{ "id": 4239816, "name": "STATE OF NEW MEXICO ex rel. NEW MEXICO OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GRAND RIVER ENTERPRISES SIX NATIONS, LTD., a Foreign Corporation, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State ex rel. New Mexico Office of the Attorney General v. Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd.", "decision_date": "2014-04-15", "docket_number": "Docket No. 32,091", "first_page": "383", "last_page": "387", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2014-NMCA-073" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "2013-NMCA-022", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4191141 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" }, { "page": "\u00b6 28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/3/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMCA-149", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3784522 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/143/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 U.S. 286", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11306135 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" }, { "page": "295", "parenthetical": "\"[F]oreseeability alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.\" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/444/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 N.M. 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552776 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "1994-NMSC-044", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 1, 15" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 P.3d 862", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2013-NMCERT-001", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 P.3d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2002-NMCA-030", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 183090 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/131/0772-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMCA-089", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1224670 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/136/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 N.M. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2829357 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/86/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "1974-NMSC-035", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 16" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 N.M. 746", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1598947 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/105/0746-01" ] }, { "cite": "1987-NMSC-040", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 20" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 P.3d 18", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2013-NMCA-072", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4334512 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 14" }, { "page": "\u00b6 9" }, { "page": "\u00b6 17" }, { "page": "\u00b6 32" }, { "page": "\u00b6 25" }, { "page": "\u00b6 16" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 20, 31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/4/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 N.M. 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 725439 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/115/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "1993-NMCA-034", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 N.M. 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1571026 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/91/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "1977-NMSC-017", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 644, "char_count": 12434, "ocr_confidence": 0.777, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.292217809909693e-08, "percentile": 0.2707827753664403 }, "sha256": "c8ed0ee27522a1276abced5d23a989d0e541f77a6944a23bafce3f6c109b9e30", "simhash": "1:5cf9ae332a8f1d53", "word_count": 1942 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:19:17.637489+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge", "WE CONCUR:", "MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge", "TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge" ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NEW MEXICO ex rel. NEW MEXICO OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GRAND RIVER ENTERPRISES SIX NATIONS, LTD., a Foreign Corporation, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nFRY, Judge.\n{1} Defendant Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., a tobacco company, appeals the district court\u2019s denial of its motion to set aside a default judgment entered against it in an action brought by the State to force Grand River to contribute money into New Mexico\u2019s tobacco escrow fund. On appeal, Grand River argues that the default judgment must be set aside because (1) the State failed to comply with the rules governing the service of process on foreign corporations; and (2) the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over Grand River when it entered the default judgment. Because we agree with Grand River that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction, we conclude that the district court\u2019s default judgment is void and must be set aside.\nBACKGROUND\n{2} Grand River manufactures tobacco products, including Opal brand cigarettes. Grand River is incorporated in Canada, with its principal place of business in Ohsweken, Ontario, and operates exclusively on the Six Nation Indian Reserve. During the time material to this litigation, Grand River was not registered to do business in New Mexico, did not have an agent for the service of process in New Mexico, and did not directly engage in business activity in New Mexico.\n{3} In early 2005, Grace\u2019s Smoke Shop in Deming, New Mexico allegedly sold approximately 19,540 Opal cigarettes. Grace\u2019s Smoke Shop purchased the cigarettes from wholesale distributor Snow Mountain Wholesale, located in Las Vegas, Nevada. According to the affidavit of Grand River\u2019s President, Grand River did not have any contact or a contractual arrangement with either Snow Mountain Wholesale or Grace\u2019s Smoke Shop regarding the sale of the cigarettes in New Mexico.\n{4} In 2007, the Attorney General filed suit against Grand River for failing to comply with the Tobacco Escrow Fund Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 6-4-14 to -24 (2003, as amended through 2009). The Act requires some tobacco companies to contribute money into an escrow account according to the amount of individual cigarettes they have sold in the state. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 6-4-13(C) (2004). The Attorney General alleged that Grand River owed approximately $327.37 to the State for the 19,540 Opal cigarettes Grace\u2019s Smoke Shop sold in 2005.\n{5} The Attorney General mailed Grand River a copy of the summons and complaint by certified mail. See Rule 1-004(N) NMRA (service of process on foreign corporations). Grand River did not respond to the Attorney General\u2019s complaint. The Attorney General subsequently sought and was granted a default judgment. Grand River then moved to set aside the default judgment, arguing that the judgment was void because the Attorney General failed to properly serve Grand River with process and because the district court lacked personal jurisdiction. Rule 1-060(B)(4) NMRA (providing that the court may relieve a party from a final judgment on the grounds that the judgment is void). The district court denied Grand River\u2019s motion. Grand River appeals.\nDISCUSSION\n{6} Under Rule 1-060(B)(4), the district court is required to set aside a void judgment. Nesbit v. City of Albuquerque, 1977-NMSC-017, \u00b6 12, 91 N.M. 455, 575 P.2d 1340. In this case, Grand River argued that the default judgment was void because the district court lacked personal jurisdiction. See Alvarez v. County of Bernalillo, 1993-NMCA-034, \u00b6 10, 115 N.M. 328, 850 P.2d 1031 (noting that a judgment entered against a party over whom the court lacks personal jurisdiction is a void judgment). The parties stipulated below that New Mexico does not have general personal jurisdiction over Grand River. See Sproul v. Rob & Charlies, Inc., 2013-NMCA-072, \u00b6 14, 304 P.3d 18 (\u201c[Tjhe flow of a manufacturer\u2019s goods into the forum state alone does not create sufficient ties with that state to give it general jurisdiction over the manufacturer.\u201d). W e therefore limit our analysis to the determination of whether New Mexico can exercise specific personal jurisdiction under the facts in this case. Because we conclude that New Mexico cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over Grand River in this case, we do not consider Grand River\u2019s additional argument that service of process was improper.\nStandard of Review\n{7} Generally, we review a district court\u2019s denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment for abuse of discretion. Rodriguez v. Conant, 1987-NMSC-040, \u00b6 20, 105 N.M. 746, 737 P.2d 527. However, a district court has no discretion to refuse to set aside a void judgment under Rule 1-060(B)(4). Chavez v. County of Valencia, 1974-NMSC-035, \u00b6 16, 86 N.M. 205, 521 P.2d 1154. \u201cThe determination of whether the district court has personal jurisdiction [over a nonresident defendant] is a question of law that we review de novo.\u201d Sublett v. Wallin, 2004-NMCA-089, \u00b6 11, 136 N.M. 102, 94 P.3d 845. We review \u201cthe pleadings and affidavits ... in the light most favorable to the party asserting jurisdiction.\u201d Santa Fe Technologies, Inc. v. Argus Networks, Inc., 2002-NMCA-030, \u00b6 12, 131 N.M. 772, 42 P.3d 1221 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\nSpecific Personal Jurisdiction and the Stream of Commerce Theory\n{8} The State asserted that personal jurisdiction existed pursuant to New Mexico\u2019s long-arm statute. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 38-1-16 (1971). Because we consider the long-arm statute \u201cas being coextensive with the requirements of due process,\u201d we no longer require a determination that the defendant committed one of the acts enumerated by the statute but rather \u201cundertake a single search for the outer limits of what due process permits.\u201d M.R. v. SereniCare Funeral Home, L.L.C., 2013-NMCA-022, \u00b6 8, 296 P.3d 492 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert denied, 2013-NMCERT-001, 299 P.3d 862. \u201cDue process is satisfied only when a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state so that the assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant will not violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,\u201d Sproul, 2013-NMCA-072, \u00b6 9 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The \u201cminimum contacts\u201d required to establish jurisdiction depend on \u201cwhether the jurisdiction asserted is general (all-purpose) or specific (case-linked).\u201d Id. In the context of specific personal jurisdiction, the \u201ccentral feature of minimum contacts . . . is the requirement of purposeful availment.\u201d Id. \u00b6 16; see also F.D.I.C. v. Hiatt, 1994-NMSC-044, \u00b6 8, 117 N.M. 461, 872 P.2d 879 (\u201c[Tjhere [must] be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum [s]tate, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Specific personal jurisdiction is \u201cconfined to adjudication of [the] issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction\u201d and is \u201cdecided on a case-by-case basis.\u201d Sproul, 2013-NMCA-072, \u00b6 17 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n{9} In some instances the \u201cflow of a manufacturer\u2019s products into the forum state through the stream of commerce\u201d constitutes purposeful availment and \u201cmay provide specific jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation.\u201d Id. Under this \u201cstream of commerce\u201d theory, \u201cpersonal jurisdiction may exist over a nonresident defendant that \u2018delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum [sjtate.\u2019 \u201d Id. \u00b6 20 (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980)). Under our current framework, a showing that the manufacturer specifically directed its activities at the forum state or had actual knowledge that its product would ultimately be sold in the forum state is not required. Sproul, 2013-NMCA-072, \u00b6 32. But the \u201cmere foreseeability that a product may make its way into our state either by the act of a consumer or through a random or isolated sale is not enough to confer jurisdiction.\u201d Id. \u00b6 25; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295 (\u201c[F]oreseeability alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Instead, there \u201cmust be some act purposefully directed at the forum state,\u201d Sproul, 2013-NMCA-072, \u00b6 25, even if that act \u201carise[s] from the efforts of the [defendant] to serve directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other [s]tates.\u201d SereniCare, 2013-NMCA-022, \u00b6 28 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\nThe District Court Lacked Specific Personal Jurisdiction\n{10} We briefly set out the sum of the State\u2019s allegations and evidence in support of its assertion that New Mexico could exercise personal jurisdiction over Grand River. In its complaint, the State alleged that Grand River \u201chas contracted to either manufacture, sell, or profit from the sale of cigarettes\u201d in New Mexico and has \u201cmaintain[ed] purposeful and continuous business interactions in this State by the ongoing sales of tobacco products.\u201d In its motion for default judgment, the State argued that the exercise of personal jurisdiction was proper because \u201c[Grand River] has sold cigarettes to consumers in New Mexico ... for pecuniary gain either directly or through distributors, retailers, or similar intermediary or intermediaries.\u201d The State attached to its motion Grace\u2019s Smoke Shop\u2019s \u201cReporting Form for Cigarette Sales of Non-Participating Manufacturer Brands\u201d filed with the New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department showing that Opal brand cigarettes were sold in its store. To the extent that these averments and the exhibit\u2014 when viewed in the light most favorable to jurisdiction \u2014 allege that Grand River \u201cpurposefully established contact with New Mexico,\u201d they could support a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. Sproul, 2013-NMCA-072, \u00b6 16; Zavala v. El Paso Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 2007-NMCA-149, \u00b6 13, 143 N.M. 36, 172 P.3d 173.\n{11} However, Grand River filed an affidavit by its president negating many of the State\u2019s averments. The affidavit stated that Grand River had never engaged in any business activity in New Mexico and that it never had any contractual relationship with either Snow Mountain Wholesale or Grace\u2019s Smoke Shop. The president\u2019s affidavit also stated that Grand River, including its cigarette manufacturing, operates exclusively on the Six Nation Indian Reserve in Canada and that it has not sold cigarettes at any place other than the Six Nation Indian Reserve. Furthermore, the State\u2019s only documentary evidence \u2014 the taxation form \u2014 establishes only that Grace\u2019s Smoke Shop purchased the cigarettes from Snow Mountain Wholesale but fails to establish any commercial relationship between Grand River and Grace\u2019s Smoke Shop or Snow Mountain Wholesale. The president\u2019s affidavit therefore negates the State\u2019s only averments and evidence that Grand River contracted to manufacture, sell, or profit from the sale of cigarettes in New Mexico through the use of a nationwide distribution chain. In the absence of such evidence, there is nothing to establish that Grand River placed its cigarettes into the national stream of commerce in expectation that the cigarettes would be purchased in New Mexico. See Sproul, 2013-NMCA-072, \u00b6\u00b6 20, 31. We therefore conclude that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction and that the default judgment is void and should be set aside. See Hiatt, 1994-NMSC-044, \u00b6\u00b6 1, 15 (holding that a default judgment was void and should be set aside where the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant).\nCONCLUSION\n{12} The default judgment of the district court is reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.\n{13} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nCYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nMICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge\nTIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge", "type": "majority", "author": "FRY, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary K. King, Attorney General Rebecca A. Parish, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM", "for Appellee", "Luebben Johnson & Bamhouse LLP Randolph H. Barnhouse Kelli J. Keegan Los Ranchos de Albuquerque, NM", "for Appellant" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2014-NMCA-073\nFiling Date: April 15, 2014\nDocket No. 32,091\nSTATE OF NEW MEXICO ex rel. NEW MEXICO OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GRAND RIVER ENTERPRISES SIX NATIONS, LTD., a Foreign Corporation, Defendant-Appellant.\nGary K. King, Attorney General Rebecca A. Parish, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM\nfor Appellee\nLuebben Johnson & Bamhouse LLP Randolph H. Barnhouse Kelli J. Keegan Los Ranchos de Albuquerque, NM\nfor Appellant" }, "file_name": "0383-01", "first_page_order": 399, "last_page_order": 403 }