{ "id": 4240967, "name": "CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, Respondent, v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES Local 1888, et.al., Petitioners", "name_abbreviation": "City of Albuquerque v. American Federation of State, Employees Local 1888", "decision_date": "2014-12-02", "docket_number": "Docket No. 32,917", "first_page": "361", "last_page": "367", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2015-NMCA-023" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "2000-NMSC-004", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 106478 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 20" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/128/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 N.M. 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1586426 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/101/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "1984-NMSC-050", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 3" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 1019", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1021", "parenthetical": "\"To remand is to send back. Further, the term implies that what is being sent back is returned from where it came. 'Remand' is subject to no other construction.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1998-NMSC-020", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 834209 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 4" }, { "page": "\u00b6 16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/125/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMCA-069", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3670129 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" }, { "page": "\u00b6 14" }, { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/141/0686-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 P.3d 108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2012-NMSC-007", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4187930 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" }, { "page": "\u00b6 9" }, { "page": "\u00b6 10" }, { "page": "\u00b6 10" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 9, 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/1/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMCA-034", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3783362 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/143/0637-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 P.3d 992", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2014-NMCA-082", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4239941 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" }, { "page": "\u00b6 10" }, { "page": "\u00b6 10" }, { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/6/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 N.M. 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2867377 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/89/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "1976-NMCA-039", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 7" }, { "page": "\u00b6 7" }, { "page": "\u00b6 7" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 729, "char_count": 16272, "ocr_confidence": 0.778, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.1408475938172457 }, "sha256": "51734293c8449f9fa41cc564359aca8e629b4d32e17a2ccb4b1e384df5da2019", "simhash": "1:191181fbfd1527ba", "word_count": 2589 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:10:55.229683+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge", "CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge", "MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge" ], "parties": [ "CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, Respondent, v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES Local 1888, et.al., Petitioners." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nGARCIA, Judge.\nWe granted the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees\u2019 (AFSCME) petition for writ of certiorari. AFSCME seeks review of a district court order that affirmed in part and reversed in part the administrative decision made by the Public Employee Labor Relations Board (the PELRB). The district court determined that the PELRB properly dismissed AFSCME\u2019s prohibited practice complaints against the City of Albuquerque (the City) because the PELRB did not have jurisdiction to hear those complaints. The district court also ruled that the PELRB had no authority to \u201cremand\u201d the dismissed prohibited practices complaints to the City\u2019s Labor Management Relations Board (the LMRB).\nThe critical issue involves the grandfather status of the LMRB under the Public Employee Bargaining Act (the PEBA). For approximately eighteen months, the LMRB was not functioning to resolve employee complaints because the board was missing one of its required three members. AFSCME asserted that the PELRB had jurisdiction under the PEBA to hear the prohibited practice complaints filed during the time period that the LMRB was not functioning. Alternatively, AFSCME asserts that the PELRB has jurisdiction to remand these specific prohibited practice complaints directly to the LMRB once it began to function again. Under the undisputed factual circumstances presented for review, we affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nThe Complaints\nAFSCME represents the City\u2019s employees in their collective bargaining and labor disputes with the City. Between September 2010 and June 2011, AFSCME filed several prohibited practice complaints against the City. It did not file these complaints with the LMRB, but instead filed them directly with the PELRB. It alleged in these complaints that the PELRB had jurisdiction to hear them because the LMRB had been \u201cnon-functional since December, 2009.\u201d\nThe PELRB\u2019s Dismissal and Remand\nThe City asked the PELRB to dismiss the subject complaints that were filed directly with the PELRB. It argued that the City was not subject to the PELRB\u2019s jurisdiction because it has grandfather status under the PEBA and the LMRB has exclusive jurisdiction to hear those complaints against the City that AFSCME filed with the PELRB.\nThe PELRB\u2019s hearing officer recommended that the complaints be dismissed. He concluded that the PELRB did not have jurisdiction over the complaints because, at the time of his recommendation, the LMRB had resumed functioning to process employee complaints against the City. In reaching this conclusion, the PELRB hearing officer suggested that the PELRB would have jurisdiction over the complaints if the LMRB was not \u201cproductive\u201d or \u201cfunctioning\u201d at the time of his recommendation. The hearing officer also recommended that the complaints be \u201cremanded\u201d to the LMRB. The PELRB then issued a final decision that adopted the hearing officer\u2019s recommendations to dismiss the complaints and remand them to the LMRB.\nThe City\u2019s Appeal to the District Court\nThe City appealed the PELRB\u2019s decision to the district court. It argued that the PELRB had no jurisdiction to hear the complaints \u2014 even if LMRB was not hearing them at the time of the PELRB decision \u2014 and thus, it had no authority to remand the complaints to the LMRB. The district court agreed with the .City that the PELRB did not have jurisdiction to hear the complaints and that it also lacked authority to remand the complaints to the LMRB. It effectively rejected the argument that the PELRB could exercise any type of jurisdiction over the complaints at the time the PELRB decision was rendered.\nDISCUSSION\nIn its brief in chief, AFSCME renews the arguments it made in front of the PELRB and the district court. It argues that the PELRB may assume jurisdiction over complaints involving a public employer entitled to grandfather status under the PEBA when that employer\u2019s labor relations board is not operating at the time, and thus, that the PELRB also had the authority to remand the complaints to the LMRB once it returned to an operating status.\nI. General Principles and Standard of Review\n\u201cAdministrative bodies are the creatures of statutes.\u201d Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. v. N.M. Envtl. Improvement Bd., 1976-NMCA-039, \u00b6 7, 89 N.M. 223, 549 P.2d 638. They can act only on matters that are within the scope of the authority that a statute has delegated to them \u201ceither expressly or by necessary implication.\u201d Jones v. Holiday Inn Express, 2014-NMCA-082, \u00b6 9, 331 P.3d 992 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M., 1976-NMCA-039, \u00b6 7.\nWhether an administrative body has acted beyond the scope of its authority is a question of statutory construction that we review de novo. See Jones, 2014-NMCA-082, \u00b6 10; Leonard v. Payday Prof\u2019l/Bio-Cal Comp., 2008-NMCA-034, \u00b6 11, 143 N.M. 637, 179 P.3d 1245. When construing a statute, we \u201cdetermine and give effect to legislative intent\u201d by looking to the plain meaning of the statute\u2019s words and reading its provisions \u201ctogether to produce a harmonious whole.\u201d Jones, 2014-NMCA-082, \u00b6 10 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We begin by looking to the state and local labor-laws involved in this case.\nII. The City\u2019s Labor-Management Relations Ordinance\nIn the early 1970\u2019s, Albuquerque\u2019s city council adopted an ordinance governing the \u201c[l]abor-[m]anagement [Relations\u201d between the City and- its employees (the LMRO). See Albuquerque, N.M., Ordinances ch. 3, art. II, \u00a7\u00a7 3-2-1 to -18 (1971, as amended through 2002). Among other things, the LMRO gives City employees the right to organize for the purpose of collectively bargaining with the City. Albuquerque, N.M., Ordinances ch. 3, art. II, \u00a7\u00a7 3-2-2(A) and 3-2-3. And the LMRO prohibits the City and its employees from engaging in certain conduct, which it calls, \u201cprohibited practices.\u201d Albuquerque, N.M., Ordinance ch. 3, art. II \u00a7 3-2-9.\nThe LMRO requires that a three-member board \u201cbe formed[] to assist in the implementation and administration of the [ordinance].\u201d Albuquerque, N.M., Ordinance \u00a7 3-2-15. When a City employee believes that the City has engaged in a \u201cprohibited practice,\u201d he or she must submit a complaint to the LMRB within thirty days from the date that the alleged prohibited practice occurred. Albuquerque, N.M., Ordinance \u00a7 3-2-9(D). The City has five days to answer this complaint and, within five days of the City\u2019s answer, the LMRB must schedule a hearing. Id. Although the LMRO provides an avenue for the City or an employee to appeal the LMRB\u2019s decision, Albuquerque, N.M., Ordinance \u00a7 3-2-10(D), it does not identify or provide a specific remedy where the LMRB fails to timely render a decision.\nIII. The PEBA\nAbout twenty years after the City adopted its LMRO, the Legislature first enacted a statewide labor-management relations law for public employees (the PEBA). See City of Albuquerque v. Montoya, 2012-NMSC-007, \u00b6 9, 274 P.3d 108. The PEBA \u201cguarantees public employees the right to organize and bargain collectively with their employers.\u201d Id. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted); see NMSA 1978, \u00a7 10-7E-2 (2003). And it created the statewide PELRB. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 10-7E-8(A) (2003). The PELRB \u201chas the power to enforce provisions of the [PEBA.]\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 10-7E-9(A), (F) (2003).\nThe PEBA includes a grandfather clause for public employers who, like the City, had adopted their own collective bargaining systems before the PEBA was enacted. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 10-7E-26(A) (2003); Montoya, 2012-NMSC-007, \u00b6 9. This grandfather clause allows a public employer to \u201ccontinue to operate under [its own] provisions and procedures\u201d where two conditions are met. Section 10-7E-26(A). The first condition is that the public employer must have \u201cadopted by ordinance, resolution},] or charter amendment a system of provisions and procedures permitting employees to form, join[,] or assist a labor organization for the purpose of bargaining collectively.\u201d Id.; see Montoya, 2012-NMSC-007, \u00b6 10. The second condition is that this system must have been adopted before October 1, 1991. Section 10-7E-26(A); see Montoya, 2012-NMSC-007, \u00b6 10. Additionally, if a grandfathered public employer\u2019s pre-existing ordinance, resolution, or charter amendment \u201csubstantially] change[s] after January 1, 2003 [,]\u201d the grandfathered public employer must comply with additional provisions enumerated in Section 10-7E-26(B) of the PEBA. Section 10-7E-26(A). Thus, as long as a public employer\u2019s system of provisions and procedures meets the two conditions for grandfather status and the written policy adopting that system has not substantially changed after January 1, 2003, the employer does not have to comply with any other provisions of the PEBA. Id.; see Montoya, 2012-NMSC-007, \u00b6\u00b6 9, 11 (stating that Section 10-7E-26(A) is a \u201cgrandfather clause\u201d that \u201cremove[s] from the statute\u2019s reach a class that would otherwise be encompassed by its language\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also City of Deming v. Doming Firefighters Local 4521, 2007-NMCA-069, \u00b6 6, 141 N.M. 686, 160 P.3d 595 (recognizing that if the grandfather clause applies, \u201cthe PEBA does not apply\u201d).\nThe PEBA defines \u201ccollective bargaining\u201d as \u201cthe act of negotiating between a public employer and an exclusive representative for the purpose of entering into a written agreement regarding wages, hours [,] and other terms and conditions of employment}.]\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 10-7E-4(F) (2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The PEBA does not require grandfathered public employers, whose collective bargaining systems have not substantially changed after January 1,2003, to have local boards that are actively adjudicating employee grievances.\nIV. Analysis\nAFSCME does not dispute that the City\u2019s LMRO is entitled to grandfather status under the PEBA and that the LMRO has not substantially changed since January 1, 2003. Instead, AFSCME points to the PEBA\u2019s language that allows grandfathered public employers to \u201ccontinue to operate\u201d under their pre-existing systems. See \u00a7 10-7E-26(A). It submits that this language implies that the PELRB could hear complaints involving grandfathered public employers if the local boards created under those systems were not in fact \u201coperating\u201d or \u201cfunctioning\u201d to hear complaints. We disagree.\nThe PELRB was created by the PEBA and its authority is limited to those matters that the PEBA has delegated to it \u201ceither expressly or by necessary implication.\u201d Jones, 2014-NMCA-082, \u00b6 9 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M., 1976-NMCA-039, \u00b6 7; see also \u00a7 10-7E-8(A) (creating the PELRB). The PEBA does not expressly delegate any authority to the PELRB to hear complaints involving grandfathered public employers. But, by implication, the PELRB has the power to determine in the first place whether a public employer or aspects of its labor relations system meet the conditions.for grandfather status. See Deming Firefighters Local 4521, 2007-NMCA-069, \u00b6 14 (\u201c[T]he PELRB has the initial ability to determine its jurisdiction}.]\u201d).\nOnce the determination is made that a public employer and its labor relations system has grandfather status and that its collective bargaining system has not substantially changed after January 1, 2003, no other provision of the PEBA applies to that employer. Id. \u00b6 6 (explaining that if the grandfather clause applies, \u201cthe PEBA does not apply\u201d). And, if the public employer is not subject to the terms of the PEBA, then the PELRB has no jurisdiction to hear its complaints because the PELRB can only enforce the PEBA\u2014 it cannot enforce the LMRO. See \u00a7 10-7E-9(F) (noting that the PELRB \u201chas the power to enforce provisions of the [PEBA]\u201d); Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. N.M. Fed'n of Teachers, 1998-NMSC-020, \u00b6 4, 125 N.M. 401, 962 P.2d 1236 (recognizing that the \u201cPEBA created the PELRB, whose function is the administration of [the] PEBA\u201d); Deming Firefighters Local 4521, 2007-NMCA-069, \u00b6 6 (\u201c[Because the PEBA does not apply, the [PELRB] does not have jurisdiction.\u201d),\nWe therefore agree with the district court\u2019s conclusion that the PELRB did not have jurisdiction to hear AFSCME\u2019s complaints and that it did not act \u201cin accordance with law\u201d when it remanded the complaints to the LMRB. See Regents, 1998-NMSC-020, \u00b6 16 (recognizing that a court may reverse the PELRB\u2019s actions where those actions are \u201carbitrary, capricious[,] or an abuse of discretion; . . . not supported by substantial evidence on the record taken as a whole; or... otherwise not in accordance with law\u201d). Complaints cannot be \u201cremanded\u201d to a tribunal if they did not originate there. See Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1102 (abridged 9th ed. 2010) (defining \u201cremand\u201d as meaning \u201c[t]o send (a case or claim) back to the court or tribunal from which it came for some further action\u201d); see also Mid-Ohio Liquid Fertilizers, Inc. v. Lowe, 469 N.E.2d 1019, 1021 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (\u201cTo remand is to send back. Further, the term implies that what is being sent back is returned from where it came. \u2018Remand\u2019 is subject to no other construction.\u201d); Los Alamos Cnty. v. Beery, 1984-NMSC-050, \u00b6 3, 101 N.M. 157, 679 P.2d 825 (stating that an \u201corder of remand simply returns the jurisdiction of the cause to the lower court in which it originated\u201d). And the PEBA does not grant the PELRB the authority, either expressly or by necessary implication, to transfer complaints against a public employer to other tribunals. See \u00a710-7E-9 (\u201cBoard; powers and duties.\u201d).\nWe note that this decision is limited to the narrow issue of jurisdiction under the PEBA. AFSCME has not challenged whether the City\u2019s LMRO continued to be entitled to grandfather status because the LMRB was not \u201coperating\u201d for over eighteen months. It also did not raise any arguments involving due process, equity, or other legal principles. Thus, we do not address these issues. See State v. Bell, 2014-NMCA-___, \u00b6 19, ___ P.3d ___(No. 31,890, Sept. 9, 2014) (\u201cWe do not address issues or questions unraised by litigants.\u201d). AFSCME has not asked this Court to review the decision of the PELRB under a legal principle that might allow us to employ the right-for-any-reason doctrine. Under the circumstances, we will not consider any other legal principle under the theory that the PELRB decision was right for any reason. See Meiboom v. Watson, 2000-NMSC-004, \u00b6 20,128 N.M. 536, 994 P.2d 1154 (stating that appellate courts, will not assume the role of the fact finder and delve into fact-dependent inquiries for purposes of a \u201cright for any reason\u201d analysis).\nV. AFSCME\u2019s Lack of Any Remedy Argument\nWe disagree with AFSCME\u2019s final argument that the district court\u2019s decision will result in \u201can impossible legal vacuum\u201d and create a \u201cright without a remedy.\u201d NMSA 1978, Section 44-2-4 (1984) provides an example of at least one action that a union may take when a local board is not functioning: When \u201cany inferior tribunal, corporation, board[,\\ or person\u201d fails to perform its duties, the affected parties may apply to the district court for a writ of mandamus to compel that public body to act. Id. (emphasis added) (providing that the \u201c[p]urpose\u201d of a mandamus writ is \u201cto compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station\u201d and that it \u201cmay require an inferior tribunal to . . . proceed to the discharge of any of its functions\u201d). AFSCME does not discuss or argue the availability of this or any other potential remedy.\nCONCLUSION\nThe order entered by the district court is affirmed.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nTIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nCYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge\nMICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge", "type": "majority", "author": "GARCIA, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "City of Albuquerque David Tourek, City Attorney Rebecca E. Wardlaw, Assistant City Attorney Samantha M. Hults, Assistant City Attorney \u25a0 Albuquerque, NM French & Associates, P.C. Paula I. Forney Stephen G. French Albuquerque, NM for Respondent", "Youtz & Valdez, P.C. Shane Youtz Stephen Curtice James Montalbano Albuquerque, NM for Petitioners" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2015-NMCA-023\nFiling Date: December 2, 2014\nDocket No. 32,917\nCITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, Respondent, v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES Local 1888, et.al., Petitioners.\nCity of Albuquerque David Tourek, City Attorney Rebecca E. Wardlaw, Assistant City Attorney Samantha M. Hults, Assistant City Attorney \u25a0 Albuquerque, NM French & Associates, P.C. Paula I. Forney Stephen G. French Albuquerque, NM for Respondent\nYoutz & Valdez, P.C. Shane Youtz Stephen Curtice James Montalbano Albuquerque, NM for Petitioners" }, "file_name": "0361-01", "first_page_order": 377, "last_page_order": 383 }