{ "id": 4240625, "name": "SOPURKH KAUR KHALSA, SHAKTI PARWHA KAUR KHALSA, and EK ONG KAR KAUR KHALSA, Trustees of the Yogi Bhajan Administrative Trust, Plaintiffs/Counter-DefendantsAppellees, v. INDERJIT KAUR PURI, Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Khalsa v. Puri", "decision_date": "2015-01-14", "docket_number": "No. 35,043; Docket No. 32,600", "first_page": "390", "last_page": "409", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2015-NMCA-027" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "102 N.M. 707", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580211 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/102/0707-01" ] }, { "cite": "1985-NMCA-038", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 43" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2003-NMCA-032", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 15768 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/133/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "2010 WY 91", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "WY", "case_ids": [ 6992538 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 38", "parenthetical": "stating that under the Uniform Trust Code, \"[o]nce it has been determined that authority exists to award fees and costs, a trial court has extremely broad discretion to rule on the amount of such an award\"" }, { "page": "986", "parenthetical": "stating that under the Uniform Trust Code, \"[o]nce it has been determined that authority exists to award fees and costs, a trial court has extremely broad discretion to rule on the amount of such an award\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p3d/233/0977-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 N.M. 17", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 723221 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/113/0017-01" ] }, { "cite": "1991-NMSC-099", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 2" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2007-NMCA-101", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3692151 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/142/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 P.3d 398", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.M. 764", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1588533 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/100/0764-01" ] }, { "cite": "1984-NMSC-024", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 2" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 P.3d 250", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2013-NMCERT-010", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 P.3d 1224", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2013-NMCA-104", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4077164 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/5/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMCA-012", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 18630 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/124/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMCA-124", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1428068 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/135/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 F.2d 857", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1263237 ], "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "863", "parenthetical": "stating that \"Texas recognizes the right of the [spouse] to make moderate gifts for just causes\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/205/0857-01" ] }, { "cite": "807 S.W.2d 391", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9994236 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401-02", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/807/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590265 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "1990-NMSC-018", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 2" }, { "page": "\u00b6 23" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "406 F. Supp. 2d 756", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 904263 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "759" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/406/0756-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 N.M. 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 715163 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/111/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "1991-NMCA-001", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 18-19" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1997-NMCA-044", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 142204 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/123/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 P.3d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2014-NMCERT-008", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 P.3d 217", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2014-NMCA-090", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4240495 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 7" }, { "page": "\u00b6 7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/6/0630-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1786, "char_count": 60883, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.2517320620208356e-08, "percentile": 0.2693062414063523 }, "sha256": "01e3e179245bf904bf1854c0daf14b5e0c0f1fb92a84be0f5e00a992167d3305", "simhash": "1:db224b336e3bae5f", "word_count": 9662 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:10:55.229683+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge", "MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge", "MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge" ], "parties": [ "SOPURKH KAUR KHALSA, SHAKTI PARWHA KAUR KHALSA, and EK ONG KAR KAUR KHALSA, Trustees of the Yogi Bhajan Administrative Trust, Plaintiffs/Counter-DefendantsAppellees, v. INDERJIT KAUR PURI, Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff-Appellant," ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nFRY, Judge.\nThis case involves a dispute over the division of the community estate of Harbhajan Singh Khalsa Yogiji, more commonly known as Yogi Bhajan, deceased, and his wife, Defendant Inderjit Kaur Puri, whom the parties refer to as Bibiji. Yogi Bhajan was a spiritual and religious leader of the Sikh religion in the United States. Before Yogi Bhajan\u2019s death, the spouses\u2019 assets were titled in a trust for the benefit of both spouses. When Yogi Bhajan died, Plaintiffs Sopurkh Kaur Khalsa, Shakti Parwha Kaur Khalsa, and Ek Ong Kar Kaur Khalsa ultimately became trustees of two successor trusts \u2014 one for the distribution of Bibiji\u2019s half of the community estate and one for the distribution of Yogi Bhajan\u2019s half. Bibiji claimed that the trustees breached their fiduciary duties to her in a number of ways such that she was entitled to a reallocation of part of Yogi Bhajan\u2019s half of the community estate. Following years of litigation and a five-day trial, the district court rejected Bibiji\u2019s claims and concluded that the trustees had not breached any duties owed to Bibiji. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nThe Estate Plan\nThe present controversy springs from the estate plan developed for Yogi Bhajan and Bibiji by attorney Kate Freeland in 1979 or 1980. For this estate plan, Freeland prepared wills for each spouse and a living trust. After the tax laws changed in 1986, Freeland prepared an amendment and restatement of the initial living trust, and the spouses executed that document in 1987. We refer to this document as the Living Trust.\nUnder the Living Trust, Yogi Bhajan and Bibiji were the trustors, and Yogi Bhajan was the sole trustee. The Living Trust gave Yogi Bhajan broad powers as trustee, including the power, within his discretion, to invest or reinvest the properties comprising the trust estate; to make loans; to sell, lease, exchange, or make contracts concerning real or personal property; to develop real estate; to \u201ccontinue to hold, operate, sell or liquidate any business enterprise\u201d; and to \u201cborrow money and to encumber or hypothecate trust property.\u201d\nThe Living Trust provided for a plan of distribution upon the death of either trustor. If Yogi Bhajan predeceased Bibiji, Bibiji\u2019s community property interest in cash or cash equivalents would be held in a separate trust for her benefit, which we call the Survivor\u2019s Trust. In addition, the Living Trust\u2019s interest in certain real properties would continue to be held in trust (the Property Trust) for Bibiji during her lifetime, and the Living Trust\u2019s interest in two other real properties would be distributed to Siri Singh Sahib ofSikhDharma Brotherhood. The remaining Living Trust assets would first be used to pay taxes and the expenses associated with Yogi Bhajan\u2019s last illness and funeral and then to fund a trust to be paid to Yogi Bhajan\u2019s assistants designated in a separate written instrument.\nThe 2004 Amendment to the Living Trust\nIn 2004, atFreeland\u2019s urging, the spouses amended the Living Trust in three ways pertinent to this appeal. First, the amendment changed the disposition of real property such that, if Yogi Bhajan predeceased Bibiji, (a) the Living Trust\u2019s interest in real property in India and Los Angeles, California, would go to Bibiji\u2019s share of the trust; (b) real property in Espa\u00f1ola, New Mexico, had \u201calready been donated to charity, subject to the right of [Bibiji] and Yogi Bhajan to live there for their lives\u201d; and (c) as a result of the preceding, there would be no Property Trust. Freeland testified that the Los Angeles property was part of the community estate and that she believed the property in India was Yogi Bhajan\u2019s separate property. Thus, the amendment provided that, if Yogi Bhajan predeceased Bibiji, Bibiji would receive not only her half interest in the Los Angeles community real property but also Yogi Bhajan\u2019s half interest in that property, and she would receive Yogi Bhajan\u2019s interest in his separate real property in India.\nSecond, the amendment provided that \u201c[Bibiji\u2019s] community property interest in royalties, royalty agreements, patents, licenses, and other intellectual properties\u201d would be treated the same as cash or cash equivalents. In other words, if Yogi Bhajan predeceased Bibiji, Bibiji would receive her one-half community property interest in these intellectual properties. The previous version of the Living Trust had not made any provision for Bibiji to receive her community property interest in royalty payments, which had increased dramatically after the Living Trust was first amended.\nThird, the amendment stated that Yogi Bhajan and Bibiji agreed that upon Yogi Bhajan\u2019s death, his community interest in the trust assets (apart from the real property in Los Angeles and India, which would go to Bibiji) would be distributed as he would direct in a separate written document. Yogi Bhajan and Bibiji further agreed that the successor co-trustees, upon the death of either spouse, would be Shalcti, Sopurkh, and Kamaljit Kur Kohli. Shakti and Sopurkh worked as Yogi Bhajan\u2019s assistants for many years. Kamaljit is the daughter of Yogi Bhajan and Bibiji.\nSeveral months after executing the 2004 amendment, Yogi Bhajan executed a written document entitled \u201cDirection for Distribution of Yogi Bhajan\u2019s Share of Trust,\u201d which provided that, upon Yogi Bhajan\u2019s death, all of his interest in YB Teachings, LLC, would be donated to the non-profit Kundalini Research Institute, and that all of his remaining interest in the Living Trust\u2019s assets (apart from the Los Angeles and India properties) would be- distributed as follows: (1) to make up the difference between $125,000 and what Yogi Bhajan had already gifted to an education savings plan for a young child, Dharam Dev Kaur Khalsa; and (2) to an LLC organized for the purpose of distributing specified income percentages to fifteen named individuals, including Shakti and Sopurkh. The fifteen individuals would be members of the LLC and would be required to maintain a lifestyle consistent with Yogi Bhajan\u2019s teachings and values. Upon the death of a member, the member\u2019s share would be paid to the Legacy of Yogiji Foundation. The LLC contemplated by this document (the Staff LLC) was created in 1jhe fall of 2004. The parties refer to this trust, created to benefit Yogi Bhajan\u2019s staff, as the Administrative Trust.\nEvents Following Yogi Bhajan\u2019s Death\nYogi Bhajan died on October 6, 2004. Harijot Kaur Khalsa, the bookkeeper for the Living Trust since its inception, immediately closed down the bank accounts and opened two new accounts \u2014 one for the Survivor\u2019s Trust and one for the Administrative Trust. Freeland, who had been hired as legal counsel by the successor trustees, and the trustees met with members of Yogi Bhajan\u2019s family and members of the Staff LLC to discuss distribution of the Living Trust\u2019s assets. Relying on the records Harijot had kept for the previous twenty to thirty years, the trustees assembled the assets and distributed Bibiji\u2019s interest to the Survivor\u2019s Trust. Most of the assets had been distributed either to Bibiji or to the Administrative Trust by the end of 2004.\nIn May 2005, Bibiji\u2019s attorney wrote to Freeland and asserted that Yogi Bhajan had made charitable contributions from 1996 to 2004 without Bibiji\u2019s knowledge or consent. The letter went on to request a credit in half the amount of these contributions and asked for information regarding charitable contributions made prior to 1996 and regarding intellectual property owned by the Living Trust. In light of Bibiji\u2019s claims, Freeland and Bibiji\u2019s attorney agreed that it would be inappropriate for Bibiji\u2019s daughter, Kamaljit, to remain as a trustee of the Administrative Trust and for Shakti and Sopurkh to continue as trustees of the Survivor\u2019s Trust. Kamaljit was replaced by Ek Ong Kar Kaur as the third trustee of the Administrative Trust. Shakti and Sopurkh resigned as trustees for the Survivor\u2019s Trust. We refer to Shakti, Sopurkh, and Ek Ong Kar Kaur as the Trustees.\nInitiation of Litigation\nFreeland, on behalf of the Trustees, requested backup information for Bibiji\u2019s claims. In the ensuing months, the Trustees continued to request explanations for and details of Bibiji\u2019s claims, but they did not receive any. The Trustees made no further distributions of estate assets in light of Bibiji\u2019s claims. The Trustees ultimately filed the present action seeking a judgment declaring what, if anything, was owed to Bibiji beyond what had already been distributed to her. Bibiji filed a counterclaim seeking an accounting, removal of certain Trustees, and damages for breach of the trust and breach of fiduciary duties. After nearly two years of litigation, the district court dismissed the Trustees\u2019 complaint for declaratory relief due to lack of controversy. The case then proceeded to trial on Bibiji\u2019s counterclaim.\nThe district court heard five days of testimony and received over 500 exhibits. Bibiji did not testify. After taking the matter under advisement, the district court found in favor of the Trustees on all claims and dismissed \u201call claims which have been or could have been brought by [Bibiji] in this case.\u201d It further found that \u201c[j]ustice and equity require that [Bibiji] pay the reasonable attorney fees incurred by [the Trustees].\u201d The amount of attorney fees was to be determined at a later time. This appeal followed.\nDISCUSSION\nBibiji raises nine issues on appeal, which we consolidate into three issues. First, Bibiji maintains that the district court erred in finding that the Trustees did not breach their fiduciary duties to her as a beneficiary of the Living Trust in a variety of ways. Second, she claims that the district court made several procedural errors. Third, she contends that the district court erred in determining that the Trustees were entitled to recover their reasonable attorney fees.\n1. The Trustees\u2019 Alleged Breaches of Fiduciary Duties\nBibiji argues that the Trustees breached their fiduciary duties by (a) failing to investigate and inventory the Living Trust\u2019s assets, (b) improperly managing assets and conspiring to deprive Bibiji of income from a license of trademarks, (c) ignoring conflicts of interest, and (d) failing to reallocate trust assets to account for Yogi Bhajan\u2019s alleged improper dissipation of community property. While the last two issues include discrete questions of law, the thrust of Bibiji\u2019s claims related to the Trustees\u2019 alleged breaches of duty concern whether substantial evidence supports the district court\u2019s findings that no such breaches occurred. We reject Bibiji\u2019s contention that these issues involve mixed questions of fact and law requiring de novo review.\nSubstantial evidence is \u201crelevant evidence that a reasonable mind could accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d Deutsche Bank Nat\u2019l Trust Co. v. Beneficial N.M. Inc., 2014-NMCA-090, \u00b6 7, 335 P.3d 217 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. granted sub nom. Deutsche Bank v. Johnston, 2014-NMCERT-008, 334 P.3d 425. In reviewing a substantial evidence argument, \u201c[t]he question is not whether substantial evidence exists to support the opposite result, but rather whether such evidence supports the result reached.\u201d Las Cruces Prof\u2019l Fire Fighters v. City of Las Cruces, 1997-NMCA-044, \u00b6 12, 123 N.M. 329, 940 P.2d 177. \u201c[W]e will not reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder.\u201d Id. \u201cWe consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and disregard any inferences and evidence to the contrary.\u201d Deutsche Bank, 2014-NMCA-090, \u00b6 7.\nBefore turning to Bibiji\u2019s specific claims, we clarify that the Trustees did not become trustees until Yogi Bhajan died. Until that point, all of the assets in the Living Trust were administered by Yogi Bhajan as the sole trustee. Once Yogi Bhajan died, two trusts came into existence: the Survivor\u2019s Trust, of which Bibiji was the sole beneficiary, and the Administrative Trust, of which the Staff LLC and the Legacy of Yogiji Foundation were the beneficiaries. Trustees Shalcti and Sopurkh owed duties to the beneficiaries of both trusts until 2005, when they resigned as trustees of the Survivor\u2019s Trust in light of Bibiji\u2019s claims. After their resignation, they owed duties only to the beneficiaries of the Administrative Trust.\nThe Living Trust contained provisions guiding the actions of the Trustees in administering the Administrative Trust. The Living Trust granted the same broad powers of administration to the Trustees that Yogi Bhajan had enjoyed as the sole trustee of the Living Trust during his lifetime. These powers included the power to invest and reinvest the trust estate; to make loans; to sell, exchange, or lease property; to hold securities; to improve real estate; to employ attorneys, accountants, and other agents; and to budget the trust\u2019s estimated annual income and expenses \u201cin such manner as to equalize, as far as practical, periodic income payments to beneficiaries.\u201d\nUnderlying all of Bibiji\u2019s claims against the Trustees is the undisputed legal premise that the Trustees had the obligation to administer the trusts \u201cin good faith\u201d and \u201cin accordance with [their] terms and purposes and the interests of the beneficiaries.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 46A-8-801 (2003). Because the trusts had more than one beneficiary, the Trustees were required to \u201cact impartially . . . giving due regard to the beneficiaries\u2019 respective interests.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 46A-8-803 (2003). The Trustees had the duty to \u201cadminister the trust[s] as a prudent person would, by considering the purposes, terms, distributional requirements and other circumstances of the trust[s]\u201d and \u201cexercise reasonable care, skill and caution.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 46A-8-804 (2003). In addition, the Trustees had the obligation to \u201ctake reasonable steps to take control of and protect the trust property.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 46A-8-809 (2003).\nTo clarify, upon the death of Yogi Bhajan, the then-trustees owed these fiduciary duties to Bibiji as a beneficiary of the Living Trust\u2019s assets to ensure that Bibiji received all of the assets that the Living Trust directed to be placed in the Survivor\u2019s Trust. Once these assets were transferred to the Survivor\u2019s Trust, the then-trustees\u2019 fiduciary duties to Bibiji continued because, at least initially, they were the trustees of the Survivor\u2019s Trust. However, once Shakti and Sopurkh resigned as trustees of the Survivor\u2019s Trust in August or September 2005, they no longer owed Bibiji any fiduciary duties. At that point, they were trustees of only the Administrative Trust, and their fiduciary duties were owed to the beneficiaries ofthattrust \u2014 the members ofthe Staff LLC and the Legacy of Yogiji Foundation.\nWith all of this in mind, we turn to Bibiji\u2019s claims.\na. Duties to Investigate and Inventory Trust Assets\nBibiji argues that the Trustees breached their duties to investigate and inventory trust assets because they admitted that they did not investigate whether the Living Trust or Yogi Bhajan had owned any assets other than those listed in the records maintained by Harijot. Bibiji claims that she identified eighteen categories of assets not reflected in Harijot\u2019s records, including real estate, jewelry, swords, minerals, books published by Yogi Bhajan, video lectures, trademarks, trade secrets, formulas, recipes, and paintings by Yogi Bhajan.\nThe district court made numerous findings of fact regarding Bibiji\u2019s assertions in this regard. The court found that Yogi Bhajan initially hired Harijot to prepare a general ledger for the Living Trust in 1982 and that from 1982 until Y ogi Bhajan\u2019s death, \u201cHarijot had spent decades ensuring that all of Yogi Bhajan and Bibiji\u2019s community property and separate assets were properly transferred to and titled in the Living Trust, and inventoried on the Living Trust\u2019s general ledgers.\u201d Harijot was assisted in this endeavor by Freeland and by Shakti, who was Yogi Bhajan\u2019s executive secretary, all of whom communicated regularly over the years in order to ensure that all assets were transferred and titled in the Living Trust during Yogi Bhajan\u2019s lifetime. The district court also found that the intellectual property at issue had been properly inventoried and that Bibiji\u2019s share of this property had been appropriately distributed.\nSubstantial evidence through the testimony of Harijot and Freeland and through exhibits supported these findings. Both Harijot and Freeland testified that they regularly strived to ensure that all new assets were transferred to the Living Trust. As for the broad categories of assets that Bibiji argues were overlooked, Freeland testified that she was aware that \u201cYogi Bhajan was a prolific author, creator of recipes, trademarks, business assets and the like\u201d and that she attempted to ensure that those assets were listed as part of the Living Trust estate. The estate tax return included detailed schedules listing the Living Trust\u2019s real estate; stocks and bonds; mortgages, notes, and cash; life insurance; miscellaneous property, which included the name and likeness of Yogi Bhajan, royalty contracts, business interests, vehicles, jewelry, furs, and personal effects; and annuities. As for weapons and paintings, Freeland testified that she understood that these were gifts to Yogi Bhajan in his capacity as head of the church, which would make them separate property, and they were placed in the church archives. The district court made a finding to this effect based on this testimony.\nThe Trustees\u2019 expert CPA testified that the records he reviewed reflected a professional and complete accounting of the community\u2019s assets, and that all of the assets of the Living Trust properly made their way into the Survivor\u2019s Trust and the Administrative Trust after Yogi Bhajan\u2019s death. All of this testimony supports the district court\u2019s view that, in accordance with Section 46A-8-804, the Trustees conducted the inventory and transfer of Living Trust assets as a prudent person would and in a reasonable manner. Given Harijot\u2019s careful record keeping over the years, there would be no reason for the Trustees to believe that additional assets might exist. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the Trustees, as our standard of review requires us to do, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the district court\u2019s determination that the Trustees did not breach any fiduciary duties in their investigation of assets.\nb. Management of Assets\nBibiji claims that the Trustees breached various duties in their management of the licensing of trademarks. During Yogi Bhajan\u2019s lifetime, the Living Trust had entered into a licensing agreement with Golden Temple of Oregon, Inc. (Golden Temple), for the use of trademarks for the name and likeness of Yogi Bhajan on specified cereals, teas, and body care products. Under the agreement, Golden Temple agreed to pay to the Living Trust royalties of between 0.10 percent and 3.5 percent of Golden Temple\u2019s gross sales. When Yogi Bhajan died, Harijot told Golden Temple to divide its royalty payments and pay one-half to the Survivor\u2019s Trust and one-half to the Administrative Trust because the license agreement was community property. In about 2008, Golden Temple discontinued use of Yogi Bhajan\u2019s name and likeness but continued to use the names \u201cYogi\u201d and \u201cYogi Tea.\u201d It stopped paying royalties.\nThere was a similar licensing agreement between the Living Trust and Amalgamated Sales Corp., Ltd. for the use of Yogi Bhajan\u2019s name and likeness on teas distributed in northern Africa and Europe. Like Golden Temple, Amalgamated stopped paying royalties in about 2008. The Trustees did not sue Amalgamated because there were no funds coming into the Administrative Trust, which could not afford to take on another .lawsuit in light of the present litigation. Instead of suing, the Trustees entered into a tolling agreement with Amalgamated, which provided that the Trustees would not sue during a specified period of time and that the delay would not count toward the applicable statute of limitations. The Trustees believed they were protecting the continuation of the Administrative Trust by entering into this agreement. At some point, Amalgamated transferred its assets to Golden Temple, which meant that a successor tolling agreement regarding the trademarks licensed to Amalgamated was between the Trustees and Golden Temple.\nAs for the trademarks initially licensed to Golden Temple, the Trustees sent a letter of default to Golden Temple, and Golden Temple then resumed royalty payments. Bibiji, as half owner of the trademarks, pursued Golden Temple by way of an arbitration to determine ownership of the \u201cYogi\u201d trademarks, and she suggested that the Trustees participate. The Trustees declined, seemingly in part because they thought that the term \u201cYogi\u201d was a generic term rather than a trademark and in part because they did not feel the Administrative Trust had the funds to take on any more litigation, given the . continuing litigation in the case now before us. Bibiji\u2019s arbitration was successful, and the arbitrators determined that Golden Temple had no right to the \u201cY ogi\u201d trademarks and that it had infringed the trademarks. They awarded Bibiji her half interest in the royalty payments that Golden Temple should have paid.\nAfter the arbitration award, Golden Temple sought to negotiate a new license of the trademarks. Initially, the Trustees and Bibiji took the position that they were willing to grant Golden Temple a non-perpetual, non-worldwide license. Golden Temple offered to pay a flat 3 percent royalty, with a minimum royalty paymentpf $2 million and a maximum of $4 million per year, an offer to which both Bibiji and the Trustees objected. Negotiations then broke down, but the Trustees alone continued to negotiate with Golden Temple.\nUltimately, the Trustees, representing the Administrative Trust\u2019s half interest in the Y ogi, Y ogi Tea, and other trademarks, entered into an interim licensing agreement with Golden Temple in October 2011. The agreement provided that Golden Temple would pay back royalties to the Administrative Trust as calculated in the arbitration award to Bibiji and future royalties calculated according to the same formula applied in the arbitration award. The agreement was to remain in effect until either (a) the execution of an agreement whereby Golden Temple would purchase the Administrative Trust\u2019s interest in the trademarks or (b) the agreement was terminated by either party upon 180 days prior written notice. Under the agreement, Golden Temple was required to offer the same terms to Bibiji for her half interest in the trademarks, but Bibiji rejected the offer. The agreement further provided that Golden Temple would indemnify the Administrative Trust from any damages resulting from claims by Bibiji arising from the Administrative Trust entering into the agreement.\nFuture royalties under the agreement would be paid by Golden Temple at the same rate that was payable under the 2004 license agreement, which was 3.5 percent, stepping down to 0.5 percent on sales exceeding $25 million. This was lower than the flat 3 percent rate Golden Temple offered during negotiations when Bibiji was participating. The Trustees agreed to accept the lower royalty rate because there was concern about Golden Temple having a deadline to its use of the trademark, and the Trustees were very interested in keeping the .trademark viable with a company that had experience with selling Yogi Tea under the trademark. If the district court approved of a sale, the Trustees planned to sell the Administrative Trust\u2019s undivided half interest in the trademarks to Golden Temple for $9.7 million, and the sale proceeds would be distributable to the Staff LLC.\n, At some point prior to the execution of the interim licensing agreement, the Trustees learned that Bibiji believed she had the opportunity of licensing the trademarks for 6 percent. The Trustees asked for more information about this prospective licensee, but they never received that information from Bibiji or her attorney.\nAs we understand Bibiji\u2019s arguments, she claims that the Trustees mismanaged trust assets when they failed to seek advice from a trademark expert as to who owned the Yogi trademarks and when they declined to enforce the Administrative Trust\u2019s contract rights when Golden Temple and Amalgamated suspended royalty payments. Bibiji further contends that the Trustees did not have the power to enter into the new licensing agreement with Golden Temple because the trademarks were never made assets of the Living Trust.\nWe first observe that Bibiji\u2019s arguments regarding the trademarks apparently challenge the Trustees\u2019 compliance with their fiduciary duties even though the actions at issue occurred long after Shakti and Sopurkh resigned as trustees of the Survivor\u2019s Trust. At the time Golden Temple and Amalgamated stopped making royalty payments, the Trustees oversaw only the Administrative Trust, and their duties therefore ran to the beneficiaries of that trust, not to Bibiji. The district court appreciated this distinction. In its written decision, the district court stated that \u201c[p]rior to the transfer to Bibiji of her one-half interest in the [intellectual property] rights, the Trustees did hold that interest in trust for Bibiji, but that interest was transferred in December 2004. Once that transfer was accomplished, the Trustees\u2019 fiduciary duties as to that interest ended.\u201d\nBibiji\u2019s arguments apparently rest on her claim that she is entitled to more than half of the trademark rights. This claim in turn springs from her assertion that she is entitled to a reallocation of Yogi Bhajan\u2019s half of the community property due to his alleged excess expenditure of community funds prior to his death. Bibiji\u2019s claim for reallocation cannot be characterized as a beneficiary\u2019s claim against the Trustees because the trustee/beneficiary relationship between the parties ended in 2005 when Shakti and Sopurkh resigned as trustees of the Survivor\u2019s Trust. Rather, Bibiji\u2019s claim to reallocation can be characterized as the claim of one spouse against the estate of the other for alleged misappropriation of community property. This is what the district court properly concluded. Fernandez v. Fernandez, 1991-NMCA-001, \u00b6\u00b6 18-19, 111 N.M. 442, 806 P.2d 582 (explaining that a gift made by one spouse in breach of his or her fiduciary duty may result in the wronged spouse\u2019s recovery of his or her community share of the gift from the spouse who made the gift).\nTo the extent that Bibiji is arguing that the Trustees failed to accurately inventory and distribute her half interest in the trademarks, the district court found that all of \u201cYogi Bhajan\u2019s intellectual property interests were properly inventoried and, in accordance with the Living Trust\u2019s 2004 amendment, 50 [percent] of Yogi Bhajan\u2019s intellectual property was distributed to Bibiji.\u201d The district court further found that the intellectual property interests that were the subject of the pre-death licensing agreements with Golden Temple and Amalgamated \u201cwere inventoried on the [estate tax return] Form 706 by the contracts themselves, and are specifically listed on the contract exhibits.\u201d And the district court found that \u201call [intellectual property] interests to which Bibiji was entitled were properly and promptly distributed to her, most especially the [Golden Temple] and Amalgamated royalties interests intended to provide Bibiji a stable source of income.\u201d These findings were supported by the evidence summarized above and in the preceding section of this Opinion.\nTo the extent Bibiji is claiming that the Trustees\u2019 interim licensing agreement with Golden Temple and its tolling agreement with Amalgamated somehow negatively impacted her half interest in the Yogi trademarks, the district court viewed the relationship between the parties regarding the trademarks as co-owners. We observe that because Bibiji and the Administrative Trust each owned a one-half interest in the trademarks, this contention of negative impact on Bibiji\u2019s trademark interest is in the nature of a claim of trademark infringement by one co-owner against the other, not a claim of breach of fiduciary duty in the trust context. Since the only claims Bibiji asserted against the Trustees were claims of breach of fiduciary duty, these infringement claims seem to be misplaced. Nonetheless, because the parties litigated these claims without objection and because the district court decided them, we address them.\nThe district court relied on case law stating that \u201c[a]n owner does not infringe upon his co-owner\u2019s rights in a trademark by exercising his own right of use. Likewise, he does not dilute those rights by exercising his own right of use.\u201d Derminer v. Kramer, 406 F. Supp. 2d 756, 759 (E.D. Mich. 2005). This is legally correct, according to a leading treatise on the subject. \u201cWhen parties are co-owners of a mark, one party cannot sue the other for infringement. A co-owner cannot infringe the mark it owns.\u201d 2 McCarthy on Trademarks & Unfair Competition \u00a7 16.40 (4th ed. 2014).\nTo the extent Bibiji had any claim that the Trustees had any additional duty to her regarding the trademarks, the district court put that claim to rest when it found that \u201c[t]he Trustees\u2019 decision to enter into the [ijnterim [licensing [agreement . . . with [Golden Temple] was fiscally sound and preserved the marks\u2019 financial potential.\u201d The district court explained that if the Trustees had not entered into the agreement, \u201c[Golden Temple] would have been forced to re-brand, which would have greatly diminished, and potentially destroyed,\u201d the potential financial value of the trademarks. These findings are supported by the evidence summarized above. Given the cost of the present litigation to the Administrative Trust, it made sense for the Trustees to preserve the value of the trademarks through the interim licensing agreement and the tolling agreement rather than to expend additional trust funds to pursue litigation against Golden Temple and Amalgamated. We therefore reject Bibiji\u2019s claim that the district court erroneously failed to find that the Trustees mismanaged assets.\nc. Alleged Conflicts of Interest\nBibiji claims that Sopurkh and Shakti had a conflict of interest as soon as Bibiji requested reallocation ofthe community assets because they were beneficiaries of the Administrative Trust who would benefit if Bibiji\u2019s claims failed. Sopurkh and Shakti indeed withdrew as trustees of the Survivor\u2019s Trust when Bibiji asserted her claim. But Bibiji appears to contend that they were also required to withdraw as trustees of the Administrative Trust. Again, we note that Sopurkh and Shakti\u2019s fiduciary duties to Bibiji ended when they withdrew as trustees of the Survivor\u2019s Trust. Because Bibiji was not a beneficiary of the Administrative Trust, she could not assert a claim that Sopurkh and Shakti remaining as trustees of the Administrative Trust constituted a breach of their fiduciary duties. Furthermore, Bibiji\u2019s reallocation claim was a claim of one spouse against the estate of the other spouse, not a claim asserted in the context of a trust relationship.\nTo the extent Bibiji is contending that Sopurkh and Shakti\u2019s status as beneficiaries by itself constituted a conflict of interest, we affirm the district court\u2019s findings to the contrary. The district court found that the Living Trust itself required that only one trustee be independent and not a beneficiary of the Administrative Trust. Ek Ong Kar Kaur is not a beneficiary of the Administrative Trust and, therefore, the Living Trust\u2019s requirements are satisfied. These findings are supported by the specific provisions of the Living Trust, which was introduced into evidence, and by other evidence at trial. In addition, the district court found that Sopurkh recused herself from participating in any decisions related to Golden Temple, of which she had once been president. This finding, too, was supported by the evidence.\nd. Reallocation of Community Property\nBibiji\u2019s primary contention in the district court and on appeal is that Yogi Bhajanmade gifts and charitable contributions of community property during his lifetime without Bibiji\u2019s knowledge and consent and that, as a result, Bibiji was entitled to aportion of Yogi Bhajan\u2019s half of the community estate in order to make up for these unauthorized dispositions. Bibiji relies on Roselli v. Rio Communities Service Station, Inc., 1990-NMSC-018, 109 N.M. 509, 787 P.2d 428, for the proposition that if a spouse manages community property in a way that violates his or her fiduciary duty to the other spouse, \u201cthe aggrieved spouse may have recourse first against the other spouse\u2019s property, and then against the donee of the property.\u201d Thus, Bibiji claims, the Trustees had the obligation to reallocate portions of Yogi Bhajan\u2019s half of the community estate, which ended up in the Administrative Trust, to Bibiji, and the Trustees\u2019 failure to do so constituted a breach of their fiduciary duty to her.\nIn order to assess Bibiji\u2019s claims, we consider the sparse New Mexico case law on the issue. Roselli involved a husband who named his son from a prior marriage as the beneficiary of two community-purchased life insurance policies without his wife\u2019s knowledge. 1990-NMSC-018, \u00b6 2. In a dispute after the husband\u2019s death, our Supreme Court reversed summary judgment in favor of the wife on the disposition of the insurance proceeds because issues of fact remained to be resolved. Id. \u00b6 24. In doing so, the Court established certain legal principles to guide the district court on remand. The Court first acknowledged that by statute, \u201ceither spouse alone has the power to manage, control, or dispose of the entire community personal property, unless one spouse is otherwise designated.\u201d Id. \u00b6 18 (citing NMSA 1978, \u00a7 40-3-14 (1975)). The Court then reviewed the law in other community property states and established what it called the \u201cbest rule\u201d as follows:\n(1) each spouse has the power to manage and dispose of the community\u2019s personal property;\n(2) subject to a fiduciary duty to the other spouse; and\n(3) absent intervening equities, a gift of substantial community property to a third person without the other spouse\u2019s consent may be revoked and set aside for the benefit of the aggrieved spouse.\nRoselli, 1990-NMSC-018, \u00b6 23.\nA subsequent case shed additional light on the matter. In Fernandez, our Supreme Court suggested factors that could inform the Roselli rule, including whether the managing spouse\u2019s action furthered \u201cthe common benefit of both members of the community},]\u201d 1991-NMCA-001, \u00b6 12, and whether the objectionable gift or expenditure constituted a \u201csubstantial portion of the community property.\u201d Id. \u00b6 21.\nWe distill the following principles from Roselli and Fernandez. First, either spouse may dispose of community property unless the disposition violates the spouse\u2019s fiduciary duty to the other spouse. Second, the fiduciary duty in question involves the assessment of the equities of the particular circumstances. Third, in assessing the equities, a court should consider whether the disposition furthers both spouses\u2019 common benefit and whether the disposition amounted to a substantial portion of the community property.\nThe district court in the present case found guidance in the law of Texas, which is also a community property state, and on which our Supreme Court relied in Roselli. The district court noted that the applicable Texas law is summarized as follows:\nIn the absence of fraud on the rights of the other spouse, a spouse has the right to control and dispose of community property subject to his sole management____The managing spouse has the burden to show that his disposition of the property was fair.\nThe court will consider three primary factors of \u2018fairness\u2019 in reviewing one spouse\u2019s claim of constructive fraud against the other. The factors to be considered are the size of the property disposed of in relation to the total size, of the community estate; the adequacy of the estate remaining to support the other spouse after the disposition; and the relationship of the parties involved in the transaction or, in the case of a gift, of the donor to the donee.\nMassey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391, 401-02 (Tex. App. 1991) (citations omitted). These factors are similar to those we have distilled from Roselli and Fernandez.\nThe district court went on to analyze whether Yogi Bhajan breached his fiduciary duty to Bibiji under the framework of three questions: (1) whether the gift was a reasonable one for just cause; (2) whether the property given was excessive compared to the value of the entire community estate; and (3) whether the gift was \u201cin discharge of a legal, moral or civic obligation.\u201d The district court derived the first question from Texas law, as stated in Kemp v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 205 F.2d 857, 863 (5th Cir. 1953) (stating that \u201cTexas recognizes the right of the [spouse] to make moderate gifts for just causes\u201d). We interpret the notion of \u201cjust cause\u201d to be a fair extension of the concept of a gift for the community\u2019s common benefit, as stated in Fernandez. The second question is consistent with the precepts stated in Roselli and Fernandez. We find little support in the case law for the third question, so we eliminate it from our consideration.\nBecause the assessment of these factors involves balancing the equities presented by a particular set of circumstances, we review the district court\u2019s determination for abuse of discretion. See Romero v. Bank of the Sw., 2003-NMCA-124, \u00b6 28, 135 N.M. 1, 83 P.3d 288 (explaining that \u201cthe issue of how the district court uses its equitable powers to provide an appropriate remedy is reviewed only for abuse of discretion\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).\nHaving established a framework for assessing the district court\u2019s findings on the issue of reallocation, we turn to the gifts and charitable contributions that Bibiji found objectionable. It is notable that Bibiji herself never testified at trial and, as a result, information abouther objections was supplied indirectly.\nBibiji\u2019s expert accountant, David Hinton, testified about how he calculated which gifts and charitable contributions were objectionable. He prepared a report listing the amounts of charitable contributions made by the marital community annually for the years 1981 to 2004 and compared those contributions to the income reported for those years on the spouses\u2019 joint income tax returns. Hinton testified that Bibiji would have agreed to 15 percent of total income as an acceptable level of contribution. He calculated that 15 percent of total income for the twenty-three years at issue was $2,248,877 and that actual contributions totaled $5,109,554. Subtracting the former from the latter yielded the sum of $2,860,677. Hinton also provided a list of other gifts of which Bibiji apparently did not approve, totaling $576,260. Adding together Bibiji\u2019s half interest in the charitable contributions exceeding 15 percent and in the unapproved gifts yielded the sum of $1,819,950, which Bibiji claimed she was entitled to receive via a reallocation of Yogi Bhajan\u2019s half of the community estate.\nThe district court rejected Bibiji\u2019s claim for reallocation for a number of reasons. On the issue of gifts, the court first found that the list of challenged gifts was taken from the Living Trust\u2019s accounting entry for nondeductible disbursements, and some of those items were not actually gifts. These non-gift items included a trip that Bibiji herself took to Africa, payments to family members (including Kamaljit, the daughter of Yogi Bhajan and Bibiji), expenses incurred during visits with Indian guests, medical expenses for Yogi Bhajan and members of the Sikh community, and payments for religious services, Harijot\u2019s testimony supported these findings of fact.\nAlso in connection with gifts, the court found that the Trustees were simply unable to accept the contention that Bibiji did not know about and would have objected to them. This was in part because Bibiji\u2019s list of unapproved gifts varied from year to year during the course of this litigation, in part because the list contained clearly non-objectionable gifts beneficial to the community, as detailed above, and in part because Bibiji failed to provide specifics regarding her claimed lack of knowledge or consent, despite repeated requests for such information. These findings were also supported by the evidence.\nIn regard to charitable contributions, the district court found that Bibiji\u2019s expert accountant \u201cgave no credit for years in which the contributions were less than 15 percent nor any credit for contributions in excess of 15 percent that Bibiji expressly approved (such as the donation of the ranch in Espa\u00f1ola, to which Bibiji admitted she consented).\u201d The court also found that the expert \u201cfailed to account for the tax benefits received by the community as a result of the charitable contributions.\u201d\nThe evidence supported these findings. Hinton testified that for years where charitable contributions were less than 15 percent, he simply noted a zero rather than a negative number, and he never considered the overall effect of using zero in five of the years in question. He also testified that Bibiji approved the donation of the Espa\u00f1ola ranch, valued at $745,000, in 1995, which was more than the total income for that year. However, he did not account for this approved donation in his straight mathematical calculation that any contribution above 15 percent of income was a non-approved contribution. The Trustees\u2019 expert accountant testified that the charitable contributions in excess of 15 percent of income resulted in a federal tax savings to the community of $1,118,892 and a state tax savings of $220,543.\nIn light of these findings regarding gifts and charitable contribrrtions made during Yogi Bhajan\u2019s lifetime, the district coqrt then applied the legal analysis of whether the gifts or contributions were reasonable and for just cause and whether the property given was excessive compared to the value of the entire community estate. With respect to gifts, the court found that many of the gifts \u201cwere small in comparison to the community estate[,j\u201d that \u201c[i]n the aggregate, the gifts did not violate [Bibiji\u2019s] rights],]\u201d and that \u201cYogi Bhajan did not breach his spousal fiduciary duty to Bibiji in making the gifts.\u201d Given that many of the objectionable gifts actually benefited the community and the children of Yogi Bhajan and Bibiji, we cannot say that the district court abused'its discretion in so finding.\nAs for the charitable contributions, the district court made several relevant findings, including:\n\u2022 \u201cMany of the donations were made to non-profit organizations that were involved in the couple\u2019s spiritual mission.\u201d\n\u2022 \u201cBibiji gave implied, if not express, consent to the charitable contributions, particularly in view of the course of conduct of the public life of the couple.\u201d\n\u2022 \u201cThe Living Trust\u2019s charitable donations, while sizeable, were reasonable in light of the marital community\u2019s life mission and for just causes; the donations ... were not excessive compared to the community estate; and the donations did not leave Bibiji without the means to sustain herself.\u201d\nAgain, these findings were supported by substantial evidence. A cursory review of the charitable contributions made over the years reveals that the vast majority were made to non-profits affiliated with the Sikh religion, including various Sikh Dharma organizations, 3HO Foundation, and the Kundalini Research Institute. Bibiji was the Bha,i Sahiba for Sikh Dharma and its affiliates, which meant that she was the authority on the proper practice of the Sikh religion. She was also on the boards of Sikh Dharma Educational Institute and 3HO Foundation and \u201chad a strong interest in promoting the mission of 3HO in the world arena.\u201d And, in the opinion of Freeland, Bibiji \u201chas been directly involved in the charitable activities that those [charitable] contributions support. She in turn receives, directly and indirectly, tangible and intangible benefits from her association with the organizations.\u201d\nThe district court\u2019s finding thatBibiji impliedly consented to the majority of charitable contributions is further supported by evidence that she and Yogi Bhajan made it their life\u2019s mission to support and enhance the Sikh community they had established in the United States after they emigrated from India. Bibiji stated in a letter to the Sikh community:\nMy husband and I have built the organization and given millions of dollars of contributions over the years. More than money, we have dedicated our entire lives to these organizations. My husband and I donated the Ranch in Espa\u00f1ola and several other properties we own to the Sikh Dharma.\nIn addition, Trustee Ek Ong Kar Kaur testified that she was present innumerable times from the early 1970s until Yogi Bhajan\u2019s death when donations and charitable giving were discussed in Bibiji\u2019s presence. Bibiji signed all of the income tax returns that listed charitable donations. And, because Bibiji sat on the board of many of the donee charitable organizations, including 3HO and the Sikh Dharma Educational Institute, she would have had access to information about the funding of those organizations. Bibiji and Yogi Bhajan subscribed to the tenet ofDas Vandh, which is tithing at 10 percent of base income. But 10 percent was a baseline rather than a ceiling for charitable contributions. Yogi Bhajan and Bibiji \u201cencouraged giving by their example, not only to one organization, but over and above Das Vandh, and to other organizations and to help people and other communities that needed help.\u201d\nThe evidence also established that Yogi Bhajan\u2019s estate was valued at $6,061,254 and that Bibiji\u2019s half of the community property totaled $3,021,632 Bibiji received an additional $706,000 from Yogi Bhajan\u2019s half of the community assets, including Yogi Bhajan\u2019s half interest in certain real properties and Yogi Bhajan\u2019s separate real property in India. Thus, there was substantial evidence that Bibiji\u2019s share of the estate, which amounted to more than half, was sufficient to sustain her. Furthermore, Bibiji\u2019s half of the objectionable charitable deductions, which were arbitrarily calculated at anything in excess of 15 percent of annual income, totaled $1,430,339 over a period of time exceeding twenty years, while the tax savings attributable to charitable deductions in excess of 15 percent of income totaled $1,141,435.\nWhile Bibiji presented evidence contrary to the evidence summarized above, \u201cwhen there is a conflict in the testimony, we defer to the trier of fact.\u201d Buckingham v. Ryan, 1998-NMCA-012, \u00b6 10, 124 N.M. 498, 953 P.2d 33. \u201cThe question is not whether substantial evidence exists to support the opposite result, but rather whether such evidence supports the result reached.\u201d Las Cruces Prof\u2019l Fire Fighters, 1997-NMCA-044, \u00b6 12. There being considerable evidence supporting the district court\u2019s decision under the Roselli-Fernandez framework discussed -above, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in declining to order reallocation of Yogi Bhajan\u2019s half of the community assets.\n2. Alleged Procedural Errors\nBibiji claims that the district court made several procedural errors, including: (a) entry of a collateral estoppel order, which precluded full litigation of Bibiji\u2019s claims; (b) entry of an overly broad judgment dismissing all claims that have been or could have been brought by Bibiji; and (c) allowing the Trustees to rely on advice of counsel when they failed to assert this theory as an affirmative defense. We are not persuaded.\na. Collateral Estoppel Order\nThis claim asserted by Bibiji is entangled with a prior opinion of this Court in related litigation, In re Estate of Yogiji, 2013-NMCA-104, 311 P.3d 1224, cert. deniedsub nom. Puri v. Khalsa, 2013-NMCERT-010, 313 P.3d 250. At some point in the long history of the present litigation, more than four years after Yogi Bhajan\u2019s death, Bibiji filed a proceeding in the district court seeking probate of Yogi Bhajan\u2019s will and the appointment of a personal representative. Id. \u00b6 2. The gist of Bibiji\u2019s claim in the probate proceeding was that she wanted a personal representative to investigate what assets Yogi Bhajan owned at the time of his death in an effort to determine whether any assets actually belonged to her. \u00a3 | 7. The district court probated the will, appointed a personal representative, and directed the personal representative to determine whether there were any assets other than those that had been identified and distributed by the successor trustees of the Living Trust, the Survivor\u2019s Trust, and the Administrative Trust. Id. \u00b6 8. The district court then limited the personal representative\u2019s investigation to assets specifically identified by Bibiji as having questionable title. Id. \u00b6 9. When the personal representative\u2019s investigation revealed no previously unidentified assets, the district court closed the probate proceeding. Id. \u00b6 13.\nThe district court in the present case entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law after the district court in the probate case had closed the case before it. Consequently, the district court in the case before us entered the following conclusions of law:\nLL. Bibiji is precluded by the judgment entered in the [pjrobate [cjourt from litigating whether there were any assets belonging to Yogi Bhajan on the date of death, October 6, 2004, which were not identified and distributed by the Trustees.\nNN. Bibiji is precluded from litigating a claim that the Trustees failed to locate and identify property that was owned by Yogi Bhajan at the time of his death . . because the [pjersonal [representative investigated the list of alleged assets that Bibiji provided and found no evidence to support Bibiji\u2019s ownership claims regarding other assets.\nFollowing entry of the findings and conclusions in this case, this Court filed an opinion reversing the district court\u2019s ruling in the probate case. In that opinion, we analyzed a specific section of the Probate Code and concluded that the district court had interpreted it too narrowly. We stated that \u201c[o]n remand, the personal representative may conduct a complete investigation and inventory of assets in which [Yogi Bhajan] had an interest at the time of his death\u201d and that the personal representative could \u201cconfirm title to any assets that are properly in the possession of a devisee, and he may inventory the assets that were properly identified as residue for transfer to the trust.\u201d Id. \u00b6 31. We expressly held that Bibiji\u2019s claim for reallocation of assets was off limits in the remanded probate proceeding because that claim was the subject of the case now before us. Id.\nBibiji now contends that the district court\u2019s conclusions LL and NN \u201ceffectively ratified [the] Trustees\u2019 determination of what assets [Yogi Bhajan] owned at his date of death and [the] Trustees\u2019 distribution of those assets.\u201d She further maintains that this Court\u2019s reversal of the determination in the probate proceeding in Estate ofYogiji \u201chas made clear that there has been no appropriate comprehensive investigation of [Yogi Bhajan]\u2019s assets and the [district [c]ourt\u2019s ... findings and conclusions are erroneous.\u201d\nWe disagree with Bibiji\u2019s arguments. If the personal representative conducts an investigation of assets, which our opinion in Estate of Yogiji by no means required, and if the personal representative finds assets that were overlooked by the Trustees in their inventory \u2014 a matter of sheer speculation at this point \u2014 then those assets will be distributed in accordance with the instructions in the Living Trust. Any newly discovered assets that are determined to be community property will be distributed half to Bibiji and half to the Administrative Trust. The likelihood that any new assets will be discovered seems remote because, as the Trustees note in their brief, Bibiji had approximately five years during the course of the present litigation to conduct her own investigation through the discovery process, and she was unable to produce evidence of any asset that had been overlooked in the Trustees\u2019 inventory. \u2022\nb. Overly Broad Judgment\nBibiji next claims that the district court exceeded its jurisdiction in its judgment, which dismissed \u201call claims which have been or could have been brought by [Bibiji] in this case, including all claims related to the transactions and occurrences that are the subject matter of the claims alleged in this case.\u201d Bibiji contends that there are pending disputes between her and the Trustees in California federal court regarding \u201cnew breaches of duty in the management of trust assets and the trademarks and [intellectual property] which were not assets of the [Living Trust].\u201d\nWe do not understand Bibiji\u2019s argument. She cites no authority for the proposition that the district court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss Bibiji\u2019s claims, and we therefore assume there is no such authority. In re Adoption of Doe, 1984-NMSC-024, \u00b6 2, 100 N.M. 764, 676 P.2d 1329 (stating that where a party cites no authority to support an argument, we may assume no such authority exists). The language Bibiji objects to does no more than describe explicitly the normal preclusive effect of any judgment-entered after litigation. Pielhau v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2013-NMCA 112, 314 P.3d 398. If Bibiji believes the judgment in the present case does not preclude litigation of issues or claims raised in the California court, she can present that view in that court, presumably in response to motions that may be filed by the Trustees in that court.\nc. Defense of Advice of Counsel\nBibiji challenges several of the district court\u2019s findings that mention the fact that the Trustees hired Freeland to advise them as they administered the transfer of assets from the Living Trust to the two successor trusts and as they attempted to address Bibiji\u2019s claims. Bibiji contends that these findings establish that the Trustees raised an \u201cadvice of counsel\u201d defense without having first pleaded the defense and that by allowing this to occur, the district court permitted the Trustees to \u201csandbag Bibiji and deprive her of the opportunity to engage in discovery and properly prepare her case for trial.\u201d\nAgain, we do notunderstandBibiji\u2019s argument. As authority, she relies on Gingrich v. Sandia Corp., for the proposition that \u201cwhen the advice of counsel defense is raised, the party raising the defense must permit discovery of any and all legal advice rendered on the disputed issue.\u201d 2007-NMCA-101, \u00b6 24, 142 N.M. 359, 165 P.3d 1135 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Gingrich is inapposite because it involved waiver of attorney-client privilege when the client was relying on its attorney\u2019s advice as a defense. Here, the briefs raise no issues involving attorney-client privilege. In addition, there is no suggestion that the Trustees raised advice of counsel as a defense. Instead, they consulted with an attorney to advise them in administering the trusts, as they are permitted to do under NMSA 1978, Section 46A-8-807(A)(l) (2003) (stating that \u201c[a] trustee may delegate duties and powers that a prudent trustee of comparable skills could properly delegate under the circumstances\u201d providing the trustee \u201cexercise [s] reasonable care, skill and caution in . . . selecting . . . agentfs]).\u201d\n3. Attorney Fees\nThe Trustees asked for an award of attorney fees pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 46A-10-1004 (2003), which provides:\nIn a judicial proceeding involving the administration of a trust, the court, as justice and equity may require, may award costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney fees, to any party, to be paid by another party or from the trust that is the subject of the controversy.\nIn its judgment, the district court stated that justice and equity supported an award to the Trustees of their reasonable attorney fees in accordance with this statute. The amount of the award would be determined after appropriate evidence had been submitted. In this appeal, we are not concerned with the amount of fees awarded but only with the fact that an award was made.\nBibiji argues that the district court erred in determining that the Trustees were entitled to an award of attorney fees because (1) they waived such an award by failing to ask for it in their pleadings, (2) justice and equity do not require this award, and (3) the award violated Bibiji\u2019s due process rights because she did not have the opportunity to brief the issue.\nWhile there is no New Mexico case law interpreting Section 46A-10-1004, generally speaking, an award of attorney fees is a matter for the district court\u2019s discretion. See Lenz v. Chalamidas, 1991-NMSC-099, \u00b6 2, 113 N.M. 17, 821 P.2d 355 (\u201cAward of attorney fees rests in the discretion of the trial court and this [Cjourt will not alter the fee award absent an abuse of discretion.\u201d); see also Garwood v. Garwood, 2010 WY 91, \u00b6 38, 233 P.3d 977, 986 (Wyo. 2010) (stating that under the Uniform Trust Code, \u201c[o]nce it has been determined that authority exists to award fees and costs, a trial court has extremely broad discretion to rule on the amount of such an award\u201d).\nWe are not persuaded by Bibiji\u2019s argument that the Trustees waived their claim for an award of attorney fees or that she was denied the opportunity to brief the issue. Bibiji has not cited any authority in support of the proposition that a request for attorney fees is waived unless it is pleaded. The Trustees asked for an award in their closing argument brief, and Bibiji could have responded to this request in her closing argument reply brief but failed to d'o so. Moreover, Bibiji responded in depth to the Trustees\u2019 actual motion for attorney fees, which was filed after the judgment was entered. While Bibiji claims that she \u201cmight have made different procedural choices or otherwise amended her litigation strategy\u201d if she had known earlier about the Trustees\u2019 claim for attorney fees, she does not provide any examples of the alleged prejudice she sustained. We decline to speculate regarding what Bibiji failed to demonstrate.\nOn the merits, Bibiji disputes the district court\u2019s finding that justice and equity require an award of the Trustees\u2019 attorney fees. She maintains that the Trustees\u2019 claim for declaratory judgment was dismissed long before trial, thus making Bibiji the prevailing party, and that the Trustees\u2019 \u201csuccessful defense against Bibiji\u2019s claims merely makes this a split result.\u201d While she cites cases in which courts have declined to award attorney fees under such circumstances, those same cases reiterate that the decision whether to award fees rests in the trial court\u2019s discretion. See, e.g., Hedicke v. Gunville, 2003-NMCA-032, \u00b6 28, 133 N.M. 335, 62 P.3d 1217 (explaining that \u201cif each party prevails on one claim and loses on one claim, the trial court could and may conclude that neither is ultimately a prevailing party on those claims\u201d);/\u00bb re Estate of Foster, 1985-NMCA-038, \u00b6 43, 102 N.M. 707, 699 P.2d 638 (stating that an award of attorney fees, \u201cbeing equitable[,] depends on the facts of the case and the exercise of equitable power must be used with discretion\u201d). Given the many years of litigation over issues on which Bibiji failed to present any direct evidence to support her claims and in light of the Trustees\u2019 overall success in defending these claims, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in determining that justice and equity required an award of the Trustees\u2019 reasonable attorney fees.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court\u2019s judgment.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nCYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nMICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge\nMICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge\nBecause Plaintiffs and several witnesses share the same last name, we refer to them by their first names in this Opinion.", "type": "majority", "author": "FRY, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Sanders & Westbrook, P.C. Maureen A. Sanders Albuquerque, NM Wray & Girard, P.C. Jane Katherine Girard Katherine Wray Albuquerque, NM for Appellees", "Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A. Emil J. Kiehne Albuquerque, NM The Soni Law Firm SurjitP. Soni Pasadena, CA for Appellant" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Certiorari Denied, January 14, 2015,\nNo. 35,043\nIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2015-NMCA-027\nFiling Date: November 19, 2014\nDocket No. 32,600\nSOPURKH KAUR KHALSA, SHAKTI PARWHA KAUR KHALSA, and EK ONG KAR KAUR KHALSA, Trustees of the Yogi Bhajan Administrative Trust, Plaintiffs/Counter-DefendantsAppellees, v. INDERJIT KAUR PURI, Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff-Appellant,\nSanders & Westbrook, P.C. Maureen A. Sanders Albuquerque, NM Wray & Girard, P.C. Jane Katherine Girard Katherine Wray Albuquerque, NM for Appellees\nModrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A. Emil J. Kiehne Albuquerque, NM The Soni Law Firm SurjitP. Soni Pasadena, CA for Appellant" }, "file_name": "0390-01", "first_page_order": 406, "last_page_order": 425 }