within the definitions provided in Section 30-7-18.\nFurther, the State argues that the Legislature was not alerted to the need to specifically include dry ice bombs within the purview of the Explosives Act because, at the time that the statute was drafted, other state legislatures had yet to expressly prohibit such devices. We see no rational basis for this argument. The Legislature is free to draft and to amend statutes as it sees fit. Dry ice bombs are not a new concept. See e.g., Rataj, 73 F.2d at 184-85 (describing, in 1934, the makings of what would be considered a dry ice bomb today). Nor do we believe that our Legislature would depend upon statutory amendments from other states to alert them to the concept or to the danger of such devices. We have concluded that the Legislature did not intend to include dry ice bombs within the purview of the Explosives Act. Cf. Muqqddin, 2012-NMSC-029, \u00b6 37 (declining to expand the statutory definition of \u201cprohibited space,\u201d as that term is used in the burglary statute, absent the Legislature\u2019s clear intent to do so).\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court\u2019s dismissal of the charge against Defendant for possession of an explosive or incendiary device.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nJONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nJAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge\nM. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge\n\u201cDry ice is carbon dioxide ... in solid form. . . . At normal temperatures, dry ice changes from a solid to gas rapidly and, increasingly so when placed in water and agitated. In the transition from solid to gas, its volume increases 500 times, and, when confined, as in a bottle, the pressure exerted naturally increases, and, if the container cannot withstand the expansion, it must burst.\u201d N.Y. Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Rataj, 73 F.2d 184, 185 (3d Cir. 1934). This is commonly referred to as a \u201cdry ice bomb.\u201d See, e.g., In re Joseph S., 698 N. W. 2d 212, 226-27 (Neb. Ct. App. 2005).\nThe State concedes that Defendant didnotpossess an \u201cincendiary device.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "SUTIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OTERO COUNTY James Waylon Counts, District Judge", "Gary K. King, Attorney General Pranava Upadrashta, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Appellant", "The Law Offices of Nancy L. Simmons, P.C. Nancy L. Simmons Albuquerque, NM for Appellee" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Certiorari Granted, August 16, 2013,\nNo. 34,235\nIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2013-NMCA-091\nFiling Date: June 6, 2013\nDocket No. 32,046\nSTATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KEVIN ALVERSON, Defendant-Appellee.\nAPPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OTERO COUNTY James Waylon Counts, District Judge\nGary K. King, Attorney General Pranava Upadrashta, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Appellant\nThe Law Offices of Nancy L. Simmons, P.C. Nancy L. Simmons Albuquerque, NM for Appellee" }, "file_name": "0658-01", "first_page_order": 674, "last_page_order": 681 }