{
  "id": 4240797,
  "name": "EDWARD LUCERO, JR., and ELAINE LUCERO, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Petitioner",
  "name_abbreviation": "Lucero v. Northland Insurance",
  "decision_date": "2015-03-26",
  "docket_number": "Docket No. 34,607",
  "first_page": "557",
  "last_page": "566",
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          "page": "54",
          "parenthetical": "\"This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of: 1. Covered persons; 2. Claims made; 3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or 4. Vehicles involved in the auto accident.\" (internal alterations omitted)"
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  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice",
      "BARBARA J. VIGIL, Chief Justice",
      "PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice",
      "EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice",
      "JERRY H. RITTER, Judge Sitting by Designation"
    ],
    "parties": [
      "EDWARD LUCERO, JR., and ELAINE LUCERO, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Petitioner."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "OPINION\nBOSSON, Justice.\nA trucking company purchased a liability insurance policy covering each of its several tractors and trailers. The policy stipulated that liability coverage would be limited to \u201c$1,000,000 each \u2018accident.\u2019\u201d A tractor-trailer rig insured under the policy was involved in a single accident. The question before us is whether $1,000,000 is the limit per accident for both vehicles (the tractor and the trailer) or whether each vehicle has liability coverage in the amount of $1,000,000. The district court interpreted the policy to limit its coverage to $1,000,000; our Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed. Because this dispute affects not only the parties to this lawsuit but arguably New Mexico\u2019s place among the many jurisdictions that have grappled with similar policy language, we granted certiorari and now reverse the Court of Appeals.\nBACKGROUND\nThe facts in this case are undisputed. The Luceros were severely injured when their vehicle was hit by a tractor-trailer negligently driven by an employee of H & J Hamilton Trucking Company, insured by Defendant Northland Insurance Company. Northland defended Hamilton in the ensuing lawsuit. Eventually, Northland stipulated to liability, and the Luceros agreed to dismiss all claims against Northland and its insured in exchange for a settlement in the amount of policy limits.\nThe parties disagreed, however, as to the policy limits. Before the district court, the parties' filed cross-motions for summary judgment seeking to answer this question. Northland maintained that its insurance policy limits liability to $1,000,000 for each accident, an amount it tendered to the Luceros. The Luceros, on the other hand, interpreted the policy as providing $1,000,000 for each covered auto. Hamilton\u2019s tractor and trailer are both covered autos under the policy, so the Luceros sought $1,000,000 for each, or $2,000,000 for both. The district court agreed with Northland\u2019s reading of the insurance policy and granted summary judgment for $1,000,000. The Court of Appeals reversed, agreeing with the Luceros. See Lucero v. Northland Ins. Co., 2014-NMCA-055, \u00b6\u00b6 1, 27, 326 P.3d 42.\nDISCUSSION\nBecause the insurance policy before us involves liability coverage, we interpret the policy \u201cin accordance with the same principles which govern the interpretation of all contracts.\u201d Ponder v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2000-NMSC-033, \u00b6 11, 129 N.M. 698, 12 P.3d 960 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Our primary goal is to determine \u201cthe intentions of the contracting parties ... at the time they executed the [policy].\u201d Id. \u201cWhen discerning the purpose, meaning, and intent of the parties to a contract, the court\u2019s duty is confined to interpreting the contract that the parties made for themselves, and absent any ambiguity, the court may not alter or fabricate a new agreement for the parties.\u201d CC Hous. Corp. v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 1987-NMSC-117, \u00b6 6, 106 N.M. 577, 746 P.2d 1109. \u201cThus, when the policy language is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to the contract and enforce it as written.\u201d Ponder, 2000-NMSC-033, \u00b611.\nThe Insurance Policy.\nThree sections of the policy before us are particularly relevant in resolving this case: Declarations Item Two, \u201cSchedule of Coverages and Covered Autos,\u201d Section 11(A), \u201cLiability Coverage,\u201d and Section 11(C), \u201cLimit of Insurance.\u201d We look first to the Declarations page, Item Two, entitled \u201cSchedule of Coverages and Covered Autos,\u201d which we insert from the original.\nWe note particularly the language stating: \u201cThis policy provides only those coverages where a charge is shown in the premium column below. Each of these coverages will apply only to those \u2018autos\u2019 shown as Covered \u2018Autos.\u2019\u201d As noted above, the Declarations page then provides, and sets forth separate premiums for, various kinds of coverages including the liability coverage for bodily injury and property damage at issue in this lawsuit. \u201cCovered Auto\u201d is a defined term in the policy that refers in a separate page to Hamilton\u2019s five tractors and six trailers, including both the tractor and the trailer involved in this accident. Accordingly, Northland is clearly liable for the negligence of its insured up to any limits of liability the policy declares. As is evident from the quoted portion of the Declarations page, the policy limits liability coverage to a maximum of \u201c$1,000,000 each \u2018accident.\u2019\u201d\nMoving beyond the Declarations page to the main body of the policy, the next significant provision, Section 11(A) \u201cLiability Coverage,\u201d reads as follows:\nWe will pay all sums an \"insured\" legally must pay as damages because of \"bodily injury\" or \"property damage\" to which this insurance applies, caused by an \"accident\" and resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of a covered \"auto\".\nWe will also pay all sums an \"insured\" legally must pay as a \"covered pollution cost or expense\" to which this Insurance applies, caused by art \"accident1 and resulting from the ownership, 'maintenance or use of covered \"autos\". However, we will only pay for the \"covered pollution cost or expense\" if there is either \"bodily Injury\" or \"property damage\" to which this insurance applies that is caused by the same \"accident\".\nWe have the right and duty to defend any \"insured\" against a \"suit\" asking for such damages or a \"covered pollution cost or expense\", However, we have no duty to defend any \"insured\" against a \"suit seeking damages for \"bodily injury\" or \"property damage\" or a \"covered pollution cost or expense\" to which this insurance does not apply. We may investigate and settle any claim or \"suit\" as we consider appropriate, Our duty to defend or settle ends when the Liability Coverage Limit of Insurance has been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements.\nThe third relevant policy provision, Section 11(C) entitled \u201cLimit of Insurance,\u201d then proceeds to define the limit on liability coverage:\nRegardless of the number of covered \"autos\u201d, \u201cinsureds\u201d, premiums paid, claims made or vehicles involved in the \"accident\u201d, the most we will pay for the total of all damages and \u201ccovered pollution cost or expense\u201d combined, resulting from any one \"accident\" is the Limit of Insurance for Liability Coverage shown in the Declarations.\nReading the three provisions together, we see that Northland\u2019s promise in Section II (A) to \u201cpay all sums an \u2018insured\u2019 legally must pay as damages . . . caused by an \u2018accident\u2019 and resulting from the ... use of a covered \u2018auto\u2019,\u201d is limited by Section 11(C), \u201cthe most we will pay for ... all damages ... resulting from any one \u2018accident.\u2019\u201d That limit is \u201c$1,000,000 each \u2018accident\u2019\u201d as stated on the Declarations page.\nThe Luceros read the policy as promising something different. They argue that the policy provides $1,000,000 in liability coverage for each \u201ccovered auto\u201d involved in any one accident. Because two \u201ccovered autos\u201d were involved in this accident (the tractor and the trailer) and because each \u201ccovered auto\u201d carries $1,000,000 in liability coverage, the Luceros contend that the policy limits in this case are $2,000,000, not $1,000,000. The Court of Appeals agreed with the Luceros\u2019 position. See Lucero, 2014-NMCA-055, \u00b6 13 (\u201cDefendant is obligated to provide $ 1 million in coverage for the tractor involved in the accident and $1 million in coverage for the trailer involved in the same accident, for a total of $2 million in coverage.\u201d).\nAs authority for their conclusion, the Luceros look first to the Declarations page Schedule of Coverages, previously quoted, which states in part that \u201c[e]ach of these coverages will apply only to those \u2018autos\u2019 shown as Covered \u2018Autos.\u2019\u201d The Luceros read this as a grant of coverage up to the policy limits of $1,000,000 for each covered auto involved in any accident, including this situation involving two covered autos in one accident. We question whether the policy really grants such expansive coverage.\nFirst, the policy simply does not say that it grants coverage in the amount of policy limits for each covered auto, each-accident. The language does not read, \u201ceach of these coverages will apply to [each of] those autos shown . . . .\u201d The language states instead that \u201c[e]ach of these coverages will apply only to those \u2018autos\u2019 shown . . . .\u201d It is as if the Luceros would read the word \u201conly\u201d out of the sentence. Textually, the provision is phrased not as a grant but as a limitation: \u201conly\u201d those autos shown on the list of covered autos are eligible for $1,000,000 of liability coverage. There is a critical distinction between a grant of coverage and \u201cthe amount of such coverage.\u201d See Vigil v. California Cas. Ins. Co., 1991-NMSC-050, \u00b6\u00b6 7-8, 112 N.M. 67, 811 P.2d 565 (emphasis added). Plainly, the Declarations page makes liability coverage available for each of the covered autos, but it does not grant policy limits for each covered auto.\nThe Declarations page then stipulates that its limit of liability is \u201c$1,000,000 each \u2018accident.\u2019\u201d Clearly then, liability coverage is not boundless; the policy does not say \u201c$1,000,000 each covered auto each accident.\u201d The limitation on the Declarations page apparently applies as an outside limit per \u201caccident\u201d without regard to the number of covered autos involved.\nEven, however, if there were reasonable grounds for disagreement over the terms of the Declarations page, language in the body of the policy settles the matter. Section 11(A) of the policy, previously quoted, states: \u201cOur duty to defend or settle ends when the Liability Coverage Limit of Insurance has been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements.\u201d As previously discussed, the Declarations page provides that this limit is $1,000,000 each-accident. Section 11(C) ofthe policy then says the same thing in terms of a \u201cper accident\u201d outside limit on whatNorthland will pay. It states: \u201cRegardless of the number of covered \u2018autos\u2019 ... or vehicles involved in the \u2018accident\u2019,\u201d the most Northland will pay \u201cfor the total of all damages ... resulting from any one \u2018accident\u2019 is the Limit of Insurance for Liability Coverage shown in the Declarations \u00bf$1,000,000 each accident].\u201d Therefore, the argument advanced by the Luceros that the policy provides $ 1,000,000 in coverage for \u201ceach covered auto in each accident\u201d simply does not find support in the language of the policy. The policy limits Northland\u2019s exposure to $1,000,000 per accident regardless of the number of covered autos involved in any one accident.\nImportantly, we observe that other jurisdictions interpreting similar insurance clauses have reached a similar conclusion. See Grinnell Select Ins. Co. v. Baker, 362 F.3d 1005, 1006 (7th Cir. 2004) (\u201cThis is the most we will pay regardless of the number of: 1. \u2018Insureds\u2019; 2. Claims made; 3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or 4. Vehicles involved in the auto accident.\u201d); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Munroe, 614 F.3d 322, 324-25 (7th Cir. 2010) (\u201cThe \u2018Combined Limit of Liability\u2019 provision ... provides that the per-occurrence limit \u2014 $1,000,000\u2014is the most that Auto-Owners will pay, \u2018regardless of the number of automobiles shown in the Declarations ... or automobiles involved in the occurrence.\u2019\u201d (second omission in original)); Suh v. Dennis, 614 A.2d 1367, 1370 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992) (\u201cRegardless of the number of covered \u2018autos\u2019, \u2018insureds\u2019, premiums paid, claims made, or vehicles involved in the \u2018accident\u2019, the most we will pay for all damages resulting in any one \u2018accident\u2019 is the Limit of Insurance for Liability Coverage shown in the Declarations.\u201d); United Servs. Auto. Ass\u2019n v. Baggett, 258 Cal. Rptr. 52, 54 (Ct. App. 1989) (\u201cThis is the most we will pay regardless of the number of: 1. Covered persons; 2. Claims made; 3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or 4. Vehicles involved in the auto accident.\u201d (internal alterations omitted)); United Servs. Auto. Ass\u2019n v. Wilkinson, 569 A.2d 749, 751 -52 (N.H. 1989) (\u201cRegardless of the number of covered autos, insureds, claims made or vehicles involved in the accident, our limit of liability is as follows:... The most we will pay for all damages resulting from bodily injury to any one person caused by any one accident is the limit shown in this endorsement for \u2018each person\u2019.\u201d); Banner v. Raisin Valley, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 591, 592 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (\u201cThe limitation of liability section clearly states that the limit applies regardless of the number of vehicles involved in the accident.\u201d). The Luceros offer little contrary authority.\nThe Luceros, focusing on the precise language and phrasing of Section 11(C), put forward a different theory of that section\u2019s intent, essentially arguing that the limits of that section simply do not apply when two covered autos are involved in one accident. For ease of reference, we state the Limitation of Insurance clause once more.\nRegardless of the number of covered \u201cautos\u201d, \u201cinsureds\u201d, premiums paid, claims made or vehicles involved in the \u201caccident\u201d, the most we will pay for . . . any one \u201caccident\u201d is the Limit of Insurance for Liability-Coverage shown in the Declarations [$1,000,000 each accident].\nThe Luceros point out that \u201c[r]egardless of the number of covered \u2018autos\u2019\u201d as stated in Section 11(C) does not say \u201cregardless of the number of covered autos involved in the accident.\u201d The Luceros argue that since the phrase is not tied to covered autos involved in the accident, then the phrase should be read as, \u201cregardless of the number of covered autos not involved in the accident.\u201d\nThis interpretation, according to the Luceros, makes the phrase an anti-stacking clause and not a limit on per-accident liability. Anti-stacking clauses are typically designed to prevent the insured from aggregating (stacking) policy limits that apply to covered vehicles that are not involved in the particular accident. See Lucero, 2014-NMCA-055, \u00b6 19. Here, the Luceros are not trying to aggregate (or stack) policy limits for covered autos not involved in the accident; they seek to aggregate the limits provided for each of the covered autos that is involved in the accident. Therefore, the Luceros argue that the limits referred to in Section 11(C) do not apply to this particular circumstance where more than one covered auto is involved in a single accident.\nOf course, the Limitation of Insurance clause does use the term \u201cinvolved in the accident\u201d after the word \u201cvehicles\u201d (\u201c[r]egardless of the number of . . . vehicles involved in the \u2018accident\u2019\u201d). The Luceros argue that the term \u201cinvolved in the \u2018accident\u2019\u201d only modifies \u201cvehicles\u201d and not any of the antecedent terms before it \u2014 like covered autos (\u201c[r]egardless of the number of covered \u2018autos\u2019\u201d). The Luceros note the absence of a comma between \u201cclaims made\u201d and \u201cor vehicles involved in the accident.\u201d The Luceros point out that \u201ccovered autos\u201d is specifically defined in the policy whereas the term \u201cvehicles\u201d is not, and therefore, \u201cvehicles\u201d is intended to refer to something other than \u201ccovered autos.\u201d Instead, the Luceros argue that \u201cvehicles\u201d is a generic term that refers to all autos and not \u201ccovered autos,\u201d a debatable assertion given that all \u201ccovered autos\u201d must as well be \u201cvehicles.\u201d\nThus, argue the Luceros, by putting the term \u201cvehicles\u201d instead of \u201ccovered autos\u201d right before the phrase \u201cinvolved in the accident,\u201d Northland must have intended the clause \u201cinvolved in the \u2018accident\u2019\u201d to mean that the limits in the Declarations page apply regardless of the number of other vehicles involved or claims made against the insured. For example, the limit of liability would be the same if the insured was in an accident with one other vehicle or one hundred other vehicles. Similarly, the limit of liability would be the same whether there were one hundred claims against the insured or one.\nBut, according to the Luceros, this clause was not intended to modify or limit liability for multiple \u201ccovered autos\u201d involved in the accident. In that case, there would be no limit. Northland would have to pay $2,000,000 for two covered autos in one accident, $6,000,000 for six covered autos, even $11,000,000 if all eleven covered autos were somehow involved in a single accident. At the very least, the Luceros\u2019 interpretation suggests ambiguity, and ambiguity in contracts should be interpreted in favor of the insured.\nWe note that \u201ca contract is ambiguous if a. genuine doubt appears as to its meaning, that is, if after applying established rules of interpretation, the written instrument remains reasonably susceptible to at least two reasonable but conflicting meanings ....\u201d11 Williston on Contracts: Ambiguity as a prerequisite to interpretation and construction \u00a7 30:4 (4th ed. 2014) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). This does not mean that every possible interpretation will lead to an ambiguity. While the Luceros\u2019 reading is not entirely implausible, it relies in part on a very technical rule of English known as the Doctrine of the Last Antecedent. See LeClercq, supra, at 201-02. Such rules may inform our analysis, but they are merely a guide to discerning legislative intent. Hale v. Basin Motor Co., 1990-NMSC-068, 110 N.M. 314, 795 P.2d 1006. We believe our duty is not to impose hyper-technical rules of grammar when interpreting the true intentions of parties to a contract. If that were our duty, then most contracts would be ambiguous.\nFrom the text of Section 11(C), considered as a whole and not parsed too finely, we believe it is clear that Northland intended its \u201c$1,000,000 each \u2018accident\u2019\u201d limitation to apply \u201c[rjegardless of the number of covered \u2018autos\u2019 ... or vehicles\u201d that are \u201cinvolved in the \u2018accident\u2019.\u201d Regardless of that number, not the number of covered autos not involved in the accident, the policy proclaims its limit: \u201c[T]he most we will pay for the total of all damages . . . resulting from any one \u2018accident\u2019\u201d is $1,000,000.\nReading Section 11(C) as a per-accident limit of liability regardless of the number of covered autos involved in the accident appears to be consistent with the majority of jurisdictions that have addressed this issue. It is also consistent with similar cases in which the tractor and the trailer are both involved in a single accident. See Munroe, 614 F.3d at 325 (following the accident of a tractor trailer, the policy unambiguously limits coverage to $1,000,000); Canal Ins. Co. v. Blankenship, 129 F. Supp. 2d 950, 953 (S.D. W. Va. 2001) (the policy liability for the truck and trailer was properly limited to $1,000,000 and did not provide for $2,000,000 policy limits); Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Estate of Karpov, 559 F.3d 621, 625 (7th Cir. 2009) (although the accident involved a covered tractor and trailer, \u201c[t]he insurance policy clearly and expressly limited [the insurer\u2019s] liability to a maximum of $1,000,000 per accident\u201d).\nWe note three cases that are particularly helpful in deciding this issue. First, in Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 756 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 2000), the Florida Supreme Court construed a limit of liability clause after a tractor-trailer rig caused an accident with a single car. Id. at 31-32. Although the Court found that the language of the limitation-of-liability clause in that particular policy was ambiguous, it turned to several cases from other jurisdictions as an example of what the insurer should have done -to make its liability limit unambiguous. Id. at 33-36. The Florida Court stated:\nIn contrast to the clause drafted by Auto-Owners in this case, the limiting provisions of the insurance policies set forth in the recent reported decisions include an introductory qualifying clause that clearly and unambiguously explains that liability coverage is limited to a certain amount \u201cregardless\u201d of the number of vehicles involved in the accident.\nId. at 36. See also State Auto Ins. Co. v. Stinson, 142 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision); Weimer v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 575 N.W.2d 466, 469 n.6 (Wis. 1998); Dennis, 614 A.2d at 1370. The limiting phrase \u201cregardless of the number of vehicles involved in the accident\u201d is of course strikingly similar to Northland\u2019s language in this very case.\nReferring to these other cases, the Florida Court then observed,\nThe presence of these qualifying clauses evidences an established custom in the insurance industry as to the language used by insurers in drafting clauses where the intent is to limit liability coverage to a single amount, even though multiple insured vehicles are involved in an accident. As these out-of-state cases demonstrate, when multiple insured vehicles are involved in a single accident, a limitation of liability can be achieved by the simple use of a qualifying clause.\nAnderson, 756 So. 2d at 36 (citation omitted).\nWe regard this reference to a \u201ccustom in the insurance industry\u201d as significant. Because Northland can justifiably rely on limiting phraseology accepted elsewhere to achieve its desired objective, we should proceed cautiously before creating different expectations solely for our state.\nSimilarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit interpreted a limit-of-liability clause after three sets of tractor-trailers, all owned by the insured, were involved in one accident. Munroe, 614 F.3d at 323. The policy contained a combined limit of liability of $1,000,000 per occurrence \u2018\u201cregardless of the number of automobiles shown in the Declarations ... or automobiles involved in the occurrence.\u2019\u201d Id. at 325 (omission in original). The Court found no ambiguity: \u201cWhile the Munroes attempt to find ambiguity, including in the terms \u2018automobiles\u2019 and \u2018combined,\u2019 these contortions merit little discussion here: applied to the ' facts of this case, the unambiguous terms of the policy limit the coverage to $1,000,000 for each occurrence, notwithstanding the involvement of three . . . tractor-trailers.\u201d Id.\nFinally, the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia interpreted a limit of liability clause after a tractor and trailer were involved in a deadly accident. Blankenship, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 952. The sole question was whether the policy limitprovided $1,000,000 total liability coverage or $1,000,000 for each vehicle. Id. The policy contained a clause that read \u201c[rjegardless of the number of . . . automobiles to which this policy applies,. . . [t]he limit of liability stated in the schedule of the policy as applicable to \u2018each occurrence\u2019 is the total limit of the company\u2019s liability . . . .\u201d Id. The injured parties claimed that this language was ambiguous \u201cbecause it does not limit liability to one million dollars per occurrence when more than one covered vehicle is involved in the accident.\u201d Id. at 953. They suggested that the insurance company should have added the language \u201c\u2018regardless of the number of vehicles involved in the accident.'\u201d Id. (emphasis added). The Court held that the insurance policy was not ambiguous and provided coverage up to $1,000,000 per occurrence. Id. at 956. The Court noted that \u201c[a] court should read policy provisions to avoid ambiguities and not torture the language to create them.\u201d Id. at 953 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\nThus, we are satisfied that Northland\u2019s position appears to be more in line with the \u201ccustom\u201d within the industry and the jurisprudence construing it. While that observation is not necessarily dispositive, it does inform our deliberations. The Luceros\u2019 position, on the other hand, appears to be almost without supporting authority, at least in terms of cases interpreting similar policy language. In its briefing to this Court, Northland asserted that the Luceros\u2019interpretation of the policy, as adopted by our Court of Appeals, \u201cstands alone among the 50 state judicial systems.\u201d See Grinnell, 362 F.3d at 1007. Though perhaps somewhat hyperbolic, that statement remains largely unchallenged, and the Luceros have not done much to discredit it.\nCONCLUSION\nWe hold that Northland limited its liability to $1,000,000 for each accident regardless of the number of insured vehicles involved. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the district court\u2019s grant of summary judgment in favor of Northland.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nRICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice\nWE CONCUR:\nBARBARA J. VIGIL, Chief Justice\nPETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice\nEDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice\nJERRY H. RITTER, Judge Sitting by Designation\nWe note that while stacking generally involves aggregating the policies of the vehicles not involved in the accident, merely saying a clause is an anti-stacking clause is not alone dispositive. A court should look to the facts of the case and the language as a whole to determine if a clause is actually an anti-stacking clause. See Progressive Premier Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Kocher ex rel. Fleming, 932 N.E.2d 1094, 1098 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).\nAccording to the Doctrine of the Last Antecedent, \u201c[e] vidence that a qualifying phrase is supposed to apply to all antecedents instead of only to the immediately preceding one may be found in the fact that it is separated from the antecedent by a comma.\u201d Terri LeClercq, Doctrine of the Last Antecedent: The Mystifying Morass of Ambiguous Modifiers, 40 Tex. J. Bus. L. 199, 210 (2004) (footnote, internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\nThe Fifth District Court of Appeals for Illinois has found policies ambiguous despite a similar limit of liability clause. See Kocher, 932 N.E.2d at 1096 (\u2018\u201cThe limit of liability shown on the Declarations Page is the most we will pay regardless of the number of: 1. claims made; 2. covered vehicles; 3. trailers shown on the Declarations Page; 4. insured persons; 5. lawsuits brought; 6. vehicles involved in an accident; or 7. premiums paid.\u2019\u201d). However, the court found the policy ambiguous because the amount in the limit liability in the declarations page was listed more than once. The court specifically distinguished its case with those cases where the amount in the declarations page was listed only once. Id. at 1102. In our case, Northland\u2019s policy only states the limit of liability once.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "BOSSON, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Montgomery & Andrews, P.A. Kevin M. Sexton Andrew S. Montgomery Santa Fe, NM for Petitioner",
      "O\u2019Connell Law, L.L.C. Erin B. O\u2019Connell Albuquerque, NM Law Offices of Geoffrey R. Romero Geoffrey R. Romero Albuquerque, NM The Vargas Law Firm, L.L.C. Ray M. Vargas, II Albuquerque, NM for Respondents",
      "Butt, Thornton & Baehr, P.C. Paul Trafton Yarbrough Jane A. Laflin Albuquerque, NM Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A. Thomas A. Outler Seth L. Sparks Albuquerque, NM Civerolo, Gralow, Hill & Curtis, P.A. Lance Dean Richards Albuquerque, NM for Amici Curiae American Trucking Associations, Inc., Trucking Industry Defense Association and New Mexico Trucking Association"
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2015-NMSC-011\nFiling Date: March 26, 2015\nDocket No. 34,607\nEDWARD LUCERO, JR., and ELAINE LUCERO, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Petitioner.\nMontgomery & Andrews, P.A. Kevin M. Sexton Andrew S. Montgomery Santa Fe, NM for Petitioner\nO\u2019Connell Law, L.L.C. Erin B. O\u2019Connell Albuquerque, NM Law Offices of Geoffrey R. Romero Geoffrey R. Romero Albuquerque, NM The Vargas Law Firm, L.L.C. Ray M. Vargas, II Albuquerque, NM for Respondents\nButt, Thornton & Baehr, P.C. Paul Trafton Yarbrough Jane A. Laflin Albuquerque, NM Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A. Thomas A. Outler Seth L. Sparks Albuquerque, NM Civerolo, Gralow, Hill & Curtis, P.A. Lance Dean Richards Albuquerque, NM for Amici Curiae American Trucking Associations, Inc., Trucking Industry Defense Association and New Mexico Trucking Association"
  },
  "file_name": "0557-01",
  "first_page_order": 573,
  "last_page_order": 582
}
