{ "id": 4078296, "name": "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. DANIEL ALMANZAR, Defendant-Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Almanzar", "decision_date": "2013-12-02", "docket_number": "Docket No. 33,763", "first_page": "265", "last_page": "272", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2014-NMSC-001" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "309 P.3d 1047", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2013-NMSC-043", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4333550 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/4/0700-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMSC-001", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 77119 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0768-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMSC-032", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 1224669 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/136/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 P.3d 260", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2012-NMSC-022", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4190294 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/2/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-013", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4243054 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 P.3d 1235", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2013-NMSC-001", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4191197 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/3/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-026", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4244840 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMSC-041", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4002999 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 13" }, { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/144/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 P.3d 405", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2013-NMSC-018", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4335316 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/4/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "2011-NMSC-026", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4249968 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" }, { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/149/0729-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 P.3d 238", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2012-NMCA-111", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4190123 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 1" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/2/0717-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 867, "char_count": 20263, "ocr_confidence": 0.767, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1587380691256762e-07, "percentile": 0.7695251730892418 }, "sha256": "2cfaf2296a949174c94609b0f9644134552952f091c03389522c66a298380273", "simhash": "1:733122feaa213180", "word_count": 3241 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:28:15.201030+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "BARABARA J. VIGIL, Justice", "PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Chief Justice", "RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice", "EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice", "CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice" ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. DANIEL ALMANZAR, Defendant-Respondent." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nVIGIL, Justice.\n{1} In this case we address whether the phrase \u201cat the scene\u201d in NMSA 1978, Section 31-1-7(A) (1995) authorizes law enforcement officers to make a warrantless arrest for domestic violence beyond the precise geographic location where the disturbance occurred. In this case, Daniel Almanzar (\u201cDefendant\u201d) was arrested without a warrant across the street from where he allegedly battered his girlfriend (\u201cVictim\u201d). When the police searched Defendant pursuant to his arrest, they found a golf-ball-sized mass of cocaine in his pants pocket. He was subsequently charged with a drug trafficking offense. Defendant moved to suppress the cocaine on the basis that the arrest was unlawful because he was not arrested \u201cat the scene\u201d as required under Section 31-1-7(A). The district court denied his motion, concluding that the warrantless arrest was lawful because Defendant was arrested in close proximity to where the actual incident took place.\n{2} The Court of Appeals reversed the district court and held that the wan-antless arrest was not lawfully made because Section 31-1-7(A) specifically limits the authority of law enforcement officers to make an arrest for domestic battery, a misdemeanor, where the incident took place. We disagree with this analysis. Our interpretation of the Legislature\u2019s intent in creating the statutory warrantless arrest exception in Section 31-1-7(A) leads us to conclude that Defendant\u2019s arrest was lawful because it was reasonably close in proximity to where the domestic violence took place.\nI. BACKGROUND\n{3} On December 1, 2007, Defendant and Victim were in the parking lot at Tingley Coliseum on the New Mexico State Fair grounds in Albuquerque. Defendant and Victim began quarreling, and he allegedly kicked Victim. After the incident, Victim left the fairgrounds and walked to a Walgreens drug store across the street on the corner of Central Avenue and San Pedro Drive, where she called 911. Defendant also left the fairgrounds, but he walked to a Circle K convenience store across the street on the corner of Central Avenue and Louisiana Boulevard. The Albuquerque Police Department dispatched officers to both locations in response to the 911 call.\n{4} The officers identified Defendant when they arrived at the Circle K. As the officers approached Defendant, he put his hands in his pockets and refused to remove them after being asked to do so. The officers escorted Defendant out of the store, handcuffed him, and performed a pat-down search. The officer who performed the search felt a hard object in Defendant\u2019s pocket and removed a golf-ball-sized mass of cocaine. The officers then put Defendant in the back of a squad car and drove him to the Walgreens where Victim was located.\n{5} When they arrived at Walgreens, Victim identified Defendant as the person who had battered her. Once Victim identified Defendant, one of the arresting officers made the initial determination that Defendant would be charged with domestic violence and taken in for booking. However, Defendant was not charged with the domestic violence offense, but instead was charged with and indicted on one count of trafficking a controlled substance in contravention ofNMSA 1978, Section 30-31-20 (2006).\n{6} B efore trial, D efendant moved to suppress the cocaine evidence. He argued that the search amounted to an illegal pat-down and that it was unlawful because, pursuant to Section 31-1-7(A), the police had no authority to arrest him away from where the incident took place without a warrant. The district court denied Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the physical evidence, concluding that the pat-down was lawful and that the arrest was lawful because \u201cit was in the general vicinity, certainly in [the] area,\u201d of the scene.\n{7} The Court of Appeals reversed the district court on both grounds. State v. Almanzar, 2012-NMCA-111, \u00b6 1, 288 P.3d 238. First, it held that the officer who performed the pat-down exceed his authority by removing the cocaine from Defendant\u2019s pocket because the cocaine did not appear to be a weapon. Id. Second, the Court of Appeals held that Defendant\u2019s arrest was unlawful because the officers did not make the arrest at the precise location of the alleged battery. Id. Accordingly, it held that the cocaine should have been suppressed. Id.\n{8} The State now asks this Court to address the lawfulness of Defendant\u2019s arrest and reverse the Court of Appeals on this single issue. It argues that the \u201cat the scene\u201d language in Section 31-1-7(A) was satisfied because the arrest was made within minutes of the alleged battery, and the arrest was made across the street from the reported incident. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the warrantless arrest was lawful. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the district court\u2019s denial of Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nII. DISCUSSION\nA. Standard of Review\n{9} The district court\u2019s denial of Defendant\u2019s motion'to suppress evidence presents a mixed question of fact and law. See State v. Williams, 2011-NMSC-026, \u00b6 8, 149 N.M. 729, 255 P.3d 307. This Court reviews factual matters with deference to the district court\u2019s findings if substantial evidence exists to support them, and it reviews the district court\u2019s application of the law de novo. Id. Further, since Defendant\u2019s appeal centers on our interpretation of Section 31 -1 -7(A), this Court interprets that statute de novo. See Moongate Water Co. v. City of Las Cruces, 2013-NMSC-018, \u00b6 6, 302 P.3d 405 (\u201cStatutory interpretation is an issue of law that we review de novo.\u201d).\nB. The Warrantless Arrest Was Lawful Under Section 31-1-7(A) Because It Was Made in Close Proximity to Where the Incident Took Place\n{10} The central issue is whether Defendant was lawfully arrested without a warrant for domestic violence when the arrest took place across the street from where the alleged incident occurred. If Defendant\u2019s arrest was lawful, then the search incident to the arrest falls within the exception to the constitutional search warrant requirement. See N.M. Const, art. II, \u00a7 10 (\u201cThe people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures.\u201d); U.S. Const, amend. IV (\u201cThe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.\u201d); State v. Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, \u00b6 13, 144 N.M. 371, 188 P.3d 95 (\u201cOne of the most firmly established exceptions to the warrant requirement is \u201cthe right on the part of the government, always recognized under English and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). We hold that because Defendant\u2019s warrantless arrest was made within close proximity to the alleged incident, it was lawful under Section 31-1-7(A). Therefore, as the district court ruled, the cocaine was found pursuant to a search incident to a lawful arrest, and Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress was properly denied.\n{11} We begin our analysis by noting the constitutional limitations on the government\u2019s authority to make an arrest without a warrant and search incident thereto. Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution provides that \u201c[t]he people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures.\u201d The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution also provides this guarantee. \u201cWarrantless [searches and] seizures are presumed to be unreasonable.\u201d Williams, 2011-NMSC-026, \u00b6 8 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While our state constitution and its federal counterpart impose a warrant requirement to ensure that searches and seizures are reasonable, \u201cour courts have historically recognized that it is not always reasonable to require a warrant and have developed a number of well-established exceptions to the warrant requirement.\u201d Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, \u00b6 11.\n{12} One such exception is \u201cthe right on the part of the government, always recognized under English and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested.\u201d Id. \u00b6 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Warrantless searches \u201chave been considered reasonable because of the practical need to prevent the arrestee from destroying evidence or obtaining access to weapons or instruments of escape, without any requirement of specific probable cause to believe weapons or evidence are present in a particular situation.\u201d Id. Thus, our inquiry is whether Defendant was lawfully arrested so that the officer\u2019s search of his person falls within this exception.\n{13} In order to lawfully arrest an individual for a misdemeanor, a police officer must have a warrant, unless the misdemeanor was committed in the officer\u2019s presence. See City of Las Cruces v. Sanchez, 2009-NMSC-026, \u00b6 11, 146 N.M. 315, 210 P.3d 212 (\u201c[I]n New Mexico, an officer may execute a warrantless misdemeanor arrest only if the offense was committed in the officer\u2019s presence.\u201d). Section 31-1-7(A) creates an exception to this general rule for misdemeanor domestic disturbances, such as the one reported here, by providing that:\nNotwithstanding the provisions of any other law to the contrary, a peace officer may arrest a person and take that person into custody without a warrant when the officer is at the scene of a domestic disturbance and has probable cause to believe that the person has committed an assault or a battery upon a household member.\nThere is no dispute that the officers had probable cause in this case; rather, the dispute centers on whether the officers were \u201cat the scene\u201d of the disturbance when they made the warrantless arrest. Our task, therefore, is to determine what the Legislature intended by using the phrase \u201cat the scene\u201d in Section 31-1-7(A).\n{14} In interpreting statutory language, \u201c[o]ur main goal ... is to give effect to the Legislature\u2019s intent.\u201d State v. Hall, 2013-NMSC-001, \u00b6 9, 294 P.3d 1235. To discern the Legislature\u2019s intent, the Court \u201clook[s] first to the plain language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning, unless the Legislature indicates a different one was intended.\u201d Marbob Energy Corp. v. N.M. Oil Conservation Comm'n 2009-NMSC-013, \u00b6 9, 146 N.M. 24, 206 P.3d 135 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). \u201cWhere the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.\u201d Diamond v. Diamond, 2012-NMSC-022, \u00b6 25, 283 P.3d 260 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).\n{15} If the relevant statutory language is unclear, ambiguous, or reasonably subject to multiple interpretations, then the Court should proceed with further statutory analysis. See State v. Smith, 2004-NMSC-032, \u00b6 9, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022. (\u201c[W]e exercise caution in applying the plain meaning rule. Its beguiling simplicity may mask a host of reasons why a statute, apparently clear and unambiguous on its face, may for one reason or another give rise to legitimate (i.e., nonfrivolous) differences of opinion concerning the statute\u2019s meaning.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). We reject a \u201cmechanical statutory construction when the results would be absurd, unreasonable, or contrary to the spirit of the statute.\u201d Id. \u00b6 10. When interpreting a statute, we are also informed by the history, background, and overall structure of the statute, as well as its \u201cfunction within a comprehensive legislative scheme.\u201d State v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, \u00b6 13, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939.\n{16} The authority to make an arrest without a warrant for a domestic dispute is contained in Section 31-1-7(A), which has two requirements. The arresting officer must be at the scene of the domestic disturbance, and the officer must have probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a domestic assault or battery. Whether the officer had probable cause to arrest Defendant is not at issue. We are called upon to address only the first element of Section 31-1-7(A) in this case. Defendant asserts, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the phrase \u201cat the scene\u201d should be read literally to mean that the arresting officer must make the arrest where the domestic disturbance occurred. The State argues, and the district court agreed, that the phrase should be interpreted to mean that the police officer may make an arrest anywhere near in space and time from where and when the incident occurred. Under the facts of this particular case, we agree with the latter interpretation.\n{17} Defendant\u2019s plain language reading of the statute appears to be that \u201cat the scene\u201d means at the precise place where the domestic violence occurred. The Court of Appeals agreed with this narrow interpretation and held that the ordinary meaning of the word scene is \u2018\u201cthe place of occurrence or action.\u2019\u201d Almanzar, 2012-NMCA-l 11, \u00b6 25 (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2028 (unabridged ed. 2002)). Defendant\u2019s interpretation of the phrase \u201cat the scene\u201d uses synonyms such as \u201cplace,\u201d \u201clocation,\u201d or \u201cthe place of occurrence or action\u201d which we consider unhelpful because these terms fail to render the statute workable. At oral argument, defense counsel argued that \u201cat the scene\u201d could be defined to be the same physical address or the same ownership or occupancy unit, however, when pressed by the Court, as to whether that meant the fairgrounds was one \u201cscene,\u201d while crossing the street to call the police took you to a different \u201cscene,\u201d defense counsel responded that for large areas it should mean \u201cwithin sight.\u201d This interpretation is unworkable, and it became obvious with the follow up question of whether stepping behind a visual obstruction removed one from the \u201cscene,\u201d and thereby from the reach of the law.\n{18} The State argues that due to the volatile and dangerous nature of domestic disturbances, \u201cat the scene\u201d must be read broadly to enable an officer to make a warrantless arrest within a reasonable time and distance of the incident. The State further asserts that a narrow reading of the statute would lead to absurd results, such as preventing an officer from making an arrest if a victim were forced to cross the street from the incident to call the police and her abuser followed her. Instead, the State argues that the Legislature has recognized the severity of domestic violence, and has created the warrantless arrest exception to combat the gravity of domestic violence situations. In our opinion, the difference in each side\u2019s interpretation of the phrase \u201cat the scene\u201d illustrates the beguiling simplicity with which the plain meaning rule can literally mask the statute\u2019s true intention. We agree with the State, however, because its interpretation conforms with precisely what we consider to be the Legislature\u2019s intent in creating the warrantless arrest exception.\n{19} The Family Violence Protection Act (\u201cthe Act\u201d), NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 40-13-1 to -12 (1987, as amended through 2013) illuminates our inquiry into the Legislature\u2019s intent. When Section 31-1-7(A) is viewed in light of the Act, the Legislature\u2019s intent is clarified. See Baker v. Hedstrom, 2013-NMSC-043, \u00b6 26, 309 P.3d 1047 (\u201c[A]ll provisions of a statute, together with other statutes in pari materia, must be read together to ascertain the legislative intent.\u201d). For instance, the Act states that \u201c[a] local law enforcement officer responding to the request for assistance shall be required to take whatever steps are reasonably necessary to protect the victim from further domestic abuse.\u201d Section 40-13-7(B). It then goes on to list several measures that an officer may take to ensure victim safety, such as: advising of the remedies available to the victim under the Act; informing the victim about the availability of shelter, counseling, or medical care; transporting the victim to a medical facility or shelter; accompanying the victim to the victim\u2019s residence to obtain clothing and personal effects; helping the victim possess a dwelling or enforcing an order of protection; arresting the alleged perpetrator; and, advising about the right to initiate criminal proceedings. Id.\n{20} These measures reflect that, the Legislature\u2019s first priority in addressing domestic disturbances is ensuring a victim\u2019s safety. With this clear purpose in mind, we conclude that Section 31-1-7(A) was enacted to enable an officer to ensure a victim\u2019s safety by allowing the officer to arrest an aggressor who is still at the scene of the incident without a warrant. Thus, the test for whether an officer was \u201cat the scene\u201d for purposes of the statute is one of reasonableness. The police must make the warrantless arrest reasonably close to the scene both spatially and temporally. We infer that the Legislature used the language \u201cat the scene\u201d to strike a reasonable balance between preventing harm to the victim and protecting the rights of the accused. If the police arrive at the scene of a domestic disturbance within a reasonable time after the violence is alleged to have occurred, such that the evidence of the violence is still fresh, and if the aggressor is still physically close enough to the victim to be able to reinitiate violence, then Section 31-1-7(A) empowers law enforcement to incapacitate the aggressor and protect the victim by making a warrantless arrest.\n{21} Section 31-1-7(A) gives law enforcement officers an effective tool with which to ensure a victim\u2019s safety and to diffuse what is often a dangerous situation. A rigid, geography-based interpretation of Section 31 -1 -7(A) conflicts with these express purposes. To read the language \u201cat the scene\u201d of Section 31-1-7(A) as restricting the officer\u2019s ability to arrest Defendant across the street from, and within minutes of, the domestic disturbance would be contrary to the Legislature\u2019s intent. Had this incident occurred at the home shared by Victim and Defendant, it would be unreasonable if the police could not arrest Defendant without a warrant simply because he crossed the street or went to a neighbor\u2019s home. Similarly, in this case it would contravene the Legislature\u2019s intent to interpret the statute as requiring the officers in this situation to arrest Defendant in the parking lot of Tingley Coliseum, rather than where Defendant was located across the street. Such a rigid interpretation of the statute would defeat the purpose of the warrantless arrest exception.\n{22} In this case, we interpret \u201cat the scene,\u201d as used in Section 31-1-7(A), to authorize law enforcement officers to make a warrantless arrest within minutes of the incident, at a location directly across the street from the incident. This interpretation is consistent with the Legislature\u2019s intent and the purpose of Section 31-1-7(A). The record reflects that the police responded to the convenience store within minutes of the 911 call, and the store was situated directly across the street from where the alleged physical altercation took place. Under these circumstances, we conclude that because the officers made the arrest within minutes and within close proximity to the alleged disturbance, the officers were \u201cat the scene\u201d at the time of the arrest. Therefore, we hold that the arrest was lawful under Section 31-1-7(A).\nIII. CONCLUSION\n{23} We hold that the warrantless arrest of Defendant was lawful and valid under Section 31-1-7(A), and because Defendant was lawfully arrested, the officer\u2019s search of Defendant incident to that arrest was valid. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the district court\u2019s denial of Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\n{24} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nBARABARA J. VIGIL, Justice\nWE CONCUR:\nPETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Chief Justice\nRICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice\nEDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice\nCHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice", "type": "majority", "author": "VIGIL, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary K. King, Attorney General Nicole Beder, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Petitioner", "Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender Nina Lalevic, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Respondent" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2014-NMSC-001\nFiling Date: December 2, 2013\nDocket No. 33,763\nSTATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. DANIEL ALMANZAR, Defendant-Respondent.\nGary K. King, Attorney General Nicole Beder, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Petitioner\nJorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender Nina Lalevic, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Respondent" }, "file_name": "0265-01", "first_page_order": 281, "last_page_order": 288 }