{ "id": 4241305, "name": "SARA BENAVIDES, Worker-Petitioner, v. EASTERN NEW MEXICO MEDICAL CENTER and ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Employer/Insurer-Respondents", "name_abbreviation": "Benavides v. Eastern New Mexico Medical Center", "decision_date": "2014-11-06", "docket_number": "Docket No. 34,128", "first_page": "55", "last_page": "65", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2014-NMSC-037" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "95 N.M. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1575563 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/95/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 N.M. 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2776921 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/85/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "1973-NMSC-0984", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.M. 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2836548 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/88/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "1975-NMSC-055", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 7" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 N.M. 17", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 715059 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/111/0017-01" ] }, { "cite": "1989-NMCA-100", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" }, { "page": "\u00b6 9" }, { "page": "\u00b69" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 N.M. 752", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1592850 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/108/0752-01" ] }, { "cite": "1989-NMCA-060", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 7" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 707", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2869563 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0707-01" ] }, { "cite": "1977-NMCA-079", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 N.M. 665", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2802257 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/74/0665-01" ] }, { "cite": "1964-NMSC-179", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 4" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2001-NMSC-034", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 183113 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 1" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/131/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "590 N.E.2d 781", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 10, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "782-83" }, { "page": "783" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "577 F.2d 1113", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 879403 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1118-1119" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/577/1113-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMSC-053", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3692262 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/142/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 N.M. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 322256 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/122/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMSC-070", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 25" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 N.M. 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580724 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/53/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "1949-NMSC-015", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 8, 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.M. 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2810088 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/77/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "1967-NMSC-021", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 11" }, { "page": "\u00b6 13" }, { "page": "\u00b6 13" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 N.M. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2853025 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/70/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "1962-NMSC-037", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 N.M. 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582932 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/55/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "1951-NMSC-046", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 8-9" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 N.M. 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2846385 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/66/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "1959-NMSC-076", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" }, { "page": "\u00b6 3" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 N.M. 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1579494 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/52/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "1948-NMSC-060", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 2, 3, 7" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 N.M. 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8841783 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/57/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "1953-NMSC-048", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 12, 21" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 12, 21" }, { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 N.M. 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1579511 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/52/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "1948-NMSC-019", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 13, 18" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 N.M. 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1557996 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/35/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "1930-NMSC-057", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 5, 14" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 5, 14" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 N.M. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5317986 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/61/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "1956-NMSC-062", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 13-14" }, { "page": "\u00b6 14" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.M. 8", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1588631 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/100/0008-01" ] }, { "cite": "1983-NMCA-063", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 15" }, { "page": "\u00b6 15" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 12, 16" }, { "page": "\u00b6 17" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 11-12" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 16, 20, 26" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 N.M. 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 715074 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/111/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "1991-NMSC-021", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-032", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4243724 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" }, { "page": "\u00b6 14" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "\u00b6 29" }, { "page": "\u00b6 29" }, { "page": "\u00b6 29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.M. 728", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1575451 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "non-precedential" }, { "parenthetical": "non-precedential" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/95/0728-01" ] }, { "cite": "1981-NMCA-030", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "weight": 6, "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "non-precedential" }, { "page": "\u00b6 8" }, { "page": "\u00b6 23" }, { "page": "\u00b6 4" }, { "page": "\u00b6 23" }, { "page": "\u00b6 2" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1364, "char_count": 32136, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.1919318652509997e-08, "percentile": 0.32568597628664836 }, "sha256": "9c090fb0e4019525e498bb17f822347e3b0c0ac1bab351d89bf193043e9f272d", "simhash": "1:c045945abea154e4", "word_count": 5313 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:10:55.229683+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice", "BARBARA J. VIGIL, Chief Justice", "RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice", "EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice", "CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice" ], "parties": [ "SARA BENAVIDES, Worker-Petitioner, v. EASTERN NEW MEXICO MEDICAL CENTER and ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Employer/Insurer-Respondents." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nMAES, Justice.\nWhen a worker\u2019s injury \u201cresults from the negligence of the employer in failing to supply reasonable safety devices in general use for the- use or protection of the worker,\u201d the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (the Act) provides that a worker\u2019s benefits shall be increased by 10%.NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 52-1-1 to -70 (1929, as amended through 2013)-. In this case we determine whether a \u201cwet floor\u201d-sign is a safety device and whether a nurse who slips on a recently mopped floor at work is entitled to a 10% increase in benefits when a \u201cwet floor\u201d sign was not posted near the mopped floor. We hold that a \u201cwet floor\u201d sign is a safety device and that the nurse\u2019s injury resulted from the negligence of the employer in failing to supply reasonable safety devices in general use. In addition, we hold that Section 52-5-1 of the Act does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers.\nI. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY\nSara L. Benavides (Worker), a registered nurse working for Eastern New Mexico Medical Center (Employer), slipped and fell on a wet floor in the Medical Center and sustained compensable injuries in 2006. Worker seriously injured her right leg, right hip, lower back, and neck. Soon after, Worker began receiving temporary total disability benefits of $585.89 per week, the maximum rate for a 2006 injury. Worker has continued to receive benefits at this rate.\nIn 2011, Employer filed a complaint seeking a determination of permanent partial disability benefits and maximum medical improvement. Worker filed an amended answer and counterclaim requesting, among other things, a 10% increase in benefits due to a failure to supply a safety device pursuant to Section 52-1 -10(B). Worker claimed that \u201cwet floor\u201d signs are a safety device and because they were not posted in or around the patient\u2019s room where she fell, she was entitled to the 10% safety device penalty. Employer denied the safety device allegation and demanded strict proof which resulted in a full evidentiary hearing before the Workers\u2019 Compensation Judge (WCJ).\nAt the hearing, only three witnesses testified: Worker; William Fladd, Employer\u2019s Director of Environmental Services; and Rose Blount, another registered nurse who worked for Employer. Mr. Fladd testified that it has been his practice to supply each housekeeping cart with two to four \u201cwet floor\u201d signs. He said that it is Employer\u2019s policy and procedure to place a \u201cwet floor\u201d sign near the entrance of the room being mopped before mopping and to remove the \u201cwet floor\u201d sign after the floor has dried. Mr. Fladd stated that the purpose of a \u201cwet floor\u201d sign is \u201cto notify people of a potentially dangerous situation.\u201d At trial, Mr. Fladd stated that he had disciplined employees in the past who failed to post \u201cwet floor\u201d signs.\nMs. Blount testified that on the same day that Worker suffered her injury, she also slipped but did not fall on a wet floor when she was attending to a patient, and that no \u201cwet floor\u201d signs were posted in or around the room. Ms. Blount warned her patient not to get out of bed after the patient informed her that \u201chousekeeping just mopped the floor.\u201d Ms. Blount stated that she walked up and down the hall looking for a housekeeper, but she could not find one, nor did she see a housekeeping cart or a \u201cwet floor\u201d sign. Ms. Blount then asked the unit secretary to call housekeeping to request a \u201cwet floor\u201d sign while she watched the door to make sure that nobody was injured.\nWorker testified that as she entered a patient\u2019s room to administer medication, she took about three steps and \u201cjust slipped,\u201d landing on her pubic bone and twisting her whole torso. Worker described the pain as feeling as if somebody had sliced the back of her calf with a knife and that her whole foot was throbbing. Worker remained on the floor for at least five minutes until she crawled to the sink to gather paper towels to place over the floor because she \u201cnoticed it was very wet\u201d and she \u201cdidn\u2019t want anybody else to fall.\u201d As Worker left the room, she noticed that there was not a \u201cwet floor\u201d sign outside of the patient\u2019s room and she did not see any other \u201cwet floor\u201d signs in the hall. Worker witnessed Ms. Blount at the nurse\u2019s station requesting that somebody post \u201cwet floor\u201d signs. Soon after, \u201cwet floor\u201d signs were posted.\nThe WCJ entered a compensation order finding that \u201cwet floor\u201d signs were safety devices, and that Employer did supply \u201cwet floor\u201d signs but that they were not deployed as they should have been. Nevertheless, the WC J concluded in his compensation order that \u201cEmployer provided all safety devices which were appropriate, as required by statute, or in general use,\u201d and that increased benefits under Section 52-l-10(B) were inappropriate.\nWorker timely appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Jaramillo v. Anaconda Co., 1981-NMCA-030, 95 N.M. 728, 625 P.2d 1245, is controlling in this case. Benavides v. Eastern N.M. Med. Ctr., No. 32,450, mem. op. \u00b64 (N.M. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2013) (non-precedential). In Jaramillo, the Court of Appeals held that the \u201cfailure to provide\u201d language in Section 52-l-10(B) did not apply to a situation where a safety device is provided by an employer but is not properly employed by a fellow employee. Jaramillo, 1981-NMCA-030, \u00b6 8. Because this was \u201cprecisely what happened here,\u201d the Court of Appeals denied the 10% increase in benefits. Benavides, No. 32,450, mem. op. \u00b6 3.\nWorker appealed the following issue to this Court: \u201cWhether an injured worker is entitled to an increase in benefits pursuant to [Section] 52-1 -10(B) if an employer fails to provide a safety device at a potentially dangerous or hazardous work site.\u201d We granted certiorari.\nII. STANDARD OF REVIEW\n\u201cWe review factual findings of Workers\u2019 Compensation Administration judges under a whole record standard of review\u201d. Dewitt v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 2009-NMSC-032, \u00b6 12, 146 N.M. 453, 212 P.3d 341. \u201cSubstantial evidence on the record as a whole is evidence demonstrating the reasonableness of an agency\u2019s decision, and we neither reweigh the evidence nor replace the fact finder\u2019s conclusions with our own.\u201d Id. (internal citation omitted). We will uphold the Board\u2019s decision if we \u201cfind evidence that is credible in light of the whole record and that is sufficient for a reasonable mind to accept as adequate to support the conclusion reached by the agency.\u201d Herman v. Miners\u2019 Hosp., 1991-NMSC-021, \u00b6 6, 111 N.M. 550, 807 P.2d 734 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). \u201c[Ajlthough the evidence may support inconsistent findings, we will not disturb the agency\u2019s finding if supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.\u201d Id.\n\u201cIn reviewing a WCJ\u2019s interpretation of statutory requirements, we apply a de novo standard of review\u201d. Dewitt, 2009-NMSC-032, \u00b6 14.\n\u201cWe look first to the plain meaning of the statute\u2019s words, and we construe the provisions of the' Act together to produce a harmonious whole. \u201cAfter we determine the meaning of the statutes, we review the whole record to determine whether the WCJ\u2019s findings and award are supported by substantial evidence.\u201d\nId. (citation omitted).\nIII. DISCUSSION\nSection 52-1-10(B) provides:\nIn case an injury to, or death of, a worker results from the failure of an employer to provide safety devices required by law or, in any industry in which safety devices are not prescribed by statute, if an injury to, or death of, a worker results from the negligence of the employer in failing to supply reasonable safety devices in general . use for the use or protection of the worker, then the compensation otherwise payable under the Worker\u2019s Compensation Act shall be increased ten percent.\nWorker and Employer both argue that the statutory language is unambiguous as to the requirement to provide safety devices. The parties differ, however, as to whether a \u201cwet floor\u201d sign is a safety device and what is required by the language \u201csupply reasonable safety devices.\u201d\nA. A \u201cwet floor\u201d sign is a safety device\nW orlcer argues that a \u201cwet flo or\u201d sign is a safety device because its purpose is to warn of a potential danger or hazard. Employer answers that signs promote safety, which is different from an actual safety device, such as a machine guard.\nWhat is a reasonable safety device is a factual question. Martinez v. Zia Co., 1983-NMCA-063, \u00b6 15, 100 N.M. 8, 664 P.2d 1021. A safety device is something which \u2018\u201cwill lessen danger or secure safety,\u2019 as something tangible, concrete, that can be seen, touched or felt \u2014 an \u2018instrumentality\u2019 \u2014 -as opposed to a rule or course of conduct.\u201d Montoya v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 1956-NMSC-062, \u00b6\u00b6 13-14, 61 N.M. 268, 299 P.2d 84. \u201c[Wjhat is or is not a safety device depends on the purpose involved.\u201d Martinez, 1983-NMCA-063, \u00b6 15. \u201cThe term \u2018safety device\u2019 must be given a broad interpretation so as to include any practical or reasonable method of lessening or preventing a specific danger to which a workman is exposed.\u201d Jaramillo, 1981-NMCA-030, \u00b6 23.\nExamples of tangible safety devices that lessen a specific danger include the following: goggles used to protect workers\u2019 eyes from flying particles, Pino v. Ozark Smelting & Mining Co., 1930-NMSC-057, \u00b6\u00b6 5, 14, 35 N.M. 87, 290 P. 409; guard rails on a platform to protect workers from falling, Thwaits v. Kennecott Copper Corp., Chino Mines Div., 1948-NMSC-019, \u00b6\u00b6 13, 18, 52 N.M. 107, 192 P.2d 553; a gas indicator to give notice of the presence of deadly gases, Apodaca v. Allison & Haney, 1953-NMSC-048, \u00b6\u00b6 12, 21, 57 N.M. 315, 258 P.2d 711; cable clamps to prevent a drill cable from falling into a water well and entangling a worker, Flippo v. Martin, 1948-NMSC-060, \u00b6\u00b6 2, 3, 7, 52 N.M. 402, 200 P.2d 366; a rear view mirror on a tractor that allowed the operator to see behind him or her, Martinez, 1983-NMCA-063, \u00b6\u00b6 12, 16;amanhole cover to protect workers from falling into an open manhole, Jaramillo, 1981-NMCA-030, \u00b6 4.\n\u201cHowever, not all things which promote safety can be considered as safety devices, and even those things which might be safety devices for one purpose may not be so for another purpose.\u201d Hicks v. Artesia Alfalfa Growers\u2019 Ass\u2019n, 1959-NMSC-076, \u00b6 9, 66 N.M. 165, 344 P.2d 475. In Hicks, an employee was injured when unloading sections of a prefabricated steel building from a railroad car. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 3-4. The injury occurred because all of the heavy gauge steel wires holding the sections in place were cut at the same time instead of separately for each section. Id. Hicks held that the method of removing the wires during unloading \u201cwould not ordinarily be considered as having any relationship to safety devices to be .used for unloading.\u201d Id. \u00b6 9. Besides courses of conduct, ordinary hand tools, such as a wrench, are not safety devices. Rowland v. Reynolds Elec. Eng\u2019g Co., 1951-NMSC-046, \u00b6\u00b6 8-9, 55 N.M. 287, 232 P.2d 689.\nFrom our reading of the statute as a whole and our interpretation of New Mexico case law, we conclude that a safety device is something specific and tangible that prevents a specific danger; courses of conduct, rules, or ordinary hand tools are not safety devices. Accordingly, we find that a \u201cwet floor\u201d sign is \u201csomething tangible, concrete, that can be seen, touched or felt \u2019\u2019Montoya, 1956-NMSC-062, \u00b6 14, not a rule or course of conduct like the unloading of a railroad car. See Hicks, 1959-NMSC-076, \u00b6 3.\nA \u201cwet floor\u201d sign warns of the specific danger of a slippery floor, just as eye goggles protect a worker from the specific danger of flying particles and a gas indicator warns workers of the specific danger of harmful gasses. See Pino, 1930-NMSC-057, \u00b6\u00b6 5, 14; Apodaca, 1953-NMSC-048, \u00b6\u00b6 12, 21. Mr. Fladd testified that the purpose of a \u201cwet floor\u201d sign is to \u201cnotify people of a potentially dangerous situation.\u201d Ms. Blount recognized the specific danger of a wet floor when she warned her patient not to get out of bed because of the danger of slipping and falling. W orker overcame her injuries to clean up the wet floor with paper towels to reduce the specific risk of a wet floor. We also interpret the term safety device broadly in order to protect employees from specific dangers to which they are exposed. Jaramillo, 1981-NMCA-030, \u00b6 23. Accordingly, we conclude that a \u201cwet floor\u201d sign is a safety device because it is a tangible device that lessens a specific danger and helps to keep workers safe.\nSection 52-1-10(B) also requires that the safety device be in \u201cgeneral use.\u201d \u201cGeneral use\u201d means \u201cprevalent, usual, extensive though not universal, wide spread.\u201d Martinez, 1983-NMCA-063, \u00b6 17 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). General use \u201cis a matter of fact and not of opinion\u201d and \u201cproof of the fact may be established either by testimony of specific uses, or by evidence of general practice of contractors.\u201d Romero v. H. A. Lott, Inc., 1962-NMSC-037, \u00b6 12, 70 N.M. 40, 369 P.2d 777 (citations omitted).\nMr. Fladd testified that it was Employer\u2019s usual practice and policy to display \u201cwet floor\u201d signs before mopping and to remove them once the floor has dried. Mr. Fladd also stated that he reprimanded his employees for failing to use \u201cwet floor\u201d signs. Based on Mr. Fladd\u2019s testimony of specific and general uses of \u201cwet floor\u201d signs, we hold that \u201cwet floor\u201d signs were in general use and that a \u201cwet floor\u201d sign is a safety device in general use under Section 52-l-10(B).\nB. Worker is entitled to a 10% increase in benefits because Employer failed to supply a \u201cwet floor\u201d sign\nThe safety device statute \u201cwas passed to compel employers to supply reasonable safety devices in general use for the protection of the workmen where safety devices are not specified by law. Only by observing it may employers avoid liability under it for compensable injuries to their employees.\u201d Apodaca, 1953-NMSC-048, \u00b6 11. The penalty statute \u201cis a recognition of and an attempt to correct the disproportion which might exist between the misconduct and the penalty. . . . The result is an incentive to both parties to observe safe practices\u201d. Baca v. Gutierrez, 1967-NMSC-021, \u00b6 11, 77 N.M. 428, 423 P.2d 617. We have not found any ordinance or statute that requires \u201cwet floor\u201d signs, nor do the parties cite to any such law; thus the key question is whether Employer negligently failed to \u201csupply\u201d a \u201cwet floor\u201d sign; Cf. Jones v. Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 1949-NMSC-015, \u00b6\u00b6 8, 12, 53 N.M. 127, 202 P.2d 1080 (explaining that an improved electrical switch was required by the Mine Safety Act).\nWorker contends that it \u201cdefies logic and reason\u201d to conclude thatEmployer supplied a \u201cwet floor\u201d sign when it was not posted near or around the wet floor. The fact that Employer had \u201cwet floor\u201d signs on nearby carts, Worker asserts, is not sufficient to prove that Employer supplied \u201cwet floor\u201d signs. Worker also argues that the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision is contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-8 (1989), titled \u201cDefenses to action by employee.\u201d Because part of the \u201cno fault\u201d system of the Act, several common law defenses previously available to employers were abolished, including negligence of \u201ca fellow servant,\u201d Worker contends that housekeeping staff were \u201cfellow servants,\u201d therefore the WCJ erred by attributing negligence to the staff instead of Employer.\nEmployer counters that Section 52-1 - 10(B) is unambiguous in its requirement that an employer only supply safety devices; the language does not make the employer the \u201cinsurer of his employees\u2019 safety.\u201d Employer cites to Jaramillo in support of its argument that reading the statute to obligate employers to monitor all devices at all times, or to \u201cwatchdog\u201d careless employees, is to read more into the statute than it contains.\nThe first guide to statutory interpretation is the actual wording of the statute. Dewitt, 2009-NMSC-032, \u00b6 29. However, this Court has advised that a literal interpretation of the Act is not always appropriate because \u201cthe provisions of the [Act] are imprecise. . . . This serves as a warning that the plain language rule may not be the best approach to interpreting this statute.\u201d Chavez v. Mountain States Constructors, 1996-NMSC-070, \u00b6 25, 122 N.M. 579, 929 P.2d 971. When the statutory language is ambiguous \u201cwe can consider principles of statutory construction that are employed with statutes that are unclear. In doing so, we must attempt to construe a statute according to its obvious spirit or reason.\u201d Dewitt, 2009-NMSC-032, \u00b6 29 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, \u201cwe strive to read related statutes in harmony so as to give effect to all provisions.\u201dN.M. Indus. Energy Consumers v. PRC, 2007-NMSC-053, \u00b6 20, 142 N.M. 533, 168 P.3d 105.\n\u201cSupply\u201d is defined as, \u201c[t]o furnish or provide (a person) with something.\u201d XVII The Oxford English Dictionary 256 (2d ed. 1989) (alteration in original). We do notread anything in the definition of \u201csupply\u201d nor glean anything from its common understanding that specifies whether furnishing or providing a person with a safety device means requiring the use of the safety device. Thus, we turn to precedent and other tools of statutory construction.\nIn Usery v. Kennecott Copper Corp., the Tenth Circuit held that \u201cprovide\u201d does not mean \u201crequire use.\u201d 577 F.2d 1113, 1118-1119 (10th Cir. 1977). According to Usery, this result is mandated by the plain meaning of the word \u201cprovide,\u201d which must be used in interpreting the Occupational Safety and Health Act, which does not require the prevention of \u201call accidents, but to provide American employees with safe and healthful working conditions \u2018so far as possible. \u201d\u2019M at 1118. We find the Usery interpretation too formalistic and in contradiction of the requirement that the plain.language rule does not end our inquiry. See also NMSA 1978, \u00a7 50-9-21(A) (1993) (\u201cNothing in the Occupational Health and Safety Act shall be construed or held to supersede or in any manner affect the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\u201d).\nInstead, we must also construe the statute \u201caccording to its obvious spirit or reason.\u201d Dewitt, 2009-NMSC-032, \u00b6 29. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). \u201cThe legislature enacted [this section] as a penalty system, placing the duty on the employer to furnish adequate safety devices in general use ..., and in the event of his failure to do so, making him liable to be found guilty of negligence and subject to the penalty provided.\u201d Baca, 1967-NMSC-021, \u00b6 13.\nThe legislative history of the [Occupational Safety and Health] Act is clear that \u201cfinal responsibility for compliance with the requirements of this Act remains with the employer.\u201d It is difficult to conceive of any rationale that, in the face of employee head, eye, hand, and other injuries, permits an employer to escape responsibility and compliance duties under the [Occupational Safety and Health] Act by simply pointing to shelves filled with unused hardhats, goggles, gloves, and other protective equipment.\nMark A. Rothstein, Occupational Safety and Health Law, \u00a7 5:7 (2013 ed.).\nIn this case, the Court of Appeals held that Jaramillo is controlling. In Jaramillo a mine worker fell through a manhole when an insecure cover shifted as he stepped on it. 1981-NMCA-030, \u00b6 2.The safety device in question in Jaramillo was a manhole cover, provided by the employer at the work site but \u201cleft uncovered by the negligence of fellow employees.\u201d Id. \u00b6\u00b6 4-5. We hold that Jaramillo is not controlling in this case because a \u201cwet floor\u201d sign was not near the site of the accident. Moreover, the negligence of the fellow employee in this case was the complete failure to deploy a \u201cwet floor\u201d sign after mopping, not merely deploying the sign incorrectly.\nThis case is more analogous to Martinez, 1983-NMCA-063, and State, ex rel. Weich Roofing, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 590 N.E.2d 781 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990). In Martinez, an equipment operator was injured while operating a Bobcat tractor that was not equipped with a rear view mirror. 1983-NMCA-063, \u00b6\u00b6 11-12. The employer had other Bobcats equipped with rear view mirrors; Id. \u00b6 12. The Court of Appeals found that a rear view mirror was a safety device, that the employer failed to provide a rear view mirror, and affirmed the district court\u2019s award of an increase of benefits pursuant to Section 52-1 - 10(B). Martinez, 1983-NMCA-063, \u00b6\u00b6 16, 20, 26. The facts are similar here. Employer provided \u201cwet floor\u201d signs but one was not used at the accident site.\nIn Weich Roofing, a roofing employee ascended to the roof using a ladder equipped with safety feet in accordance with an applicable safety regulation. 590 N.E.2d at 782-83. While the employee was on the roof, a co-worker removed the ladder and substituted a wooden ladder without safety feet in its place. Id. at 783. The wooden ladder was the upper portion of an extension ladder. Id. The lower portion of the extension ladder had safety feet, but the upper portion did not. Id. When the employee descended from the roof, the wooden ladder slid out from under him causing injury. Id. The employer in Weich Roofingh&d specifically instructed employees to place safety shoes on the upper portion of an extension ladder when it was used separately and had made feet available on the crew\u2019s equipment truck. Id.\nOn appeal, the employer argued that safety feet were made available in the equipment truck and were therefore provided. Id. The employer also argued that the \u201cco-employee\u2019s negligent removal of and failure to use available safety equipment in violation of company policy\u201d relieved it of liability. Id. The Ohio court rejected employer\u2019s arguments, stating:\nRelator thus contends that the specific safety regulations require an employer to make required safety equipment available, not to ensure its proper use by employees. Nevertheless, this is not the law of Ohio. Specific safety requirements are enacted to protect the lives, health, or safety of employees. The employer, not the employee, has the obligation to comply with specific safety requirements. Although an employee or third-party may be assigned by the employer to ensure compliance with a specific safety requirement, the ultimate responsibility for failure to comply with such a requirement remains with the employer .... As this court recently observed, specific safety regulations are intended to protect employees from their own negligence, folly, or stupidity, in addition to providing them with a safe working environment.\nId. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).\nWeich Roofing is slightly different from this case because safety feet for ladders were specifically required by the Ohio Administrative Code. There is no such requirement for \u201cwet floor\u201d signs in New Mexico. Nonetheless, we find the rationale compelling and in line with the purpose and spirit of the Act that employers must create a safe work environment for their employees.\nHaving determined that a \u201cwet floor\u201d sign is an essential safety device at a work site where nurses are expected to promptly attend to the needs of numerous patients to provide critical care, we conclude that safety devices cannot effectuate their purposes if they are kept in utility closets or in storage. They must be \u201csupplied\u201d and \u201cused\u201d to prevent accidents. The mere fact that Employer had written policies and procedures in place and that \u201cwet floor\u201d signs were provided to custodians does not satisfy the spirit and purpose of the Act. Section 52-l-10(B) places the final responsibility and duty on the employer to furnish adequate safety devices for its workers. See Baca, 1967-NMSC-021, \u00b6 13.\nWorker was not warned of a dangerous situation when she entered the patient\u2019s room because there was not a \u201cwet floor\u201d sign posted near the room nor did she see any posted down the hallway. Further, the testimony from Mr. Fladd and Ms. Blount establish that this was not the only time that \u201cwet floor\u201d signs were not placed near a wet floor. Mr. Fladd testified that he had disciplined numerous of his employees for failing to post \u201cwet floor\u201d signs before Worker\u2019s accident. Ms. Blount testified that she also nearly fell on a slippery floor the same day as Worker and that no \u201cwet floor\u201d signs were posted. Worker and Ms. Blount had to take safety precautions into their own hands when Worker dried the wet floor with paper towels and Ms. Blount requested that \u201cwet floor\u201d signs be posted and stood watch to ensure that nobody else was injured on the slippery floor.\nWe also agree with Worker\u2019s contention that Section 52-1-8 prohibits shifting the blame for providing safety devices to the custodial staff. Section 52-1 -8(B) states that it shall not be a defense \u201cthat the injury or death was caused, in whole or in part, by the want of ordinary care of a fellow servant.\u201d This language affirms that Section 52-1 -10(B) imposes a responsibility on the employer to create a safe work environment by ensuring that safety devices are supplied and properly employed.\nThe rights of workers and the rights of employers must be subject to the same standards. See Section 52-5-1; Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 2001-NMSC-034, \u00b6 1, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148. Section 52-1 -10(A) provides that a worker\u2019s benefits shall be decreased by ten percent if an injury results from the worker\u2019s \u201cfailure to use a safety device provided by [the] employer.\u201d When Subsection (A) and (B) are read together, if a worker\u2019s failure to \u201cuse\u201d a safety device results in a 10% decrease in benefits, then an employer\u2019s failure to \u201csupply\u201d a safety device should likewise result in a 10% increase in benefits.\nWe hold that Employer failed to supply a safety device and that Worker is entitled to a 10% increase under Section 52-1-10(B). We are not unmindful that under the Act an employer is not to be held strictly liable for all violations. We do not hold here that Employer must provide constant over-the-shoulder supervision for each of its employees, but we do hold that in order to fulfill its statutory obligation, Employer must do more than issue written policies and procedures to its employees or conduct \u201cdepartment training\u201d shortly after hiring them.\nC. Section 52-5-1 does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers\nWorker asserts that interpretation of the laws is a power vested solely 'in the judiciary and that Section 52-5-1 is contrary to established case law that the Act should be interpreted under the rule of liberal construction. See Mascarenas v. Kennedy, 1964-NMSC-179, \u00b6 4, 74 N.M. 665, 397 P.2d 312 (\u201cWe are firmly committed to the doctrine that the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act is remedial legislation and must be liberally construed to effect its purpose.\u201d); Avila v. Pleasuretime Soda, Inc., 1977-NMCA-079, \u00b6 10, 90 N.M. 707, 568 P.2d 233 (\u201cIt requires no citation of authority that the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Actmustbe liberally construed to accomplish beneficent purposes for which it was enacted, and that all reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of employees.\u201d). Section 52-5-1, titled \u201cPurpose,\u201d reads in relevant part:\nIt is the specific intent of the legislature that benefit claims cases be decided on their merits and that the common law rule of \u201cliberal construction\u201d based on the supposed \u201cremedial\u201d basis of workers\u2019 benefits legislation shall not apply in these cases. . . . Accordingly, the legislature declares that the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act . . . [is] not remedial in any sense and [is] not to be given a broad liberal construction in favor of the claimant or employee on the one hand, nor are the rights and interests of the employer to be favored over those of the employee on the other hand.\nEmployer answers that this issue was not preserved because it was raised for the first time in this appeal. In the alternative, Employer\u2019s only argument is that when the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it must be given effect.\n\u201cTo preserve a question for review it must appear that a ruling or decision\u201d below was fairly invoked. Rule 12-216(A) NMRA. In Montez v. J & B Radiator, Inc., the Court of Appeals held that claimant\u2019s failure to raise a constitutional attack on the statute before the Workers\u2019 Compensation Division did not preclude appellate review, inasmuch as the Division had no authority to decide the issue. 1989-NMCA-060, \u00b6 7, 108 N.M. 752, 779 P.2d 129. Montez further stated that \u201c[rjaising such an issue before the hearing officer was not required in order to preserve it because he had no authority to decide the issue.\u201d Id.\nThe situation is similar here. Worker did not raise her constitutional argument in front of the WCJ. However, in her docketing statement to the Court of Appeals Worker did raise the question of \u201c[w]hether the WC J erred in his interpretation of \u00a7 52-1-10(B).\u201d The Court of Appeals issued its Memorandum Opinion dismissing her appeal before any briefs were submitted. We hold that Worker\u2019s issue was preserved.\nWorker\u2019s argument was previously advanced in Garcia v. Mt. Taylor Millwork, Inc., 1989-NMCA-100, 111 N.M. 17, 801 P.2d 87. The Court of Appeals concluded that Section 52-5-1 was not an attempt to undermine the jurisprudence developed by the appellate courts. Garcia, 1989-NMCA-100, \u00b6 9. Instead, the Court found Section 52-5-1 to be \u201ca prospectively applicable statement of legislative intent that neither attempts nor purports to retroactively dismantle established workers\u2019 compensation case law enunciated under the rule of liberal construction.\u201d Garcia, 1989-NMCA-100, \u00b6 9.\n\u201cWe have repeatedly held that every presumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity and regularity of legislative enactments. A statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless the court is satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that the legislature went outside the constitution in enacting the challenged legislation.\u201d McGeehan v. Bunch, 1975-NMSC-055, \u00b6 7, 88 N.M. 308, 540 P.2d 238 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Where \u201ca statute is susceptible to two constructions, one supporting it and the other rendering it void, a court should adopt the construction which will uphold its constitutionality.\u201d Huey v. Lente, 1973-NMSC-0984 6, 85 N.M. 597, 514 P.2d 1093. \u201cThe constitutional doctrine of separation of powers allows some overlap in the exercise of governmental function[s].\u201d Mowrer v. Rusk, 1980-NMSC-l 13, \u00b6 25, 95 N.M. 48, 618 P.2d 886.\nBy virtue of Worker\u2019s argument that Section 52-5-1 violates the doctrine of separation of powers and the holding in Garcia that it is only a statement of legislative intent, it is evident that Section 52-5-1 is susceptible to two constructions. We are not convinced \u201cbeyond all reasonable doubt\u201d that the legislature overstepped its bounds in enacting Section 52-5-1. We agree with the Court of Appeals in Garcia that the legislature did not intend the courts to disregard precedent by applying liberal construction. Garcia, 1989-NMCA-100, \u00b69. We also agree with the Court of Appeals that liberal construction can still be applied by this Court as it is but one of many tools employed in construing legislation. Id. \u00b6 11. We hold that Section 52-5-1 does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers.\nIV. CONCLUSION\nSection 52-l-10(B) imposes a duty on employers to ensure that they maintain a safe work environment by providing necessary safety devices. Employer cannot be said to have supplied \u201cwet floor\u201d signs just because they were made available to custodians. Employer must ensure that such safety devices are properly employed to avoid accidents such as Worker\u2019s. Therefore, Worker is entitled to a 10% increase in benefits. We also hold that Section 52-5-1 is constitutional.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nPETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice\nWE CONCUR:\nBARBARA J. VIGIL, Chief Justice\nRICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice\nEDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice\nCHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice", "type": "majority", "author": "MAES, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Gerald A. Hanrahan Albuquerque, NM for Petitioner", "Hale & Dixon, P.C. Timothy S. Hale Albuquerque, NM for Respondents" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2014-NMSC-037\nFiling Date: November 6, 2014\nDocket No. 34,128\nSARA BENAVIDES, Worker-Petitioner, v. EASTERN NEW MEXICO MEDICAL CENTER and ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Employer/Insurer-Respondents.\nGerald A. Hanrahan Albuquerque, NM for Petitioner\nHale & Dixon, P.C. Timothy S. Hale Albuquerque, NM for Respondents" }, "file_name": "0055-01", "first_page_order": 71, "last_page_order": 81 }