{ "id": 4239881, "name": "RABO AGRIFINANCE, INC., Successor in Interest to Farm Credit Bank of Texas, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRA XXI, LTD., a Texas Limited Partnership, composed of VEIGEL CATTLE Company, as General Partner; ROBERT WAYNE VEIGEL, a/k/a BOB W. VEIGEL; ELLA MARIE WILLIAMS VOGEL, a/k/a ELLA MARIE VEIGEL; VEIGEL CATTLE COMPANY, a Texas corporation; VEIGEL FARM PARTNERS, a Texas general partnership d/b/a Veigel Partners; BOB VEIGEL, INC., a Texas corporation; STEVE VEIGEL, INC., a Texas corporation; VEIGEL-KIRK, INC., a Texas corporation; VICKI VEIGEL, INC., a Texas corporation; VEIGEL FARMS, INC., a Texas corporation; TERRA PARTNERS, a Texas general partnership; BURNETT & VEIGEL, INC., a Texas corporation, as general partner of Terra Partnership, a Texas general partnership; and, ALL UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS OF INTEREST IN THE PREMISES ADVERSE TO THE PLAINTIFF, Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Rabo Agrifinance, Inc. v. Terra XXI, Ltd.", "decision_date": "2014-10-08", "docket_number": "No. 34,891; Docket No. 32,697", "first_page": "780", "last_page": "785", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2014-NMCA-106" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "106 N.M. 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 708768 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/106/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "1987-NMCA-133", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 20" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.M. 764", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1588533 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/100/0764-01" ] }, { "cite": "1984-NMSC-024", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 2" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2005-NMCA-033", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 929219 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/137/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 N.M. 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2718564 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/68/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "1961-NMSC-038", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 18" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "389 S.W.3d 234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 7094467, 7094487 ], "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw3d/389/0234-01", "/sw3d/389/0234-02" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMCA-009", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3670407 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b63" }, { "page": "\u00b6 18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0912-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590256 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "1989-NMSC-078", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" }, { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 P.3d 127", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2012-NMCA-038", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4188686 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 18" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/1/0512-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 760, "char_count": 18259, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14076303290269046 }, "sha256": "b0426ab8ecfb98ef820f92ebc98623a31b4f8d2e6e88031e14a067b57a6d8842", "simhash": "1:d40ced8343a3364a", "word_count": 2975 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:19:17.637489+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge", "WE CONCUR:", "JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge", "MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge" ], "parties": [ "RABO AGRIFINANCE, INC., Successor in Interest to Farm Credit Bank of Texas, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRA XXI, LTD., a Texas Limited Partnership, composed of VEIGEL CATTLE Company, as General Partner; ROBERT WAYNE VEIGEL, a/k/a BOB W. VEIGEL; ELLA MARIE WILLIAMS VOGEL, a/k/a ELLA MARIE VEIGEL; VEIGEL CATTLE COMPANY, a Texas corporation; VEIGEL FARM PARTNERS, a Texas general partnership d/b/a Veigel Partners; BOB VEIGEL, INC., a Texas corporation; STEVE VEIGEL, INC., a Texas corporation; VEIGEL-KIRK, INC., a Texas corporation; VICKI VEIGEL, INC., a Texas corporation; VEIGEL FARMS, INC., a Texas corporation; TERRA PARTNERS, a Texas general partnership; BURNETT & VEIGEL, INC., a Texas corporation, as general partner of Terra Partnership, a Texas general partnership; and, ALL UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS OF INTEREST IN THE PREMISES ADVERSE TO THE PLAINTIFF, Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nFRY, Judge.\n{1} Defendants, collectively referred to as Terra throughout this Opinion, appeal the district court\u2019s orders granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding and denying their motion under Rule 1-060(B)(5) NMRA for relief from the judgment. Terra argues that the district court erred in applying the after-acquired title doctrine and in denying their post-judgment motion under Rule 1-060(B)(5), arguing that the judgment has been satisfied. Because we disagree with Terra, we affirm.\nBACKGROUND\n{2} This is the second time this case has been before this Court, and we reiterate the basic facts underlying this suit from the first opinion. Rabo Agrifinance, Inc. v. Terra XXI, Ltd., 2012-NMCA-038, 274 P.3d 127. Plaintiff is the holder of two promissory notes secured by a mortgage covering property located in Quay and Guadalupe Counties, New Mexico (the New Mexico property) and a deed of trust covering land in Deaf Smith County, Texas. Id. \u00b6 2. At the time Terra granted the mortgage, it owned an undivided fifty percent interest in the New Mexico property. Id. Five years later, Terra received a warranty deed to the New Mexico property that effectively gave it a 100 percent ownership interest in the property. Id. In 2005, Plaintiff successfully sued in federal court to collect on the amounts due on the promissory notes. Id. \u00b6 3. Plaintiff subsequently brought suit in New Mexico to confirm the judgment entered against Terra and sought to foreclose the mortgage on the New Mexico property to the full extent of T erra\u2019s 100 percent interest on the basis of the after-acquired title doctrine. Id. \u00b6 4. \u201cThe common law doctrine of after-acquired title is one under which title to land subsequently acquired by a grantor who previously attempted to convey title to the same land, which he then did not own, completely and automatically inures to the benefit of his prior grantee.\u201d Hays v. King, 1989-NMSC-078, \u00b6 8, 109 N.M. 202, 784 P.2d 21.\n{3} In the first appeal, we reversed the district court\u2019s ruling in favor of Terra that the doctrine of after-acquired title did not apply in this case. We held that \u201cas a general matter, the after-acquired title doctrine can be applied in New Mexico in favor of a mortgagee of property based on mortgage covenants unless particular circumstances warrant non-application.\u201d Rabo Agrifinance, Inc., 2012-NMCA-038, \u00b6 18. Because the mortgage purported to convey Terra\u2019s interest in the New Mexico property \u201cwith mortgage covenants,\u201d id. \u00b6 7 (internal quotation marks omitted), we remanded to the district court for further proceedings regarding the application of the after-acquired title doctrine to the facts of this case. Id. \u00b6 18.\n{4} On remand, the district court applied the after-acquired title doctrine and concluded that because Terra granted the mortgage at issue \u201cwith mortgage covenants,\u201d it is estopped from claiming that the mortgage did not attach to the entire property when Terra subsequently obtained a 100 percent interest. Because Terra was estopped to claim that the mortgage did not attach to the entire New Mexico property, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff.\n{5} Following the entry of summary judgment, Terra sought to conduct further discovery on the issue of whether land in Texas that was also used to secure the mortgage had been sold, and, if so, whether the proceeds of the alleged sale satisfied the judgment. Terra ultimately filed a motion for relief from the judgment under Rule 1-060(B)(5), arguing that the judgment had indeed been satisfied because Plaintiff allegedly received sufficient funds in the sale of the Texas property to satisfy its judgment against Terra. The district court denied Terra\u2019s motion, and Terra now appeals.\nDISCUSSION\nI. After-Acquired Title Doctrine\n{6} In arguing that the district court erred in applying the after-acquired title doctrine, Terra makes three main contentions. Terra argues that (1) the after-acquired title doctrine is limited by the extent of the grantor\u2019s conveyance, (2) the mortgage covenants did not expand the interest Terra purported to convey, and (3) the district court mistakenly focused on Plaintiffs intent in its application of the after-acquired title doctrine. We address these contentions in two parts. First, we group Terra\u2019s first two arguments into the basic determination of what Terra purported to convey in the mortgage. Second, we determine whether the district court improperly considered the Plaintiffs intent in applying the doctrine.\nA. Terra Purported to Convey a 100 Percent Interest in the Property\n{7} As a general matter, we take no issue with Terra\u2019s argument that application of the after-acquired title doctrine is limited by the extent of the grantor\u2019s conveyance. As noted above, the doctrine \u201cestops a grantor who obtains title to land after already granting the land from claiming the land as against the grantee.\u201d Rendleman v. Heinley, 2007-NMCA-009, \u00b63, 140 N.M. 912, 149 P.3d 1009. \u201cA grantor who executes a deed purporting to convey land to which he has no title or to which he has a defective title at the time of the conveyance will not be permitted, when he afterward acquires good title to the land, to claim in opposition to his deed as against the grantee[.]\u201d Hays, 1989-NMSC-078, \u00b6 9 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Terra\u2019s argument is therefore correct to the extent that if it did not purport to convey a 100 percent interest in the property, the after-acquired title doctrine could not benefit Plaintiff. See Rendleman, 2007-NMCA-009, \u00b6 18 (explaining that the after-acquired title doctrine did not apply in another case \u201cbecause there had been no attempt by the grantor to convey the property in question to one of the parties\u201d). Thus, the threshold issue before us is what Terra purported to convey in the mortgage documents. We review this issue de novo. Id. \u00b6 14 (\u201cWhether the doctrine of after-acquired title applies is a question of law, which we review de novo.\u201d).\n{8} Terra argues that it did not purport to convey a 100 percent interest in the property because it only purported to convey its \u201cinterest in and to\u201d the New Mexico property in the mortgage. Terra likens this language to a quitclaim deed, to which the after-acquired title doctrine is likely inapplicable. See Hays, 19 8 9-NMSC-07 8, \u00b6 5 (\u201c[The plaintiff cites] as authority... cases supporting the propositions that a quitclaim deed vests only the title held by the grantor at the time of the conveyance, and that the after-acquired title doctrine does not apply to one claiming title under a quitclaim deed____[W]e have no quarrel with the substance of these cited authorities^]\u201d). Terra further argues that language in the mortgage stating that Terra granted, mortgaged, and conveyed its interest in and to the New Mexico property \u201cwith mortgage covenants\u201d does not operate to enlarge the interest purportedly conveyed by the mortgage. For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the grant of the mortgage \u201cwith mortgage covenants\u201d purported to convey a 100 percent interest in the property and that the district court therefore properly applied the after-acquired title doctrine.\n{9} As an initial matter, we rejectDefendants\u2019 invitation to view language in the mortgage as analogous to a quitclaim deed so as to preclude application of the after-acquired title doctrine. \u201c[A]n essential characteristic of a quitclaim deed is that it contains no warranties or covenants by the grantor.\u201d R & R Land Dev., L.L.C. v. Am. Freightways, Inc., 389 S.W.3d 234, 242 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012); see 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds \u00a7 10 (2014). The mortgage in this case was explicitly granted \u201cwith mortgage covenants\u201d as well as with a litany of further \u201crepresentations, warranties, and covenants.\u201d We thus conclude that any similarity between the \u201cmy interest in and to\u201d language in this mortgage and language often found in quitclaim deeds ends at a purely semantic level.\n{10} Furthermore, the phrase \u201cmortgage covenants\u201d has a specific, statutorily defined meaning in New Mexico. NMSA 1978, Section 47-1-40 (1947) states that the use of \u201cmortgage covenants\u201d in a mortgage is construed to mean that \u201cthe mortgagor . . . covenants with the mortgagee . . . that he is lawfully seized in fee simple of the granted premises4, that they are free from all encumbrances; that the mortgagor has good right to sell and convey the same; and that he will . . . warrant and defend the same to the mortgagee . . . forever against the lawful claims and demands of all persons.\u201d (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore construe \u201cwith mortgage covenants\u201d as covenanting the entirety of the premises listed in the mortgage. We do not deny that this presumption can be overcome by an express statement to the contrary; however, we find no such language in the mortgage at issue. In particular, the mortgage makes no mention that the granted premises are limited to a fifty percent interest, and we would be required to read such language into the mortgage to determine that the statement \u201cmy interest in and to\u201d referred to only a fifty percent interest. Cf. Sharpe v. Smith, 1961-NMSC-038, \u00b6 18, 68 N.M. 253, 360 P.2d 917 (\u201cIt is the intent which is expressed in the deed and not a secret intention of the party . . . existing at the time of execution that is controlling.\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)).\n{11} Thus, when we construe the language \u201cwith mortgage covenants\u201d in accordance with Section 47-1-40, the mortgage purports to convey the entirety of the granted premises \u2014 the property listed in the mortgage \u2014 and not only the fifty percent interest Terra possessed at the time it executed the mortgage. This is not an \u201cexpansion\u201d of the interest Terra conveyed, as Terra argues. Instead, when construed in accordance with Section 47-1-40, \u201cwith mortgage covenants\u201d clarifies what \u201cinterest in and to\u201d the property Terra purported to convey: fee simple absolute. This Court\u2019s opinion in the first appeal concluded as much in the general sense, and we see no reason to fully reiterate this Court\u2019s analysis on this point. Rabo Agrifinance, Inc., 2012-NMCA-038, \u00b6 12 (stating that it is well settled that when one purports to convey land in fee simple through a mortgage, any title to the property acquired afterwards will inure to the benefit of the mortgagee). In sum, because Terra purported to convey the entire property listed in the mortgage, the district court properly applied the after-acquired doctrine to conclude that the subsequently acquired fifty percent interest inured to the benefit of Plaintiff.\nB. The District Court Did Not Rely on the Grantee\u2019s Intent\n{12} Terra also argues that the district court inappropriately focused on the intent of the grantee \u2014 Plaintiff\u2014in applying the after-acquired title doctrine. While we are uncertain which portion of the district court\u2019s decision evinces a reliance on Plaintiff s intent since Terra does not provide citation to the record to support this assertion, we assume that the basis of Terra\u2019s contention is the district court\u2019s statement in its decision letter that Plaintiff \u201cbelieved the mortgage to cover 100 [percent] of the real property at issue herein, but [Terra] only owned an undivided 50 [percent] interest in the real property.\u201d Our reading of the district court\u2019s decision on the after-acquired title doctrine issue, however, does not show any reliance by the district court on Plaintiffs intent. Similar to what we concluded above, the district court determined that Terra \u201cgranted the mortgage \u2018with mortgage covenants\u2019 [and is] now estopped by the after-acquired title doctrine from claiming the mortgage did not attach to the entire real property at the time [Terra] obtained [a 100 percent interest] in the real property.\u201d\nII. Rule 1-060(B)(5)\n{13} Terra argues that the district court erred in denying its motion under Rule 1-060(B)(5) that the judgment in this case has been satisfied. Rule 1-060(B)(5) provides that \u201cthe court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment . . . [when] the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged}.]\u201d \u201cWe generally review the trial court\u2019s ruling under Rule 1-060(B)[(5)] for an abuse of discretion except ... where the issue is one of pure law.\u201d Edens v. Edens, 2005-NMCA-033, \u00b6 13, 137 N.M. 207, 109 P.3d 295 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n{14} We briefly set out a simplified version ofthe alleged facts pertinent to Terra\u2019s argument. In addition to securing the underlying notes in this case with the mortgage covering the New Mexico property, Terra also secured the notes with a deed of trust covering a large portion of land in T exas. Terra subsequently granted second and third lien interests on the properties. Following default and non-judicial foreclosure of the Texas property, Ag Acceptance Corporation (AAC), the third lienholder and entity seeking foreclosure, was the successful bidder and took the Texas property subject to Plaintiffs first and second liens. Terra alleges that AAC then sold the Texas property to Champion Feeders, LLC some ten years later, free and clear of Plaintiffs first and second liens and the related judgment lien. Terra argues that any payment Plaintiff received from AAC to release its liens on the property should have been credited against the judgment.\n{15} Terra raises two points. Terra first argues that the debt and judgment in the present case has been satisfied by \u201cnecessary implication\u201d as a result of the conveyance of the Texas property free and clear of Plaintiff s liens. Second, Terra argues that if Plaintiff denies receiving compensation for the release of its liens on the Texas property, the primary fund doctrine requires that the judgment be satisfied first from the Texas property, not the New Mexico property.\n{16} Terra cites no authority to support its first argument \u2014 that monies paid by a successful bidder in a foreclosure sale to a senior lienholder in order to extinguish the senior lienholder\u2019s liens should be credited toward the judgment debtor\u2019s debt. Instead, Terra cites NMSA 1978, \u00a7 48-7-4(A) (1991), which states that \u201c[w]hen any debt... secured by a mortgage or deed of trust upon any real estate in the state has been fully satisfied, it is the duty of the mortgagee ... to cause the full satisfaction of it to be entered of record in the office of the county clerk.\u201d We fail to see how this statute supports Terra\u2019s assertion. If Terra had satisfied its debt to Plaintiff then Plaintiff would have a duty to record it in the office of the county clerk. See \u00a7 48-7-4(A). That is not what happened here. Terra defaulted on its obligations, and the property securing such obligations was foreclosed on. Therefore, because Terra cites no authority to support its proposition, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 1-60(B)(5) motion on this point. In re Adoption of Doe, 1984-NMSC-024, \u00b6 2, 100 N.M. 764, 676 P.2d 1329 (stating that where a party cites no authority to support an argument, we may assume no such authority exists).\n{17} As for Terra\u2019s argument regarding the primary fund doctrine, we decline to review this contention because Terra did not preserve the error below. Terra acknowledges that it did not refer to the primary fund doctrine in its Rule 1-060(B)(5) motion, nor did it cite to the case it primarily relies on to support its argument. However, Terra contends that its argument below embodies the principles of the primary fund doctrine and that therefore the issue was preserved. We disagree. We will not conclude that the district court abused its discretion in failing to apply a doctrine of law when that doctrine was not presented to the district court. See Woolwine v. Furr\u2019s, Inc., 1987-NMCA-133, \u00b6 20, 106 N.M. 492, 745 P.2d 717 (stating that to preserve an issue for review on appeal, it must appear that the plaintiff fairly invoked a ruling on the same grounds argued in the appellate court). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Terra\u2019s motion under Rule 1-060(B)(5).\nCONCLUSION\n{18} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court\u2019s grant of summary judgment and its denial of Terra\u2019s Rule 1-060(B)(5) motion.\n{19} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nCYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nJAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge\nMICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge\nIn this Opinion, the term \u201cPlaintiff\u2019 includes Rabo Agrifinance, Inc. and its predecessor in interest, Farm Credit Bank of Texas.\nTerra requested that if this Court affirms the judgment, the judgment be modified to exclude the \u201cSnipes Property,\u201d which was excluded from the judgment in the first appeal but was not excluded from the judgment we are reviewing in the present appeal. We believe such a determination \u2014 whether the property was inadvertently included in the judgment \u2014 is best handled by the district court on remand.", "type": "majority", "author": "FRY, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Rowley Law Firm, L.L.C. Richard F. Rowley, II Richard F. Rowley, III Clovis, NM", "for Appellee", "Keleher & McLeod, P.A. Thomas C. Bird James L. Rasmussen Justin B. Breen Albuquerque, NM", "for Appellants" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Certiorari Denied, October 8, 2014,\nNo. 34,891\nDocket No. 32,697\nIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2014-NMCA-106\nFiling Date: June 25, 2014\nRABO AGRIFINANCE, INC., Successor in Interest to Farm Credit Bank of Texas, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRA XXI, LTD., a Texas Limited Partnership, composed of VEIGEL CATTLE Company, as General Partner; ROBERT WAYNE VEIGEL, a/k/a BOB W. VEIGEL; ELLA MARIE WILLIAMS VOGEL, a/k/a ELLA MARIE VEIGEL; VEIGEL CATTLE COMPANY, a Texas corporation; VEIGEL FARM PARTNERS, a Texas general partnership d/b/a Veigel Partners; BOB VEIGEL, INC., a Texas corporation; STEVE VEIGEL, INC., a Texas corporation; VEIGEL-KIRK, INC., a Texas corporation; VICKI VEIGEL, INC., a Texas corporation; VEIGEL FARMS, INC., a Texas corporation; TERRA PARTNERS, a Texas general partnership; BURNETT & VEIGEL, INC., a Texas corporation, as general partner of Terra Partnership, a Texas general partnership; and, ALL UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS OF INTEREST IN THE PREMISES ADVERSE TO THE PLAINTIFF, Defendants-Appellants.\nRowley Law Firm, L.L.C. Richard F. Rowley, II Richard F. Rowley, III Clovis, NM\nfor Appellee\nKeleher & McLeod, P.A. Thomas C. Bird James L. Rasmussen Justin B. Breen Albuquerque, NM\nfor Appellants" }, "file_name": "0780-01", "first_page_order": 796, "last_page_order": 801 }