{ "id": 4240434, "name": "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RENE HERMOSILLO, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Hermosillo", "decision_date": "2014-09-24", "docket_number": "No. 34,863; Docket No. 32,891", "first_page": "749", "last_page": "759", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2014-NMCA-102" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "2011-NMCA-018", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4250024 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/149/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 P.3d 668", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2012-NMSC-033", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4189330 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 9, 39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/2/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "2010-NMCA-066", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4248352 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 14-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/148/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "2011-NMCA-030", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4248919 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 11-12, 15" }, { "page": "\u00b6 10" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 11-12,15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/149/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "945 F. Supp. 19", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 5626368 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "*22", "parenthetical": "during the execution of a search warrant of the defendant's house for illegal weapons, where five police officers were present and the defendant was handcuffed for the duration the defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/945/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 F.3d 659", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9247145 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675-76" }, { "page": "663-64" }, { "page": "676" }, { "page": "663-64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/369/0659-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 N.M. 771", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1598939 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/105/0771-01" ] }, { "cite": "1987-NMCA-052", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 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Amendment, including handcuffing for officer and public safety, and verbal notice to the suspect" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2014-NMCERT-003", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "year": 2014, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "discussing authorities that determine the objective indicia of formal arrest under the Fourth Amendment, including handcuffing for officer and public safety, and verbal notice to the suspect" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 P.3d 945", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "year": 2014, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "discussing authorities that determine the objective indicia of formal arrest under the Fourth Amendment, including handcuffing for officer and public safety, and verbal notice to the suspect" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2014-NMCA-041", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4077295 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2014, "pin_cites": [ { "page": 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"/nm/129/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMSC-048", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 827394 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 39" }, { "page": "\u00b6 40" }, { "page": "\u00b6 43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444-45" }, { "page": "444" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1217, "char_count": 33015, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.641311856738278e-08, "percentile": 0.3522597263392576 }, "sha256": "85ebdad6c99bac3eebf2391e69b556cbf80e3d9887e52fa2abadb6927686ec62", "simhash": "1:edeaf116a9e58266", "word_count": 5189 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:19:17.637489+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge", "WE CONCUR:", "CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge", "J. MILES HANISEE, Judge ," ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RENE HERMOSILLO, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nGARCIA, Judge.\n{1} Defendant, a probationer, pled no contest to trafficking controlled substances and delivery or manufacture of drug paraphernalia, reserving the right to appeal from the district court\u2019s denial of his motion to suppress. In this opinion, we determine whether Defendant\u2019s Fifth Amendment rights were violated when he was not given the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966), while handcuffed and questioned in his home by his probation officer during a random home visit. We hold that, under the specific facts of this case, Defendant was not \u201cin custody\u201d for Fifth Amendment purposes and, therefore, no Miranda warnings were required. We affirm the district court\u2019s denial of Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nA. Standard of Review\n{2} In conducting our review, \u201cwe bear in mind that there is a distinction between factual determinations which are subject to a substantial evidence standard of review and application of law to the facts, which is subject to de novo review.\u201d State v. Munoz, 1998-NMSC-048, \u00b6 39, 126 N.M. 535, 972 P.2d 847 (alteration, internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see State v. Nieto, 2000-NMSC-031, \u00b6 19, 129 N.M. 688, 12 P.3d 442 (reviewing de novo whether a defendant is subject to a custodial interrogation). In other words, \u201c[w]e determine whether the law was correctly applied to the facts, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party[,] . .. indulging] in all reasonable inferences in support of the [trial] court\u2019s ruling and disregarding] all evidence and inferences to the contrary.\u201d State v. Bravo, 2006-NMCA-019, \u00b6 5, 139 N.M. 93, 128 P.3d 1070.\nB. Background and Procedural Facts\n{3} Although Defendant challenges the district court\u2019s conclusions, he does not argue that the district court\u2019s findings were not supported by substantial evidence. In accordance with the standard of review, we accept the district court\u2019s findings, as follows, and view them in the light most favorable to the State.\n{4} Defendant was on supervised probation after pleading no contest to possession of a controlled substance (felony \u2014 narcotic drug), resisting, evading or obstructing an officer (refusal to stop), and reckless driving in Lea County District Court Cause No. D-506-CR-2012-086. Defendant\u2019s supervising probation officer went over the probation order with Defendant, who acknowledged that he read and understood it, initialing each paragraph. The district court judge signed the probation order, and it was filed in the district court. Under its terms, among other things, Defendant was required: (1) to report to his probation officer as often as required; to submit completed and truthful reports; and to be truthful, accurate, and prompt in all communications with his probation officer; (2) not to.associate with any persons having a criminal record or other probationers and parolees; and (3) to permit his probation officer to visit him at home or his place of employment at any time; and to permit a warrantless search of his person, automobile, and residence, if the probation officer has reasonable cause to believe the search would produce evidence of a probation violation. In addition, as part of the probation intake process, Defendant entered into a \u201crules for home visits\u201d agreement, agreeing among other things: (1) to promptly answer the door and invite the officers in; and (2) to be courteous and cooperative with the officers.\n{5} On the evening of October 18, 2012, the probation officer was conducting home visits of various probationers under his supervision. Defendant\u2019s home was not originally on the list but was added because Defendant had recently been testing positive for drugs. The probation officer routinely has law enforcement officers accompany him on evening/night home visits, and on this evening he was accompanied by a drug task force officer.\n{6} The probation officer and drug task force officer went to Defendant\u2019s front door and knocked. The probation officer saw Defendant look out a window and observe the probation officer, then disappear. The probation officer heard activity in the house, and he became suspicious when Defendant did not promptly answer the door and decided he would search Defendant\u2019s residence for evidence of a probation violation. The probation officer continued to knock and announce his presence, and after a while Defendant\u2019s wife answered the door and let the officers inside. The probation officer found that Defendant had gone into a bathroom and locked the door. When he knocked on the bathroom door and announced his presence, Defendant refused to come out, saying he was going to the bathroom. During a quick and cursory protective sweep, the officers saw a known felon and fellow probationer leaving through the back door. The officers stopped this person who said that he and Defendant had been drinking beer in Defendant\u2019s house.\n{7} After a while, Defendant came out of the bathroom. Defendant was searched, and $580 cash was found on his person. The probation officer became suspicious because Defendant had previously reported his income was less than that amount. \u201cAs a result of what had transpired and the uncertainty of the situation, Defendant was immediately handcuffed for officer safety reasons.\u201d Defendantwas ordered to sit down and remain there, but \u201cwas not placed under arrest.\u201d Defendant was not told of his right to remain silent or of his right against self-incrimination pursuant to Miranda.\n{8} The probation officer asked the drug task force officer, in Defendant\u2019s presence, whether a drug dog was available to search Defendant\u2019s residence. Defendant admitted to drinking alcohol with the other probationer. D efendant then asked to talk privately with his probation officer \u201cto explain himself\u2019 and led the officer into the laundry room. The probation officer saw empty beer cans in the trash basket, and Defendant again admitted to drinking alcohol with the other probationer. The probation officer told Defendant he intended to search the house and asked Defendant \u201cif there was [anything] in his residence he was not supposed to have.\u201d Defendant responded, saying, \u201cYeah, can I show you?\u201d Defendant took the probation officer to a cabinet in the \u201cparty room\u201d of his house, and said, \u201cit\u2019s up there.\u201d The probation officer looked at the area Defendant referred to and observed what appeared to be drugs.\n{9} The probation officer notified the drug task force officer of \u201cwhat [he] had observed[,]\u201d and the drug task force officer contacted another officer to obtain a search warrant. In the course of the search, it was confirmed that the probation officer had observed drugs, and the drugs were seized along with digital scales. Defendant was arrested and charged with trafficking a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia.\n{10} Defendant moved to suppress all statements he made while handcuffed, and all evidence that was seized as a result of the statements he made while handcuffed, arguing that he was interrogated while in custody without being advised of his Miranda rights. The State responded. After conducting a hearing and entering findings and conclusions, the district court denied the motion to suppress. Defendant entered a conditional plea agreement reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. This appeal followed.\nC. The Miranda Test\n{11} The Fifth Amendment protections provided under Miranda apply only to \u201ccustodial interrogation^].\u201d 384 U.S. at 444; see State v. Smile, 2009-NMCA-064, \u00b6 24, 146 N.M. 525, 212 P.3d 413. In determining whether a defendant is in custody for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, \u201cthe court must apply an objective test to resolve the ultimate inquiry: was there a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest[?]\u201d State v. Wilson, 2007-NMCA-111, \u00b6 14, 142 N.M. 737, 169 P.3d 1184 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because the Miranda test is an obj ective one, we do not consider the subjective beliefs of the defendant or the officer about whether the defendant was in custody. Wilson, 2007-NMCA-111 \u00b6 14. Rather, we consider \u201chow a reasonable man in the suspect\u2019s position would have understood his situation.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). If no formal arrest occurred prior to questioning, our appellate courts engage in a fact-specific analysis of the totality of the circumstances under which the questioning took place in order to decide whether the custody requirement is met. See, e.g., Smile, 2009-NMCA-064, \u00b6 27. The following factors guide our inquiry: \u201cthe purpose, place, and length of interrogation[,]. . . the extent to which the defendant is confronted with evidence of guilt, the physical surroundings of the interrogation, the duration of the detention, and the degree of pressure applied to the defendant.\u201d Munoz, 1998-NMSC-048, \u00b6 40 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In determining whether a person is being interrogated, we consider whether the officer\u2019s questioning is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response or has that effect. State v. Ponce, 2004-NMCA-137, \u00b6 37, 136 N.M. 614, 103 P.3d 54.\nD. The Miranda Test and Probationers\n{12} We have often noted that \u201c[probation is the release by the court without imprisonment of an adult defendant convicted of a crime.\u201d Id. \u00b6 8 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As such, probation is an act of clemency with the goal of education and rehabilitation, and it is not painless. See State v. Donaldson, 1983-NMCA-064, \u00b6 32, 100 N.M. 111, 666 P.2d 1258. In order to effectuate a probationer\u2019s rehabilitation, a sentencing court may impose conditions that have as their objective the deterrence of further misconduct. Ponce, 2004-NMCA-137, \u00b6 8. As a result, probation status significantly reduces a probationer\u2019s expectation of privacy. See, e.g., State v. Baca, 2004-NMCA-049, \u00b6 42, 135 N.M. 490, 90 P.3d 509.\n{13} Although a probationer does not lose the privilege against self-incrimination, the United States Supreme Court has refused to extend the requirements of Miranda warnings to prearranged routine probation interviews with probation officers. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430 (1984) (holding that a probationer meeting with his probation officer was not \u201cin custody\u201d for purposes of receiving Miranda warnings even though he was \u201csubject to a number of restrictive conditions governing various aspects of his life,\u201d and \u201cin custody for purposes of federal habeas corpus\u201d) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In Murphy, the defendant\u2019s confession to new crimes to his probation officer did not require Miranda warnings even though (1) the probation officer could compel the defendant\u2019s attendance and truthful answers; (2) the probation officer consciously sought incriminating evidence; (3) the defendant did not expect investigatory questions and could not seek counsel before the meeting; and (4) there were no other individuals present to guard against abuse or trickery. Id. at 431-32; see United States v. Manning, 2008 WL 4915991, *5 (N.D. Okla. 2008) (summarizing the circumstances under which the Supreme Court did not require Miranda warnings for the probationer in Murphy and holding that no Miranda warnings were reqirired under such precedent and in this case where neither meeting of the probationer with his probation officer created the coercive environment or involved restraint, isolation, or threatening behavior sufficient to create a custodial situation). In holding that no Miranda warnings were required in Murphy, the United States Supreme Court emphasized that the incriminating statements were obtained in a prearranged routine probation interview that was not a custodial setting; there was no formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest; and the defendant was free to leave at the end of the meeting. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 430-31. In a footnote, the United States Supreme Court further emphasized that \u201c[a] different question would be presented if [the defendant] had been interviewed by his probation officer while being held in police custody or by the police themselves in a custodial setting.\u201d Id. at 430, n.5.\n{14} This Court applied the Miranda test in the probation context in Ponce. 2004-NMCA-137, \u00b6\u00b6 37-38. In that case, we held that the defendant probationer was not entitled to Miranda warnings because (1) he was interviewed at the probation office during a standard probation meeting, a setting that should not be characterized as unfamiliar or an interrogation environment; (2) although he was arrested upon arrival at the meeting, the arrest was not for independent criminal activity, but rather for noncriminal conduct that nevertheless was a violation of the defendant\u2019s probation conditions (the defendant had tested positive for alcohol under a no-alcohol probation condition); and (3) the probation officer\u2019s question about how the defendant arrived at the probation office was not designed to elicit an incriminating response or likely to have that effect. Ponce, 2004-NMCA-137 \u00b6\u00b6 37-38. Referring to the footnote in Murphy quoted above, we stated in Ponce that \u201cthe issue might be different if the defendant were under formal, custodial arrest\u201d meaning, \u201can arrest for criminal activity in a custodial interrogation setting.\u201d Ponce, 2004-NMCA-137 \u00b6 38.\nE. Once Handcuffed, Was Defendant in Custody for Fifth Amendment Purposes?\n{15} Defendant argues that once handcuffed, he was in custody, and since he was subsequently interrogated without Miranda warnings, his responses must be suppressed. In responding to Defendant\u2019s arguments, we recognize this Court\u2019s methodology for analyzing the Miranda issue in Wilson to be useful and instructive. In Wilson, this Court examined the handcuffing of a defendant during a traffic stop, parsing the relevant Fourth Amendment inquiry from the Miranda!Fifth Amendment inquiry in order to correctly apply the relevant legal tests to the facts.\n1. Handcuffing and Reasonableness Under the Fourth Amendment\n{16} In Wilson, when the defendant failed to cooperate with the traffic stop and acted defensively and threateningly, the officer used force to handcuff him, causing the defendant to drop to his knees, and then placed the defendant in the back of a police vehicle where he was questioned by police. 2007-NMCA-111, \u00b6\u00b6 3-4. We observed that the amount of force used by the officer was reasonable under a Fourth Amendment analysis and did not transform the traffic stop into a de facto arrest. See Id. \u00b6\u00b6 18-19, 35 (discussing the difference between Fourth and Fifth Amendment analysis and noting that the Fourth Amendment inquiry is one of reasonableness); see also State v. Paananen, 2014-NMCA-041, \u00b6\u00b6 19-25, 321 P.3d 945, cert. granted, 2014-NMCERT-003, 324 P.3d 376 (No. 31, 982, Mar. 28, 2014) (discussing authorities that determine the objective indicia of formal arrest under the Fourth Amendment, including handcuffing for officer and public safety, and verbal notice to the suspect).\n{17} Under a Fourth Amendment analysis in this case, the probation officer acted reasonably in performing a pat down search of Defendant and handcuffing him when he came out of the bathroom. Handcuffing Defendant was objectively reasonable due to the \u201cuncertainty of the situation\u201d occasioned by Defendant\u2019s running and hiding and \u201cfor officer safety\u201d purposes. Up to that point, Defendant had failed to comply with his obligation to cooperate with the home visit. In addition, no de facto arrest occurred at that point. See, e.g., State v. Lovato, 1991-NMCA-083, \u00b6\u00b6 24, 32, 112 N.M. 517, 817 P.2d 251 (holding that officers used reasonable force in effectuating an investigatory detention and thus the stop did not amount to an arrest where the officers stopped a vehicle suspected in a recent drive-by shooting and, with guns drawn, ordered the occupants to exit the vehicle with the fingers laced behind their necks, then handcuffed the occupants). The probation officer testified that he told Defendant he was not under arrest, and the district court specifically found that when handcuffed, \u201cDefendant was not placed under arrest.\u201d Defendant does not contend that this finding is not supported by substantial evidence. See, e.g., Paananen, 2014-NMCA-041, \u00b6 19 (discussing that exactly when an arrest has taken place is for the district court to determine in the first instance, and if contested on appeal, is reviewed for substantial evidence).\n2. Miranda Warnings Are Not Required During Routine Traffic Stops or Routine Probation Visits\n{18} In Wilson, we noted that \u201cgenerally, routine traffic stops do not require that a detainee be given Miranda [Fifth Amendment] warnings before interrogation.\u201d Wilson, 2007-NMCA-111, \u00b6\u00b6 15, 20 (relying on Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440-42 (1984); see State v. Sanchez, 2001-NMCA-109, \u00b6 22, 131 N.M. 355, 36 P.3d 446; Armijo v. State ex rel. Transp. Dep\u2019t, 1987-NMCA-052, \u00b6 6, 105 N.M. 771, 737 P.2d 552 (requiring Miranda warnings only when a \u201cdefendant can demonstrate that, at any time between the initial stop and the arrest, he was subjected to restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).\n{19} In this case, the probation order and home visits agreement required Defendant to fully cooperate with officers during home visits. Murphy informs us that a routine visit of a probationer by his probation officer, like a routine traffic stop, does not ordinarily present a Fifth Amendment situation that will be recognized as an in-custody interrogation. 465 U.S. at 430.\n3. A Routine Stop for Questioning, not Requiring Miranda Warnings, may Evolve Into a Custodial Interrogation Situation\n{20} In Wilson, we concluded that a routine traffic stop that initially did not require Miranda warnings subsequently evolved into a custodial interrogation equivalent to a formal arrest when the defendant was forcibly handcuffed, dropped to his knees, and then placed in a police vehicle for questioning. Wilson, 2007-NMCA-111, \u00b6 35. In concluding that Miranda warnings were required, we relied on United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 675-76 (2d Cir. 2004). Wilson, 2007-NMCA-111, \u00b6\u00b6 32-33.\n{21} In Newton, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the defendant-parolee was in custody for purposes of the Fifth Amendment when, based on a telephone call from the defendant\u2019s mother informing authorities that the defendant had a gun and was threatening to kill her and her husband, three parole officers and three police officers entered the defendant\u2019s home and immediately handcuffed him, even though the defendant was told that he was not being placed under arrest and that the handcuffs were being used only to ensure his own safety and that of the officers. 369 F.3d at 663-64. In so holding, the Second Circuit observed that \u201c[hjandcuffs are generally recognized as a hallmark of a formal arrest.\u201d Id. at 676; see also, United States v. Alvelo-Ramos, 945 F. Supp. 19, *22 (D. Puerto Rico 1996) (during the execution of a search warrant of the defendant\u2019s house for illegal weapons, where five police officers were present and the defendant was handcuffed for the duration the defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda).\n{22} In Wilson, we also discussed several New Mexico cases that buttressed our conclusion that the defendant was not in custody for Fifth Amendment purposes by noting that the defendant was not restrained or handcuffed during the police encounter. 2007-NMCA-111, \u00b6\u00b6 25-29; see State v. Bravo, 2006-NMCA-019, \u00b6 11, 139 N.M. 93, 128 P.3d 1070 (holding that the defendant was not in custody in part because \u201c[h]er movements were not restricted in any way by the officers\u201d and she could move freely throughout her home during the interview); Munoz, 1998-NMSC-048, \u00b6 43 (holding that the defendant was not in custody when he willingly went with police to be questioned, was not handcuffed or searched, was not interviewed in a locked space, and was taken back home when the interview was completed). Recently, we relied on Wilson in part to hold that the defendant was in custody for Fifth Amendment purposes, despite agreeing to meet with officers, when he was handcuffed, transported in a police vehicle, and interrogated at the district attorney\u2019s office without handcuffs but under other conditions indicating restraint. State v. Olivas, 2011-NMCA-030, \u00b6\u00b6 11-12, 15, 149 N.M. 498, 252 P.3d 722.\n4. Handcuffing Defendant did not Transform the Probationary Home Visit Into a Custodial Interrogation Situation\n{23} Applying Wilson and Olivas, this Court must now determine whether Miranda warnings are required whenever a defendant-probationer is handcuffed while being questioned by his probation officer during a random home visit. Rather than embrace a bright-line rule, we consider the totality of the circumstances presented by the specific facts of the case. See Olivas, 2011-NMCA-030, \u00b6 10 (stating that \u201cour appellate courts engage in a fact-specific analysis of the totality of the circumstances under which the questioning took place in order to decide whether the custody requirement is met\u201d). In considering the totality of the circumstances, we find Murphy and Ponce to be more instructive than Wilson and Olivas.\n{24} First, Murphy and Ponce directly address the application of Miranda in a probationary context. Wilson and Olivas, as well as the New Mexico cases discussed in Wilson, do not. In Murphy, the United States Supreme Court stated that \u201cwe decline to require [.Miranda warnings] here since the totality of the circumstances is not such as to overbear a probationer\u2019s free will.\u201d Murphy, 465 U.S. at 431. It reasoned that the general obligation of probationers to appear and answer questions truthfully did not in itself convert the defendant\u2019s otherwise voluntary statements into compelled ones. Id. It also recognized that the nature of probation is such that probationers should expect to be questioned on a wide range of topics relating to their past criminality. Id. at 432. Further, the fact that the investigation was focused on the defendant as a suspect of a separate rape and murder did not trigger the need for Miranda warnings in a noncustodial setting. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 431. In Murphy, no Miranda warnings were required becadse the regular probation meeting presented a noncustodial setting and because the probationer was not arrested and was allowed to leave after the meeting. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 430, n.5.\n{25} In Ponce, the defendant probationer was immediately arrested for a violation of his probation agreement when he arrived at the probation meeting. 2004-NMCA-137, \u00b6 2. While the Ponce opinion does not state that the defendant probationer was handcuffed when he was arrested, the defendant recognized that he was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. This Court held that no Miranda warnings were required because the defendant was arrested for a noncriminal probation violation rather than for independent criminal activity, and the only issue preserved for review on appeal involved a question by an officer which was not designed to elicit an incriminating response. Ponce, 2004-NMCA-137 \u00b6\u00b6 37-38.\n{26} In the present case, Defendant\u2019s probation meeting was a random home visit rather than a regularly scheduled office visit. Although not prearranged, the visit took place in Defendant\u2019s home, a noncustodial setting. Even though the date and time were not prearranged, random home visits are specifically authorized under the probation order and the home visit agreement, and a probationer accepts and expects that random home visits may occur in the ordinary course of probation. In this case. Defendant had already tested positive for drugs at previous office visits. Therefore, Defendant could reasonably expect that his probation officer might conduct a home visit to investigate these violations. Thus, the fact that the home visit was unscheduled does not, in and of itself, transform this case out of the ambit of Murphy and Ponce or otherwise automatically indicate that Defendant was in custody when the officers made their random home visit.\n{27} Second, Defendant was not isolated or overwhelmed by the police presence. Defendant\u2019s wife and another probationer were at Defendant\u2019s house at the time of the visit. Even though a drug task force officer accompanied the probation officer, the district court specifically found that the officer was selected to accompany the probation officer that evening \u201cbecause of his availability and county wide jurisdiction and not because of any expertise in dealing with drug offenses.\u201d The district court further found that the probation officer \u201cwas in charge of, directed and conducted the encounter\u201d with minimal involvement from the drug task force officer, and that the probation officer\u2019s questions and conduct \u201cwere in furtherance of his duties. . . [and] the legitimate ends of his role\u201d as D efendant\u2019s probation officer rather than as an agent of the drug task force. Under these circumstances, the presence of the drug task force officer does not mandate that Defendant was in custody for Fifth Amendment purposes, iSee generally, State v. Bolin, 2010-NMCA-066, \u00b6\u00b6 14-15, 148 N.M. 489, 238 P.3d 363 (observing that the presence of law enforcement officers does not alter the authority of a probation officer so long as the probation officer is acting \u201cwith a probationary purpose\u201d rather than merely as \u201ca subterfuge for criminal investigations\u201d).\n{28} Third, the totality of the circumstances that occasioned the handcuffing of the defendants in Wilson, Newton, and Olivas on the one hand, and Defendant in this case, are quite different. In Wilson, the defendant was forcibly handcuffed and dropped to his knees, then immediately placed in the back of a police car for questioning. 2007-NMCA-111 \u00b6 35. In Newton, in order to investigate parole violations that also constituted new crimes, six officers entered the defendant\u2019s home intending to arrest him, handcuffed him, and searched his home. 369 F.3d at 663-64. In Olivas, once the defendant agreed to meet with officers, they secured him in handcuffs at the rendezvous location and transported him in the back of a marked police car to the district attorney\u2019s office for questioning; the interrogating officers at the district attorney\u2019s office did not inform the defendant at any time that he was not under arrest or that he was free to leave the room or that he could terminate the interview by choice. 2011-NMCA-030, \u00b6\u00b6 11-12,15. While at the district attorney\u2019s office, the defendant was not handcuffed but he was escorted at all times, including during smoke breaks outside the building; he was interrogated in a small room with the door closed and with two officers present at all times, one of whom sat between the defendant and the door; and the questioning officer interrogated the defendant by accusing him of the victim\u2019s murder and by repeatedly directing him to confess. Id.\n{29} In this case, there is no evidence of force in relation to the handcuffing, or isolation in a secure location, or confinement as in Wilson, or of overwhelming police presence as in Newton, or of confinement and coercion as in Olivas. For identified safety concerns, Defendant was handcuffed when he came out of the locked bathroom and, in accordance with his home visits agreement, told to remain seated in a room of his home. Thereafter, Defendant demonstrated that he felt relatively unrestrained and familiar enough with his probation officer to ask to speak privately with the probation officer \u201cto explain himself.\u201d Defendant then took the probation officer into another room of his house, the laundry room, where the probation officer saw empty beer cans in the trash can, and Defendant admitted to drinking alcohol with the other probationer. When the probation officer told Defendant he was going to search the house and asked Defendant if he had anything he was not supposed to have, the probation officer was continuing to investigate various probation violations and was proceeding in a reasonable manner. Defendant\u2019s admission and subsequent referral to a cabinet in the \u201cparty room\u201d was not coerced in any manner and was the first instance that potentially transformed the home visit into an investigation of new unrelated criminal activity. Any Fifth Amendment protections arose after Defendant showed his probation officer the \u201cparty room\u201d cabinet containing the drugs.\n{30} The fact that Defendant was handcuffed does not automatically establish that he was in custody for Fifth Amendment purposes. Rather, the fact that Defendant was handcuffed is one of many factors that must be considered under the totality of the circirmstances. In this case, the handcuffing exerted a level of restraint but was only utilized after Defendant created an insecure and problematic home visit environment. It was reasonable for the probation officer to temporarily restrain Defendant in order to obtain compliance with the terms and conditions of the probation order and the home visits agreement. As a result, the use of handcuffs on Defendant did not, by itself, rise to the level of an arrest or a custodial interrogation for Fifth Amendment purposes.\n{31} It is also worth noting that the officers did not arrive at Defendant\u2019s home with the intention of threatening, coercing, or tricking Defendant into admitting to an unrelated and independent crime. At the outset, the probation officer knew Defendant had recently tested positive for drugs at prior office visits, and the home visit was specifically undertaken to investigate these prior violations. After Defendant ran and hid from the officers, their reasonable suspicions were justifiably heightened. When Defendant came out of the bathroom and the probation officer conducted a protective pat down and found a large amount of cash on Defendant, the officer\u2019s reasonable suspicions were justifiably heightened regarding potential drug use. At that point, the officer appropriately proceeded to ask the drug task force officer about the availability of a drug dog, and he told Defendant he intended to search the residence. Thus, the home visit evolved into an investigation of a probation violation that focused on the possession of drugs inside Defendant\u2019s residence. Coercion, threatening tactics, and tricks were not used to investigate Defendant\u2019s potential probation violations, including the possibility of drugs within Defendant\u2019s residence.\n{32} As a result, the officer\u2019s actual question regarding whether \u201cthere was [anything] in [Defendant\u2019s] residence he was not supposed to have\u201d was objectively related to the home visit for probation violation purposes and was not specifically designed to elicit admission of an unrelated and independent crime. The probation officer did not accuse Defendant of possessing or trafficking in drugs and did not badger him into admitting such activity.\nF. Conclusion\n{33} Under the totality of the circumstances, Defendant was not in custody or formally arrested for Fifth Amendment purposes when he answered the question from his probation officer and escorted the probation officer to the drugs inside his home. Because the officers did not obtain the drugs and drug paraphernalia unlawfully, we do not address the application of the inevitable discovery doctrine. See State v. Haidle, 2012-NMSC-033, \u00b6\u00b6 9, 39, 285 P.3d 668 (stating that the inevitable discovery analysis is unnecessary unless we first determine that evidence was obtained through unlawful police conduct). Finally, because Defendant failed to develop and preserve his mere assertion on appeal that the New Mexico constitution was violated, there is no need to address this issue. See State v. Quinones, 2011-NMCA-018, \u00b6 17, 149 N.M. 294, 248 P.3d 336 (declining to engage in the interstitial approach where the defendant failed to establish that the federal analysis is flawed, that there are structural differences between the state and federal governments, or that there are distinctive New Mexico characteristics warranting a departure from federal analysis).\n{34} We affirm the district court\u2019s order denying Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\n{35} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nTIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nCYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge\nJ. MILES HANISEE, Judge ,", "type": "majority", "author": "GARCIA, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary K. King, Attorney General Becca Salwin, Assistant Attorney General", "Santa Fe, NM for Appellee", "Templeman & Crutchfield, P.C. C. Barry Crutchfield Lovington, NM", "for Appellant" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Certiorari Denied, September 24,2014,\nNo. 34,863\nDocket No. 32,891\nIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2014-NMCA-102\nFiling Date: August 14, 2014\nSTATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RENE HERMOSILLO, Defendant-Appellant.\nGary K. King, Attorney General Becca Salwin, Assistant Attorney General\nSanta Fe, NM for Appellee\nTempleman & Crutchfield, P.C. C. Barry Crutchfield Lovington, NM\nfor Appellant" }, "file_name": "0749-01", "first_page_order": 765, "last_page_order": 775 }