{ "id": 4334829, "name": "MARIA MAGDALENA AEDA, a/k/a MAGDALENA GIRON, Petitioner-Appellee, v. OSAMAH AEDA, Respondent-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Aeda v. Aeda", "decision_date": "2013-09-20", "docket_number": "No. 34,291; Docket No. 31,182", "first_page": "759", "last_page": "771", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2013-NMCA-095" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "455 U.S. 745", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11307633 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/455/0745-01" ] }, { "cite": "801 A.2d 679", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 9410196 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/801/0679-01" ] }, { "cite": "662 P.2d 295", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 4857002 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297-98", "parenthetical": "holding that support obligations ended with termination ofparental rights since termination of parental rights severs the parent-child relationship" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nev/99/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr. 2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 S.E.2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 2170102 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sc/290/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 P.2d 130", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 So. 3d 1117", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 3d", "case_ids": [ 7050399 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1126", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "1133-45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so3d/39/1117-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMSC-017", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 257701 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/127/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 P.2d 1371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 510015 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1374-76" }, { "page": "1374-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan/207/0804-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 P.2d 702", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 1237922 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "705" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz-app/6/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 N.M. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1557079 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164" }, { "page": "715" }, { "page": "164" }, { "page": "715" }, { "page": "714-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/92/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 N.M. 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1586416 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" }, { "page": "1073" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/101/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 N.M. 638", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1561276 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "652" }, { "page": "1008" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/119/0638-01" ] }, { "cite": "2010-NMSC-045", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4250007 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/149/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11333627 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/387/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 N.M. L. Rev. 341", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "N.M. L. Rev.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1997-NMCA-021", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 142284 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 7", "parenthetical": "discussing pre-1917 history of such codes" }, { "parenthetical": "discussing pre-1917 history of such codes" }, { "parenthetical": "discussing pre-1917 history of such codes" }, { "page": "\u00b6 7" }, { "page": "\u00b6 8" }, { "page": "\u00b6 5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/123/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566617 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326" }, { "page": "960" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMCA-019", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1998-NMCA-067", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 834363 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/125/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "2002-NMCA-004", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 183165 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/131/0430-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMCA-162", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4242116 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/145/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 N.M. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 725397 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283" }, { "page": "986" }, { "page": "283" }, { "page": "986", "parenthetical": "\"Legislative silence is at best a tenuous guide to determining legislative intent}.]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/115/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 N.M. 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 322279 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/122/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMSC-064", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1998-NMCA-050", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 834155 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/125/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 768", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 N.M. 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5354517 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222", "parenthetical": "\"We are not permitted to read into a statute language which is not there, particularly if it makes sense as written.\"" }, { "page": "585", "parenthetical": "\"We are not permitted to read into a statute language which is not there, particularly if it makes sense as written.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/80/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMCA-011", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4244001 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 N.M. 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 322289 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/122/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMSC-078", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 17" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 764", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566662 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "768" }, { "page": "354" }, { "page": "768-69" }, { "page": "354-55" }, { "page": "354-55" }, { "page": "769" }, { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0764-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMCA-008", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 17109 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/124/0405-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1458, "char_count": 38637, "ocr_confidence": 0.836, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.22383782585142e-08, "percentile": 0.38511280001266485 }, "sha256": "3c0ee0c4a8305517fed6eed639f13cd5da55d5a13141b54eddac3120a977df79", "simhash": "1:92f7440a48888312", "word_count": 6186 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:50:37.461651+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge", "WE CONCUR:", "CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge", "MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge" ], "parties": [ "MARIA MAGDALENA AEDA, a/k/a MAGDALENA GIRON, Petitioner-Appellee, v. OSAMAH AEDA, Respondent-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nBUSTAMANTE, Judge.\nAs a matter of first impression we are asked to decide whether termination of parental rights ends a parent\u2019s obligation to make child support payments imposed in a divorce decree. We conclude that a termination of parental rights severs the parent-child relationship completely \u2014 including the support obligation. As a result we reverse the district court\u2019s order.\nI. BACKGROUND\nMaria Magdalena Aeda (Mother) and Osamah Aeda (Father) were married in 1984 and divorced in 1990. They had two children during the marriage. The divorce decree ordered Father to pay $600 per month in child support until the children reached majority, were emancipated, or until further order of the court.\nIn March 1993, Mother filed for termination of Father\u2019s parental rights, alleging failure to pay child support and physical and mental abuse of her and the children. Father did not respond to Mother\u2019s motion on its merits. Rather, he filed a special appearance challenging jurisdiction. Father did nothing in the case after filing his special appearance, failing even to appear at the hearing he requested on the issue.\nThe district court held a hearing on the motion accepting oral testimony and exhibits. In its order terminating Father\u2019s parental rights, the district court found that \u201cthe children . . . have been abandoned as [Father had] paid no child support since entry of the [divorce decree]\u201d and that \u201c[t]he children . . . have witnessed horrific violence and mayhem to those they love; specifically, their mother and maternal grandmother, which violence was a result of [F]ather\u2019s conduct.\u201d The district court also found that Father had kidnapped the children for ten months in 1990, taking them to Texas and not permitting them any contact with Mother during that time. Specifically with x\u2019egard to the children, the district court determined:\n5. There will be no damage to the children if they never have contact with [F]ather again. In fact, the children will be relieved.\n12. [T]here has been extensive emotional and physical abuse of the minor children and it is in the best interest of these children that the parental rights of [F]ather be terminated forever.\nThe termination order of November 1, 1993, made no mention of alteration of the child support order. Notably, neither Mother\u2019s motion nor the district court\u2019s order cited any statutory authority.\nIn 1991, Mother applied for assistance from the New Mexico Human Services Department, Child Support Enforcement Division (HSD), which prompted collection efforts by HSD against Father. Using a variety of mechanisms, HSD seized approximately $7620 from Father between 1991 and 2005. In 2004, Father contested the seizure of funds from his bank account in an administrative hearing, arguing that New Mexico did not have jurisdiction over his divorce proceedings. The hearing officer in that proceeding determined that New Mexico had jurisdiction, HSD had acted properly in seizing the funds, and Father owed over $42,000 in child support at that time. There is no indication in the record that Father ever raised termination of his rights as a defense to HSD\u2019s collection efforts.\nIn October 2008, HSD moved to intervene in the proceedings between Mother and Father (the divorce and termination proceedings were assigned the same case number) and filed a motion to establish a payment plan for child support arrearages. Now represented by counsel, Father moved to dismiss HSD\u2019s motion arguing that \u201c[b]y terminating his parental rights, the [termination ojrder terminated [Father\u2019s] parental relationship with the children such that [Father] thereafter owed no legal duty or obligation to the children, including any duty to support the children.\u201d Father also asserted laches as an affirmative defense. In June 2009, after Father responded, Mother, through private counsel, filed her own motion to show cause through which she sought payment of child support arrearages under the divorce decree.\nThe district court held a hearing on Father\u2019s and Mother\u2019s motions in August 2009. At the conclusion of the hearing the district court ruled against Father because in its view parental rights and the duty to support are \u201cseparate and distinguishable.\u201d The record does not include an order reflecting this ruling until entry in February 2011 of the final order that is the subject of this appeal.\nAfter the district court\u2019s oral denial of Father\u2019s motion to dismiss, HSD withdrew as intervenor and \u201cpermanently\u201d waived its assignment of rights and financial interests.\nIn June 2010 the district court determined after a hearing that the defense of laches did not apply to this case. And, after a final hearing, the district court ordered Father to pay past due child support, plus interest, in the stipulated amount of $117,502.41, covering the fourteen-year period from October 1994 through September 30, 2010. Father appealed.\nII. DISCUSSION\nFather first argues that the district court misconstrued the applicable statutes in ruling that termination of his parental rights did not terminate his child support obligations. He also argues that the district court erred in finding that the defense of laches was inapplicable. Given our conclusion that termination of parental rights does terminate child support obligations, there is no need to address laches.\n1. Standard of Review\nInterpretation of a statute is a question of law, which an appellate court reviews de novo. See Morgan Keegan Mortg. Co. v. Candelaria, 1998-NMCA-008, \u00b6 5, 124 N.M. 405, 951 P.2d 1066. The overriding purpose of statutory construction is to \u201cgive effect to the Legislature\u2019s intent.\u201d Key v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 121 N.M. 764, 768, 918 P.2d 350, 354 (1996). \u201cIn interpreting statutes, we seek to give effect to the Legislature\u2019s intent, and in determining intent we look to the language used and consider the statute\u2019s history and background.\u201d Id. at 768-69, 918 P.2d at 354-55. If we determine that the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for additional analysis of the statute. Sims v. Sims, 1996-NMSC-078, \u00b6 17, 122 N.M. 618, 930 P.2d 153. Rather, \u201cit is . .. the responsibility of the judiciary to apply the statute as written.\u201d Martinez v. Cornejo, 2009-NMCA-011, \u00b6 11, 146 N.M. 223, 208 P.3d 443 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see State ex rel. Barela v. N.M. State Bd. of Educ., 80 N.M. 220, 222, 453 P.2d 583, 585 (1969) (\u201cWe are not permitted to read into a statute language which is not there, particularly if it makes sense as written.\u201d). When the statute\u2019s language is not clear and unambiguous, we rely on the history of the statute, Key, 121 N.M. 768-69, 918 P.2d at 354-55, construction of \u201cother statutes concerning the same subject matter,\u201d Quantum Corp. v. State Taxation & Revenue Department, 1998-NMCA-050, \u00b6 8, 125 N.M. 49, 956 P.2d 848, and the principles embodied in the Uniform Statute and Rule Construction Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 12-2A-1 to -20 (1997). Unless a statute violates the Constitution, \u201c[w]e will not question the wisdom, policy, or justness of legislation enacted by our Legislature.\u201d Madrid v. St. Joseph Hosp., 1996-NMSC-064, \u00b6 10, 122 N.M. 524, 928 P.2d 250. Finally, we note that \u201c[legislative silence is at best a tenuous guide to determining legislative intent[.]\u201d Swink v. Fingado, 115 N.M. 275, 283, 850 P.2d 978, 986 (1993).\n2. Which Statute Requires Construction\nOur first task is to determine which statute requires construction. Mother filed the petition for termination of Father\u2019s rights in March 1993 and the district court granted the petition in November 1993. Between those two dates, the Legislature passed amendments to the Children\u2019s Code, which became effective on July 1, 1993. 1993 N.M. Laws, ch. 77, \u00a7\u00a7 234, 236. Thus, our review is focused on the construction of the Children\u2019s Code as it existed before those amendments were effective, not on the language of the Children\u2019s Code after the amendments. See \u00a7 12-2A-16(A), (B) (\u201cA pending civil action or proceeding may be completed and a right accrued may be enforced as if the statute or rule had not been amended or repealed.\u201d).\nHaving determined the temporal focus of our inquiry, we must next determine which statute was operative in this case. Neither Mother\u2019s petition for termination of Father\u2019s rights nor the district court\u2019s order cited a statutory basis for the termination. We conclude that the petition and order were based on the authority granted in NMSA 1978, Sections 32-1-54 and -55 (1985) primarily because there were no other provisions for termination of parental rights extant at the time. In addition, Section 32-1-55 and other sections of the Children\u2019s Code were cited by Mother in subsequentpleadings, and the district court found \u201c[tjhat there ha[d] been extensive emotional and physical abuse of the ... children and it is in the best interest of these children that the parental rights of [Father] be terminated forever[,]\u201d which are some of the required elements of termination under Sections 32-1-54 and -55. See \u00a7 32-1-54 (A), (B)(3). Our focus here, then, is on construction of Sections 32-1-54 and -55.\n3. Sections 32-1-54 and -55 Are Not Clear and Unambiguous\nWe next examine Sections 32-1-54 and -55 to determine if they are clear and unambiguous. The provision describing the effect of an order of termination reads:\nA judgment of the court terminating parental rights divests the parent of all legal rights and privileges, and dispenses with both the necessity for the consent to or receipt of notice of any subsequent adoption proceeding concerning the child. A child\u2019s inheritance rights from and through its biological parents are terminated only by a subsequent adoption.\nSection32-l-55(J). Section32-1-55 generally describes the process to be followed by the district court when considering a petition to terminate parental rights. The companion provision \u2014 Section 32-1-54 \u2014 generally provides the substantive grounds upon which parental rights may be terminated. Section 32-1-54(E) adopts by reference the definition of \u201cparental rights\u201d found in the Adoption Act. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 40-7-30(K) (1985, as amended through 1989). That definition states: \u2018\u201cparental rights\u2019 means all rights of a parent with reference to a minor, including parental right to control, to withhold consent to an adoption},] or to receive notice of a hearing on a petition for adoption}.]\u201d). Id.\nMother notes that this language \u201conly speaks in terms of the rights of the parent.\u201d Mother contends that because the statutes\u2019 terms address only a parent\u2019s rights to his or her child, rather than a parent\u2019s duties toward the child, a child\u2019s inherent right to support from the parent persists after termination of the parent\u2019s rights. Mother\u2019s argument relies on the premise, well established in New Mexico law, that a child is entitled to support from his or her parents. See Mintz v. Zoernig, 2008-NMCA-162, \u00b6 15, 145 N.M. 362, 198 P.3d 861 (\u201cIt is well established that a natural father is required to support his children.\u201d); In re Estate of DeLara, 2002-NMCA-004, \u00b6 10, 131 N.M. 430, 38 P.3d 198 (\u201cOur Supreme Court has characterized child support as a parent\u2019s most important single obligation.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Tedford v. Gregory, 1998-NMCA-067, \u00b6 24, 125 N.M. 206, 959 P.2d 540 (\u201cIn New Mexico, . . . children are entitled to support from their parents.\u201d).\nIf this were the only sentence at issue, Mother\u2019s argument would be persuasive. The second sentence of Section 32-l-55(J), however, reserves to a child specific inheritance rights. Father argues that the Legislature\u2019s explicit preservation of a child\u2019s right to inherit indicates that other rights were not preserved after termination. He argues, \u201cIf the Legislature had also intended to impose a duty of continuing child support on parents whose parental rights were terminated . . . then logically it would have done so by . .. stat[ing] that children retained child support rights as well as rights of inheritance.\u201d He appears to invoke \u201cthe old rule of statutory construction inclusio unius estexclusio alterius; the inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of another.\u201d State ex rel. State Eng'r v. Lewis, 1996-NMCA-019, \u00b6 11, 121 N.M. 323, 326, 910 P.2d 957, 960. Like Mother\u2019s argument, Father\u2019s argument for interpretation of the second sentence of Section 32-l-55(J) would be more persuasive if the sentence stood alone, but it does not. While we might infer from the explicit preservation of inheritance rights that other rights are not preserved, by the same token we also might infer from the absence of reference to a parent\u2019s obligations that termination of parental rights extinguishes only rights, not obligations. Given no clear basis for the choice, we conclude that Section 32-1-55(J) does not by itself answer the question posed by this case. Thus, we turn to other principles of construction.\n4. History of the Children\u2019s Codes and Sections 32-1-54 and -55\nWe turn first to the history of Sections 32-1-54 and -55. That history not surprisingly reflects an evolution of attitudes toward the parent-child relationship and the problems posed by abused, neglected, and delinquent children. Until relatively recently, provisions for the removal of children from unfit parents were grouped with statutes governing adoption. See State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep\u2019t v. B.J., 1997-NMCA-021, \u00b6 7, 123 N.M. 99, 934 P.2d 293; see also Theodore E. Lauer, The New Mexico Children\u2019s Code: Some Remaining Problems, 10 N.M. L. Rev. 341, 342 nn.4 & 5 (1980) (discussing pre-1917 history of such codes). Pre-statehood laws addressing parental rights were included in a chapter titled \u201cAdopting and Legitimizing\u201d and permitted courts \u201cto remove children from the custody ofprostitutes or inhabitants of a house of ill fame and to grant custody to another proper person, association, or corporation\u201d and \u201cto permit adoption of children who had been abandoned and were not provided for by parents or relatives.\u201d B.J., 1997-NMCA-021, \u00b6 7; see 1897 Compiled Laws of New Mexico \u00a7\u00a7 1503 & 1504, C.L. 1897. That chapter also provided that \u201c[t]he parents and relatives of an adopted child are, from the time of its adoption, relieved of all parental duties toward and all responsibility for the child so adopted, and shall have no right to or control over it.\u201d 1897 Compiled Laws ofNew Mexico \u00a7 1508, C.L. 1897.\nIn 1917, a \u201cmore extensive statutory structure\u201d was enacted that became the root of today\u2019s Children\u2019s Code. B.J., 1997-NMCA-021, \u00b6 8; Lauer, supra, at 342. The 1917 statute focussed on \u201cdelinquent and neglected children\u201d and \u201cempowered the district courts to adjudge as wards of the court and to place under the guardianship of individuals or associations\u201d neglected or abused children. Lauer, supra, at 342-343. Until 1972, although separate statutes existed governing adoptions, the \u201cdependent and neglected children\u201d statutes also included provisions for adoption of a neglected child and procedures for parents to challenge adoptions. See, e.g., NMSA 1941, \u00a7\u00a7 25-201 to -218 (1893, as amended through 1933); NMSA 1941, \u00a7\u00a7 25-219, -223, -228 (1951) (Vol. 2, 1951 Cum. Pocket Supp.); -224 (1953) (Vol. 2, 1953 Pocket Supp.); NMSA 1953, \u00a7\u00a7 22-2-20 to - 35 (1971, as amended through 1975) (Vol. 5, 1975 Pocket Supp.); NMSA 1953, \u00a7\u00a7 13-9-6 (1951); -6.1 (1961) (Vol. 3, 1967 Pocket Supp.) (\u201cFreeing children for adoption \u2014 Procedure\u2014Parental rights protected\u201d). Thus, there appears to have been some overlap between the two types of statutes. These early provisions relating to abused or neglected children remained largely unchanged from 1917 until 1972. Lauer, supra, at 343 ;BJ., 1997-NMCA-021, \u00b6 5; see NMSA 1941, \u00a7\u00a7 44-202 (1917); -206 (1951) (Vol. 3, 1951 Cum. Pocket Supp.); NMSA 1953, \u00a7\u00a7 13-9-2 (1917);-6 (1951).\nIn 1972, the Children\u2019s Code was enacted and the previous provisions were repealed. 1972 N.M. Laws, ch. 97, \u00a7\u00a7 1 to 45. The Children\u2019s Code was based in large part on the \u201cLegislative Guide for Drafting Family and Juvenile Court Acts\u201d published by the Children\u2019s Bureau of the Social and Rehabilitation Service of the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Lauer, supra, at 344. The Children\u2019s Code was motivated partially by the United States Supreme Court\u2019s decision in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), in which the Court \u201cextended to juveniles the right to notice of charges, to counsel, to confrontation and to cross-examination of witnesses, and to the privilege against self-incrimination.\u201d State v. Rudy B., 2010-NMSC-045, \u00b6 55, 149 N.M. 22, 243 P.3d 726; see Lauer, supra, at 343-44. Consequently, its focus was primarily on \u201cstrengthening] the rights of children in the juvenile court [and] advanced thinking in terms of children\u2019s rights and procedural safeguards.\u201d Lauer, supra, at 344. The 1972 version of the Children\u2019s Code did not contain a provision specifically addressing termination of parental rights. It did include a definition of \u201cparent\u201d and provided for placement of children when their parents\u2019 rights had been terminated. See NMSA 1953, \u00a7 13-14-3(F) (1973) (stating that a \u201cparent\u201d is one whose rights have not been terminated); NMSA 1953, \u00a7 13-14-25(H) (Vol. 3, 1975 Pocket Supp.) (specifying who may be a guardian of a child when parental rights have been terminated).\nMeanwhile, in 1971, anew Adoption Act was enacted. 1971 N.M. Laws, ch. 222. The new statute included a provision for termination ofparental rights when a child had been abandoned or \u201cthe parent . . . has repeatedly or continually neglected . . . the natural and legal obligations of care and support}.]\u201d NMSA 1953, \u00a7 22-2-23(3) (1971) (Vol. 5, 1975 Pocket Supp.); 1983 N.M. Laws, ch. 239, \u00a7 2. The 1971 Adoption Act defined \u201cparental rights\u201d as \u201call rights of a parent with reference to a minor, including parental right to control, or to withhold consent to an adoption, or to receive notice of a hearing on a petition for adoption}.]\u201d Section 22-2-21(1) (1971) (Vol. 5, 1975 Pocket Supp.).\nAnd, for the first time in New Mexico\u2019s statutes, the 1971 Adoption Act provided a description of the effect of an order terminating parental rights. Section 3(E) of the Adoption Act provided:\nE. The court after hearing may grant or deny a judgment terminating parental rights. A judgment of the court terminating parental rights has the same effect as an adoption judgment has in terminating the parent-child relationship, including terminating parental rights, dispensing with the consent, and with any required notice of an adoption proceeding of a parent whose relationship is terminated by the judgment.\n1971 N.M. Laws, ch. 222, at 754. This language was codified at Section 22-2-23(E).\nIn 1975 the Legislature amended Section 22-2-23. 1975 N.M. Laws, ch. 185. Relevant to our inquiry, the Legislature repealed Subsection (E) and replaced it with two new provisions:\nF. The court after hearing may grant or deny a judgment terminating parental rights. If the attempted termination is based on the unfitness of the parent, that unfitness must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. The court\u2019s judgment shall recite the findings upon which it is based; if the court terminates parental rights, it shall also appoint a custodian for the minor and shall fix responsibility for the minor\u2019s support.\nG. A judgment of the court terminating parental rights divests the parent and the child of all legal rights, privileges, duties and obligations, including rights of inheritance, with respect to each other, and dispenses with both the consent of, and the requirement of notice to, that parent whose relationship is terminated by the judgment for a subsequent adoption proceeding.\nSection 22-2-23(F), (G) (Vol. 5, 1975 Pocket Supp.) (emphasis added). This section was recompiled into NMSA 1978 as Section 40-7-4. Parallel Tables. Although Section 40-7-4 was amended several times, the language on the effect of termination of parental rights remained constant until 1985. 1983 N.M. Laws, ch. 239, \u00a7 2. It is clear that the 1971 and 1975 termination provisions contemplate complete extinguishment of the parent-child relationship, including a parent\u2019s support obligation.\nIn 1985, as part of yet another significant revision to the Adoption Act, the provisions for termination of parental rights were essentially moved from the Adoption Act to the Children\u2019s Code when Section 40-7-4 was repealed and Sections 32-1-54 and -55 were adopted instead. 1985 N.M. Laws, ch. 194, \u00a7\u00a7 36, 37, 39. Sections 32-1-54 and -55 incorporated Section 40-7-4\u2019s provisions permitting termination when a child has been abandoned, abused, or neglected and most of the procedural requirements found in Section 40-7-4. See \u00a7 32-1-54(B)(1), (3); \u00a7 32-1-55(A), (B), (I), (J). Section 32-1-54(E) also provided that \u201c[t]he definitions contained in Section 2 of the Adoption Act [40-7-30 NMSA 1978] shall apply to the termination of parental rights under this section and Section 32-1-55.\u201d (Alteration in original.) The only definition that is relevant to our inquiry is that of \u201cparental rights\u201d found at Section 40-7-30(K), and it is the same definition found in the 1971 version of the Adoption Act (\u201c \u2018[P]arental rights\u2019 means all rights of a parent with reference to a minor, including parental right to control, to withhold consent to an adoption[,] or to receive notice of a hearing on a petition for adoption[.]\u201d).\nMost important to our purposes are the amendments to the language regarding the effect of termination of parental rights. That language was amended to remove reference to a parent\u2019s \u201cduties and obligations\u201d to a child, as well as to a child\u2019s rights, duties, privileges and obligations with respect to a parent. Section 32-1 -55(J). It was also amended to preserve a child\u2019s right to inherit from the terminated parent. Id. Thus, the 1985 amendment resulted in the language that is at the heart of this case.\nThe question is whether the changes in language from 1975 to 1985 reveal a legislative intent to continue support obligations after termination ofparental rights. We conclude that they do not. We start by considering the reason for the termination provisions. The overall purposes of the Children\u2019s Code are to promote the best interests of the children involved and to promote the unity of the family whenever possible. See \u00a7 32-1-54(A); NMSA 1978, \u00a7 32-1-2(A) (1972). The unfortunate but inescapable fact, however, is that at times these two goals are irreconcilable. Given the findings entered by the district court in its order terminating Father\u2019s rights here, it appears this was one of those times. When that occurs termination of parental rights is required. See In re Adoption of 119 N.M. 638, 652, 894 P.2d 994, 1008 (1995). The 1971 and 1975 versions of the provisions on the effect of termination clearly describe a complete severance of the parent-child relationship. See 1971 N.M. Laws, ch. 222 at 754 (discussing Section 22-2-23(E) (1971)); \u00a7 22-2-23(F), (G) (1975) (Vol. 5, 1975 Pocket Supp.). They reflect that the function of termination is to separate as completely as possible the child from a dysfunctional parent \u2014 all in the child\u2019s best interest. See In re Adoption of Doe, 101 N.M. 34, 37, 677 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Ct. App. 1984).\nThough the language used in 1985 is simpler, we perceive no intent by the Legislature to change the purpose and function of termination; that is, severance of the parent-child relationship. The one exception, of course, is that the Legislature explicitly preserved the child\u2019s right of inheritance. This change does not indicate a legislative intent to preserve ongoing support obligations of the parent. Inheritance rights and child support are simply too different to infer a legislative connection. If anything, the explicit treatment of inheritance rights and silence as to ongoing support implies a legislative intent to not alter the effect of termination on support duties.\nWe also note that the 1985 amendments deleted reference to children\u2019s \u201clegal rights, privileges, duties and obligations with respect to parents.\u201d If the legislature harbored any intent to thereby alter the effect of severance of the parent-child relationship and retain parental responsibility for financial support, there would be no need to explicitly exclude inheritance rights from the effect of termination. And deleting reference to a child\u2019s rights and privileges is quite an odd way to preserve a right to continuing support. The continuation of support obligations after termination \u2014 a signal change \u2014 would seemingly require definitive action by the Legislature.\nFather argues that the 1985 amendment was in response to this Court\u2019s 1978 holding in Wasson v. Wasson, 92 N.M. 162, 164, 584 P.2d 713, 715 (Ct. App. 1978). Father argues that the Legislature eliminated references to a parent\u2019s \u201cduties and obligations\u201d from the termination statute because they were \u201cunnecessary\u201d after the Wasson Court implicitly accepted that \u201ctermination of parental rights includes both parental rights and parental obligations\u201d when it cited \u201capprov[ingly]\u201d to Anguis v. Superior Court In & For County of Maricopa, 429 P.2d 702 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967) and Roelfs v. Sam P. Wallingford, Inc., 486 P.2d 1371 (Kan. 1971). See Wasson, 92 N.M. at 164, 584 P.2d at 715. In Wasson, the Court relied on the pre-1985 language, which expressly terminated a parent\u2019s \u201cduties and obligations\u201d to a child when the parent\u2019s rights were terminated, to hold that termination ofparental rights of the father was not in the best interests of the child because termination of the father\u2019s rights would also terminate the child\u2019s right to inherit from the father. Id. According to Father, \u201c[t]he Legislature\u2019s . . . elimination of [the words] \u2018duties and obligations\u2019 [after Wasson] should properly be interpreted as the removal of superfluous language which was unnecessary in view of the judicially accepted recognition\u201d that the rights of parents and children are reciprocal. See State v. Cleve, 1999-NMSC-017, \u00b6 14, 127 N.M. 240, 980 P.2d 23 (stating the presumption that the Legislature is aware of case law when drafting legislation and \u201ccould have expressly taken a different approach\u201d from the court in amendments to a statute if it disagreed with the court\u2019s interpretation) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).\nFather simply pushes the Court\u2019s mere citation to Anguis and Roelfs too far. The reference to Anguis and Roelfs can be seen as the Court\u2019s general agreement with the approach evident in those cases to treat parental \u201crights\u201d and \u201cobligations\u201d as two faces of the same coin. But the Wasson holding was based on the explicit language of the statute in place at the time; the Court did not have to \u201cconstrue\u201d the statute\u2019s language at all or rely on foreign cases to reach its ruling. Wasson, 91 N.M. at 163-64, 584 P.2d at 714-15. The significance of the Court\u2019s reference to Anguis and Roelfs in Wasson is thus ambiguous. Furthermore, Roelfs was based on an examination of Kansas statutes, which are different from those here, and is, therefore, of limited use. 486 P.2d at 1374-76. In addition, the Anguis court\u2019s definition of parental rights \u201cis totally devoid of any use of the rules of statutory construction or any other legal reasoning. It appears that the court simply decided without any basis that the term \u201c \u2018parental rights\u2019 . . . means \u2018both parental rights and parental obligations.\u2019 \u201d Ex parte M.D.C., 39 So. 3d 1117, 1126 (Ala. 2009) (citation omitted). Thus, we do not agree with Father that we can assume the Legislature relied on a seven-year-old case for a \u201cjudicially accepted\u201d definition of parental rights in crafting Section 32-1-55(J). See Swink, 115 N.M. at 283, 850 P.2d at 986 (\u201cLegislative silence is at best a tenuous guide to determining legislative intent}.]\u201d).\nWe conclude that the changes in the statute from 1975 to 1985 cannot reasonably be interpreted to preserve ongoing support obligations by parents after termination.\n5. Related Statutory Provisions\nWe next examine related parts of the Children\u2019s Code. Father argues that we can ascertain legislative intent to extinguish a parent\u2019s obligation to support a child after termination from the requirement for the district court to \u201cappoint a custodian for the minor . . . and fix responsibility for the minor\u2019s support\u201d after parental rights are terminated. Section 32-1-55(1). He notes that this provision is not specific as to who should be responsible for supporting a child after a parent\u2019s rights are terminated and contrasts it with the \u201cParental responsibility\u201d provision, which states that \u201c[t]he court shall order the parent to pay the reasonable costs of support and maintenance of the child that the parent is financially able to pay if a child is adjudicated to be neglected, abused or in need of supervision and the court orders the child placed with an agency or individual other than the parent.\u201d (emphasis added). Section 32-1-47(C); see \u00a7 32-l-41(C) (permitting the court to order the parent to pay a \u201creasonable sum\u201d for the support of the child if legal custody of the child has been \u201cvested in someone other than the child\u2019s parents\u201d and permitting contempt charges if the parent \u201cwillfully fails ... to pay\u201d). Father assumes that Section 32-1-47(C) applies only when parental rights are not terminated and that \u201c[i]f the Legislature had not intended to distinguish between a parent\u2019s child support responsibility when the child is placed with a third party without termination of parental rights and when a parent\u2019s rights are terminated, then it logically would have likewise imposed an express duty [to pay] child support on a parent whose rights have been terminated.\u201d\nMother argues to the contrary that Section 32-l-47(C) supports continuation of support obligations after termination. She argues that Father\u2019s distinction between Section 32-1-47(C) and Section 32-1-55(1) is specious because Section 32-l-47(C)\u2019s provision applies even when parental rights are terminated so long as the two stated conditions (adjudication of abuse or neglect and a court-ordered placement other than with the parent) are met, and that its silence as to termination of parental rights means that termination has no effect on responsibilities under the provision.\nWe do not agree with either interpretation fully, though we conclude that Father is closer to the mark. We agree that Section 32-1-47(C) applies only to instances in which parental rights have not been terminated. By its terms, Section 32-1-47(C) applies to a set of circumstances that are broader than and separate from orders of termination. Placement of a child with a parent is not possible after termination of that parent\u2019s rights. See \u00a7 32-1-3(1) (defining \u201ccustodian\u201d as \u201ca person, other than a parent or guardian, who exercises physical control, care or custody of the child\u201d). Thus, Section 3 2-1-47(C) cannot apply when parental rights are terminated because it presumes the possibility that placement with a parent is an option. This interpretation is bolstered by Section 32-l-47(A), which describes a factual scenario \u2014 an action against the child personally in which the parents may be joined \u2014 which can only occur pre-termination. Further, there is nothing about a finding that a child is in need of supervision or has been neglected or abused that necessarily requires termination. Situations that progress to termination are handled under Sections 32-1-54 and -55. Orders of support entered prior to actual termination bear no relationship to what may be appropriately ordered after termination. In sum, we conclude that Section 32-1-47 addresses a different problem in the course of child adjudications and is not helpful in assessing what Section 32-1 -55(J) means with regard to ongoing parental support after termination.\nThe definition of \u201cparental rights\u201d referenced in the termination provisions does not mention parental responsibilities. Section 40-7-30(K). We acknowledge that otherparts of the Children\u2019s Code explicitly distinguished between rights and responsibilities. For example, the definition of \u201clegal custody\u201d was:\n[A] legal status created by the order of the court.. . that vests in a person or agency the right to determine where and with whom a child shall live; the right and duty to protect, train and discipline the child and to provide him with food, shelter, education and ordinary and emergency medical care; and the right to consent to his enlistment in the armed forces of the United States, all subject to .. . any existing parental rights and responsibilities.\nSection 32-1-3(J) (emphasis added).\nSimilarly, a \u201c[pjermanent guardianship vests in the guardian all rights and responsibilities of a parent, subject to the rights and responsibilities of the natural or adoptive parent, if any, as set forth in the decree of permanent guardianship.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 32-1-58(A) (1987).\nThis review reveals that the Legislature intentionally distinguished between parental rights and parental responsibilities in some provisions. Of course, we \u201cread the statute in its entirety and construe each part in connection with every other part to produce a harmonious whole.\u201d Key, 121 N.M. at 769, 918 P.2d at 355. However, these provisions do not provide any help in interpreting legislative intent as to support payments after termination.\nSections 32-1-3(J) and 32-1-58(A) address circumstances that can only exist pretermination. This alone makes them suspect as guides to the meaning and effect of provisions which apply post-termination. In addition, Sections 32-1-3(J) and 32-1-58(A) address the problems inherent to situations in that the control of and responsibility for a child is placed in persons or agencies foreign to the child. There is an obvious need to be more detailed as to the powers and duties vested in a non-parent over a child. In some instances a complicating factor may be that custody \u2014 in its broadest sense \u2014 may be split between persons and agencies and even parents. When \u201ccustody\u201d is split there is even more need for recognition in the controlling statute of the various roles inherent in taking care of a child. But these considerations say nothing about these roles after termination. Termination is meant to eliminate a parent\u2019s connection with the child. There is no need for parsing roles thereafter because the parent has none.\nWe conclude thatthe Legislature had no intent to change the fundamental nature and effect of an order terminating rights when it amended the Children\u2019s Code in 1985. The fundamental and terrible act of severing the parent-child relationship cuts off all connection between them except as specifically excepted by the Legislature.\nOur analysis has relied on our interpretation of New Mexico\u2019s statutes as they existed as of March 1993. We have not relied on out-of-state authorities to this point \u2014 though they are numerous. Our reluctance to rely on out-of-state cases stems primarily from the fact that the statutory schemes they interpret are different. See, e.g., Roelfs, 486 P.2d at 1374-76. The scope ofthe differences weakens their force as interpretive guides in New Mexico. In addition, some of the cases do not engage in sufficiently independent analysis, choosing instead to cite cases from other states and essentially say \u201cwe agree.\u201d See, e.g.,Anguis, 429 P.2d at 705; In re K.S., 515 P.2d 130, 133 (Colo. 1973); Coffey v. Vasquez, 350 S.E.2d 396, 397 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986). With those limitations in mind, we do note that the great majority of out-of-state cases agree that almost as a matter of definition termination of parental rights \u2014 or more accurately the parent-child relationship \u2014 works to end the parental support obligation. An illustrative case is County of Ventura v. Gonzales, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 461, 464 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), concluding that an order terminating parental rights completely severs the parent-child relationship and implicitly terminates the parental duty of support. See also State ex rel. Welfare Div. of Dep't of Human Res. v. Vine, 662 P.2d 295, 297-98 (Nev. 1983) (holding that support obligations ended with termination ofparental rights since termination of parental rights severs the parent-child relationship).\nWe decline to follow cases such as Ex parte M.D.C. and State v. Fritz, 801 A.2d 679 (R.I. 2002) because we believe they fail to address the function, purpose, and seriousness of a termination of parental rights. Further, their analysis relies unduly on statutory provisions other than their termination section for definitional guidance. As we demonstrate above, other statutory provisions designed to address pre-termination circumstances offer no useful guidance for the post-termination world. Our view and approach to the issue is more in line with the vigorous dissent filed by Justice Murdock in Ex parte M.D.C., 39 So. 3d at 1133-45.\nCONCLUSION\nThe judgment below is reversed. The matter is dismissed.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nMICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nCYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge\nMICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge\nGiven that the events giving rise to this case occurred twenty years ago, however, we limit the force of our mling to the statutory provisions in effect in March 1993 \u2014 the date the petition to terminate Father\u2019s parental rights was filed.\nNMSA 1953, Sections 13-14-1 to -45 (1972, as amended through 1973), the original Children\u2019s Code, were recompiled into NMSA 1978, Sections 32-1-1 to - 48 (1972, as amended through 1989). Parallel Tables. Additional sections were added to the Children\u2019s Code in 1979 and 1981 such that the Code encompassed Sections 32-1-1 to -53, and a 1993 recompilation resulted in the Children\u2019s Code encompassing all of Section 32A, including modified versions of Sections 32-1-54and-55. We understand Sections 32-1-54 and -55 to bepart of the Children\u2019s Code at the times relevant to this case.\nIt is much more likely that the 1985 amendments were prompted by the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), which explicitly recognized a fundamental liberty interest in the right of parents to raise their children.", "type": "majority", "author": "BUSTAMANTE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Magdalena Giron Las Cruces, NM Pro Se Appellee", "Keithly & English, P.C. Shane A. English Anthony, NM for Appellant" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Certiorari Granted, September 20, 2013,\nNo. 34,291\nIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2013-NMCA-095\nFiling Date: July 24, 2013\nDocket No. 31,182\nMARIA MAGDALENA AEDA, a/k/a MAGDALENA GIRON, Petitioner-Appellee, v. OSAMAH AEDA, Respondent-Appellant.\nMagdalena Giron Las Cruces, NM Pro Se Appellee\nKeithly & English, P.C. Shane A. English Anthony, NM for Appellant" }, "file_name": "0759-01", "first_page_order": 775, "last_page_order": 787 }