{ "id": 4241619, "name": "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN GREEN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Green", "decision_date": "2014-12-11", "docket_number": "No. 34,939; Docket No. 31,787", "first_page": "173", "last_page": "183", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2015-NMCA-007" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "2008-NMCA-103", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4002593 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/144/0574-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMCA-076", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 929186 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/137/0674-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMCA-086", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3691461 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/142/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-016", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4244296 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "2001-NMCA-060", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 352568 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/130/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 N.M. 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1592893 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/108/0604-01" ] }, { "cite": "1989-NMCA-036", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 4" }, { "page": "\u00b6 5" }, { "page": "\u00b6 11" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 N.M. 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 716982 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/110/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "1990-NMSC-067", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 8, 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2004-NMCA-049", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1427962 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 16" }, { "page": "\u00b6 36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/135/0490-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.M. 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1575569 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/95/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "1980-NMCA-122", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 19" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 N.M. 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582527 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/98/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "1982-NMCA-111", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 15" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3553", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "463 F.3d 526", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 3722104 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/463/0526-01" ] }, { "cite": "1972-NMCA-135", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 5" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 P.3d 251", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2013-NMCERT-010", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 P.3d 493", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2013-NMCA-011", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4191871 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 24" }, { "page": "\u00b6 25" }, { "page": "\u00b6 26" }, { "page": "\u00b6 28" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 27-34" }, { "page": "\u00b6 36" }, { "page": "\u00b6 37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/3/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 N.M. 295", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2770906 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/84/0295-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMCA-092", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3671424 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6 3" }, { "page": "\u00b6 3" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 U.S. 25", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12045986 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that a district court may accept a defendant's guilty plea despite an absence of admission to criminal wrongdoing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/400/0025-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1226, "char_count": 33595, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.207966869300525e-08, "percentile": 0.3279212417403486 }, "sha256": "e84b41843f035473e4c8a89ff76c3d1f1ea368a3e204cf512f3cd8e8a49ff726", "simhash": "1:836edb16e57a0541", "word_count": 5124 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:10:55.229683+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "J. MILES HANISEE, Judge", "MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge", "M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge" ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN GREEN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nHANISEE, Judge.\nThis appeal follows the revocation of Defendant\u2019s probation and his ensuing return to incarceration in order to conclude his original term of imprisonment in full. In 2003, after pleading guilty to second-degree kidnapping and murder, Defendant was sentenced to nineteen years, of which nine were suspended by the district court. In 2008, after about five years in prison, Defendant was released on probation. Within months of his release, however, the State began to allege what became a series of ensuing violations that culminated in the revocation of Defendant\u2019s probation. Ultimately, the district court ordered Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in prison, including a previously imposed one year habitual offender enhancement. Defendant appeals both the revocation of his probation, as well as the conditions of probation. We affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nIn 2001 Defendant was indicted for the kidnapping, rape, and murder of Kathryn Dockweiller, an Albuquerque attorney, in 1988. Defendant was allowed to plead guilty, pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (holding that a district court may accept a defendant\u2019s guilty plea despite an absence of admission to criminal wrongdoing), to second-degree murder, contrary to NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-2-l(B) (1980) and kidnapping, contrary to NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-4-1 (1973). During the plea hearing, Defendant did not oppose the State\u2019s request that the district court take judicial notice of the grand jury proceedings and content of the indictment to establish a factual basis for the plea.\nThe record reveals that Detective Bill Peters of the cold-case unit of the Bernalillo County Sheriffs Department provided testimony to the grand jury that indicted Defendant. He informed the grand jury that Ms. Dockweiller had disappeared on May 12, 1988, and was found several days later in a shallow grave, still bound and gagged. The Office of the Medical Investigator (OMI) concluded that the nature and manner of death had been homicide by strangulation. Pursuant to the death investigation conducted by OMI, vaginal swabs were taken from Ms. Dockweiller that revealed the presence of semen within Ms. Dockweiller\u2019s body thathad been deposited there \u201cat or near the time of her death.\u201d Defendant was originally a suspect in Ms. Dockweiller\u2019s murder, and following a report from his ex-wife over a decade later, wherein she disclosed her discovery of Ms. Dockweiller\u2019s calendar concealed within Defendant\u2019s vehicle, Detective Peters obtained a search warrant for Defendant\u2019s DNA, which was found to match the DNA obtained from Ms. Dockweiler\u2019s body. Based on this discovery, Defendant was indicted and chose to plead guilty in lieu of trial.\nFollowing the plea colloquy, the district court observed that the murder of Ms. Dockweiller was in fact the second murder Defendant had committed. A pre-sentencing report informed the district court that Defendant had been previously sentenced to serve a twenty-year period of imprisonment in Texas based upon an unrelated homicide and attempt to commit criminal rape in 1979. Based on the circumstances of the instant case and in light of Defendant\u2019s past criminal history, the district court ordered that he serve the statutory maximum penalty of nine years for the second-degree murder of Ms. Dockweiller, nine additional years for her kidnapping, and an extra year because he was a habitual offender. Due to the ten-year sentencing cap established within the plea agreement, however, the district court suspended nine of Defendant\u2019s nineteen year cumulative sentence. It imposed the maximum available period of probation of five years, alongside two years of supervised parole. In its judgment and sentence, the district court ordered probation to be wholly conditioned upon Defendant \u201cobeyfing] all rules, regulations^] and orders of the [probation [authorities.\u201d\nWhen Defendant was released from prison, he signed a sex offender behavioral contract. Although not required to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 29-11 A-1 to -10 (1995, as amended through 2013), Defendant was compelled to comply with various sex-offender-related terms of probation, including abstention from the purchase, possession, or subscription to \u201cany sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material.\u201d In the contract, Defendant agreed that probation authorities were free to examine any computer Defendant could access for inappropriate content, including, but not limited to pornography. Within months of Defendant\u2019s release and placement on probation in 2008, probation authorities alleged that he was in violation of specific prohibitions to which he had agreed. Specifically, the probation violation report alleged that Defendant had associated with other probationers and parolees, responded to personal dating ads on the internet, and left the county withoutpermission. He was arrested on the probation violations, and the State sought revocation of his probation.\nAt the time, Defendant challenged the allegations on the grounds that the sex offender behavioral contract he was required to sign was not reasonably related to the charges of conviction, and that the \u201coverbroad, pervasive, and undifferentiated restrictions\u201d associated with sex offender probation violated his due process rights. He relied on State v. Williams, in which we held that a defendant not convicted of a sex offense under SORNA cannotbe subjected to SORNA requirements. 2006-NMCA-092, \u00b6 12, 140 N.M. 194, 141 P.3d 538. The State, through the New Mexico Corrections Department (NMCD), filed a response, maintaining that the crimes of conviction, considered alongside what was known regarding his prior murder conviction, justified the probationary supervision he received. NMCD asserted that probation authorities have broad discretion to supervise probationers with those conditions it deems appropriate and that NMSA 1978, Section 31-21-4 (1963) requires that the post-release probationary treatment of persons convicted of crimes \u201cshall take into consideration their individual characteristics, circumstances, need[s,] and potentialities.\u201d Following a hearing, the district court denied Defendant\u2019s motion to modify the terms and conditions of his probation, yet did not then revoke Defendant\u2019s probation.\nIn May 2011 Defendant was again arrested for what were alleged to be additional probation violations. This time, the probation report asserted that Defendant: (1) was in violation ofhis behavioral contract as he was found to have pornographic imagery on his computer; (2) had responded to personal advertisements on his laptop computer in violation of the behavioral contract; and (3) had violated his probation by associating with other probationers and parolees. During the ensuing violation hearing, Officer Baum, Defendant\u2019s probation supervisor, testified that when Defendant had initially signed the behavioral contract and Defendant had reviewed the conditions contained within it, specifically including the conditions on computer usage that disallowed pornography and sexually explicit material. The officer testified that upon opening and examining Defendant\u2019s computer, he observed a \u201cphoto of a nude woman.\u201d Officer Baum testified that he asked Defendant if \u201cthere [were] any porn images\u201d on the computer, and Defendant replied that-there were. Officer Baum stated that he and a colleague later conducted a forensic examination of the computer and found numerous pornographic images. Over Defendant\u2019s objection as to foundation, a collage of the images found were entered into evidence as State\u2019s Exhibit 2 (Exhibit 2) during Defendant\u2019s revocation hearing. Following the hearing, the court revoked Defendant\u2019s probation and ordered that he serve the remainder ofhis original sentence.\nDefendant appeals the revocation ofhis probation on three bases, arguing that: (1) the requirement that he sign a sex offender behavior contract was an illegal condition of probation; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support any of the probation violations found by the district court or, in the alternative, he lacked notice that his conduct could constitute violations of the conditions of probation; and (3) the images found on Defendant\u2019s laptop lacked aproper foundation and should have been determined to be inadmissible.\nLEGALITY OF CONDITIONS OF PROBATION\nNew Mexico law places squarely within purview of the district court the authority to order a defendant to \u201csatisfy any other conditions reasonably related to . . . rehabilitation.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 31-20-6(F) (2007). An award of probation is a discretionary act of the sentencing court, and a challenge to its terms and conditions is reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Williams, 2006-NMCA-092, \u00b6 3. \u201cHowever, a sentencing court may not impose an illegal sentence. [I]t does not have the discretion to impose a probation term or condition that is contrary to law.\u201d Id. \u00b6 4. \u201cWe review the legality of a [criminal] sentence under the de novo standard of review.\u201d Id.\nThe Conditions of Probation Imposed by NMCD were Authorized by the District Court\nDefendant first contends that the conditions of probation to which he was required to adhere were illegal because NMCD lacked the authority to mandate that his release be conditioned upon his being party to any \u201csex offender behavior contract\u201d that included conditions not expressly provided within the district court\u2019s-judgment and sentence. To support his argument, Defendant relies upon Section 31 -20-6, which requires that the sentencing court attach to its order \u201creasonable conditions as it may deem necessary to ensure that the defendant will observe the laws of the United States and the various states and the ordinances of any municipality.\u201d Defendant additionally relies on State v. Martinez, which states that \u201c[c]onditions [of probation] may not be added by amendment subsequent to imposition of a valid original judgment.\u201d 1972-NMCA-l 3 5, \u00b6 4, 84 N.M. 295, 502 P.2d 320.\nConsidering this same issue, our Court determined that a district court\u2019s enumeration of a special probationary condition that the defendant \u201ccomply with any other reasonable conditions specified by the Probation and Parole Division[,]\u201d is sufficient indicia to justify placement of a defendant on sex offender supervision. State v. Leon, 2013-NMCA-011, \u00b6 24, 292 P.3d 493 (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. quashed, 2013-NMCERT-010, 313 P.3d 251. In Leon, we cited to Martinez, where the defendant \u201cargued that the conditions imposed by the probation office were without legal effect because they were not part of the district court\u2019s order deferring his sentence.\u201d Leon, 2013-NMCA-011, \u00b6 25. We determined that the language of the order in Martinez made the conditions imposed by the probation office the conditions ofthe defendant\u2019s probation. 1972-NMCA-135, \u00b6 5.\nHere, the district court\u2019s order generally stated that \u201cDefendant is ordered to be placed on supervised probation . , . on condition that Defendant obey all rules, regulations},] and orders of the [probation [authorities.\u201d As in both Martinez and Leon, the district court\u2019s judgment and sentence incorporates language which justified specific, individual requirements of probation. \u201cThat the terms and conditions set by the probation office were not spelled out in the order itself did not establish that those terms and conditions were not imposed by the court.\u201d Leon, 2013-NMCA-011, \u00b6 26. On both our precedent and the facts of this case, we determine that the conditions of probation were sufficiently stated in the district court\u2019s original judgment and sentence.\nRelying on United States v. Carter, 463 F.3d 526 (6th Cir. 2006), Defendant nonetheless argues that NMCD failed to adequately justify its decision imposing sex offender conditions upon Defendant and that it never established that a sexual offense was committed in the first place. Carter stated that a district court must justify special conditions of supervised release at the time of sentencing and must \u201cstate in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence^]\u201d Id. at 528 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But we do not find Carter to be helpful or supportive ofDefendant\u2019s position. Specifically, Carter does not support Defendant\u2019s contention that NMCD was required \u201cto state its reasons and rationale for mandating special sex offender conditions- of probation.\u201d Carter imposes, in a federal context, explanatory requirements solely upon the district court, not upon any probationary entity. More importantly, this requirement is imposed pursuant to federal statute, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3553(c) (2010), a mandate the New Mexico Legislature has not adopted. See State v. Lack, 1982-NMCA-111, \u00b6 15, 98 N.M. 500, 650 P.2d 22 (\u201cAuthority to grant probation is a matter of legislative grace, and the district court\u2019s power to impose probation is purely statutory.\u201d).\nWe conclude that Defendant has not established that Carter, or any argument he has made regarding the behavioral contract, is able to overcome the probationary discretion authorized by Martinez and Leon that extends from the district court to probation authorities when worded as the district court did in this case. The behavioral contract Defendant was required to sign upon his release from prison and commencement of probation was a proper exercise of probationary authority pursuant to the judgment and sentence that followed and was based upon the plea agreement Defendant also signed. Defendant\u2019s signature on the plea agreement, provided in the presence of his attorney, acknowledged his understanding of its terms that included the five-year period of probation and warned that any violation could lead to Defendant\u2019s return to incarceration for the balance of the original sentence imposed..\nThe District Court Did Not Err in Denying Defendant\u2019s Motion to Modify the Conditions of Probation\nDefendant next argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying Defendant\u2019s motion to modify the conditions of release as no reasonable relationship existed between Defendant\u2019s convictions and the conditions of probation. He additionally argues that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support sex offender probation. Among other conditions, the sex offender supervision behavioral contract required that Defendant abstain from purchasing, possessing, or subscribing \u201cto any sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material.\u201d He was also prohibited from possessing pornography. Defendant asserts that he was not convicted of a sexual offense, nor was there a factual basis or evidence supporting an inference that a sexual offense occurred, and therefore, these conditions were not reasonably related to his convictions of second-degree murder and kidnapping.\nUnder the abuse of discretion standard appropriate for our review of conditions of probation, \u201cwe will not set . . . aside [the terms and conditions of a probation] unless they[:] (1) have no reasonable relationship to the offense for which the defendant was convicted, (2) relate to activity which is not itself criminal in nature, and (3) require or forbid conduct which is not reasonably related to deferring future criminality.\u201d Williams, 2006-NMCA-092, \u00b6 3 (emphasis, alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). \u201cTo be reasonably related, the probation condition must be relevant to the offense for which probation was granted.\u201d State v. Gardner, 1980-NMCA-122, \u00b6 19, 95 N.M. 171, 619 P.2d 847. On appeal, it is Defendant\u2019s burden to persuade us that the district court erred and abused its discretion in holding that a reasonable relationship existed between Defendant\u2019s kidnapping and murder convictions and his conditions of probation. Leon, 2013-NMCA-011, \u00b6 28; State v. Baca, 2004-NMCA-049, \u00b6 16, 135 N.M. 490, 90 P.3d 509. We determine Defendant failed to do so, and we remain unpersuaded by his conclusions to the contrary.\nAs we have stated, Defendant pleaded guilty to the second-degree kidnapping of Ms. Dockweiler. The statute at the time of her kidnapping and murder defined kidnapping as \u201cthe unlawful taking, restraining or confining of a person, by force or deception, with intent that the victim ... (3) be held to service against the' victim\u2019s will.\u201d Section 30-4-l(A)(3). Our Supreme Court has recognized that \u201c \u2018hfolding] for servicefs]\u2019 \u201d can include holding a victim for sexual purposes. See State v. McGuire, 1990-NMSC-067, \u00b6\u00b6 8, 12, 110 N.M. 304, 795 P.2d 996. The district court record indeed contains evidence supporting the State\u2019s assertion that there was a sexual element to Defendant\u2019s crime. There was testimony before the grand jury that Defendant\u2019s semen was located within Ms. Dockweiler\u2019s deceased body and that it was \u201cdeposited at or near the time of her death.\u201d Furthermore, Defendant had been indicted by the grand jury on a charge of first degree criminal sexual penetration, a fact that the district court addressed at the hearing on Defendant\u2019s motion to modify in response to Defendant\u2019s assertion that the State did not present evidence that it believed a sex crime was committed. Lastly, the pre-sentence report indicates that this was not the first instance in which Defendant was charged with a sexually based crime; Defendant was previously charged with \u201c[ajttemptto [cjommit [cjriminal [rjape\u201d in the state of Texas.\nThus, Defendant\u2019s contention that the requirement that he sign and adhere to a sex offender behavior contract bore no relation to facts suitable for the district court\u2019s or probation authorities\u2019 reliance is inaccurate and incomplete. His contention that these things are too remote in time or that he \u201cnever had an opportunity to challenge those assertions\u201d misunderstands the distinction between what would have been required to convict him of sex offenses during a trial on the merits and what is properly relied upon to inform those tasked with maintaining community safety at the time Defendant was permitted to leave prison before his sentence was complete.\nAgain in this regard, we rely on Leon, 2013-NMCA-011, \u00b6\u00b6 27-34. There, the defendant pled no contest to contributing to the delinquency of a minor and selling or giving alcohol ito a minor. Id. \u00b6 2. Upon suspension of his sentence, the defendant was ordered by NMCD to sign a sex offender behavior contract. The defendant already had a prior felony conviction for a sex offense. Id. \u00b6 3. This Court acknowledged that the defendant\u2019s current convictions involved criminal contact with minors and based on these circumstances, in addition to the defendant\u2019s criminal history, the district court did not err in determining that a sex offender behavior contract was reasonably related to the current convictions, rehabilitation, and public safety. i\u00edf.-\u00b6\u00b6 30-31.\nAlthough we recognize that in the case before us Defendant had not been convicted of a sexual offense, as had the defendant in Leon, such is not fatal to the conditions of Defendant\u2019s probation. Defendant was in fact charged with a sexual offense on two prior occasions and indicted by a grand jury on one of those charges. As in Leon, Defendant\u2019s current conviction involved criminal contact with Ms. Dockweiller, and what is more crucial to our analysis is, not only was it criminal contact, but of a sexual nature. What had become the cold case of Ms. Dockweiller\u2019s murder was solved solely as a result of the discovery that the semen found in her deceased body was Defendant\u2019s. It would be inappropriate that our Legislature\u2019s instruction that probation authorities study a defendant\u2019s case to determine that individual\u2019s \u201ccharacteristics, circumstances, needs and potentialities},]\u201d Section 31-21-4, somehow be viewed to require exclusion of such a material fact. Given the available facts regarding Defendant\u2019s current convictions, considered alongside his alarmingly similar criminal history, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in ruling that the conditions of his probation were reasonably related to his current convictions, rehabilitation, or public safety. See Leon, 2013 -NMCA-011, \u00b6 27 (\u201cThe court has broad discretion to effect rehabilitation and may impose conditions designed to protect the public against the commission of other offenses during the term, and which have as their objective the deterrence of future misconduct.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Baca, 2004-NMCA-049, \u00b6 36 (\u201cThe general purposes of probation... are rehabilitation and deterrence, for community safety[.]\u201d).\nSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT PROBATION REVOCATION\nDefendant next asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support any of the alleged probation violations upon which his probation was revoked. The probation violation report alleged numerous violations, one being violation of the sex offender behavior contract that directly prohibited possession of sexual images on Defendant\u2019s laptop. Defendant contends that this condition was overly vague such that a \u201creasonable person would not have known that the nude images would be considered pornography[,]\u201d and thus he contends that the evidence was insufficient to support revocation of his probation. The State argues that the images depict pornographic, sexually oriented, or sexually stimulating photographic depictions, the very' content Defendant was disallowed from possessing and was forewarned would constitute violative conduct.\nProof of a probation violation need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Martinez, 1989-NMCA-036, \u00b6 4, 108 N.M. 604, 775 P.2d 1321. Instead, the evidentiary standard is that the violation must be established with a reasonable certainty, such that a reasonable and impartial mind would believe that the defendant violated the terms of probation. State v. Sanchez, 2001-NMCA-060, \u00b6 13, 130 N.M. 602, 28 P.3d 1143. The burden of proving a violation with reasonable certainty lies with the State. Leon, 2013-NMCA-011, \u00b6 36. \u201cWe review [a district] court\u2019s decision to revoke probation under an abuse of discretion standard. To establish an abuse of discretion, it must appear the [district] court acted unfairly or arbitrarily, or committed manifest error.\u201d Martinez, 1989-NMCA-036, \u00b6 5 (citations omitted). We conclude that the State has met its burden, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Defendant\u2019s probation.\nUpon his release from custody, Defendant signed the sex offender behavior contract, and he acknowledged that he \u201cread, or . . . had read to [him], and understood] these additional supervision conditions.\u201d The contract stated, under condition A of the \u201ccomputers/electronics/entertainment\u201d provision, that Defendant was prohibited from possessing \u201cany sexually oriented or sexually stimulating material.\u201d The condition explains that this \u201cincludes, but is not limited to: [s]exual devices, books, magazines, video/audio tapes, DVDs, CD ROMs, and [i]nternet websites.\u201d Condition C of the same provision stated that any computer to which Defendant had access would be subject to examination for inappropriate content, including but not limited to pornography or adult websites. Officer Baum had reviewed the conditions of probation with Defendant, and specifically informed Defendant that probation authorities would have \u201cfull access to [his] computer to do any searches on it for pornography or sexually explicitmaterial.\u201d He testified that he informed Defendant that he was not to possess \u201cany sexually explicit material[,]\u201d including \u201c[p]ictures[,] [n]aked women [or] [m]en. Anything that\u2019s sexually explicit.\u201d\nBaum additionally testifiedthatupon performing a field visit, he and another probation officer located and searched Defendant\u2019s computer. Baum explained that in conducting the computer search he initially saw \u201ca photo of a nude woman,\u201d and that Defendant \u201cacknowledged that there was pornography on his computer[.]\u201d Baum testified that he was present during a forensic examination that was conducted on Defendant\u2019s computer and viewed the resulting report containing the nude images. Exhibit 2 is the report and collage of nude images the State entered into evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court found that Defendant violated paragraph C of the \u201ccomputers/electronics/entertainment\u201d provision of the sex offender behavior contract, ruling that the images discovered on Defendant\u2019s computer were in fact pornography and revoked Defendant\u2019s probation.\nAlthough our case law contains little guidance on the definition of adult pornography, we are helped by our Supreme Court\u2019s definition of \u201c \u2018sexually explicit exhibition\u2019 \u201d and our Legislature/s definition of \u201csexual conduct\u201d in the context of sexual exploitation of children and sexually oriented material harmful to minors, respectively. Our Supreme Court has defined the term \u201csexually explicit exhibition\u201d as a \u201cgraphic and unequivocal display or portrayal of nudity or sexual activity.\u201d State v. Myers, 2009-NMSC-016, \u00b6 19, 146 N.M. 128, 207 P.3d 1105. Furthermore, our Legislature defines \u201csexual conduct\u201d as an \u201cact of masturbation, . . . physical contact with a person\u2019s clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks or, if such person be female, breast[.]\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a730-37-l(C) (1973). Weconclude each of these definitions encompasses that which is \u201csexually oriented\u201d within the terms of Defendant\u2019s sex offender behavior contract. Moreover, each such category was included within the many images collected by Defendant on his laptop hard drive.\nWhat Defendant contends to be \u201cmere nudity,\u201d we, like the district court before us, hold to be at least nine images of or depicting sexual activity and/or physical contact with unclothed female genitals or buttocks. Given the highly sexual nature of these images, in conjunction with Officer Baum\u2019s testimony that he informed Defendant that possession of these types of images were disallowed under the sex offender behavior contract, we conclude that not only did Defendant have notice of the prohibitions, but that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable mind to conclude that Defendant violated this condition of probation and that the district court\u2019s revocation of Defendant\u2019s probation did not constitute an abuse of discretion.\nADMISSIBILITY OF PHOTOGRAPHS\nAs his last point of appeal, Defendant argues that the photographs contained in Exhibit 2 were improperly admitted on the basis that the State failed to properly authenticate or lay a sufficient foundation for their admission. \u201cWe review the district court\u2019s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.\u201d State v. Neal, 2007-NMCA-086, \u00b6 36, 142 N.M. 487, 167 P.3d 935. Although Defendant acknowledges that the rules of evidence do not apply to probation revocation hearings, he nonetheless argues that his due process rights were violated because Exhibit 2 was improperly admitted.\nAt the probation revocation hearing, Officer Baum testified that, after he saw the initial nude photograph on Defendant\u2019s computer, he arrested Defendant for a probation violation, and was present while another officer conducted a forensic examination on Defendant\u2019s computer. Baum testified that he saw the report containing the images that was generated from the examination and printed that report. Baum identified Exhibit 2 as the report he printed from the scan of Defendants computer based on a sticky note he placed on the document and the document itself. When the State sought admission of Exhibit 2 into evidence, Defendant objected on the grounds that the State had failed to lay the proper foundation. Defendant argued that another officer ran the software on Defendant\u2019s computer, and Baum merely \u201cwent and grabbed documents off the printer}, and] he ha[d] no idea how it all happened before then.\u201d Defendant asserted that it was too far of a stretch for Baum \u201cto say that [the images] that came off the printer necessarily [were] on [Defendant\u2019s] computer.\u201d The district court disagreed and admitted the photos into evidence, explaining that Baum \u201cwas present at all times that the forensic examination was conducted},]\u201d and that he was \u201cable to identify it... in court as the material that he saw at the time that the scan was done.\u201d\nDefendant now argues that Officer B aum could not provide proper authentication testimony to establish that Exhibit 2 was originally located on Defendant\u2019s computer. He also suggests that the images were placed on the computer by the software used by probation authorities, and notes that Baum cannot testify that the images were not already stored on the software prior to the forensic analysis of Defendant\u2019s computer. Defendant additionally contests Baum\u2019s identification of the document containing the images, asserting that \u201c[i]t is inconceivable that Officer Baum actually recognized the images themselves from a single prior viewing\u201d and that \u201cBaum\u2019s recognition of the sticky note is an improper authentication for admission of the attached packet.\u201d\nThe primary problem with Defendant\u2019s challenge to the admission of Exhibit 2 is that rules of evidence do not apply during probation revocation hearings. See Rule 11-1101(D)(3)(d) NMRA; Rule 11-901 NMRA. Moreover, Defendant fails to cite any authority in support of his request that we apply an evidentiary standard to the contrary. Despite the detail in which he addresses what he perceives to be the failed evidentiary and admissibility underpinnings of Exhibit 2, we will not consider this argument. See State v. Vaughn, 2005-NMCA-076, \u00b6 42, 137 N.M. 674, 114 P.3d 354 (stating that \u201cthis Court will not consider an argument that lacks citation to any legal authority in support of that argument\u201d).\nD efendant additionally argues that he was denied the opportunity to question the officer who performed the forensic scan of his computer regarding the forensic software or the administration of the scan. Defendant asserts that the technique used in the software search to locate the images on Defendant\u2019s computer is vital to establishing that Defendant had knowledge that the images were on his computer, and the district court erred in finding knowing possession \u201cwithout any foundational testimony.\u201d Although Defendant acknowledges that he is not alleging a confrontation violation, he maintains that his due process rights were violated as a result of allowing Officer Baum to lay the foundation for the admission of Exhibit 2. We disagree.\nIn our review of the record we notice that Officer Baum testified that after he located the first nude image on Defendant\u2019s computer, he questioned Defendant about whether \u201cthere [were] any porn images\u201d on the computer, and Defendant acknowledged that there were. In probation violation hearings, the district court performs two separate roles, fact finding and disposition. Martinez, 1989-NMCA-036, \u00b6 11. In this context, Officer Baum\u2019s testimony bore the capacity to establish that Defendant knew there was prohibited material on his computer. \u201cIt is the court\u2019s sound judgment that is invoked, and the exercise of that judgment will not be reversed on appeal unless it was mistakenly exercised.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Given this testimony, we cannot conclude that the district court\u2019s decision to revoke Defendant\u2019s probation was \u201cclearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances of the case[,]\u201d or that its ruling was \u201cclearly untenable or not justified by reason.\u201d State v. Layne, 2008-NMCA-103, \u00b6 6, 144 N.M. 574, 189 P.3d 707 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, we affirm.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the revocation of Defendant\u2019s probation.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nJ. MILES HANISEE, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nMICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge\nM. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge\nWe note that on the \u201cRepeat Offender Plea and Disposition Agreement\u201d (plea agreement), the words \u201cno contest\u201d are crossed out and the phrase \u201cguilty pursuant to Alford\u2019 is written in its place. The plea agreement, which also established the sentencing parameters agreed to by the parties, was signed by the prosecutor as well as by Defendant and his attorney.\nAlthough the record does not shed light on how much of his sentence Defendant actually served in Texas, it was clearly less than the twenty years as he murdered Ms. Dockweiller in 1988, merely nine years later.\nBecause we affirm the district court\u2019s ruling with regard to the violation of the sex offender behavior contract, contrary to Condition 5 of Defendant\u2019s conditions of probation, wo will not reach the issue of whetherthere was sufficient evidence to prove the State\u2019s remaining allegations of probation violations. See Leon, 2013-NMCA-011, \u00b6 37 (stating that \u201calthough [the d]efendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting each of his probation violations, if there is sufficient evidence to support just one violation, wc will find the district court\u2019s order was proper\u201d).", "type": "majority", "author": "HANISEE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary K. King, Attorney General Santa Fe, NM Jacqueline R. Medina, Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM for Appellee", "Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender Kimberly Chavez Cook, Assistant Public Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellant" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Certiorari Denied, December 11, 2014,\nNo. 34,939\nIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2015-NMCA-007\nFiling Date: September 22, 2014\nDocket No. 31,787\nSTATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN GREEN, Defendant-Appellant.\nGary K. King, Attorney General Santa Fe, NM Jacqueline R. Medina, Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM for Appellee\nJorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender Kimberly Chavez Cook, Assistant Public Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellant" }, "file_name": "0173-01", "first_page_order": 189, "last_page_order": 199 }