{ "id": 4241602, "name": "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JENNIFER STEPHENSON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Stephenson", "decision_date": "2015-01-26", "docket_number": "No. 35,035; Docket No. 31,273", "first_page": "545", "last_page": "552", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2015-NMCA-038" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "2010-NMCA-027", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4245178 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/147/0761-01" ] }, { "cite": "2011-NMCA-007", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4249533 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/149/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 P.3d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2014-NMSC-031", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4239416 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/6/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 P.3d 905", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2012-NMCA-013", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4188546 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/1/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 N.M. 688", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552744 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "1994-NMCA-061", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 3-6" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 N.M. 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1592844 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/108/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "1989-NMSC-010", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 26-29, 103" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2007-NMCA-162", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3783590 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 4, 13, 17-18, 29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/143/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 N.M. 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 727612 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/116/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "1993-NMCA-040", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 13" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "476 N.E.2d 127", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 11931963 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140", "parenthetical": "affirming a conviction for neglect of a dependent by abandonment where a mother left her newborn infant \"alone by the side of a deserted country gravel road out of the view of [any] passersby\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/476/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "701 N.E.2d 863", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 11805257 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "869", "parenthetical": "affirming a conviction for neglect of a dependent by abandonment where a mother left her four-year-old child alone in her apartment for four days and returned to find him dead" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/701/0863-01" ] }, { "cite": "492 S.E.2d 700", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 416242 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700-01", "parenthetical": "affirming a reckless abandonment of a child conviction where a juvenile who placed her newborn infant in a trash bag, set it out with the garbage on the porch, and went to sleep inside the house" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/228/0664-01" ] }, { "cite": "923 S.W.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9998505 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1-2", "parenthetical": "en banc" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/923/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 S.W.3d 63", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 8191083 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64", "parenthetical": "recognizing that the defendant abandoned an infant when she left the infant in a locked car at a parking lot with the windows rolled up for an hour while she was shoplifting inside of a store" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw3d/269/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "Tex. Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 22.041", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Tex. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 A.2d 889", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "892" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 Mo. 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo.", "case_ids": [ 8852037 ], "year": 1879, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468", "parenthetical": "recognizing that abandonment is a statutory offense that \"does not mean a mere temporary absence from home, or temporary neglect of parental duty\" but requires \"an intention of causing perpetual separation\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mo/70/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 P.2d 370", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 2114573 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374", "parenthetical": "\"As applied to our child abandonment statute, abandonment means relinquishing all parental claims to a child and foregoing all parental duties to a child.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or-app/20/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 N.E.2d 505", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506", "parenthetical": "holding that a parent cannot be convicted of child abandonment unless it is \"proved beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a willful leaving of his or her child . .' . with an intention of causing perpetual separation\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 N.W.2d 587", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10683942 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/287/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 S.E.2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 S.E. 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1898, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570", "parenthetical": "\"}T]o constitute . . . abandonment . . ., there must be an actual desertion, accompanied with an intention to entirely sever, so far as it is possible to do so, the parental relation, and throw off all obligations growing out of the same.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 U.S. 518", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1175332 ], "year": 1932, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/285/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 44", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590289 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0044-01" ] }, { "cite": "1989-NMCA-071", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 P.3d 830", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2013-NMSC-024", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4334028 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" }, { "page": "\u00b6 9", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/4/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563429 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "1994-NMSC-029", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 24" }, { "page": "\u00b6 24" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-035", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4244712 ], "weight": 13, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6 10" }, { "page": "\u00b6 11" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0434-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1103, "char_count": 21926, "ocr_confidence": 0.784, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.643594115661138e-08, "percentile": 0.2913501906867929 }, "sha256": "a1f23699463f712625309dbb1be086e7b0a32d2e8d2e6667545e8bd5f3a72f11", "simhash": "1:b4bff601bce32ae8", "word_count": 3558 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:10:55.229683+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge", "JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge", "JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge" ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JENNIFER STEPHENSON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nGARCIA, Judge.\nA jury found Jennifer Stephenson (Defendant) guilty of criminal child abandonment pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 30-6-1 (B)(2009). Defendant alleges multiple errors on appeal, including a contention that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict. Specifically, she argues that her conduct in putting her two-year-old son (Child) to bed in his bedroom and ignoring his cries during the night does not constitute \u201cleaving\u201d or \u201cabandoning\u201d Child under Section 30-6-l(B). We agree and reverse Defendant\u2019s conviction. Because we reverse Defendant\u2019s conviction, we need not address the remaining issues raised on appeal.\nBACKGROUND\nOn the evening in question, Defendant put her Child to bed in his bedroom and locked the bedroom door. Defendant eventually went to sleep in her own bedroom in the same apartment. Sometime during the night, Child climbed from his toddler bed up onto a dresser that was standing next to his bed. The 112-pound dresser tipped over and fell onto Child, pinning his legs between the toddler bed railing and the dresser.\nDefendant told a detective that she did not hear any cries coming from Child\u2019s bedroom. And Child\u2019s father, who returned to the apartment from work at 2:00 a.m. that night, also said that he did not hear any cries that night. At about 7:00 a.m., the father woke and heard \u201cwhimpering\u201d from Child\u2019s bedroom. He unlocked Child\u2019s bedroom door with a \u201cbutter knife\u201d and discovered that Child was pinned between the dresser and the bed railing. He removed the dresser from Child and brought him to Defendant.\nDefendant, still in her pajamas, left to take Child to the hospital emergency room. On the way to the hospital, Defendant stopped at her parent\u2019s apartment to pick up her father. Defendant checked in to the emergency room by 7:58 a.m. Defendant told the emergency room doctor that a dresser had fallen on Child.\nThe emergency room doctor testified that Child\u2019s injuries were not consistent with being \u201chit\u201d by a dresser. He said that instead of bruises, there were pressure sores on both sides of Child\u2019s legs. Child had also developed \u201ccompartment syndrome,\u201d a condition in which the cells of the leg muscles begin to die from \u201cpressure [to the legs] over time.\u201d The doctor confirmed that he initially thought that the pressure sores and the compartment syndrome may have been caused by Child being bound by a \u201cbelt\u201d or a \u201cstrap.\u201d Because the nature of Child\u2019s injuries did not fit with the cause of the injury reported by Defendant, the doctor suspected child abuse and called the police. The State charged Defendant with negligent child abuse under Section 30-6-1 (D). However, after further investigation, the doctors changed their conclusion regarding the cause of Child\u2019s injury. At trial, the emergency room doctor testified that his \u201cultimate diagnosis\u201d was that Child had sustained \u201ca crush injury\u201d that was \u201cconsistent with a very large piece of furniture pinning a child down over a period of hours.\u201d Additionally, the detective assigned to the case came to \u201cbelieve [that] the dresser did, in fact, fall on [Child]\u201d and that Child \u201cwas left there.\u201d\nAll of the doctors who testified at trial said that Child, in order to develop pressure sores and compartment syndrome, would have been trapped between the dresser and the bed railing for hours. The emergency room doctor testified that it would take \u201cseveral\u201d hours for Child\u2019s injuries to form. The orthopedic surgeon who treated Child testified that he thought Child was trapped for at least \u201ceight to twelve hours\u201d and that \u201cthis type of injury usually takes [twelve] to [twenty-four] hours to develop.\u201d The pediatric intensive care doctor who treated Child testified that she thought Child was trapped for \u201ca minimum of six to twelve hours.\u201d All of these doctors agreed that Child would have been in extreme pain and that he would have been \u201ccrying\u201d and \u201cscreaming.\u201d And a pediatric psychologist testified that a child\u2019s cry from being \u201churt\u201d is different than his cry from being \u201ctired\u201d or \u201cuncomfortable\u201d and that \u201cevery mommy knows that.\u201d\nDuring its closing argument, the State told the jury that this case was about whether it is \u201cokay to leave your child confined or pinned or trapped for [six] to [twelve] hours.\u201d It told the jury that its \u201ctheory of the case\u201d was that Child \u201cdidn\u2019t like going to bed\u201d; that Defendant \u201cput[] him in [his bedjroom\u201d and \u201clocked the door\u201d; that Child \u201cclimbfed] up on th[e] dresser . . . and the chest f[ell]\u201d; that Child was \u201cin pain\u201d and \u201ccrying\u201d; and that \u201c[Defendant] chose to ignore him.\u201d It said that \u201cthe crux of this case\u201d was Defendant\u2019s \u201cfailure to act.... her nonaction.... it\u2019s about negligence.\u201d\nThe district court instructed the jury on the elements of the crime of negligent child abuse under Section 30-6-1 (D)(1). And at defense counsel\u2019s request, the district court also instructed the jury on the elements of the crime of child abandonment. The jury acquitted Defendant of negligent child abuse, but it convicted her of child abandonment. On appeal, Defendant argues, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to support the child abandonment conviction. '\nDISCUSSION\nOur Supreme Court has observed that the Legislature \u201c[r]ecogniz[ed] the wide variety of ways that a child can be harmed by abuse and neglect\u201d and has adopted a \u201cspectrum\u201d of civil and criminal remedies to address child abuse. See State v. Chavez, 2009-NMSC-035, \u00b6 12, 146 N.M. 434, 211 P.3d 891. On the \u201cbenign\u201d end of this spectrum, the Legislature can \u201censur[e] that children receive nutritious meals}.]\u201d Id. More \u201cintrusively],\u201d children may be placed in foster care or parental rights may be terminated all together. Id. And \u201c}o]n the far end of this spectrum lies the sanction for criminal child abuse, .. . punishable by . . . imprisonment\u201d and potential loss of parental rights. Id. The statutory construction of various statutes within this spectrum of the criminal child abuse array is the first issue we must address in this case.\nStandard of Review\nInterpretation of a criminal statute is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. \u00b6 10. Our \u201cprincipal command\u201d in construing a statute is to \u201ceffectuate the intent of the [Legislature\u201d by \u201cusing the plain language of the statute.\u201d State v. Ogden, 1994-NMSC-029, \u00b6 24, 118 N.M. 234, 880 P.2d 845. When interpreting \u201cthe plain meaning of the words at issue,\u201d the appellate courts \u201coften us[e] the dictionary for guidance.\u201d State v. Boyse, 2013-NMSC-024, \u00b6 9, 303 P.3d 830.\nWe must \u201cstrictly\u201d construe statutes that define criminal conduct. Chavez, 2009-NMSC-035, \u00b6 10. And we will not read a criminal statute as applying to particular conduct \u201cunless the legislative proscription is plain.\u201d State v. Bybee, 1989-NMCA-071, \u00b6 12, 109 N.M. 44, 781 P.2d 316 (citing United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518 (1932)).\nOnce an appellate court interprets the language set forth in the relevant statutes, it \u201cappl[ies] a substantial evidence standard to review the sufficiency of the evidence at trial.\u201d Chavez, 2009-NMSC-035, \u00b6 11. We must review the evidence \u201cin the light most favorable to the prosecution\u201d to determine whether \u201cany rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In doing so, we \u201cindulg[e] all reasonable inferences and resolv[e] all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the verdict.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We are not permitted to \u201cweigh the evidence or substitute [our] judgment for that of the fact finder\u201d; we determine only whether \u201cthere is sufficient evidence to support the verdict.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\nThe Civil Child Abuse and Neglect Processes\nThe civil child abuse and neglect process \u201caddresses situations in which the child has suffered or who is at risk of suffering serious harm because of the action or inaction of the child\u2019s parent}.]\u201d Id. \u00b6 13 (emphasis, internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (quoting NMSA 1978, \u00a7 32A-4-2(B)(l)).\nWhen parental conduct or the home environment places a child at risk, the State can use its civil powers to remove the danger to the child, either by allowing the child to remain with the parents subject to their compliance with court-ordered conditions, by removing the child from the home, or by transferring legal custody to another. Importantly, this process contemplates that parents will be afforded ... an opportunity to comply with a treatment plan before the State proceeds to more drastic remedies},]... the ultimate goal [is] to preserve and reunify the family.\nId. \u00b6 14 (citation omitted).\nThe Criminal Child Abandonment Component\nIn 1973, the Legislature enacted a statute criminalizing \u201cabandonment or abuse of a child.\u201d 1973 N.M. Laws, ch. 360, \u00a7 10; see \u00a7 30-6-1. Although the statute has since been amended and re-codified, its abandonment provision remains substantially the same. In pertinent part, the abandonment provision states:\nAbandonment of a child consists of the parent, guardian},] or custodian of a child intentionally leaving or abandoning the child under circumstances whereby the child may or does suffer neglect.\nSection 30-6-l(B). \u201cNeglect\u201d is defined to mean that:\na child is without proper parental care and control of subsistence, education, medical},] or other care or control necessary for the child\u2019s well-being because of the faults or habits of the child\u2019s parents, guardian},] or custodian or their neglect or refusal, when able to do so, to provide them}.]\nSection 30-6-1 (A)(2).\nThe child abandonment statute does not define the terms \u201cleaving or abandoning.\u201d See \u00a7 30-6-1 (B). We have been unable to find any New Mexico authority determining what kind of parental conduct constitutes \u201cleaving or abandoning\u201d a child under Section 30-6-1(B). Thus, we turn to the dictionary for guidance about the \u201cplain meaning\u201d of these terms. See Boyse, 2013-NMSC-024, \u00b6 9. The word \u201cleave\u201d means \u201c}t]o depart; voluntarily go away\u201d or \u201c}t]o depart willfully with the intent not to return.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 161 (9th ed. 2010) (emphasis added). \u201cAbandonment\u201d means \u201c1. The relinquishing of a right or interest with the intention of never again claiming it. ... 3. Family law. The act of leaving a spouse or child willfully and without an intent to return.\u201d Id. at 1-2 (emphasis added).\nThese dictionary definitions are consistent with similar definitions we have found in legal encyclopedias discussing criminal child abandonment. See 23 Am. Jur. 2d Dedication to Desertion and Nonsupport \u00a7 30, at 838-39 (2013) (\u201cTo constitute abandonment or desertion of a child within the meaning of the statutes making it an offense, there ordinarily must be an actual, voluntary, or willful desertion of the child, without justification and with an intent to sever the parental relationship entirely.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also 61A C.J.S .Pardon & Parole to Parties \u00a7 381, at 471 (2013) (\u201cThe elements of the offense of abandonment of a child are \u2018desertion,\u2019 that is, the willful forsaking and desertion of the duties of parenthood, and \u2018dependency,\u2019 that is, leaving such a child in a dependent condition.\u201d).\nA survey of other states\u2019 case law reveals that historically, the term \u201cabandonment,\u201d as used in statutes criminalizing the abandonment of a child, has been interpreted in a manner consistent with the dictionary and legal encyclopedia definitions above. See Gay v. State, 31 S.E. 569, 570 (Ga. 1898) (\u201c}T]o constitute . . . abandonment . . ., there must be an actual desertion, accompanied with an intention to entirely sever, so far as it is possible to do so, the parental relation, and throw off all obligations growing out of the same.\u201d), superseded by statute as recognized in Bailey v. State, 105 S.E.2d 320 (Ga. 1958); State v. Wilson, 287 N.W.2d 587, 589-91 (Iowa 1980) (concluding that the Iowa general assembly used the term \u201cabandons\u201d in \u201cits usual sense of permanency\u201d and it did not \u201cintend to encompass a temporary absence\u201d where a mother left her eighteen-month-old child unattended in her apartment for ninety minutes while she went to a nearby gas station to talk to her boyfriend was insufficient to prove child abandonment); City of Cincinnati v. Meade, 259 N.E.2d 505, 506 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970) (holding that a parent cannot be convicted of child abandonment unless it is \u201cproved beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a willful leaving of his or her child . .' . with an intention of causing perpetual separation\u201d); State v. Laemoa, 533 P.2d 370, 374 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) (\u201cAs applied to our child abandonment statute, abandonment means relinquishing all parental claims to a child and foregoing all parental duties to a child.\u201d); see also State v. Davis, 70 Mo. 467, 468 (Mo. 1879) (recognizing that abandonment is a statutory offense that \u201cdoes not mean a mere temporary absence from home, or temporary neglect of parental duty\u201d but requires \u201can intention of causing perpetual separation\u201d).\nSome state courts have recognized that a temporary absence may be sufficient to meet the definition of abandonment. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the criminal child abandonment statute was \u201cdesigned to punish single episodes that are repugnant to our concept of an orderly society.\u201d Commonwealth v. Skufca, 321 A.2d 889, 892 (Pa. 1974) (explaining that \u201cthe jury was free to find that leaving these minor children of tender years and incapable of protecting themselves unattended for a sustained period, closeted in such a manner that they were denied assistance from without, by a parent who had the duty to provide for their safety and ignored that responsibility for her personal pleasure, fell within the conduct prohibited under [the criminal abandonment statute\u201d).\nUnder the Texas statute, \u201cabandon\u201d is more broadly defined to include \u201cleaving] a child in any place without providing reasonable and necessary care for the child, under circumstances under which no reasonable, similarly situated adult would leave a child of that age and ability.\u201d Tex. Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 22.041(a), (b) (2007)). This definition has also been applied to circumstances that involved a temporary absence. See Fernandez v. State, 269 S.W.3d 63, 64 (Tex. App. 2008) (recognizing that the defendant abandoned an infant when she left the infant in a locked car at a parking lot with the windows rolled up for an hour while she was shoplifting inside of a store); Schultz v. State, 923 S.W.2d 1, 1-2 (Tex. App. 1996) (en banc) (affirming a conviction for child abandonment where the defendant.left her two young children alone in her apartment for fifteen hours and they died in a fire). Notwithstanding the broad definition of abandonment in Texas, the term has not been construed so broadly to be applied to a circumstance where a parent remains in the same apartment with a child in distress, but ignores the child from another room.\nOther state courts have upheld convictions in situations involving a parental absence that could be identified as temporary, although the question of whether these statutes encompassed temporary or permanent abandonments was not at issue or addressed in these cases. See In re B.L.M., 492 S.E.2d 700, 700-01 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (affirming a reckless abandonment of a child conviction where a juvenile who placed her newborn infant in a trash bag, set it out with the garbage on the porch, and went to sleep inside the house); Jones v. State, 701 N.E.2d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (affirming a conviction for neglect of a dependent by abandonment where a mother left her four-year-old child alone in her apartment for four days and returned to find him dead); Davis v. State, 476 N.E.2d 127, 140 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (affirming a conviction for neglect of a dependent by abandonment where a mother left her newborn infant \u201calone by the side of a deserted country gravel road out of the view of [any] passersby\u201d).\nWe have found no authority, and the Stat\u00e9 has cited none, to establish that the combined actions by a parent of locking a child in his or her bedroom and then ignoring the child\u2019s cries while remaining in the same apartment constitutes the crime of abandonment. See State v. Ibarra, 1993-NMCA-040, \u00b6 13, 116 N.M. 486, 864 P.2d 302 (\u201cWe are entitled to assume, when arguments are unsupported by cited authority, that supporting authorities do not exist.\u201d). The State\u2019s reliance on State v. Chavez, 2007-NMCA-162, 143 N.M. 126, 173 P.3d 48 (Kimberly Chavez), is misplaced. Although this Court in Kimberly Chavez referenced that the defendant was convicted of one count of \u201cabandonment or abuse of a child[,]\u201d the statutory conviction was for negligent child abuse under Section 30-6-1 (D)(1) rather than abandonment under Section 30-6-1 (B). Kimberly Chavez, 2007-NMCA-162, \u00b6\u00b6 4, 13, 17-18, 29. In the present case, the jury found Defendant not guilty of negligent child abuse under Section 30-6-1 (D)( 1). As a result, it is clear that Kimberly Chavez addressed a conviction for negligent child abuse under Section 30-6-1(D)(1) and is not applicable to our analysis of abandonment in this case.\nWe are persuaded by those cases and authorities that apply the literal and plain meaning of abandonment to conclude that a parent must leave the child without an intent to return to be convicted of criminal child abandonment. This interpretation is consistent with our mandate to \u201ceffectuate the intent of the [Legislature\u201d by \u201cusing the plain language of the statute,\u201d Ogden, 1994-NMSC-029, \u00b6 24; to construe criminal statutes \u201cstrictly,\u201d Chavez, 2009-NMSC-035, \u00b6 10; and to avoid reading a criminal statute as applying to particular conduct \u201cunless the legislative proscription is plain,\u201d Bybee, 1989-NMCA-071, \u00b6 12. Therefore, we conclude that to convict a defendant of abandonment under Section 30-6-l(B), there must be sufficient evidence that the defendant left the child without an intent to return.\nThe State neither argued nor presented any evidence that Defendant intended to leave Child in his bedroom without an intent to return. By locking Child in his bedroom while Defendant remained inside the same apartment, Defendant has not met the definition of abandonment \u2014 leaving without an intent to return. As a result, there was insufficient evidence to support Defendant\u2019s child abandonment conviction under Section 30-6-1 (B). We note that our holding is consistent with our recent nonbinding and unpublished decision in State v. Charley, No. 31,911, mem. op. \u00b6 24 (N.M. Ct. App. April 17, 2014) (non-precedential) (determining that a \u201c[fjailure to pickup a child after school does not rise to the type of abandonment contemplated by New Mexico statutory law\u201d). Moreover, Defendant\u2019s alleged conduct was consistent with the kind of \u201cinaction\u201d that our Children\u2019s Code was designed to consider through other proceedings. See \u00a7 32A-4-2 (B)(1) (defining \u201cabused child\u201d to mean a child \u201cwho has suffered . . . serious harm because of the action or inaction of the child\u2019s parent.\u201d (emphasis added)); Chavez, 2009-NMSC-035, \u00b6 13-\nDefendant\u2019s Jury Instruction Request\nWe note that Defendant requested the jury instruction on abandonment of a child pursuant to Section 30-6-1, and the State did not object to the inclusion of this instruction. The State makes reference to this procedural matter in its appellate brief but does not present any argument, cite relevant case law to assert error, or otherwise develop any issue for further review. We might speculate that this procedural factor has some relevance on appeal. The appellate courts have addressed the issue of invited error when it is properly raised on appeal. See State v. Clark, 1989-NMSC-010, \u00b6\u00b6 26-29, 103, 108 N.M. 288, 772 P.2d 322 (addressing a failure to object to the arguments and jury instructions in the context of invited error and fundamental error); State v. Young, 1994-NMCA-061, \u00b6\u00b6 3-6, 117 N.M. 688, 875 P.2d 1119 (declining to address a defendant\u2019s challenge to the evidence and the jury instruction that he requested be given). Under the circumstances, however, this Court will not address an undeveloped issue where no authority or argument has been presented on appeal. See State v. Gutierrez, 2012-NMCA-013, \u00b6 33, 269 P.3d 905 (stating that where a party \u201cfails to cite to any facts in the record or other authority in support of [a] contention,\u201d this Court will \u201cdecline to review Defendant's undeveloped argument on appeal.\u201d)(rev\u2019d on other grounds, 2014-NMSC-031, 333 P.3d 247); State v. Gonzales, 2011-NMCA-007, \u00b6 19, 149 N.M. 226, 247 P.3d 1111 (stating that \u201cthis Court has no duty to review an argument that is not adequately developed\u201d); State v. Fuentes, 2010-NMCA-027, \u00b6 29, 147 N.M. 761, 228 P.3d 1181 (explaining that this Court does not review unclear or undeveloped arguments on appeal that would require this Court to guess at what a party\u2019s arguments might be). As a result, we decline to consider this procedural matter further.\nCONCLUSION\nDefendant\u2019s conviction for the crime of child abandonment is reversed. This matter is remanded to the district court to effectuate the dismissal of Defendant\u2019s conviction and the sentence imposed upon her.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nTIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nJAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge\nJONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge", "type": "majority", "author": "GARCIA, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary K. King, Attorney General Margaret E. McLean, Assistant Attorney General Joel Jacobsen, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Appellee", "Law Offices of the Public Defender Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender B. Douglas Wood III, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellant" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Certiorari Granted, January 26, 2015,\nJanuary 26, 2015,\nNo. 35,035\nIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2015-NMCA-038\nFiling Date: November 18, 2014\nDocket No. 31,273\nSTATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JENNIFER STEPHENSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nGary K. King, Attorney General Margaret E. McLean, Assistant Attorney General Joel Jacobsen, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Appellee\nLaw Offices of the Public Defender Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender B. Douglas Wood III, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellant" }, "file_name": "0545-01", "first_page_order": 561, "last_page_order": 568 }