{ "id": 4241564, "name": "CHARLES E. MARTIN and PATRICIA G. MARTIN, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COMCAST CABLEVISION CORPORATION OF CALIFORNIA, LLC, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Martin v. Comcast Cablevision Corp.", "decision_date": "2014-10-31", "docket_number": "No. 34,868; Docket No. 32,199", "first_page": "15", "last_page": "21", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2014-NMCA-114" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "101 N.M. 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1586403 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/101/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "1984-NMCA-064", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 29" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.M. 14", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1594980 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"The appellate court, in reviewing the [district] court['s] decision, disregards all evidence and all inferences unfavorable to the [district] court's result.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/104/0014-01" ] }, { "cite": "1986-NMCA-013", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 23" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "538 U.S. 408", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9030875 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/538/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 N.M. 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1592747 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/108/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "1989-NMSC-006", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563516 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "1994-NMSC-079", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 24" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.E.2d 667", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "670", "parenthetical": "\"The trial judge could therefore accurately determine the profits wrongfully derived from the use of the land by measuring the fair market rental value for the period of the trespass.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 N.M. 314", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 716935 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/110/0314-01" ] }, { "cite": "1990-NMSC-068", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 20" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2008-NMSC-039", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4002825 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 32" }, { "page": "\u00b643" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/144/0434-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 N.M. 690", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 725512 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/115/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "1993-NMSC-039", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 26" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 N.M. 292", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552752 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0292-01" ] }, { "cite": "1994-NMCA-021", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b62" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2010-NMCA-061", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4247504 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/148/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 840", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566545 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0840-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMCA-060", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "653 P.2d 897", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 1584635 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/99/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "1982-NMCA-168", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 20" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.M. 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1584598 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/99/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "1983-NMSC-004", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 39" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 N.M. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 720160 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/112/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "1991-NMSC-082", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b69" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 952, "char_count": 19841, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14090396776028255 }, "sha256": "05ed08e0816a4cf751cdd4380191511a29ba49041e8a747724e00d42f0b063a4", "simhash": "1:3aee82321bba7602", "word_count": 3197 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:10:55.229683+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge", "JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge", "M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge" ], "parties": [ "CHARLES E. MARTIN and PATRICIA G. MARTIN, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COMCAST CABLEVISION CORPORATION OF CALIFORNIA, LLC, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nBUSTAMANTE, Judge.\nCharles and Patricia Martin (collectively, Appellants) sued Comcast Cablevision Corporation of California, LLC (Comcast) for trespass. Having prevailed in the district court, they now appeal the amount and nature of the damages awarded. Appellants argue that the district court erred in awarding a lower amount for statutory rent than they requested and in not awarding restitution for unjust enrichment or punitive damages. We affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nAppellants live on a residential lot located in White Rock, New Mexico. The property is burdened by an easement along its east boundary within which stand two utility poles. Two cables \u2014 one for electric power and one for telephone service \u2014 were strung on the poles. In early May 1999 Mr. Martin noticed that a third cable, which he identified as a cable television line, had been strung on the poles without his knowledge or permission. The date the third cable was installed is unknown. For ease of reference and because the electrical and telephone cables are not at issue here, we will refer to the television cables as \u201cthe cable(s).\u201d\nMr. Martin immediately objected to the presence of the cable to Mickelson Media, the predecessor in interest to Comcast. Roughly a month later, Mr. Martin delivered to Mickelson Media a letter demanding payment of rent of $800 per month or removal of the cable. Later he proposed an alternate pricing scheme in which the rent amount would be decreased or eliminated depending on Mickelson Media\u2019s satisfaction of certain conditions, such as placing the cable underground. After Mr. Martin also threatened to remove the cable himself using a \u201cpneumatic rotary cutter,\u201d Mickelson Media obtained an injunction barring Mr. Martin from removing the cable. At least one additional cable was later installed.\nComcast purchased Mickelson Media in 2000 or 2001 and became the owner of the cables. Mr. Martin continued to object to the presence of the cables and ultimately filed the present suit in 2009. After a bench trial, the district court entered written findings of fact and conclusions of law in which it granted Appellants\u2019 request for ejection of the cables from their property, required all Comcast cable television cables in Appellants\u2019 subdivision to be buried, and awarded Appellants damages of $200 per month \u201cfor diminished use and enjoyment of their property\u201d running from June 1999 until the cables are buried. Since it concluded that Comcast did not act wilfully and deliberately, it denied Appellants\u2019 request for $1 million in punitive damages. With a few exceptions, which are addressed in our discussion of Appellants\u2019 arguments, Appellants do not challenge the district court\u2019s findings of fact. We therefore do not detail the unchallenged findings. An unchallenged finding of the district court is binding on appeal. See Stueber v. Pickard, 1991-NMSC-082, \u00b69, 112 N.M. 489, 816 P.2d 1111.\nFinally, we note that the parties stipulated to amendment of the judgment to reflect certain damages noted in the district court\u2019s findings of fact but omitted from the conclusions of law and final judgment. The district court entered a finding of fact to the effect that Appellants are entitled \u201cto collect statutory rent from [Comcast of] $200 per month.\u201d But neither the conclusions of law nor the final judgment reflect this finding. Hence, after mediation of this issue, the parties agreed that the judgment should be modified to reflect the district court\u2019s finding of fact and that Appellants could challenge the amount of the statutory rent on appeal.\nDISCUSSION\nAppellants raise three issues on appeal. First, they maintain that the district court should have awarded them statutory rent of $800 per month, rather than $200 per month. Second, they argue that the district court erred in not ordering Comcast to pay $2000 per month as restitution for its unjust enrichment. Third, Appellants argue that it was error to not award punitive damages. We address each argument in turn.\nAmount of Statutory Rent\nAs outlined above, the parties stipulated that the district court\u2019s conclusions of law and the final judgment should have included an award for statutory rent in addition to the damages awarded for loss of enjoyment. They also stipulated that Appellants could appeal the \u25a0 amount of statutory rent awarded. Consistent with the stipulation, Appellants\u2019 first argument is that the district court erred in finding Comcast liable for statutory rent in the amount of $200 per month, rather than the $800 per month that Appellants requested. They argue that the higher amount should have been awarded because \u201c[n]obody under New Mexico law can control the rent [they] ask for\u201d and \u201c[t]he $800 per month rent is reasonable, considering the trouble and expense Defendant has put [Appellants] through.\u201d Appellants rely on NMSA 1978, Section 42-4-9 (1907), which states that \u201c[i]f the plaintiff prevails in an ejectment action], he shall recover for damages the value of the rents and profits of such premises.\u201d Since this language does not state whether the value should be based on an objective standard or a subjective standard, Appellants maintain that the district court should have ordered the amount set by Appellants.\nAppellants\u2019 position \u2014 that their subjective assessment of appropriate rent must be honored \u2014 is contrary to the purpose behind damages in ejectment, which is compensation of the rightful possessor. See 28A C.J.S. Ejectment \u00a7 239 (2014) (\u201cCompensation constitutes the purpose and basis of damages in actions or proceedings to recover mesne profits or damages in ejectment.\u201d); Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies \u00a7 1.1, at 3 (2d ed. 1993) (\u201cThe damages remedy is a money remedy aimed at making good the plaintiffs losses.\u201d). It is also contrary to the general rule that \u201ccompensation is ordinarily the fair or reasonable rental of the land for the time ... the defendant was in wrongful possession.\u201d 28A C.J.S. Ejectment \u00a7 239 (2014); accord Hertz v. Hertz, 1983-NMSC-004, \u00b6 39, 99 N.M. 320, 657 P.2d 1169 (remanding to the district court to determine whether there had been an ouster of a cotenant and, if so, to \u201cconsider[] the fair rental value of the property\u201d in determining the amount owed to the ousted cotenant); Dobbs, supra, \u00a7 5.8(2), at530 (\u201cThe rental market value ofthe land . . . represents the value of possession or use.\u201d). Finally, it runs against the principle that an award of damages must be based on evidence adduced at trial, the corollary to which is that the amount of damages is an objective measure. See Sanchez v. Martinez, 1982-NMCA-168, \u00b6 20, 99N.M. 66, 653 P.2d 897 (\u201cA party seeking to recover damages has the burden of proving the existence of injuries and resulting damage with reasonable certainty.\u201d); Dobbs, supra, \u00a7 5.8(2), at 530 (\u201cRental value is ordinarily an objective measure, based on an estimate of the price others would pay to rent the land, not on what the trespasser personally would pay.\u201d).\nHere, Mr. Martin testified that he asked Comcast for $800 per month \u201cto get[] them to . . '. remove the cable from [his] yard.\u201d He specified that the purpose of his fee schedule was to get Comcast to remove their equipment, \u201cnot to collect rent.\u201d He also stated that he selected the $800 amount because he \u201cwanted it to be big enough so it was enough trouble for them to alleviate this problem by removing this cable from my property. I do not want to rent an easement.\u201d Thus, by Mr. Martin\u2019s own admission, $800 per month is an amount a tenant would find so unreasonable that it would prefer to remove the cables than keep them in place. We discern no error in the district court\u2019s rejection of this amount.\nUnjust Enrichment\nAppellants next argue thatthe district court should have awarded restitution for Comcast\u2019s unjust enrichment in the form of a portion of the profits Comcast earned by providing cable service while the cables ran across Appellants\u2019 property. They base this contention on the fact that the district court found that \u201c[f]or the period of time Defendant and its predecessor have been trespassing, they have been utilizing [Appellants \u2019] property for their financial gain, i.e., unjustly enriched. Their enrichment has been at least $2,000 per month.\u201d In spite of this finding, the district court did not enter a conclusion related to restitution and the final judgment does not include an order for restitution.\n\u201cThe restitutionary goal is to prevent unjust enrichment of the defendant by making him give up what he wrongfully obtained from the plaintiff.\u201d Dobbs, supra, \u00a7 1.1, at 4. Damages for unjust enrichment differ from compensatory damages in that \u201c[t]he measure of compensatory damages is the plaintiffs loss or injury, while the measure of restitution is the defendant\u2019s gain or benefit.\u201d Cent. Sec. & Alarm Co. v. Mehler, 1996-NMCA-060, \u00b6 12, 121 N.M. 840, 918 P.2d 1340; see Dobbs, supra, \u00a7 1.1, at 4. Restitution is an equitable remedy. See Arena Res., Inc. v. Obo, Inc., 2010-NMCA-061, \u00b6 15, 148 N.M. 483, 238 P.3d 357.\nBecause the district court entered a finding of fact specifically on unjust enrichment, including the amount by which Comcast was enriched, it is possible that omission of a corresponding conclusion of law and order for restitution was an oversight as Appellants argue. Nevertheless, we conclude that restitution in the form of profits is not appropriate in this case and therefore affirm. See Westland Dev. Co. v. Romero, 1994-NMCA-021, \u00b62, 117 N.M. 292, 871 P.2d 388 (\u201cAn appellate court will affirm a lower court\u2019s ruling if right for any reason.\u201d). See Cont\u2019l Potash, Inc. v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 1993-NMSC-039, \u00b6 26, 115 N.M. 690, 858 P.2d 66 (stating that while it is within the district court\u2019s discretion to award equitable remedies, \u201c[s]uch discretion is not a mental discretion to be exercised as one pleases, but is a legal discretion to be exercised in conformity with the law\u201d).\nHere, since nothing was taken from the land, Comcast\u2019s gain was simply the rent-free use of Appellants\u2019 land. Appellants\u2019 argument rests on the premise that Comcast benefitted unjustly because it earned income by providing cable service to customers using the lines crossing Appellants\u2019 property. But the provision of cable television and resulting income were the product of Comcast\u2019s business enterprise and not the use of Appellants\u2019 land. See Dobbs, supra, \u00a7 5.9, at 533 (\u201cIf the defendant should be liable to make restitution of gains, they should be gains identified with the land, not gains resulting from his enterprise.\u201d). Thus, the benefit to Comcast is better understood as the savings it realized by using Appellants\u2019 property without paying for the privilege, i.e., the rental value of the land. See 42 C.J.S. Implied Contracts \u00a7 9 (2014) (\u201cA \u2018benefit\u2019 for purposes of an unjust enrichment claim is any form of advantage that has a measurable value including the advantage of being saved from \u25a0an expense or loss.\u201d); Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment \u00a7 40 cmt. b (2011) (stating that \u201c[the] more common form [of interference with property] is that the defendant has made a valuable use of the [owner\u2019s] property without paying for it\u201d and that \u201c[t]o the extent that the defendant\u2019s unjust enrichment may be identified with ordinary rental value, the owner\u2019s entitlement to restitution is captured in the claim to damages for \u2018use and occupation.\u2019\u201d); cf. Peters Corp. v. N.M. Banquest Investors Corp., 2008-NMSC-039, \u00b6 32, 144 N.M. 434, 188 P.3d 1185 (\u201cThe remedy [of disgorgement] may not be used punitively, and thus a causal connection must exist between the breach and the benefit sought to be disgorged.\u201d).\nBecause Appellants were awarded the rental value of the land in compensatory damages, an additional award of rent for unjust enrichment would be duplicative. \u201cNew Mexico does not allow duplication of damages or double recovery for injuries received.\u201d Hale v. Basin Motor Co., 1990-NMSC-068, \u00b6 20, 110 N.M. 314, 795 P.2d 1006; see Cent. Sec. & Alarm Co., 1996-NMCA-060, \u00b6 12 (\u201cThe plaintiff may be able to pursue several theories of recovery; if liability is found on each, the plaintiff would be required to make an election among awards if duplication or double recovery would otherwise result.\u201d). We conclude that Appellants are not entitled to an additional award of rent for unjust enrichment.\nAppellants rely on the concept of \u201cmesne profits\u201d to support their contention that Comcast should pay $2000 per month of trespass on their property. \u201cMesne profits\u201d are \u201cthe profits which accrue between two given times \u2014 and [are] defined as the value of use or occupation of land during the time it is held by one in wrongful possession of it.\u201d 25 Am. Jur. 2d Ejectment \u00a7 49 (2014). We are unpersuaded by Appellants\u2019 argument. There is nothing about mesne profits that exempts them from the principle discussed above, which is that a plaintiff is entitled to no more than the amount associated with the benefit derived from the wrongful use of the property itself. See .Dobbs, supra, \u00a7 5.8(2), at 531 (stating that cases in which \u201cthe trespasser\u2019s profits from occupation of the land exceed the rental value . . . raise difficult problems in determining how much of the \u2018profit\u2019 is due to the defendant\u2019s labor and how much is due to the plaintiffs property\u201d); cf. 66 Am. Jur. 2d Restitution and Implied Contracts \u00a7 2 (2014) (\u201cThe purpose of restitution-based claims, such as unjust enrichment, is not punitive.\u201d); Krejci v. Capriotti, 305 N.E.2d 667, 670 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973) (\u201cThe trial judge could therefore accurately determine the profits wrongfully derived from the use of the land by measuring the fair market rental value for the period of the trespass.\u201d). Thus, we conclude that Appellants are not entitled to a portion of Comcast\u2019s profits over and above the amount awarded for rental of their property.\nPunitive Damages\nFinally, Appellants argue that the district court erred when it denied their request for punitive damages. They maintain that, although the district court specifically concluded that Comcast had not acted \u201cwillfully and deliberately,\u201d other findings indicate behaviors that qualify for punitive damages. They also point to evidence in the record that they believe supports an award of punitive damages. We disagree that the district court\u2019s findings are inconsistent with its conclusion or that the evidence \u25a0 in the record requires an award of punitive damages.\n\u201cWe review a [district] court\u2019s decision not to award punitive damages for abuse of discretion, and we will only reverse that decision if it is contrary to logic, and reason.\u201d Peters Corp., 2008-NMSC-039, \u00b643 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). \u201cIn New Mexico, it is well settled that because the limited purpose of punitive damages is to punish and deter persons from certain conduct, there must be some evidence of a culpable mental state.\u201d Paiz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 1994-NMSC-079, \u00b6 24, 118 N.M. 203, 880 P.2d 300 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Hence, such damages are appropriate \u201conly when the wrongdoer\u2019s conduct may be said to be maliciously intentional, fraudulent, oppressive, or committed recklessly or with a wanton disregard of the plaintiffs\u2019 rights.\u201d Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Layton, 1989-NMSC-006, \u00b6 9, 108 N.M. 171, 769 P.2d 84 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see UJI 13-1827 NMRA. The Uniform Jury Instructions provide further guidance on the conduct that warrants punitive damages: \u201cM alicious conduct is the intentional doing of a wrongful act with knowledge that the act was wrongful. Willful conduct is the intentional doing of an act with knowledge that harm may result. Reckless conduct is the intentional doing of an act with utter indifference to the consequences.\u201d UJI 13-1827. \u201c[P]unitive damages should only be awarded if the defendant\u2019s culpability, after having paid compensatory damages, is so reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of further sanctions to achieve punishment or deterrence.\u201d State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003).\nAppellants point to a number of findings as evidence that the district court found willful and deliberate conduct by Comcast. For instance, the district court found that Comcast had \u201cdeliberately disregarded\u201d a provision in the franchise agreement requiring cables to be buried in certain neighborhoods and that after Mr. Martin contacted Comcast to request removal of the cables, they were \u201cuncooperative and dismissive of his protest.\u201d The district court also found that Comcast was aware that it did not have permission to install cables on Appellants\u2019 property as early as May 1999 and that because Comcast violated the franchise ordinance and pole license, its actions were illegal. None of the findings identified by Appellants involve the type of. findings necessary to support a punitive damages award because the findings do not pertain to the mental state required. We conclude that the district court\u2019s conclusion that Comcast\u2019s conduct was not willful and deliberate is not inconsistent with its other findings.\nAs to Appellants\u2019 argument that this Court should remand for entry of punitive damages because there is evidence in the record supporting such an award, we note that \u201c[t]he question on appeal is not whether there is evidence to support an alternative result but, rather, whether the [district] court\u2019s result is supported by substantial evidence.\u201d Bagwell v. Shady Grove Truck Stop, 1986-NMCA-013, \u00b6 23, 104 N.M. 14, 715 P.2d 462. We therefore examine the record for evidence that Comcast\u2019s conduct did not merit punitive damages rather than the evidence to which Appellants direct us. See id. (\u201cThe appellate court, in reviewing the [district] court[\u2019s] decision, disregards all evidence and all inferences unfavorable to the [district] court\u2019s result.\u201d). The area vice president of Comcast testified that \u201c [i]t was [Comcast\u2019s] understanding that there was a utility easement that we were able to use [on Appellants\u2019 property].\u201d He also indicated that, at the time Comcast responded to Appellants\u2019 request to remove the cables and based on advice by Comcast\u2019s attorney, he understood that Los Alamos County had granted Comcast the right to \u201cuse the Martin property for its cables[.]\u201d Comcast\u2019s construction coordinator testified that after Appellants made their objection to the cables known, he obtained a plat of the property from the county and discussed it with the construction manager. He testified that he understood the plat to indicate that the poles were situated in a utility easement and that \u201cthe cable provider, with a franchise agreement within the municipality, would have a right to be within that utility corridor.\u201d This evidence supports the district court\u2019s conclusion that Comcast\u2019s conduct was not willful or deliberate. See Padilla v. Lawrence, 1984-NMCA-064, \u00b6 29, 101 N.M. 556, 685 P.2d 964 (affirming denial of punitive damages where \u201c[tjhere [was] substantial evidence in the record to support the [district] court\u2019s refusal to award [them]\u201d). The district court did not err in denying Appellants\u2019 request for punitive damages.\nCONCLUSION\n{20} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.\n{21} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nMICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nJAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge\nM. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge", "type": "majority", "author": "BUSTAMANTE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "J. Ronald Boyd Santa Fe, NM for Appellants", "Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A. Edward Ricco Robert L. Lucero Albuquerque, NM for Appellee" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Certiorari Denied, October 31, 2014,\nNo. 34,868\nIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2014-NMCA-114\nFiling Date: August 12, 2014\nDocket No. 32,199\nCHARLES E. MARTIN and PATRICIA G. MARTIN, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COMCAST CABLEVISION CORPORATION OF CALIFORNIA, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.\nJ. Ronald Boyd Santa Fe, NM for Appellants\nRodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A. Edward Ricco Robert L. Lucero Albuquerque, NM for Appellee" }, "file_name": "0015-01", "first_page_order": 31, "last_page_order": 37 }