{ "id": 4241695, "name": "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RON BELL, Defendant- Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Bell", "decision_date": "2014-12-03", "docket_number": "No. 34,922; Docket No. 31,890", "first_page": "437", "last_page": "445", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2015-NMCA-028" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "112 N.M. 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 720254 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/112/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "1991-NMCA-073", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 20" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 P.3d 677", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2013-NMCA-108", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4077313 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/5/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 U.S. 471", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 450611 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/371/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "2011-NMCA-079", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4251065 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/150/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19-20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "555 U.S. 323", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3679137 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333", "parenthetical": "noting that \"inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop ... do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/555/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMSC-034", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 2549752 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 35" }, { "page": "\u00b6 35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/138/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-046", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4245815 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 52" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 14, 23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/147/0134-01" ] }, { "cite": "2011-NMSC-009", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4249607 ], "weight": 10, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 50" }, { "page": "\u00b6 55" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 40, 44, 50" }, { "page": "\u00b650" }, { "page": "\u00b6 55" }, { "page": "\u00b6 17" }, { "page": "\u00b6 55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/149/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMSC-006", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 322282 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 24-25" }, { "page": "\u00b6 30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/122/0777-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 N.M. 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2714238 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/67/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "1960-NMSC-095", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 N.M. 805", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2761762 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/84/0805-01" ] }, { "cite": "1973-NMSC-041", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 23" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2010-NMCA-060", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4246759 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/148/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMSC-017", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 2549417 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/138/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMCA-003", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 827416 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 4" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0603-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1151, "char_count": 27863, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.72892633419842e-08, "percentile": 0.3591498963839205 }, "sha256": "bf9b34ead973f1f628ab297119a13d225e30a921321741ad21f17a22369209f3", "simhash": "1:325b9266fefa4b53", "word_count": 4328 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:10:55.229683+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "J. MILES HANISEE, Judge", "MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge", "JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge (specially concurring).", "JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge" ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RON BELL, Defendant- Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nHANISEE, Judge.\nIn its appellate capacity, the district court entered an opinion and order reversing a metropolitan court conviction for speeding, failure to maintain lane, and driving while impaired (first offense), on the basis that the metropolitan court should have excluded prosecution evidence that was admitted at trial in violation of the New Mexico Constitution. The State now appeals the district court order, arguing that Defendant failed to preserve the grounds relied upon by the district court for suppressing the evidence at issue and that the challenged evidence was properly admitted during trial. Because we agree with the district court that the grounds it relied upon to reverse were sufficiently preserved in the metropolitan court and constituted reversible error, we affirm.\nStandard of Review\nBecause this is a criminal action \u201cinvolving driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquors or drugs[,]\u201d the metropolitan court acted as the trial court of record, and the district court acted in its appellate capacity when it reviewed the conviction. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 34-8A-6(C) (1993); Rule 1-073 NMRA; see State v. Trujillo, 1999-NMCA-003, \u00b6 4, 126 N.M. 603, 973 P.2d 855 (stating that \u201c[f]or on-record appeals the district court acts as a typical appellate court, with the district judge simply reviewing the record of the metropolitan court trial for legal error\u201d). In subsequent appeals such as this, we apply the same standards of review employed by the district court. See id. \u00b6\u00b6 1, 5. A trial court\u2019s determination on a motion to suppress evidence involves a mixed question of law and fact, as to which our review is de novo. State v. Garcia, 2005-NMSC-017, \u00b6 27, 138 N.M. 1, 116 P.3d 72. Our scope of review, like that of the district court, is defin\u00e9d by Supreme Court rules that require that in order \u201c[t]o preserve a question for review it must appear that a ruling or decision by the metropolitan court was fairly invoked].]\u201d Rule 1 -073 (O); cf. Rule 12-216(A)NMRA. The preservation rule is applied to advance its three primary purposes:\n(1) to specifically alert the [trial] court to a claim of error so that any mistake can be corrected at that time,\n(2) to allow the opposing party a fair opportunity to respond to the claim of error and to show why the [trial] court should rule against that claim, and (3) to create a record sufficient to allow this Court to make an informed decision regarding the contested issue.\nGerke v. Romero, 2010-NMCA-060, \u00b6 18, 148 N.M. 367, 237 P.3d 111 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\nProceedings Before the Metropolitan Court\nThe sole evidence relevant to the metropolitan court\u2019s ruling denying suppression was the trial testimony of Deputy Allen. The relevant portions ofDeputy Allen\u2019s testimony described a sequence of events that began with Defendant\u2019s car passing Deputy Allen, who was driving northbound on Tramway Boulevard in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Deputy Allen then caught up with Defendant\u2019s car and determined, by reference to his own speedometer, that Defendant was driving at a speed of sixty miles per hour in an area with a posted speed limit of fifty miles per hour. At the intersection of Tramway and Spain Road, both cars stopped at a red light, but Defendant\u2019s car improperly stopped in the intersection crosswalk. When the light turned green, Defendant re-accelerated to sixty miles per hour, with Deputy Allen still following. The cars again stopped for a red light at the intersection of Tramway and Academy Road, and Defendant again accelerated to sixty miles per hour after the stop. Just north of Academy, D efendant crossed partially over the white line dividing the roadway from the shoulder, so that \u201cthe middle of the vehicle was over the white line,\u201d and continued to drive partially on the shoulder until Deputy Allen pulled him over just past the intersection ofTramway and San Rafael Avenue. As he pulled Defendant over, Deputy Allen used his radio to ask dispatch whether a DWI unit was available because \u201c[j]ust on the observation of the driving[, Deputy Allen] wasn\u2019t sure if that was what [he] was looking at or not.\u201d\nDeputy Allen approached Defendant, explained the basis for the stop, and asked Defendant for his driver\u2019s license, automobile registration, and proof of insurance. He noticed that Defendant\u2019s hands were shaky when he handed over those documents and that \u201cit sounded like something wasn\u2019t correct; something didn\u2019t sound correct about his voice.\u201d Deputy Allen described Defendant as sounding as if he were speaking with a \u201cthick tongue.\u201d\nDeputy Allen asked Defendant if he was \u201cunder the influence,\u201d and Defendant said \u201cno.\u201d Deputy Allen then had Defendant put both of his hands on the car window frame and move his head closer to the car window in order to conduct a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test. It took four attempts by Deputy Allen to conclude that Defendant bore no sign of nystagmus, a delay Deputy Allen attributed to Defendant\u2019s non-compliance with instructions. Yet Deputy Allen agreed when cross-examined that performing an HGN test while the subject is seated in his car does not comply with standards promulgated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.\nDeputy Allen next asked Defendant whether \u201che [had] any grenades, rocket launchers in the vehicle\u201d and whether \u201che had any dead bodies in the car.\u201d In response to both of those questions, Defendant said \u201cno\u201d while shaking his head. Deputy Allen then asked whether Defendant \u201chad any narcotics in the vehicle, prescription or otherwise,\u201d and Defendant answered \u201cno,\u201d but this time simultaneously nodded his head in the affirmative. Deputy Allen then asked whether there were any prescriptions in Defendant\u2019s car and Defendant again said \u201cno\u201d while contradictorily nodding his head affirmatively. Deputy Allen testified that he did not, in fact, believe that Defendant had any grenades, rocket launchers, or dead bodies in his car, but that he asked those questions to determine \u201cwhat type of response\u201d he would get from Defendant and to help \u201cdecide if [Defendant was] being truthful.\u201d Afterward, evidence was uncovered leading to Defendant\u2019s arrest and ultimately his conviction in the metropolitan court.\nFollowing Deputy Allen\u2019s testimony, Defendant moved to suppress based upon \u201clack of reasonable suspicion to even conduct a further investigation along with the lack of reasonable suspicion based on the stop.\u201d The metropolitan court heard argument from both sides on those issues and ruled that the initial traffic stop was based upon reasonable suspicion. Defendant does not challenge that ruling on appeal. Defense counsel then asked the metropolitan court for a ruling regarding whether there was sufficient reasonable suspicion for \u201cit to go from a [traffic] stop to conducting a DWI investigation.\u201d Following further argument, the metropolitan court denied Defendant\u2019s motion and ruled Deputy Allen\u2019s testimony to be admissible, specifically noting that Defendant was speeding, failed to maintain his traffic lane, and that Deputy Allen had to \u201cgo over [the HGN] directions on three different occasions.\u201d\nAppeal on the Record to the District Court\nFollowing a four-day bench trial in metropolitan court resulting in a conviction and the entry of a sentencing order, Defendant appealed to the district court arguing, inter alia, that \u201cthe metropolitan court erred in ruling independent reasonable suspicion arose outside of the scope of the initial. . . stop for traffic violations in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and [Article II, Section 10] of the New Mexico Constitution[.]\u201d The State\u2019s response asserted that Defendant relied solely upon the Fourth Amendment at trial and thus had not preserved any claim based upon the concededly broader protections afforded by Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution, because that provision of the state constitution was never expressly referenced before the metropolitan court. The district court, sua sponte, ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing on the question of \u201cwhether Defendant preserved his claim, under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution, as to whether or not Deputy Allen lacked reasonable suspicion to question Defendant regarding additional criminal activity thereby improperly expanding the scope of the traffic stop.\u201d\nAs directed, the parties submitted briefs addressing the question of whether Defendant had asserted any protection existing under the state constitution at trial. In doing so, Defendant maintained that, although his argument at trial made no specific reference to any provision of the state constitution, he had argued an established principle protected uniquely by the New Mexico Constitution. The State\u2019s disagreement notwithstanding, the district court concluded that \u201cDefendant preserved these issues for review.\u201d If Defendant was correct in his claim before the district court, the central question raised in this appeal was preserved for review both in that court and here.\nIn then substantively analyzing Defendant\u2019s state constitutional argument, the district court further concluded that \u201cDeputy Allen lacked reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the investigation to inquire into weapons and dead bodies\u201d and therefore that \u201cDefendant\u2019s motion to suppress should have been granted [in the metropolitan court] as to any evidence obtained after that inquiry.\u201d The State appeals from the district court\u2019s ruling, reiterating its contentions that Defendant\u2019s state constitutional arguments were not raised and are, therefore not preserved and that Article II, Section 10 was not violated by questions unrelated to the DWI investigation that did not expand the investigation\u2019s scope.\nPreservation of Defendant\u2019s Claims\nThe question of whether a claim under Article II, Section 10 is preserved in this case depends upon what grounds or principle Defendant asserted at trial for the suppression of evidence. Specifically, we must resolve whether Defendant\u2019s challenges that Deputy Allen lacked reasonable suspicion \u201cto even conduct a further investigation\u201d or \u201cto go from a [traffic] stop to conducting a DWI investigation\u201d must be strictly understood to challenge only investigative steps undertaken with regard to DWI. If so constrained, the objections would fail to assert the broader, well established state constitutional principle that limits police inquiries of an individual suspected of having committed a vehicle infraction to questions reasonably related to the basis for the vehicle stop. If understood to challenge any progression of investigation beyond that needed in relation to the traffic infractions observed by Deputy Allen, the time-of-trial challenge by Defendant was sufficient to gamer review of the propriety of questions about grenades, rocket launchers, and dead bodies, topics of criminality plainly afield of traffic infractions.\nTo this inquiry, New Mexico courts have long held that:\n[t]he purpose of an objection or motion is to invoke a ruling of the court upon a question or issue, and it is essential that the ground or grounds of the objection or motion be made with sufficient specificity to alert the mind of the trial court to the claimed error or errors, and that a ruling thereon then be invoked.\nState v. Lopez, 1973-NMSC-041, \u00b6 23, 84 N.M. 805, 508 P.2d 1292; see City of Portales v. Shiplett, 1960-NMSC-095, \u00b6 6, 67 N.M. 308, 355 P.2d 126 (holding that a defendant\u2019s failure \u201cto point out the claimed errors and to bring them to the attention of the trial court prevent his relying on them for the first time on appeal\u201d). But see State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, \u00b6\u00b6 24-25, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1 (stating that the defendant \u201cneed not have asserted . . . that Article II, Section 10 should be interpreted differently from the Fourth Amendment\u201d because there is \u201cestablished New Mexico law interpreting Article II, Section 10 more expansively\u201d).\nMost recently, our Supreme Court has clarified that the less stringent of New Mexico jurisprudence\u2019s preservation requirements applies in this very context due to the \u201cplethora of precedent already [establishing] Article II, Section 10[\u2019s] more expansiv[e protection than that afforded by] the Fourth Amendment.\u201d State v. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, \u00b6 50, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861. Having reviewed the trial proceedings and Leyva, we disagree with the State that the issue before us was inadequately preserved for appellate review. We conclude that not only did Defendant assert that the facts known to Deputy Allen were insufficient to justify prolonging the traffic stop for purposes of a DWI investigation, he broadly argued that there existed no \u201creasonable suspicion to even conduct a . further investigation}.]\u201d The principle asserted by Defendant was sufficient to question the propriety of Deputy Allen\u2019s questions about grenades, rocket launchers, and dead bodies. See id. \u00b6 42 (\u201c[0]nly where a state constitutional provision had never been interpreted to provide greater protection than its federal analog are parties required to alert the trial court [to the applicable constitutional provisions] and articulate reasons for departure.\u201d). While we recognize that Defendant emphasized what he perceived to be the unfounded expansion of Deputy Allen\u2019s investigation into the realm of DWI, we construe Leyva to caution against overly technical resolutions to preservation challenges in areas of law where heightened state constitutional protections are entrenched in our jurisprudence. See id. \u00b6 38 (upholding principles of preservation set forth in Gomez and noting that since its issuance \u201csome opinions have strayed by imposing a higher standard\u201d). One such well-rooted principle is the prohibition in New Mexico on police questioning that strays from the initial justification for a vehicle stop and that is not otherwise separately supported by reasonable suspicion. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, \u00b6 55.\nBecause we conclude that Defendant\u2019s challenge in the metropolitan court triggered protections pursuant to Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution, and was asserted in the metropolitan court and therefore preserved, we need not address Defendant\u2019s remaining arguments related to this issue. We turn now to whether questions asked by Deputy Allen during his investigation impermissibly expanded the scope of the traffic stop contrary to the New Mexico Constitution.\nPropriety of Questions Regarding Rocket Launchers and Dead Bodies\nIt is well-rooted within New Mexico jurisprudence that our interstitial approach to state constitutional analysis entails review of parallel or analogous provisions of the United States Constitution to determine whether the federal protections are deficient to a degree requiring supplementation to protect the rights of New Mexico citizens. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 40-42. The rule is:\n\u201c[w]here New Mexico courts have taken a different path than federal courts, our precedent governs regardless of whether a party cites specific cases in support of a constitutional principle, so long as the party asserted the principle recognized in the cases and has developed the facts adequately to give the opposing party an opportunity to respond and to give the court an opportunity to rule.\u201d\nId. \u00b6 41 (quoting Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, \u00b6 30). Leyva also clarified that the \u201cless stringent of Gomez\u2019[ s] preservation requirements^]\u201d namely the \u201cassertion of] the constitutional principle\u201d and a \u201cshowing [of] the factual basis needed for the [district] court to rule on the issue[,]\u201d Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, \u00b6\u00b6 40, 44, 50 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), applies to issues such as that raised herein because \u201c \u2018a plethora of precedent already interprets Article II, Section 10 more expansively than the Fourth Amendment.\u2019 \u2019\u2019Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, \u00b650 (quoting State v. Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, \u00b6 52, 147 N.M. 134, 217 P.3d 1032 (Bosson, J., specially concurring).\nFurther instructive to our analysis is Leyva\u2019s reaffirmation of the state constitutional principle that Defendant maintains he invoked at trial, namely that Article II, Section 10 requires \u201ca reasonable justification for the initial stop and that all questions asked during the stop be reasonably related to the reason for the stop or otherwise supported by reasonable suspicion[.]\u201d Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, \u00b6 55 (emphasis added); see State v. Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, \u00b6 35, 138 N.M. 414, 120 P.3d 836 (holding that \u201call questions asked by police officers during a traffic stop must be analyzed to ensure they are reasonably related to the initial justification for the stop or are supported by reasonable suspicion\u201d) overruled in part and on other grounds by Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, \u00b6 17. Leyva reminds us that Article II, Section 10 bestows upon drivers \u201cbroader protection to individual privacy under the New Mexico Constitution than under the Fourth Amendment.\u201d201 l-NMSC-009,\u00b653 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As a result, the propriety of police conduct during a traffic stop is measured from the perspective of the state constitution by a standard distinct from that of the Fourth Amendment. Pursuant to modem Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, a traffic stop will be held valid so long as the officer does not prolong the stop \u201cbeyond the time needed to investigate the circumstances that caused the stop, unless he develops reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity in the meantime.\u201d Id. \u00b6 19 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the proper inquiry is \u201c[wjhether an officer\u2019s questioning measurably extends the length of a traffic stop.\u201dAi. \u00b6 21; see Ariz. v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009) (noting that \u201cinquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop ... do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop\u201d).\nFor purposes of Article II, Section 10, however, our courts continue to adhere to the two-part test first articulated in Terry v. Ohio, that requires an officer\u2019s action be both \u201cjustified at its inception\u201d- and \u201creasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.\u201d 392 U.S. 1,19-20 (1968). Thus, under Article 11, Section 10, both the duration and scope of a stop must be reasonable under the circumstances and, unlike under the Fourth Amendment, even questions that do not prolong the encounter are improper if they are not \u201creasonably related to the reason for the stop or otherwise supported by reasonable suspicion[.]\u201d Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, \u00b6 55. This approach \u201censures that investigating officers do not engage in \u2018fishing expeditions\u2019 during traffic stops.\u201d Id.\nRegarding the specific questions at issue, we note that the State has not asserted that the facts of the vehicle stop gave rise to any reasonable suspicion involving the disallowed possession of certain weapons or corpses. Had such a concern been argued by the State and determined to be valid, it would constitute a permissible expansion of the scope of the traffic stop. Contrary to such a finding, the district court determined that:\nDeputy Allen jumped from a traffic investigation to an impairment investigation to questions regarding weapons and dead bodies... . There were no articulable facts introduced suggesting the Deputy had reasonable suspicion to suspect Defendant was in possession of illegal weapons or corpses.\nSuch questions, which expand the scope of the investigation, are not permitted in New Mexico, absent reasonable suspicion, irrespective of the Deputy\u2019s alleged intent to simply elicit truthful responses.\nOn the record before it, the district court\u2019s analysis was correct. Indeed, when given the opportunity to explain or establish an investigative foundation for his non-traffic-related inquiries in a manner that related to his immediate investigation, Deputy Allen offered only two related justifications: that he needed help generally deciding whether Defendant was \u201cbeing truthful,\u201d and in \u201ctrying to determine the truthfulness of a response.\u201d On appeal, the State similarly contends that \u201cDeputy Allen did not ask the questions about weapons and dead bodies with the intent to investigate whether Defendant had such things. Rather, he asked the questions as an interview technique designed to help him gauge the truthfulness of Defendant\u2019s responses about DWI.\u201d However, nothing in the record indicates a preexisting awareness on the part of Deputy Allen as to whether grenades, dead bodies or rocket launchers were located within Defendant\u2019s vehicle such to where Deputy Allen could ascertain the honesty or dishonesty of Defendant\u2019s responses. Furthermore, there is no basis under Leyva for us to assume an alternatively appropriate reason existed for asking these unrelated, and what Deputy Allen conceded to be \u201coutrageous\u201d questions regarding items Defendant could not have lawfully possessed. See id. \u00b6 55; see also Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, \u00b6 35 (stating that \u201call questions asked by police officers during a traffic stop must be analyzed to ensure they are reasonably related to the initial justification ... or are supported by reasonable suspicion\u201d that may unfold during the investigation or traffic stop). There being no such legitimate investigative purpose asserted herein, no basis for Deputy Allen to accurately ascertain the truthfulness of the answers given by Defendant, and nothing in the record to otherwise place the questions in the context of what was properly being investigated, we hold that the district court correctly concluded that the questions were constitutionally improper under Leyva.\nWhen a motorist is subjected to inquiries unsupported by reasonable suspicion during a vehicle stop, our precedent establishes that the continuing detention of that person is illegal. State v. Portillo, 2011-NMCA-079, \u00b6 24, 150 N.M. 187, 258 P.3d 466. It is likewise settled law that evidence \u201cdiscovered as a result of the exploitation of an illegal seizure must be suppressed unless it has been purged of its primary taint.\u201d Id. \u00b6 25 (citing Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, \u00b6\u00b6 14, 23, for its recitation of the \u201cfruit of the poisonous tree doctrine\u201d set forth in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)). See Leyva, 2011-NMSC-09, \u00b6 2 (stating that when an investigative officer\u2019s questions are not based upon reasonable suspicion, the proper remedy is to suppress \u201cevidence gathered as a result of the questioning\u201d); see also id. \u00b6 10 (stating \u201c[wjhere evidence has been obtained as a result of questions not justified under the Fourth Amendment, suppression of that evidence is the proper remedy\u201d). On appeal, the State\u2019s argument is limited to defending the propriety of the questions asked by Deputy Allen. The State does not argue that the evidence that led to Defendant\u2019s conviction did not result from the exploitation of his illegal detention, or maintain specifically that it derived from something other than the impermissible questions themselves. Nor did it challenge the district court\u2019s determination that Defendant\u2019s conviction must be reversed if the questions are determined to be constitutionally impermissible. We do not address issues or questions unraised by litigants. See State v. Bent, 2013-NMCA-108, \u00b6 27, 328 P.3d 677 ([W]e disregard . . . issuefs] . . . not raised on appeal.\u201d\nHere, the entirety of Deputy Allen\u2019s testimony leading to Defendant\u2019s arrest was admitted into evidence during trial, including that regarding events that transpired after the improper questions were asked and during the illegal detention. AsDeputy Allen\u2019s testimony constituted the sole basis for the metropolitan court\u2019s determination of Defendant\u2019s guilt, Defendant\u2019s conviction must be reversed.\nCONCLUSION\nThe order of the district court is affirmed.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nJ. MILES HANISEE, Judge\nI CONCUR:\nMICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge\nJONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge (specially concurring).\nAs clear as this controlling precedent now is, we question why it is any longer necessary that the simultaneously applicable protections of the Fourth Amendment and Article II, Section 10 must be independently preserved when challenging the constitutional legality of a vehicle stop in New Mexico. To require dual assertions of such persistently overlapping protections, known well to both attorneys and the judges in whose courts these issues are most frequently raised, unnecessarily risks the waiver of important protections to motorists\u2019 liberty. It is, however, for our Supreme Court to effectuate change to its own jurisprudence, and we review the district court\u2019s ruling under Leyva and cases preceding it.\nAlthough unnecessary to our resolution of this issue, we note that our Supreme Court has also stated that even if the defendant \u201chad failed to preserve the state constitutional claim, we could nevertheless consider it because freedom from illegal search and seizure is a fundamental right.\u201d Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, \u00b6 31 n.4. Also cited in the same footnote is State v. Sutton, 1991-NMCA-073, \u00b6 20, 112 N.M. 449, 816 P.2d 518, which discusses search and seizure protections under the state constitution as a matter of general public interest that exists despite the defendant\u2019s failure to preserve the claim for appellate review. See Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, \u00b6 31 n.4.", "type": "majority", "author": "HANISEE, Judge." }, { "text": "SUTIN, Judge\n(specially concurring).\nI concur but add the following thoughts.\nThe Opinion\u2019s analysis of whether Defendant properly invoked the state constitution indirectly permits a result without having to outright reject present preservation jurisprudence. It is too bad that we must resort to this indirect approach to reach a just result. I fully agree with what the Opinion states in its footnote 2. It is time to hold that in search and seizure cases our courts will automatically examine whether relief under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution should be available whenever it appears that relief is unavailable under the Fourth Amendment.\nInsofar as the questioning about grenades, rocket launchers, and dead bodies is concerned, no one, neither Deputy Allen or D efendant, nor the metropolitan court, thought that the questioning was intended to relate to whether Defendant may have had such unlawful items in his vehicle. Furthermore, the officer testified that he had learned the questioning technique in \u201cinterviews and interrogation school\u201d and that he had used similar types of questions in other traffic stop DWI investigations. Assuming, without deciding, that questioning to ascertain truthfulness in DWI (alcohol or drugs) investigations might under some particular circumstance be a legitimate investigatory process, the failure here was Deputy Allen\u2019s complete failure to lay an adequate foundation in that regard.\nAgain, assuming, without deciding whether questions related to telling the truth in a DWI investigation might be legitimate and not constitute an unlawful expansion of the investigation, it appears to me that an officer would have to show a court that the questioning was grounded in a particular skill, knowledge, experience, education, and perhaps even science, and that the questioning was likely to give an indication of truthfulness that would assist the officer in his or her investigation.\nJONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge", "type": "concurrence", "author": "SUTIN, Judge" } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary K. King, Attorney General Santa Fe, NM M. Victoria Wilson, Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM for Appellant", "Bregman & Loman, P.C. Sam Bregman Albuquerque, NM for Appellee >" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Certiorari Denied, December 3, 2014,\nNo. 34,922\nIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2015-NMCA-028\nFiling Date: September 9, 2014\nDocket No. 31,890\nSTATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RON BELL, Defendant- Appellee.\nGary K. King, Attorney General Santa Fe, NM M. Victoria Wilson, Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM for Appellant\nBregman & Loman, P.C. Sam Bregman Albuquerque, NM for Appellee >" }, "file_name": "0437-01", "first_page_order": 453, "last_page_order": 461 }