{ "id": 4241228, "name": "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NORMAN BENALLY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Benally", "decision_date": "2015-05-11", "docket_number": "No. 35,145; Docket No. 31,972", "first_page": "732", "last_page": "736", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2015-NMCA-053" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "84 St. John's L. Rev. 633", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "St. John's L. Rev.", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "635", "parenthetical": "\"When a court seeks to determine the common meaning of a term or expression, a website that anyone can edit is likely to produce a viable consensus answer.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 483", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Wm. & Mary L. Rev.", "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "n.73" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 A.3d 1042", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.3d", "case_ids": [ 3993420 ], "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "collecting cases" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md-app/202/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "Va. Code Ann. \u00a7 19.2-386.3", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Va. Code Ann.", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(A)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "448 S.E.2d 393", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" }, { "page": "396" }, { "parenthetical": "footnote omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2 P.3d 1271", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "case_ids": [ 208602 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1275" }, { "page": "1273" }, { "page": "1275" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/196/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 13-4308", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(B)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 13-4301", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(9)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "702 P.2d 1222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1224", "parenthetical": "\"An impoundment, because it involves the governmental taking of a vehicle into exclusive custody, is a 'seizure' in the literal sense of that term.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2008-NMSC-029", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4004143 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/144/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "2011-NMSC-023", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4250695 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/150/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMCA-081", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 929132 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/137/0759-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 U.S. 56", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11924920 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "61, 63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/506/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 N.M. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1571126 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/91/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "1978-NMSC-001", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 4" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1998-NMCA-176", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 827422 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMCA-011", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4244001 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 11", "parenthetical": "\"The text of a statute or rule is the primary, essential source of its meaning.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"The text of a statute or rule is the primary, essential source of its meaning.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"The text of a statute or rule is the primary, essential source of its meaning.\"" }, { "page": "\u00b6 11" }, { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "2010-NMSC-013", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4248331 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 52" }, { "parenthetical": "\"The text of a statute or rule is the primary, essential source of its meaning.\"" }, { "page": "\u00b6 52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/148/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "2001-NMCA-007", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 352365 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" }, { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/130/0085-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 791, "char_count": 14123, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.12982294956584e-08, "percentile": 0.3229904523391132 }, "sha256": "2173c4079d0d105aaeebe2116830f0eab9ac06c8811191344a72d1e09ac7f230", "simhash": "1:8b6f271990eddcd1", "word_count": 2218 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:10:55.229683+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge", "TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge", "M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge" ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NORMAN BENALLY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nBUSTAMANTE, Judge.\nThe State appeals the district court\u2019s dismissal of a forfeiture action on the ground that the State failed to file a complaint within the period designated by statute. The State makes several policy-based arguments in support of its position that the thirty-day period specified in the Forfeiture Act should begin on the date the property subject to forfeiture was discovered rather than on the date the State took custody of the property. We conclude that the State\u2019s position is contrary to the plain language of the statute and thus do not reach the State\u2019s policy arguments. We affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nThe essential facts are simple and undisputed. On June 23, 2011, officers stopped Norman Benally (Defendant) for driving with a headlight out. In the course of the stop, the officers impounded the vehicle. The vehicle was held in the Gallup impound lot where it was secured.\nFive days later, on June 28, 2011, a search warrant for the vehicle was issued and officers searched the vehicle the next day, June 29, 2011. The search uncovered $1295, among other items. On July 27, 2011, thirty-four days after the vehicle was impounded, the State filed a complaint for forfeiture of the money.\nThe district court granted Defendant\u2019s motion for dismissal of the forfeiture complaint on the ground that it was not timely filed under NMSA 1978, Section 3 l-27-5(A) (2002) of the Forfeiture Act, which states that \u201c[wjithin thirty days of making a seizure, the state shall file a complaint of forfeiture or return the property to the person from whom it was seized.\u201d The State appealed.\nDISCUSSION\nThe issue presented is whether the statutory thirty-day period was triggered on the date the State took possession of the vehicle and its contents or on the date the State executed the search warrant and discovered the money. We address this statutory construction question as one of first impression. Our review is de novo. State v. Herrera, 2001-NMCA-007, \u00b6 6, 130 N.M. 85, 18 P.3d 326.\nThe goal of statutory construction is to give effect to the Legislature\u2019s intent. Albuquerque Bernalillo Cnty. Water Util. Auth. v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm\u2019n, 2010-NMSC-013, \u00b6 52, 148 N.M. 21, 229 P.3d 494. \u201c[Ojur first step is to look at the language used by the Legislature and the plain meaning of that language.\u201d Martinez v. Cornejo, 2009-NMCA-011, \u00b6 11, 146 N.M. 223, 208 P.3d 443; see NMSA 1978, \u00a7 12-2A-19 (1997) (\u201cThe text of a statute or rule is the primary, essential source of its meaning.\u201d). \u201cStatutory language that is clear and unambiguous must be given effect [and ojnly if an ambiguity exists will we proceed further in our statutory construction analysis.\u201d Albuquerque Bernalillo Cnty. Water Util. Auth., 2010-NMSC-013, \u00b6 52 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).\nUnder this \u201cplain meaning rule\u201d we are guided by the \u201cordinary meaning\u201d of the words chosen by the Legislature. Herrera, 2001-NMCA-007, \u00b6 6; see Martinez, 2009-NMCA-011, \u00b6 11 (\u201c[A] statute should be read according to its natural and most obvious import of language without resorting to subtle and forced constructions for the purpose of either limiting or extending its operation.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Similarly, \u201c[w]e will not read language into the statute that is not there, especially when the statute makes sense as written.\u201d State v. Brennan, 1998-NMCA-176, \u00b6 5, 126 N.M. 389, 970 P.2d 161. Finally, \u201c[fjorfeitures are not favored at law and statutes are to be construed strictly against forfeiture.\u201d State v. Ozarek, 1978-NMSC-001, \u00b6 4, 91 N.M. 275, 573 P.2d 209.\nApplying these principles, we conclude that the language of Section 31-27-5(A) clearly and unambiguously indicates that the Legislature intended forfeiture complaints to be filed within thirty days of the date the State took possession of the subject property. We begin with the definition of the word \u201cseizure.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary defines \u201cseizure\u201d as \u201c[t]he act or an instance of taking possession of a person or property by legal right or process[.]\u201d Black's Law Dictionary 1564 (10th ed. 2010). Similarly, Merriam-Webster Dictionary states that \u201cseizure\u201d is \u201cthe taking possession of person or property by legal process.\u201d Merriam-Webster Dictionary, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/seizure (last visited on Dec. 11, 2014). This definition is not only a legal term of art but also has a common meaning and understanding that is applied by the public. Garner\u2019s Dictionary of Legal Usage describes the term as \u201ca nontechnical lay word meaning ... to take possession of (a thing) by legal right.\u201d Bryan A. Garner, Garner's Dictionary of Legal Usage, 803 (3d ed. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even Wiktionary defines \u201cseizure\u201d as \u201c[t]he act of taking possession, as by force or right of law. \u201d http ://en. wiktionary. org/wiki/seizure (last visited Dec. 11, 2014).\nThis definition of \u201cseizure\u201d is reflected in case law. The U.S. Supreme Court explained that \u201c[a] \u2018seizure\u2019 of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual\u2019s possessory interests in that property.\u201d Soldal v. Cook Cnty., Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Similarly, in State v. Sanchez, this Court noted that the seizure clauses of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution \u201cprotect[] notions of possession, at least insofar as [they] appl[y] to objects.\u201d 2005-NMCA-081, \u00b6 17, 137 N.M. 759, 114 P.3d 1075. In State v. Ketelson, the New Mexico Supreme Court considered the reasonableness of an officer\u2019s actions where the officer removed the defendant\u2019s gun from his vehicle. 2011-NMSC-023, \u00b6 19, 150 N.M. 137, 257 P.3d 957. The Court\u2019s -analysis rested on its recognition that \u201ceven a temporary moving of the firearm constituted, to some degree, an interference with [the d]efendant\u2019s possessory interest.\u201d Id. \u00b6 23. It recognized that the officer\u2019s possession of the gun, however temporary, \u201cmay technically be called [a] \u2018seizure[],\u2019 \u201d id. \u00b6 26, although ultimately the Court determined that the officer\u2019s actions were reasonable given the public' and officer safety concerns present in that case. Id. \u00b6 27; cf. State v. Bomboy, 2008-NMSC-029, \u00b6 10, 144 N.M. 151, 184 P.3d 1045 (concluding that an officer\u2019s taking of methamphetamine from the defendant\u2019s car did not infringe on the defendant\u2019s possessory interest because the defendant did not have a lawful right to possess methamphetamine). Because it \u201cmeaningful[ly] interfere^] with an individual\u2019s possessory interests,\u201d impoundment of a vehicle is a seizure of the vehicle. Soldal, 506 U.S. at 61, 63; see State v. Reynoso, 702 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (\u201cAn impoundment, because it involves the governmental taking of a vehicle into exclusive custody, is a \u2018seizure\u2019 in the literal sense of that term.\u201d). By the same logic, the contents of the vehicle were also seized by virtue of being in the impounded car.\nHaving concluded that the ordinary meaning of \u201cseizure\u201d incorporates the concept of an interference with possession, we next examine that term in the context of the remainder of the statute. In contrast to the statutes of some other states, the remaining language of the Forfeiture Act does not suggest a trigger other than the physical seizure of property. For example, one section of an Arizona statute defines a \u2018\u201c[sjeizure for forfeiture\u2019 [as] seizure of property by a peace officer coupled with an assertion by the seizing agency . . . that the property is subject to forfeiture.\u201d Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 13-4301(9) (1999) (emphasis added). Another section requires the state to file forfeiture complaints within \u201csixty days after [the property\u2019s] seizure for forfeiture.\u201d Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 13-4308(B) (1988). The Arizona Court of Appeals relied on the definition of \u201cseizure for forfeiture\u201d to hold that the state\u2019s complaint for forfeiture was timely even though it was filed approximately seven months after the state impounded the money found in the defendant\u2019s car. In re Approximately $50,000.00 In U.S. Currency, 2 P.3d 1271, 1275 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000). There, the state had impounded money found in the defendant\u2019s car as part of its investigation into money laundering and other charges. Id. at 1273. The court found that the definition of \u201cseizure for forfeiture\u201d \u201cclearly states that, in order to constitute a seizure for forfeiture, the state must affirmatively \u00e1ssert that the seized property is subject to forfeiture.\u201d Id. at 1275. Consequently, it held that, even though the state had possession of the money for months before it filed a forfeiture complaint, it was not until the state asserted its intention to forfeit it that the sixty-day period began. Id. The court stated, \u201cbecause the state initiated forfeiture proceedings at the same time it declared seizure of the currency for forfeiture, it clearly did not violate the statute\u2019s requirement that it initiate such proceedings within sixty days.\u201d Id.\nCommonwealth v. Brunson presents a variation on the facts in this case. 448 S.E.2d 393 (Va. 1994). There, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether the triggering event for the ninety-day period in Virginia\u2019s forfeiture statute began when the Commonwealth took physical custody of the property or when it \u201cdeclared its decision to seek forfeiture of the property.\u201d Id. at 396. The relevant statute stated that \u201c[w]hen property has been seized under [Virginia\u2019s forfeiture laws] . . . prior to filing an information, then an information against that property shall be filed within 90 days of the date of seizure or the property shall be released to the owner or lien holder.\u201d Va. Code Ann. \u00a7 19.2-386.3(A) (West2012). The Commonwealth relied on the phrase \u201cunder [Virginia\u2019s forfeiture laws]\u201d to argue that \u201calthough physically seized substantially before the informations were filed, [the property] was not \u2018seized for forfeiture\u2019 until shortly before filing the necessary informations, well within the limitations period.\u201d Brunson, 448 S.E.2d at 396. The Virginia Supreme Court rejected this construction of the statute, stating that:\nThe Commonwealth\u2019s theory transforms the seizure from an event occurring atareadily determined and objective point in time into an event, subjective in nature, whose occurrence is known only to the Commonwealth. Furthermore, the timing of this subjective event is within the absolute discretion of the Commonwealth. Only the Commonwealth knows when the seizure changed from \u2018evidentiary\u2019 to \u2018forfeiture.\u2019 This theory of seizure can effectively defeat any allegation that the information was not filed within the [ninety]-day limitation period and renders meaningless the apparent protection afforded property owners-releasing property if no information is filed within 90 days of seizure.\nId. (footnote omitted).\nUnlike Arizona\u2019s statute, Section 31-27-5(A) does not include a specific definition of \u201cseizure,\u201d see Section 31-27-3, and includes even less qualifying language than the Virginia statute addressed in Brunson. There being no language suggesting that the word \u201cseizure\u201d has a meaning other than the common one, we conclude that the Legislature intended the word \u201cseizure\u201d to have its ordinary meaning. That meaning is clear and unambiguous; hence, no further construction of Section 31 -27-5(A) is necessary. Martinez, 2009-NMCA-011, \u00b6 11 (\u201cThis plain meaning rule requires us to give effect to the statute\u2019s language and refrain from further interpretation when the language is clear and unambiguous.\u201d). Thus, the clock started when the officers impounded Defendant\u2019s car and its contents on June 23, 2011. Since the State failed to file a complaint for forfeiture within thirty days of that date, the district court properly dismissed the forfeiture action.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nMICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nTIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge\nM. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge\n\u2018Wiktionary, a sister project of Wikipedia, is an open-content dictionary that individuals with access can collaboratively edit to reflect a popular understanding of words. Some courts have turned to Wiktionary to determine a popular understanding of the English language rather than a traditional dictionary definition.\u201d Wallace H. Campbell & Co. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 33 A.3d 1042, 1052 n.7 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (collecting cases).\nSimilarly, the definition of \u201cseizure\u201d with the most \u201cup\u201d votes in Urban Dictionary includes the definition \u201cwhen the police come and take stuff from your house,\u201d which, like the other definitions, incorporates the concepts of taking and possessory interests. http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php? term=seizure (last visited Jan. 22, 2015). Urban Dictionary is \u201ca crowdsourced collection of definitions for slang words that is available on the Internet.\u201d James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court's Thirstfor Dictionaries in theRehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 483, n.73 (2013). Because Urban Dictionary lacks the quality control measures employed by some other consensus-based websites, we cite it here only to demonstrate the common understanding of the term. See idJason C. Miller & Hannah B. Murray, Wikipedia in Court: When and How Citing Wikipedia and Other Consensus Websites Is Appropriate, 84 St. John\u2019s L. Rev. 633, 635 (2010) (\u201cWhen a court seeks to determine the common meaning of a term or expression, a website that anyone can edit is likely to produce a viable consensus answer.\u201d).", "type": "majority", "author": "BUSTAMANTE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General Ann M. Harvey, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Appellant", "Law Offices of the Public Defender Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender Will O\u2019Connell, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellee" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Certiorari Granted, May 11, 2015,\nNo. 35,145\nIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2015-NMCA-053\nFiling Date: January 29, 2015\nDocket No. 31,972\nSTATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NORMAN BENALLY, Defendant-Appellee.\nHector H. Balderas, Attorney General Ann M. Harvey, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Appellant\nLaw Offices of the Public Defender Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender Will O\u2019Connell, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellee" }, "file_name": "0732-01", "first_page_order": 748, "last_page_order": 752 }