{ "id": 4078090, "name": "CITY OF ARTESIA and DONALD N. RALEY, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION OF NEW MEXICO, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "City of Artesia v. Public Employees Retirement Ass'n", "decision_date": "2013-11-13", "docket_number": "No. 34,364; Docket No. 32,355", "first_page": "272", "last_page": "279", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2014-NMCA-009" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "288 P.3d 872", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2012-NMCA-088", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4190060 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/2/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMCA-117", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3670872 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMSC-003", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 1428092 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/135/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566639 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMSC-005", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 16" }, { "parenthetical": "providing exemptions from the PERA return-to-work provisions for retirees (1) employed by the Legislature for legislative session work, and (2) elected to serve a term as an elected official" }, { "page": "\u00b6 51" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2007-NMCA-010", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3668779 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/141/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMSC-044", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3692987 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/142/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMCA-109", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4245299 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 13" }, { "page": "\u00b6 13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/147/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMCA-156", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 106541 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 416" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/128/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "579 F.3d 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 3545692, 4052847 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6", "parenthetical": "\"[I]f one party has standing in an action, a court need not reach the issue of the standing of other parties when it makes no difference to the merits of the case.\" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us-app-dc/388/0102-01", "/f3d/579/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMCA-088", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4244508 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0758-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMSC-045", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4002944 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/144/0471-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 844, "char_count": 21823, "ocr_confidence": 0.772, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.12975679277054378 }, "sha256": "7425e1ac4cf096c9defc3f7779ad6178380776bbf4b2a53203973fcb15b94dcd", "simhash": "1:1ee3bd8e302b3b1e", "word_count": 3516 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:28:15.201030+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge", "TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge", "M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge" ], "parties": [ "CITY OF ARTESIA and DONALD N. RALEY, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION OF NEW MEXICO, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nWECHSLER, Judge.\n{1} The City of Artesia (the City) and its Chief of Police Donald Raley (Raley) (Plaintiffs) filed an action for injunctive relief, writ of mandamus, and declaratory judgment to prevent the Public Employees Retirement Association of New Mexico (PERA) from suspending Raley\u2019s pension after the March 2012 municipal election in Artesia. When Raley was appointed to this position, NMSA 1978, Section 10-11-8(D) (2004) (amended 2010) provided that a PERA retiree appointed as a chief of police for a municipality had the option of filing an irrevocable exemption from PERA membership for the chief of police\u2019s \u201cterm of office.\u201d In 2010, the Legislature amended Section 10-11-8 and removed this chief of police exemption. The district court determined that PERA could not apply the 2010 version of Section 10-11-8 to Raley because the City appointed Raley for an indefinite term. We hold that Raley\u2019s term of office coincides with the City\u2019s organizational meeting following the municipal election held every two years and, therefore, the district court erred in determining that Raley\u2019s term of office was for an indefinite term. Accordingly, we reverse.\nBACKGROUND\n{2} The City appointed Raley to the position of chief of police in September 2006. At the time of his appointment, Raley was a PERA retiree and received a pension. At that time, Section 10-11-8(D) (2004) provided that a PERA retiree appointed as a chief of police for a municipality had the option of filing an irrevocable exemption from PERA membership for the chief of police\u2019s \u201cterm of office.\u201d This exemption allowed Raley to receive both his pension and his salary without either Raley or the City, having to make contributions to the PERA trust fund. Id. The City submitted the required exemption request form when it appointed Raley and left blank the line indicating the end date of Raley\u2019s \u201cterm of office.\u201d\n{3} In 2010, the Legislature amended Section 10-11-8 and removed the chief of police exemption. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 10-11-8 (2010). The effect of the 2010 amendment on Raley\u2019s exemption gives rise to the dispute in this case. Plaintiffs\u2019 position is that Raley\u2019s 2006 appointment was for an \u201cindefinite term,\u201d and, therefore, the exemption remained in effect until his service with the City was interrupted or terminated. PERA asserts that municipal appointees, including a chief of police, serve definitive terms of two years, subject to reappointment at a municipality\u2019s organizational meeting following each biennial municipal election. According to PERA, Raley\u2019s exemption ended when the City held its organizational meeting following the March 2012 municipal election because Raley\u2019s position required appointment and reappointment every two years.\n{4} After a substantive hearing on November 16, 2011, the district court granted a preliminary injunction preventing PERA from suspending Raley\u2019s pension following the election. It subsequently issued its final order allowing Raley to continue to simultaneously receive his salary and his pension for an indefinite period, applying the pre-2010 version of Section 10-11-8. The district court found that the City appointed Raley as the chief of police for an \u201cindefinite term\u201d in 2006 and that PERA could not terminate Raley\u2019s exemption based on the 2010 amendment to Section 10-11-8(D). PERA filed a timely appeal.\n{5} On appeal, PERA raises three issues, that the district court erred by (1) determining that the City has standing to litigate the issue of Raley\u2019s eligibility to simultaneously receive a salary and a pension, (2) finding that Raley was appointed for an \u201cindefinite term\u201d and that therefore a termination of his exemption pursuant to the 2010 amendment to Section 10-11 -8(D) would constitute a violation of state law, and (3) granting injunctive relief prohibiting PERA from terminating Raley\u2019s exclusion on or after ' the March 2012 organizational meeting.\nCITY OF ARTESIA\u2019S STANDING\n{6} We first turn to the issue of the City\u2019s standing. According to PERA, \u201cthe City is neither classically aggrieved nor has it provided any basis for standing under the Declaratory Judgment Act, NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 44-6-1 to -15 (1975), [and] therefore, the district court erred in concluding the City also had standing.\u201d\n{7} Unlike in federal courts, standing in New Mexico courts is not jurisdictional because it is not governed by the New Mexico Constitution. ACLU of N.M. v. City of Albuquerque, 2008-NMSC-045, \u00b6 9, 144 N.M. 471, 188 P.3d 1222. However, \u201cat least as a matter of judicial policy if not of jurisdictional necessity, our courts have generally required that a litigant demonstrate injury in fact, causation, and redressability to invoke the court\u2019s authority to decide the merits of a case.\u201d Id. \u00b6 10. The standing of a party to bring a claim is a question of law subject to de novo review. N.M. Gamefowl Ass'n Inc. v. State ex rel. King, 2009-NMCA-088, \u00b6 12, 146 N.M. 758, 215 P.3d 67.\n{8} But, even though the district court granted the City standing to litigate the issues in this case, we do not consider standing to be necessary for our review. Raley is also a Plaintiff, and PERA concedes that there is no dispute that \u201cRaley has standing to litigate the proper application of [the 2010 amendment to Section 10-11-8(D)] because it directly affects his ability to continue to receive both a salary and a pension.\u201d Because Raley has standing to assert the substantive relief sought in this case, we need not independently address the City\u2019s standing. See Comcast Corp. v. Fed. Commc\u2019n Comm\u2019n, 579 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (\u201c[I]f one party has standing in an action, a court need not reach the issue of the standing of other parties when it makes no difference to the merits of the case.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). We proceed to the merits of the case.\nSECTION 10-11-8(D)\n{9} Prior to the 2010 amendment, the PERA return-to-employment provisions provided that \u201ca retired member may be subsequently employed by an affiliated public employer if\u2019 certain conditions applied. Section 10-11-8(C) (2004). These conditions included that the retired member and the affiliated employer \u201cshall\u201d make contributions to the PERA fund. Section 10-11-8(C)(2), (3) (2004). Section 10-1 l-8(D)(l)(c) (2004) contained an exemption for a PERA retiree who was appointed as the chief of police of a municipality for the duration of the chief of police\u2019s \u201cterm of office.\u201d The exemption allowed the chief of police to continue receiving a PERA pension and a salary without either the retiree or the retiree\u2019s employer making contributions to the fund. See Section 10-11-8(D)(1) (2004).\n{10} After the 2010 amendment, Section 10-11-8 provides that a retired member may subsequently be employed by an affiliated employer but, among other conditions, \u201cthe retired member\u2019s pension shall be suspended upon commencement of the employment[.]\u201d Section 10-11-8(C)(2). The amendment went into effect on July 1,2010. 2010 N.M. Laws, ch. 18, \u00a7 2.\n{11} PERA argues that the district court erred by finding that Raley was appointed for an \u201cindefinite term\u201d as chief of police, that the chief of police exemption therefore still applies, and that suspending Raley\u2019s pension would constitute a violation of state law. On the other hand, Plaintiffs contend that the phrase \u201cterm of office\u201d does not contemplate a fixed term and that Raley and the City \u201chave long agreed and understood\u201d that his term is for an indefinite length. The parties agree that, because the chief of police exemption was no longer available after July 1, 2010, a retired member appointed to the position of chief of police after July 1, 2010 would be subject to the new statutory provisions. The issue in this case is whether Raley\u2019s \u201cterm of office\u201d ended upon the March 2012 municipal election and subsequent organizational meeting. This issue requires statutory interpretation of Section 10-11-8(D)(1) and is therefore primarily a question of Legislative intent. See Bd. of Educ. v. N.M. State Dep\u2019t of Pub. Educ., 1999-NMCA-156, \u00b6 416, 128 N.M. 398, 993 P.2d 112 (\u201cThe primary purpose of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).\n{12} . The \u201cprimary indicator\u201d of legislative intent is the language of the statute. Gonzales v. State Pub. Emps. Ret. Ass\u2019n, 2009-NMCA-109, \u00b6 13, 147 N.M. 201, 218 P.3d 1249 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). \u201cWe do not depart from the plain language of a statute unless we must resolve an ambiguity, correct a mistake or absurdity, or deal with a conflict between different statutory provisions.\u201d N.M. Bd. of Veterinary Med. v. Riegger, 2007-NMSC-044, \u00b6 11, 142 N.M. 248, 164 P.3d 947. Additionally, we determine the legislative intent \u201cby reading all the provisions of a statute together, along with other statutes in pari materia.\u201d N.M. Mining Ass\u2019n v. N.M. Water Quality Control Comm\u2019n, 2007-NMCA-010, \u00b6 12, 141 N.M. 41, 150 P.3d 991.\n{13} Our Supreme Court has addressed the meaning of the word \u201cterm\u201d and whether a \u201cterm of office\u201d has expired in a different context in Denish v. Johnson, 1996-NMSC-005, 121 N.M. 280, 910 P.2d 914. The issue in Denish was whether the terms of office of two regents at the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology had expired so that the governor could appoint their replacements. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 1, 15. The Court defined \u201cterm\u201d as \u201cthe fixed period of time the appointee is authorized to serve in office. It is a period that is established by law and specified by the executive in his or her letters of appointment.\u201d Id. \u00b6 18.\n{14} Our Supreme Court again addressed the word \u201cterm\u201d and phrase \u201cterm of office\u201d in Block v. Vigil-Giron, 2004-NMSC-003, 135 N.M. 24, 84 P.3d 72. In Block, the plaintiff was a member of the Public Regulatory Commission (PRC) who sought a declaration to be put on the ballot in the next general election to run for a second four-year term. Id. \\ 1. The plaintiff had served a two-year term upon the creation of the PRC, which was necessary in order for the members to serve staggered terms, and was subseqirently elected to a full four-year term. Id. \u00b6 2. The New Mexico Constitution limits PRC members from serving for more than two terms. Id. \u00b6 1. The plaintiff argued that since his first term was a shortened two-year term, he had not served two terms and was entitled to run for a second four-year term. Id. The Court examined the \u201cnormal understanding of the word \u2018term\u2019 \u201d and determined that it means a \u201cfixed and definite period of time; implying a period of time with some definite termination.\u201d Id. \u00b6 5 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1482 (7th ed. 1999)). The Court further defined \u201cterm of office\u201d as the \u201cperiod during which an elected officer or appointee may hold office, perform its functions, and enjoy its privileges and emoluments.\u201d Id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary, supra, at 1483). The Court applied these definitions, noted that they were consistent with Denish, and held that the plaintiff had served two terms and was therefore ineligible to be on the ballot. Id. \u00b6 6.\n{15} Applying these definitions, the legislative intent of the phrase \u201cterm of office\u201d in Section 10-11 -8(D)(1) (2004) refers to the period during which the chief of police may hold the office, perform its functions, and enjoy its privileges. We turn to the statutes outlining the appointment of municipal officers and employees in the Municipal Code, NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 3-1-1 to -66-11 (1965, as amended through 2011), to determine if the district court erred in concluding that Raley\u2019s appointment as chief of police was for an \u201cindefinite term.\u201d\n{16} Section 3-11-6(A)(1) (1965) provides that \u201c[sjubject to the approval of a majority of all members of the governing body [of a municipality], the mayor shall: (1) appoint all officers and employees except those holding elective office[.]\u201d Under Section 3-12-4(A) (1965), the chief of police is one of the appointive officers of a municipality. Section 3-ll-5(A) (1985) provides that\n[a]t the organizational meeting of the governing body [following a municipal election], the mayor shall submit, for confirmation by the governing body, the names of persons who shall fill the appointive office of the municipality .... If the governing body fails to confirm any person as an appointive official or employee of the municipality, the mayor at the next regular meeting of the governing body shall submit the name of another person to fill the appointed office or to be employed by the municipality.\nThe Municipal Code mandates that regular elections be held on the first Tuesday in March on even numbered years. Section 3-8-25 (1985). It also provides that the organizational meeting following a municipal election shall be held \u201cnot earlier than the sixth day after the election or later than the twenty-first day after the election.\u201d Section 3-8-33(H) (1995).\n{17} In compliance with the provisions of the Municipal Code, a municipality\u2019s chief of police cannot have an \u201cindefinite term\u201d because the term is dependent on the results of each election, an appointment by the mayor at the organizational meeting, and confirmation by the governing body. Under the plain meaning of \u201cterm of office\u201d as defined by Denish and Block, and in conjunction with the appointment and confirmation provisions in the Municipal Code, the term of office for a chief of police begins with the organizational meeting confirming the mayor\u2019s appointment and lasts until the next organizational meeting held following the next municipal election. In other words, the chief of police serves a two-year term commencing on the organizational meeting in which he or she is appointed until the next organizational meeting. Accordingly, Raley served a term of office that commenced following the March 2010 election and expired when he was appointed and confirmed at the organizational meeting following the March 2012 election. See Denish, 1996-NMSC-005, \u00b6 16 (\u201cA term expires when the appointee has served to the legally specified termination date.\u201d). The district court therefore erred in determining that Raley\u2019s term of office was indefinite and mandating that PERA apply the pre-2010 version of Section 10-11-8 to Raley.\n{18} We note that Section 10-11-8(D) (2010) contained two exemptions from the return-to-employment provisions. Both exemption provisions apply to retirees employed in temporary positions, or serving in an elected office, with a definitive end. See id. (providing exemptions from the PERA return-to-work provisions for retirees (1) employed by the Legislature for legislative session work, and (2) elected to serve a term as an elected official). These provisions support a conclusion that the Legislature only provided exemptions to retirees employed in positions with definitive terms. See also Section 10-11-8(E) (2013) (adding exemption for retirees employed temporarily as precinct board members for elections).\n{19} Plaintiffs make five additional arguments as to why our conclusion is incorrect. First, Plaintiffs contend that \u201c[g]iven that [the Municipal Code] treat[s] municipal officers and employees similarly, the municipal authority over appointed officials should be similar to the authority over regular employees. There is no dispute that municipal employees do not serve \u2018terms of office\u2019 that terminate and re-start each election year.\u201d Accordingly, Plaintiffs\u2019 position is that municipal officers do not serve fixed terms of office under the Municipal Code. In support, Plaintiffs point out that Section 3-ll-5(A) mandates that the mayor \u201cshall submit, for confirmation by the governing body, the names of persons who shall fill the appointive offices of the municipality and the names of persons who shall be employed by the municipality.\u201d However, Section 3-11 -5(B) provides that \u201c[a]ny person holding an appointed office at the time of the municipal election shall continue in that office until his successor has been appointed and is qualified.\u201d This holdover provision does not apply to employees of the municipality who are not appointed officers. It would be unnecessary if the Legislature intended that appointed officers serve indefinite terms. See Denish, 1996-NMSC-005, \u00b6 51 (holding that a holdover provision in our state constitution \u201cis not a simple extension of the expired term[; r]ather[,] it is an intrusion into the term following\u201d). The lack of a similar holdover provision that applies to employees supports a distinction between municipal employees and appointed officers despite the similar treatment under Section 3-ll-5(A).\n{20} Second, Plaintiffs argue that the Municipal Code never expressly states that the term of office for the chief of police is \u201cfixed\u201d and that Raley and the City have \u201clong agreed and understood\u201d thatRaley\u2019s appointmentwas \u201cindefinite\u201d when the mayor appointed Raley in 2006. However, as we have discussed, the Municipal Code requires the mayor to reappoint and the governing body to confirm the chief of police every two years, which is inconsistent with any asserted agreement between Raley and the City that Raley\u2019s appointment was indefinite. See \u00a7 3-11-6(A)(1); \u00a7 3-11-5(A). The length of Raley\u2019s \u201cterm of office\u201d as defined by the Municipal Code has legal superiority over any inconsistent agreement between the,parties. See K.R. Swerdfeger Constr., Inc. v. Bd. of Regents, Univ. of N.M., 2006-NMCA-117, \u00b6 27, 140 N.M. 374, 142 P.3d 962 (\u201cOur case law has repeatedly recognized that New Mexico . . . has a strong public policy of freedom to contract that requires enforcement of contracts unless they clearly contravene some law or rule of public morals.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Under the provisions we have discussed, the chief of police serves a term that is fixed in the sense that it commences upon appointment and confirmation at or subsequent to an organizational meeting and requires reappointment and confirmation at the next organizational meeting following every biennial municipal election.\n{21} Third, Plaintiffs argue that the relevant portions of the Municipal Code relating to the discharge of municipal officers are \u201cstatutory indicia lead[ing] to the conclusion that municipal officers serve indefinitely\u201d because the \u201cmayor and the municipal governing body may . . . discharge appointed persons at any time.\u201d Indeed, Section 3-11 -6(D) provides that \u201c(1) the governing body may discharge an appointed official or employee by a majority of all members of the governing body; (2) the mayor may discharge an appointed official or employee upon the approval of a majority of all the members of the governing body[.]\u201d However, there is no contradiction between a fixed two-year term and the removal power upon a majority vote by the governing body during that fixed term. Early removal of an appointed officer is one of the additional statutory powers granted to a municipality by the Legislature. Section 3-11-6(D).\n{22} Fourth, Plaintiffs argue that if the Legislature \u201cwishes to make clear that a term is for a definite period, it says so.\u201d See, e.g., NMSA 1978, \u00a7 32A-5-42(B) (1993) (requiring criminal sentences of a \u201cdefinite term\u201d for the crime of unauthorized facilitation of adoptions); NMSA 1978, \u00a7 54-1A-406(A) (1997) (referring to partnerships for a \u201cdefinite term\u201d). But the statutes at issue in this case are different from the examples cited by Plaintiffs and there is no ambiguity as to the \u201cterm of office\u201d in light of the provisions of the Municipal Code. As discussed, Section 10-11 -8(D)(1) (2004) generally provided an exemption from the return-to-work procedures for the \u201cterm of office\u201d of a chief of police. The Municipal Code defines the length of the term of office. Dydek v. Dydek, 2012-NMCA-088, \u00b6 58, 288 P.3d 872 (\u201c[A]s a rule of statutory construction, we read all provisions of a statute and all statutes in pari materia together in order to ascertain the legislative intent.\u201d (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).\n{23} Lastly, Plaintiffs argue that Denish is distinguishable and that \u201cit is simply not true that Denish was adopting a general definition of \u2018term\u2019 that was meant to apply outside the state-officer context of the case.\u201d In Block, our Supreme Court clarified that the \u201cnormal understanding\u201d of the word \u201cterm\u201d is that it is the \u201cperiod during which an elected officer or appointee' may hold office, perform its functions, and enjoy its privileges and emoluments.\u201d 2004-NMSC-003, \u00b6 5. The Block Court noted that the definition it applied was consistentwithDenz'iA. Denish andBlock both generally applied the plain meaning of the word \u201cterm\u201d to the statutes and constitutional provisions at issue in those cases, as we have done in this case. See Gonzales, 2009-NMCA-109, \u00b6 13.\nCONCLUSION\n{24} Raley\u2019s term of office concluded with the City\u2019s organizational meeting following the 2012 municipal election, and, therefore, the district court erred in determining that Raley\u2019s term of office was for an indefinite term. Accordingly, we reverse.\n{25} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nJAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nTIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge\nM. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge", "type": "majority", "author": "WECHSLER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Robles, Rael & Anaya, P.C. Marcus J. Rael, Jr., Esq. Adam H. Greenwoood, Esq. Vanessa R. Chavez, Esq. Albuquerque, NM for Appellees", "Public Employees Retirement Association Susan G. Pittard, General Counsel Christopher Bulman, Assistant General Counsel Santa Fe, NM for Appellant" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Certiorari Denied, November 13, 2013,\nNo. 34,364\nIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2014-NMCA-009\nFiling Date: September 16, 2013\nDocket No. 32,355\nCITY OF ARTESIA and DONALD N. RALEY, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION OF NEW MEXICO, Defendant-Appellant.\nRobles, Rael & Anaya, P.C. Marcus J. Rael, Jr., Esq. Adam H. Greenwoood, Esq. Vanessa R. Chavez, Esq. Albuquerque, NM for Appellees\nPublic Employees Retirement Association Susan G. Pittard, General Counsel Christopher Bulman, Assistant General Counsel Santa Fe, NM for Appellant" }, "file_name": "0272-01", "first_page_order": 288, "last_page_order": 295 }