{ "id": 4362086, "name": "GILA RESOURCES INFORMATION PROJECT, AMIGOS BRAVOS, TURNER RANCH PROPERTIES, L.P., STATE OF NEW MEXICO, ex rel. Gary King, Attorney General, and WILLIAM C. OLSON, Appellants, v. NEW MEXICO WATER QUALITY CONTROL COMMISSION, Appellee, and FREEPORT-MCMORAN CHINO MINES COMPANY, FREEPORT-MCMORAN TYRONE, INC., FREEPORT-MCMORAN COBRE MINING COMPANY, and NEW MEXICO ENVIRONMENT DEPARTMENT, Intervenors-Appellees. APPEAL FROM THE WATER QUALITY CONTROL COMMISSION Butch Tongate, Chair", "name_abbreviation": "Gila Resources Information Project v. New Mexico Water Quality Control Commission", "decision_date": "2015-07-13", "docket_number": "No. 35,279; No. 35,289; No. 35,290; Docket No. 33,237; Nos. 33,238 and 33,245", "first_page": "290", "last_page": "307", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2015-NMCA-076" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "2006-NMCA-082", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3670718 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMSC-022", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3783982 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/143/0740-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMCA-024", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3669284 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/141/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 N.M. 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 725509 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/115/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "1993-NMCA-020", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 8-11" }, { "page": "\u00b6 10" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 13, 15" }, { "page": "\u00b6 9" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 12-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 P.3d 902", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2012-NMCA-106", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4188744 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/2/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 N.M. 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1592827 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/108/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "1988-NMCA-109", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 1, 4" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 P.3d 978", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2013-NMCA-074", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4334781 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/4/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "2002-NMSC-013", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 260735 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/132/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMCA-136", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3692127 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/142/0717-01" ] }, { "cite": "2011-NMSC-034", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4250635 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/150/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMCA-073", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1224667 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 29" }, { "page": "\u00b6 29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/136/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMCA-139", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 2551048 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/138/0625-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 N.M. 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 322328 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/122/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMCA-098", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2007-NMCA-010", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3668779 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/141/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMCA-115", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3671626 ], "weight": 15, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 5" }, { "page": "\u00b6 5" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 2, 7-8, 26-38" }, { "page": "\u00b6 37" }, { "page": "\u00b6 36" }, { "page": "\u00b6 35" }, { "page": "\u00b6 35" }, { "page": "\u00b6 27" }, { "page": "\u00b6 33" }, { "page": "\u00b6 2" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0464-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1618, "char_count": 55518, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.061447019797991e-08, "percentile": 0.3186863404005407 }, "sha256": "ba2c790f652bb6224d68b77233274899907f4153e892ae40e2e2654170c6a331", "simhash": "1:6634aa8a7d3b2e40", "word_count": 8548 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:13:54.428467+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge", "WE CONCUR:", "MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Chief Judge", "LINDA M. VANZI, Judge" ], "parties": [ "GILA RESOURCES INFORMATION PROJECT, AMIGOS BRAVOS, TURNER RANCH PROPERTIES, L.P., STATE OF NEW MEXICO, ex rel. Gary King, Attorney General, and WILLIAM C. OLSON, Appellants, v. NEW MEXICO WATER QUALITY CONTROL COMMISSION, Appellee, and FREEPORT-MCMORAN CHINO MINES COMPANY, FREEPORT-MCMORAN TYRONE, INC., FREEPORT-MCMORAN COBRE MINING COMPANY, and NEW MEXICO ENVIRONMENT DEPARTMENT, Intervenors-Appellees. APPEAL FROM THE WATER QUALITY CONTROL COMMISSION Butch Tongate, Chair" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nSUTIN, Judge.\n{1} The Attorney General (hereafter the State) and, separately, a group of appellants comprised of Gila Resources Information Project (GRIP), Amigos Bravos, Turner Ranch Properties, L.P., and William C. Olson (collectively Gila) appealed the Water Quality Control Commission\u2019s (the Commission) order adopting a set of regulations codified at 20.6.7 NMAC (12/1/2013) pertaining to ground water protection and supplemental permitting requirements for copper mine facilities (the Regulations). The Commission and, separately, a group of Intervenors-Appellees comprised of Freeport-McMoRan Chino Mines Co., Freeport-McMoRan Tyrone, Inc., Freeport-McMoRan Cobre Mining Co., and the New Mexico Environment Department (collectively Freeport) filed answer briefs. We consolidated three appeals and address both the State\u2019s and Gila\u2019s contentions in this Opinion.\n{2} Primarily at issue in this appeal is whether the Regulations adopted by the Commission violate the Water Quality Act (the WQA), NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 74-6-1 to -17 (1967, as amended through 2013), and whether the Commission\u2019s reasons for adopting the Regulations were supported by sufficient evidence. We hold that the Regulations do not violate the WQA. Additionally, we conclude that Appellants\u2019 various attacks on the Commission\u2019s statement of reasons in support of its adoption of the Regulations do not warrant reversal. We affirm the Commission\u2019s order adopting the Regulations.\nBACKGROUND\nThe Significance and Effect of the 2009 Amendments to the WQA\n{3} Prior to 2009, the WQA did not allow the Commission to promulgate regulations that specified the methods to prevent or abate water pollution. Accordingly, the Commission, which is required to prevent or abate water pollution, did so as part of the copper mine permitting process through its \u201cconstituent agency,\u201d the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED). See \u00a7 74-6-2(K)(l) (stating in an appropriate context, \u201cconstituent agency\u201d means the department of environment); \u00a7 74-6-5(A) (stating that the Commission \u201cmay require persons to obtain from a constituent agency designated by the commission a permit for the discharge of any water contaminant\u201d). In the permitting process, an applicant was required to propose pollution-control measures to NMED for approval and, ifneeded, NMED would require specific pollution-control permit conditions. Parties who were adversely affected by the permitting action were entitled to appeal NMED\u2019s decision to the Commission. Section 74-6-5(0).\n{4} In 2009 the Legislature amended the WQA to require the Commission to adopt regulations particular to the copper industry that would specify \u201cthe measures to be taken to prevent water pollution and to monitor water quality.\u201d Section 74-6-4(K), Prospective regulations were to be developed by a constituent agency, here NMED, which was charged with establishing \u201can advisory committee composed of persons with knowledge and expertise particular to the [copper] industry . . . and other interested stakeholders to advise [NMED] on appropriate regulations to be proposed for adoption by the [Commission.\u201d Id. Further, the Legislature mandated that, after the regulations were adopted, \u201cpermits for facilities in that industry shall be subject to conditions contained in the regulations.\u201d Section 74-6-5(D).\nThe 2012-2013 Regulation-Making Proceedings\n{5} NMED formed two committees to advise it on appropriate regulations to propose to the Commission: a \u201cCopper Rule Advisory Committee\u201d (the advisory committee) and a technical committee. The advisory committee included, among others, representatives from environmental groups (including GRIP and Amigos Bravos), mine owners and operators (including Freeport), and former Ground Water Quality Bureau Chief of NMED, William C. Olson, who was hired by NMED in this instance as a contractor to assist the advisory committee. The two committees met regularly over the course of seven months to review draft language and different approaches to regulating copper mining, and in August 2012, Mr. Olson provided NMED with a draft of copper mine regulations. NMED caused the draft regulations to be edited by instructing Mr. Olson to incorporate modifications that had been suggested by Freeport, and although Mr. Olson argued that a number of Freeport\u2019s suggested modifications would violate the WQA, he eventually complied by incorporating Freeport\u2019s changes into the draft regulations. NMED submitted the edited version for public comment in September 2012. After holding two public meetings at which it took public comments on the draft regulations and after meeting with interested stakeholders, NMED prepared proposed regulations, and in October 2012, NMED petitioned the Commission to adopt its proposed regulations.\n{6} GRIP, Amigos Bravos, and Turner Ranch Properties submitted a response to NMED\u2019s petition in which they argued that the Commission should reject the petition because NMED\u2019s proposed regulations violated the WQA. The Commission voted to accept the petition, assigned a hearing officer to the matter, and scheduled a hearing on the petition to be held in April 2013. Prior to the hearing, the State moved to remand NMED\u2019s proposed regulations to NMED on the ground that the proposed regulations would violate the WQA. On the same grounds, GRIP, Amigos Bravos, and Turner Ranch Properties moved to dismiss the petition. The Commission denied these respective motions.\n{7} Additionally, the Commission granted, in part, a pretrial motion by the State to admit portions of the record from a 2007 adjudicatory proceeding titled \u201cIn the Matter of Appeal of Supplemental Discharge Permit for Closure (DP 1341) for Phelps Dodge Tyrone, Inc.\u201d (the Permit Adjudication). Specifically, the Commission ruled that its February 4, 2009, \u201cDecision and Order on Remand\u201d in the Permit Adjudication would be admitted at the hearing, while all other portions of the record from the Permit Adjudication would be excluded so as to avoid confusion and to save unnecessary expenditure of the Commission\u2019s time and resources. Although it will be discussed more thoroughly later in this Opinion, the Permit Adjudication and the 2009 Decision and Order on Remand proceeded from this Court\u2019s Opinion in 2006 in Phelps Dodge Tyrone, Inc. v. New Mexico Water Quality Control Commission, 2006-NMCA-115, 140 N.M. 464, 143 P.3d 502.\n{8} Following further reviews by NMED staff and expert witnesses, NMED edited the proposed regulations and filed a notice of amended petition in February 2013 that included a redlined version of the proposed regulations (the amended regulations), showing all changes. Over the course of ten days in April and May 2013, the Commission held a hearing on NMED\u2019s proposed amended regulations. All of the parties to this appeal presented technical testimony during the hearing. Following the hearing, the hearing officer gave all parties the opportunity to submit written closing arguments and proposed statements of reasons for the Commission\u2019s consideration. Attached to its proposed statement of reasons, NMED proposed additional changes to the amended regulations. We will refer to this draft as the \u201cfinal proposed regulations.\u201d\n{9} After reviewing the record including the pleadings, the written testimony, exhibits, hearing transcript, public comments, and the hearing officer\u2019s orders, and after hearing final oral arguments from the parties during a public meeting, the Commission issued its Order and Statement of Reasons (the Order) on September 25, 2013, adopting NMED\u2019s final proposed regulations. The Order, which is the subject of this appeal, is a 214-page document that includes, among other things, the Commission\u2019s statement of 1,306 reasons supporting its decision to adopt the Regulations. NMED\u2019s final proposed regulations, to which we refer in this Opinion as \u201cthe Regulations,\u201d were codified in December 2013 at 20.6.7 NMAC.\nLegal Context and Terminology\n{10} The objective of the Regulations is \u201cto supplement the general permitting requirements\u201d of the permitting and ground water standards regulations, 20.6.2.3000 to .3114 NMAC (12/1/1995, as amended through 8/1/2014), \u201cto control discharges of water contaminants specific to copper mine facilities and their operations to prevent water pollution.\u201d 20.6.7.6 NMAC. In the context of the WQA and the related regulations, the phrase \u201cground water\u201d refers to \u201cinterstitial water which occurs in saturated earth material and which is capable of entering a well in sufficient amounts to be utilized as a water supply[.]\u201d 20.6.2.7(Z) NMAC (8/1/2014). The term \u201cdischarge\u201d means \u201cspilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, or dumping of a water contaminant in a location and manner where there is a reasonable probability that the water contaminant may reach ground water.\u201d 20.6.7.7(B)(18) NMAC.\n{11} Discharge is regulated through a permitting process. See \u00a7 74-6-5(A) (stating that the Commission may require \u201cpersons,\u201d i.e, the owner or operator of a copper mine facility, to obtain a permit for the discharge of any water contaminant (a discharge permit)). Any person, in this case, a mine owner or operator, who wishes to discharge \u201ceffluent or leachate ... so that it may move directly or indirectly into ground water\u201d is required to apply to NMED for a discharge permit. 20.6.2.3104 NMAC (requiring a discharge permit). The Regulations reiterate this requirement. See 20.6.7.8(A) NMAC (\u201cNo person shall discharge effluent or leachate from a copper mine facility so that it may move directly or indirectly into ground water without a discharge permit approved by [NMED].\u201d).\n{12} Ground water quality standards are provided by 20.6.2.3103 NMAC that specifies the pH range and the maximum concentration of various contaminants applicable to ground water for various uses, including human health, domestic water supply, and irrigation use. For ease of reference in this Opinion, we refer to the standards set forth in 20.6.2.3103 NMAC as \u201cthe 3103 standards.\u201d Pursuant to the WQA, NMED is required to deny an application for a discharge permit if, in relevant part, its approval would violate any provision of the WQA or if \u201cthe discharge would cause or contribute to water contaminant levels in excess of [the 3103 standards]\u201d as \u201cmeasured at any place of withdrawal of water for present or reasonably foreseeable future use.\u201d Section 74-6-5(E)(2), (3).\n{13} \u201cCopper mine facility\u201d refers to \u201call areas within which copper mining and its related activities that may discharge water contaminants occurs and where the discharge will or does take place[.]\u201d 20.6.7.7(B)(13) NMAC. The phrase \u201ccopper mining and its related activities\u201d includes, among other things, open pits, waste rock piles, ore stockpiles, leaching operations, tailings impoundments, and tailings or impacted stormwater. Id. An \u201copen pit\u201d is \u201cthe area within which ore and waste rock are exposed and removed by surface mining.\u201d 20.6.7.7(B)(41) NMAC. \u201cWaste rock\u201d is \u201call material excavated from a Coppermine facility that is not ore or clean top soil.\u201d 20.6.7.7(B)(65) NMAC. \u201cTailings\u201d means \u201cfinely crushed and ground rock residue and associated fluids discharged from an ore milling, flotation beneficiation[,] and concentrating process\u201d; the \u201cfinal repository of tailings\u201d is a \u201ctailings impoundment.\u201d 20.6.7.7(B)(59), (60) NMAC. \u201cImpacted stormwater\u201d is \u201cdirect precipitation and runoff that comes into contact with water contaminants within a copper mine facility which causes the stormwater to exceed one or more of the . . . 3103 [standards.]\u201d 20.6.7.7(B)(29) NMAC.\n{14} \u201cLeaching\u201d refers to the process of \u201cplacing acidic leach solution on the tops and sides of [stockpiles]\u201d of ore and other rock piles such that \u201c[t]he solution percolates through the piles . . . dissolving] the copper[.]\u201d Phelps Dodge, 2006-NMCA-115, \u00b6 5; 20.6.7.7(B)(33) NMAC (defining a \u201cleach stockpile\u201d as \u201cstockpiles of ore and all other rock piles associated with mining disturbances that have been leached, are currently being leachedf,] or have been placed in a pile for the purpose of being leached\u201d). The leach solution is then collected and \u201cpumped to a solvent extraction and electrowinning plant where the copper is removed from the solution.\u201d Phelps Dodge, 2006-NMCA-115, \u00b6 5.\n\u201cPlace of Withdrawal\u201d and the Earlier Phelps Dodge Appeals\n{15} The phrase \u201cplace of withdrawal\u201d in Section 74-6-5(E)(3) is not defined by the WQA nor is it defined in any related regulation. The Legislature\u2019s intended meaning of \u201cplace of withdrawal\u201d was the subject of this Court\u2019s discussion in Phelps Dodge, 2006-NMCA-115, \u00b6\u00b6 2, 7-8, 26-38, in which we considered Phelps Dodge\u2019s appeal from the Commission\u2019s imposition of conditions on its discharge permit for its copper mine. In Phelps Dodge, this Court concluded that while \u201cthe [L]egislature meant to capture the concept that clean water that is currently being withdrawn for use, or clean water that is likely to be used in the reasonably foreseeable future, must be protected},]\u201d this standard is \u201cdifficult to apply to a [copper mine facility because]... it raises the question ... as to the point at which the [Legislature intended to measure compliance .... That is, should water quality be measured at the bottom of a waste rock pile, at the bottom of the mine pit, at wells located at the perimeter boundary of the mine property, or at some other point or points?\u201d Id. \u00b6\u00b6 27-28. Recognizing that as a Court, and lacking the \u201ctechnical expertise in hydrology, geology, or other applicable scientific topics},]\u201d we were ill-equipped to define \u201cplace of withdrawal\u201d in the context of a copper mine facility, we remanded the matter to the Commission to \u201ccreate some general factors or policies to guide its determination\u201d of what constituted a \u201cplace of withdrawal.\u201d Id. \u00b6\u00b6 35-37. In so doing, we offered \u201cno opinion as to whether the Commission should do so by way of rule[jmaking or by simply deciding the factors as a part of [a] specific case, or both.\u201d Id. \u00b6 35.\n{16} On remand from our Phelps Dodge Opinion, in 2007 the Commission held a hearing, and in its February 4, 2009, Decision and Order on Remand referred to earlier in this Opinion identified several factors that NMED should consider in identifying places of withdrawal at the copper mine facility. The Commission\u2019s Decision and Order on Remand required NMED to act consistently with the order in identifying places of withdrawal and appropriate locations at which the effects of the mine\u2019s discharges on ground water were to be measured and required NMED and the facility to \u201cnegotiate\u201d permit conditions that appropriately reduced ground water contamination at those places of withdrawal.\n{17} In a second appeal, in 2009, Phelps Dodge appealed the Commission\u2019s 2009 Decision and Order on Remand to this Court. During the pendency of that second appeal, some of the parties, including NMED and Phelps Dodge, sought the Commission\u2019s permission to depart from the remand order so as to pursue regulatory solutions to determine places of withdrawal, thereby avoiding further litigation over the meaning of that phrase. The Commission granted the parties relief from the directives of the Decision and Order on Remand to allow the parties to reach a settlement through various regulatory actions and processes, and Phelps Dodge subsequently withdrew its second appeal. One such regulatory action was the proceeding to establish the Regulations that are at issue in this appeal.\nThe Present Consolidated Appeal\n{18} In the consolidated appeal now before us, Gila and the State (Appellants) contend that the Order should be reversed. Although they each present various arguments in support of this overarching contention, the main crux of their respective appeals is that the Regulations violate the WQA by allowing copper mines to pollute ground water wherever the mines operate regardless of whether the ground water is or will be withdrawn for uses that require potable water. Additionally, Appellants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting aspects of the Order. And finally, although they approach it differently, Appellants argue that by adopting the Regulations the Commission improperly circumvented the Decision and Order on Remand in the Permit Adjudication.\n{19} We conclude that the Regulations do not violate the WQA, and we reject Appellants\u2019 challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the Commission\u2019s decision to adopt the Regulations. We further conclude that the Decision and Order on Remand had no bearing on the Commission\u2019s authority to adopt the Regulations. We affirm.\nDISCUSSION\nStandard of Review\n{20} Regulations that have been enacted by an agency \u201care presumptively valid and will be upheld if [they are] reasonably consistent with the authorizing statutes.\u201d N.M. Mining Ass\u2019n v. N.M. Water Quality Control Comm\u2019n, 2007-NMCA-010, \u00b6 11, 141 N.M. 41, 150 P.3d 991. \u201cA party challenging [regulations] adopted by an administrative agency has the burden of establishing [their] invalidity}.]\u201d N.M. Mining Ass\u2019n v. N.M. Mining Comm\u2019n, 1996-NMCA-098, \u00b6 8, 122 N.M. 332, 924 P.2d 741.\n{21} This Court will set aside the Commission\u2019s order adopting regulations only if the order is \u201c(1) arbitrary, capricious},] or an abuse of discretion; (2) not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (3) otherwise not in accordance with law.\u201d Section 74-6-7(B); see Gila Res. Info. Project v. N.M. Water Quality Control Comm\u2019n, 2005-NMCA-139, \u00b6 16, 138 N.M. 625, 124 P.3d 1164 (stating that an agency action is arbitrary or capricious \u201cif it is unreasonable or without a rational basis, when viewed in light of the whole record.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. N.M. Water Quality Control Comm\u2019n, 2004-NMCA-073, \u00b6 29, 136 N.M. 45, 94 P.3d 788 (stating that an agency decision is supported by substantial evidence where \u201crelevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate\u201d supports the conclusion (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).\nThe Regulations Do Not Violate the WQA\n{22} Appellants make a number of arguments in support of their respective claims that the Regulations violate the WQA. We address these arguments in turn, combining them where it is reasonable to do so in order to avoid duplication. We begin, however, by describing the Regulations, generally.\n{23} Because the phrase \u201cplace of withdrawal\u201d is not defined in the WQA, designating places of withdrawal is a matter left to NMED\u2019s and the Commission\u2019s expertise. See Phelps Dodge, 2006-NMCA-115, \u00b6 37 (recognizing NMED\u2019s authority to determine the locations of places of withdrawal, subject to the Commission\u2019s review and authority to define relevant factors). As we recognized in Phelps Dodge, in determining places of withdrawal, two competing interests are at stake: the need to protect water sources and the need to allow mining operations, which are \u201ca necessary and important component of our economy and our modern way of life.\u201d Id. \u00b6\u00b6 27, 29. Further, we recognized that because mining has inevitable environmental impacts, it would be unrealistic and overbroad to conclude that an entire mining facility is a place of withdrawal such that water quality standards must be met everywhere within the facility\u2019s boundaries. Id. \u00b6 33.\n{24} Under the Regulations, the primary method for protecting groundwater during the mine\u2019s operation is through discharge control at each mining \u201cunit,\u201d that is, at the place of each mining-related activity, by containing ground water that exceeds applicable standards. Although the containment strategy may allow ground water underlying certain units to exceed the 3103 standards during mining operations, pursuant to the Regulations, those areas are not available as \u201cplaces of withdrawal\u201d during mining operations. The effectiveness of the discharge control at each mining unit is determined by monitor wells that are located on the perimeter of each unit, and should a monitor well detect an exceedance of the 3103 standards, the Regulations require emergency repair, corrective action, and, if necessary, abatement measures. See 20.6.7.30(A) NMAC (governing the contingency requirements for copper mine facilities in the event of an exceedance of the 3103 standards).\n{25} The Regulations require monitor wells to be installed \u201cas close as practicable around the perimeter and downgradient of each open pit, leach stockpile, waste rock stockpile, tailings impoundment, process water impoundment, and impacted stormwater impoundment.\u201d 20.6.7.28(B) NMAC (footnote added). Monitor wells must be located in such a manner as to \u201cdetect an exceedance[] or a trend toward exceedance[] of the [3103] standards at the earliest possible occurrence, so that investigation of the extent of contamination and actions to address the source of contamination may be implemented as soon as possible.\u201d Id. The prospective locations of a monitor well must be stated in an application for a discharge permit for NMED\u2019s review and must include, among other things, information pertaining to \u201c[t]he ground water flow direction beneath the copper mine facility used to determine the monitoring well locations[], including supporting documentation used to determine groundwater flow direction.\u201d 20.6.7.28(A)(2) NMAC. In the event that monitor results reflect that the 3103 standards are exceeded, the Regulations require corrective action, and if NMED determines that a monitor well \u201cis not located downgradient of or does not adequately monitor the contamination source [that] it is intended to monitor,\u201d the Regulations require its replacement. 20.6.7.30(A), (B) NMAC. After the mine closes, the discharge permittee is required by the Regulations to take a number of steps to ensure continued ground water protection. See generally 20.6.7.33 NMAC (governing the closure requirements applicable to a copper mine facility); 20.6.7.35 NMAC (governing the post-closure requirements applicable to a copper mine facility).\n{26} Appellants argue that, in contravention of the WQA, the Regulations create a \u201cpoint of compliance system\u201d that allows a mine facility to pollute water under the entire mine facility up to a designated point (a point of compliance) at which a monitor well is used to ensure compliance with the 3103 standards. Appellants argue, further, that the Regulations violate the WQA because they allow discharge permittees to pollute ground water underneath a mining facility without regard for places of withdrawal.\nPoint-of-Compliance Argument\n{27} We begin by addressing Appellants\u2019 point-of-compliance arguments. In Phelps Dodge, we noted the phrase \u201cpoint of compliance\u201d as being \u201ca vertical surface located at the hydraulically downgradient limit of the waste management area that extends down into the uppermost aquifer underlying the regulated units[.]\u201d 2006-NMCA-115 \u00b6 36 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A point of compliance was one \u201cpossible factor[]\u201d this Court suggested that the Commission might consider in establishing a set of factors that could be used to determine places of withdrawal in the Permit Adjudication or in future rule-making proceedings. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 35-37. In 2009 the Legislature instructed the Commission to establish regulations for the copper industry based upon scientific and statutory considerations; however, the Legislature has remained silent on the issue of whether a point-of-compliance system is appropriate for New Mexico copper mining operations. See \u00a7 74-6-4(E), (K).\n{28} Whether Appellants\u2019 characterization of the Regulations as a point-of-compliance system is or is not proper is not significant to the outcome of this appeal. Assuming that the Regulations created a system that is properly characterized as a point-of-compliance system, nothing in the WQA prohibited the Commission from doing so. We are unpersuaded by Appellants\u2019 citations to out-of-state statutes and regulations by which they attempt to demonstrate that where legislators intended to create point-of-compliance systems, they did so expressly and/or with certain provisions that are not found in New Mexico\u2019s laws or regulations. We assume, based on our Phelps Dodge discussion, and based on the pervasiveness in other jurisdictions of laws and regulations pertaining to point-of-compliance systems, that our Legislature was aware of the concept of a point-of-compliance system when it vested the Commission with authority to establish copper mine regulations. Attorney Gen. v. Pub. Regulation Comm\u2019n, 2011-NMSC-034, \u00b6 10, 150 N.M. 174, 258 P.3d 453 (stating that appellate courts presume that the Legislature is fully aware of relevant statutory and common law). We further assume that had the Legislature intended to expressly prohibit the Commission from establishing such a system, it would have done so. Instead, our Legislature chose to leave the decision whether to establish a point-of-compliance system or an alternative to the expertise of the Commission, and Appellants\u2019 argument to the contrary, that the WQA prohibits a point-of-compliance system, is not supported by the language of the WQA. We turn now to Appellants\u2019 additional arguments that the Regulations violate various specific provisions of the WQA.\nPlaces-of-Withdrawal Argument\n{29} Section 74-6-5(E)(3) requires NMED to deny any application for a discharge permit if the discharge would cause or contribute to water contaminant levels in excess of the 3103 standards at any place of withdrawal. In turn, the Regulations expressly condition approval of a discharge permit upon the applicant\u2019s compliance with Section 74-6-5(E)(3). See 20.6.7.10(J)(3) NMAC (recognizing that NMED must deny a discharge permit if so required by Subsection E of Section 74-6-5(E)). Nevertheless, although they approach it differently, Appellants argue that the Regulations violate Section 74-6-5(E)(3) because they permit water pollution without regard to places of withdrawal.\n{30} Appellants argue that the Regulations violate Section 74-6-5(E)(3) and disregard this Court\u2019s Phelps Dodge \u201cmandate\u201d because the Regulations do not provide any basis for identifying places of withdrawal. Rather, Gila argues, the Regulations permit \u201cextensive ground water pollution at all copper mines so long as \u2018applicable standards\u2019 are met in distant monitoring wells\u201d and they \u201cblindly permit}] widespread ground water pollution wherever copper mines happen to be located.\u201d The State shares Gila\u2019s view regarding the extent of ground water pollution permitted under the Regulations and argues that the Regulations allow copper mining facilities to pollute ground water underneath \u201cits site up to a certain point, be it a monitoring well... or a property boundary.\u201d\n{31} Appellants\u2019 argument that, pursuant to our Phelps Dodge Opinion, the Commission was required to include in the Regulations factors to be used in identifying places of withdrawal is premised on a misunderstanding of our holding in Phelps Dodge. In Phelps Dodge, this Court required the Commission, on remand, to create some general factors or policies to guide its determination of the location of places of withdrawal on the mine site; however, \u201c[w]e offerfed] no opinion as to whether the Commission should do so by way of rule[~ {making or by simply deciding the factors as a part of [the Permit Adjudication].\u201d Phelps Dodge, 2006-NMCA-115, \u00b6 35. The Commission\u2019s Decision and Order on Remand in which the Commission identified a number of factors to be used by NMED and the mining facility to establish places of withdrawal at the mine site reflects the Commission\u2019s compliance with our Phelps Dodge Opinion. The Regulations that are the subject of this appeal reflect further compliance with our Phelps Dodge Opinion, and as we discuss next, they reflect compliance with the WQA, insofar as the Commission created a set of concrete regulations via the rule-making process that specifically protect ground water underlying mine facilities so that areas within a mine facility may become places of withdrawal.\n{32} As discussed earlier in this Opinion, nearly three years after our Phelps Dodge Opinion was published, the Legislature amended the WQ A to require the Commission to establish regulations particular to the copper mine industry. See \u00a7 74-6-4(K). Notably, however, the Legislature did not require the Commission to include in those regulations a list of factors or policies that must be used to determine places of withdrawal. See id. After the 2009 amendments to the WQA, determining the locations of places of withdrawal under Section 74-6-5(E)(3) was, as it always had been, left to the Commission\u2019s discretion. See Phelps Dodge, 2006-NMCA-115, \u00b6 35 (recognizing that pursuant to Section 74-6-5(E)(3) the Commission must determine places of withdrawal). In sum, the Commission\u2019s decision not to include in the Regulations factors or policies to be used for determining places of withdrawal did not violate the W QA nor did it disregard a \u201cmandate\u201d from this Court.\nThe Regulations Do Not Permit Widespread Ground Water Pollution\n{33} Next we consider Appellants\u2019 arguments that the Regulations allow widespread ground water pollution in excess of the 3103 standards under an entire mine facility up to \u201cdistant\u201d monitor wells or even to the property boundary. As discussed later in this Opinion, and having reviewed the Regulations, we conclude that the notions that the Regulations allow widespread pollution or that they allow a mine facility to pollute ground water underlying the entire facility or that the monitor wells may be \u201cdistant\u201d are unfounded or otherwise exaggerated.\n{34} Pursuant to the Regulations, all areas within a mine facility except areas that fall within the perimeter of the monitor wells must meet the 3103 standards. See 20.6.7.28(B) NMAC (governing the placement of monitoring wells and requiring that the 3103 standards be met at each monitoring well and outside the monitoring-well perimeter). Thus, within a mine facility, any place at or beyond the monitor-well perimeter is water that may now and may in the future be withdrawn for human uses. Accordingly, every place within a mine facility at and beyond the monitor-well perimeters is protected from ground water pollution, and therefore, may be used as a \u201cplace of withdrawal.\u201d See Phelps Dodge, 2006-NMCA-115, \u00b6 27 (stating that the Legislature\u2019s use of the phrase \u201cplace of withdrawal\u201d in Section 74-6-5(E)(3) captured \u201cthe concept that clean water that is currently being withdrawn for use, or clean water that is likely to be used in the reasonably foreseeable future, must be protected\u201d).\n{35} Appellants\u2019 contentions that the monitor wells would be \u201cdistant\u201d from the mining units or that the monitoring would only occur at the perimeter of the mine facility, thus allowing the entire area within the mine facility to exceed the 3103 standards are not supported by the language of the Regulations. The monitor wells must be placed as close as practicable around the perimeter and downgradient of each mining unit, and the placement of monitor wells and the number of monitor wells that are required at each unit is subject to NMED\u2019s approval. See 20.6.7.28 (A), (B) NMAC. In the hypothetical event that a prospective permittee intended to place monitor wells at a distance that any interested party deemed excessive, that party may raise the issue during the permitting process. See \u00a7 74-6-5(G) (\u201cNo ruling shall be made on any application for a permit without opportunity for a public hearing at which all interested persons shall be given a reasonable chance to submit evidence, data, views[,] or arguments orally or in writing and to examine witnesses testifying at the hearing.\u201d).\n{36} We next address Appellants\u2019 arguments regarding the extent to which the Regulations allow ground water pollution. Having rejected the notion that the Regulations permit water pollution within the entire boundary of a mine facility, we focus on the State\u2019s argument that the Regulations violate the WQA because they allow copper mining facilities to pollute ground water within a unit up to the point of a monitor well. We also address the related argument, raised by Gila, that the Regulations \u201cfrustrate[] the [WQA\u2019s] basic purpose\u201d because the Regulations permit rather than abate and prevent ground water pollution within mining units.\n{37} In promulgating the Regulations, the Commission was acting pursuant to the Legislature\u2019s mandate that it formulate regulations to \u201cprevent or abate water pollution\u201d while simultaneously weighing, among other things, the \u201csocial and economic value of the sources of water contaminants\u201d and the \u201ctechnical practicability and economic reasonableness of reducing or eliminating\u201d them. Section 74-6-4(E)(2), (3). Thus, the Commission was required to strike what it deemed to be an appropriate balance between the need to prevent or abate water pollution and the need to create regulations with which the mining industry could reasonably and practicably comply. To the extent that Appellants\u2019 arguments are implicitly based on the premise that the Commission was required by the WQA to establish regulations that would totally prevent mining operations from polluting ground water, we reject them. See Phelps Dodge, 2006-NMCA-115, \u00b6 33 (recognizing that it is unrealistic to require that all ground water underlying a mine site meet drinkable standards).\n{38} Appellants cite various provisions of the Regulations pursuant to which the ground water underlying discrete mining units is not required to meet the 3103 standards to exemplify their point that the Regulations permit ground water contamination. While the Commission acknowledged that the containment strategy required by the Regulations may allow ground water underlying certain units to exceed the 3103 standards duringmining operations, to say that the Regulations therefore permit ground water contamination goes too far. As noted earlier, containing ground water that exceeds the 3103 standards is the primary method of controlling discharge. Pursuant to the Regulations, each mining unit is governed by requirements that specifically identify the method by which contaminated water is controlled.\n{39} For example, Appellants argue that the Regulations permit ground waterpollution because, during mining operations and after closure, the 3103 standards do not apply to ground water that is located inside the \u201c \u2018area of open pit hydrologic containment\u2019 and related \u2018open pit surface drainage area.\u2019 \u201c See 20.6.7.24(D) NMAC (\u201cDuring operation of an open pit, the [3103 standards] do not apply within the area of open pit hydrologic containment.\u201d). An\n\u201c[a]rea of open pit hydrologic containment\u201d means, for an open pit that intercepts the water table, the area where ground water drains to the open pit and is removed by evaporation or pumping, and is interior to the department approved monitoring well network installed around the perimeter of an open pit[-]\u201d\n20.6.7.7(B)(5) NMAC. An \u201c \u2018[o]pen pit surface drainage area\u2019 means the area in which storm water drains into an open pit and cannot feasibly be diverted by gravity outside the pit perimeter, and the underlying ground water is hydrologically contained by pumping or evaporation of water from the open pit.\u201d 20.6.7.7(B)(42) NMAC. Thus, although it is true that the 3103 standards do not apply to open pits during mining operations, Appellants fail to acknowledge the Regulations\u2019 provision for ground water protection in that area by removing the contaminated water from the open pit. See 20.6.7.33(D) NMAC.\n{40} After closure of mining operations, Part 20.6.7.33(D) NMAC of the Regulations requires a permittee to provide a detailed closure plan for open pits that will \u201cminimize the potential to cause an exceedance of\u2019 the 3103 standards. Under that part of the Regulations, any water within an open pit that is predicted to flow into the ground water must meet the 3103 standards. 20.6.7.33(D)(2) NMAC. An exception applies only to open pits that are determined to be \u201chydrologic evaporative sink[s],\u201d meaning that evaporation of the water in the open pit will exceed the inflow and will, therefore, not flow into the ground water. 20.6.7.33(D)(1) NMAC. Thus, Appellants\u2019 assertion that the Regulations permit the water from open pits to exceed the 3103 standards perpetually after closure is inaccurate.\n{41} Gila argues, further, that the Regulations violate the WQA because they permit widespread ground water pollution above the 3103 standards without requiring the permittee to apply for a variance. Section 74-6-4(H) provides that under particular circumstances, the Commission \u201cmay grant an individual variance from any regulation}.]\u201d Nothing in the Regulations purport to alter the Commission\u2019s ability or discretion to grant a variance under Section 74-6-4(H), and having rejected Gila\u2019s premise that the Regulations \u201cpermit}] widespread ground water pollution},]\u201d we decline to consider this argument further.\n{42} In sum, Appellants have failed to demonstrate that the Regulations violate any provision of the WQA. Although the Regulations\u2019 provisions are not perfectly protective of ground water underlying a mining facility, the WQ A did not require them to be. See \u00a7 74-6-4(E). The Commission determined that the Regulations established \u201cefficient measures and clear provisions to prevent and contain ground water contamination},]\u201d and having reviewed the various at-issue provisions, we cannot conclude that the Commission reached this conclusion in error.\nCollateral Estoppel Does Not Apply to the Commission\u2019s Rule-Making Procedure\n{43} Appellants each argue that collateral estoppel precluded the Commission from \u201cre[]litigating\u201d or \u201cre[-]adjudicating\u201d facts or issues that were resolved in the Commission\u2019s Decision and Order on Remand. Yet, the State acknowledges that issues related specifically to the mine at issue in Phelps Dodge \u201cwere not in fact re[-]litigated in the Commission\u2019s rule[-]making\u201d and that the purpose of rule-making proceedings that ultimately resulted in the Commission\u2019s adoption of the Regulations at issue in this appeal was \u201centirely different\u201d from the purpose of the Commission\u2019s proceedings on remand from our Phelps Dodge Opinion. We disagree with Appellants\u2019 invocation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel in the context of this appeal.\n{44} Collateral estoppel bars \u201cthe re[]litigation of. . . facts or issues actually and necessarily determined in [a] previous litigation\u201d where, among other things, the same issue was presented and finally adjudicated in a previous lawsuit between the same parties. Rosette, Inc. v. United States Dep\u2019t of the Interior, 2007-NMCA-136, \u00b6 39, 142 N.M. 717, 169 P.3d 704. Unlike the Permit Adjudication that involved a dispute between Phelps Dodge Tyrone, Inc. and NMED concerning a single discharge permit, the Commission\u2019s adoption of the Regulations at issue in this case was not an adjudicatory proceeding. Phelps Dodge, 2006-NMCA-115, \u00b6 2; see Rauscher, Pierce, Refsnes, Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep\u2019t, 2002-NMSC-013, \u00b6 42, 132 N.M. 226, 46 P.3d 687 (recognizing that rule-making and adjudication are characteristically distinct because, among other things, rule-making affects the rights of a broad class of individuals, whereas adjudication involves concrete disputes affecting specific individuals). Because the at-issue rule-making proceeding was not an adjudication, the principle of collateral estoppel has no bearing on the Commission\u2019s decision to adopt the Regulations.\n{45} Setting aside the \u201ccollateral estoppel\u201d label, it is clear that Appellants\u2019 argument is actually an attack on the Commission\u2019s decision, as stated in the Order, to allow the Phelps Dodge Tyrone mine to operate prospectively under the Regulations instead of under the directives of the Commission\u2019s Decision and Order on Remand. This argument is not persuasive.\n{46} The Commission\u2019s Decision and Order on Remand preceded the Commission\u2019s rule-making activity at issue \u2022in this appeal. Before the Commission\u2019s Decision and Order on Remand went into effect, and while it was the subject of a pending appeal, the Commission granted the parties in Phelps Dodge relief from the directives of the order, including any directives applicable to determining where, within the Phelps Dodge Tyrone mine facility then at issue, places of withdrawal were located. The Commission\u2019s stated pirrpose for relieving the parties from the directives of the Decision and Order on Remand was, in relevant part, to allow the parties to achieve a settlement by allowing the at-issue rule-making process to occur. According to legislative mandate, after the Regulations were adopted, copper mine permits were to be subject to the conditions of the Regulations. See \u00a7 74-6-5(D) (\u201cAfter regulations have been adopted . . . permits for facilities in [the copper] industry shall be subject to conditions contained in the regulations.\u201d). Thus, contrary to the State\u2019s argument that the Commission violated the WQA by permitting the Phelps Dodge Tyrone mining site at issue in Phelps Dodge to operate subject to the Regulations, the Commission is, in fact complying with Section 74-6-5(D). To the extent that Appellants wish to challenge that mine\u2019s future application for a permit under the Regulations, they may do so in the relevant permit proceedings. See \u00a7 74-6-5(G) (requiring a public hearing before a ruling is made on a permit application).\nThe Order Does Not Require Reversal\n{47} Appellants argue that because the Commission adopted Freeport\u2019s version ofthe regulations verbatim, the Order adopting the Regulations should not be afforded deference. Further, the State urges this Court to adopt an alternative version of the Regulations that was submitted jointly by Appellants to which they refer as the \u201cJoint Proposal.\u201d Gila argues that the Order does not support its adoption of the Regulations because many of its 1,388 findings are contrary to law, arbitrary and capricious, and not supported by substantial evidence. We address these arguments in turn.\n{48} Appellants\u2019 argument that the Order is not entitled to deference derives from the proposition that courts and administrative agencies acting in an adjudicatory capacity should avoid \u201cwholesale verbatim adoption of a party\u2019s proposed findings [of fact] and conclusions\u201d of law. Bernier v. Bernier ex rel. Bernier, 2013-NMCA-074, \u00b6 15 n.4,305 P.3d 978 (\u201cThe practice of full scale verbatim adoption of extensive requested findings of fact and requested conclusions of law of the prevailing party . . . can cause this Court on appeal to grant less deference to [them] than is otherwise accorded.\u201d); Nunez v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 1988-NMCA-109, \u00b6\u00b6 1, 4, 108 N.M. 186, 769 P.2d 99 (indicating that the principle applies as well to administrative agencies acting in their adjudicatory capacity). The State does not cite any authority to show that this principle applies to an agency\u2019s statement of reasons in support of its adopted regulations which are \u201cpresumed valid and will be upheld if reasonably consistent with the statutes that they implement.\u201d Wilcox v. N.M. Bd. of Acupuncture & Oriental Med., 2012-NMCA-106, \u00b6 7, 288 P.3d 902 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n{49} Further, we summarily reject the State\u2019s suggestion that this Court \u201cshould\u201d adopt the Joint Proposal. The authority to adopt regulations pertaining to the copper industry was granted exclusively to the Commission by the Legislature. See \u00a7 74-6-4(K). This Court\u2019s authority is limited to reviewing the Regulations, and if called for, under particular circumstances, setting aside the Commission\u2019s actions. See \u00a7 74-6-7(B).\n{50} We turn now to Gila\u2019s attack on the Order. Gila argues that a number of the Commission\u2019s reasons for adopting the Regulations should be set aside because they are based on an incorrect interpretation of the WQA. To the extent that Gila\u2019s argument in this regard reiterates contentions that were addressed earlier in this Opinion, we do not address them again.\n{51} Gila attacks a portion of the Order adopting Part 20.6.7.21(B) NMAC. Part 20.6.7.21(B) NMAC governs the \u201c[ejngineering design requirements for new waste rock stockpiles[,]\u201d and it enumerates the minimum requirements that must be \u201cmet in designing engineered structures for waste rock stockpiles at copper mine facilities unless the applicant or permittee can demonstrate that an alternate design will provide an equal or greater level of containment.\u201d In relevant part, the Commission stated in its reasons for adopting that provision that\n[an NMED witness] testified that, during mining operations, water use within the mine area would be controlled by the mine operator and that water produced would be used for mining purposes. Consequently, during the period of mine operation, ground water within the mine area, including the area of a waste rock stockpile, would not be available for domestic or agricultural use. [The witness] further testified that, following closure, the area around and under a waste rock stockpile could become a place of withdrawal of water for domestic or agricultural use.\n{52} Gila argues that the Commission relied on the foregoing witness testimony to find that \u201cplaces of withdrawal are limited to present domestic and agricultural uses of water that occur somewhere outside the copper mine facility,\u201d Gila does not demonstrate where, in the record or in the Regulations, the Commission stated that \u201cplaces of withdrawal are limited to [areas] . . . outside the copper mine facility.\u201d Nor can such a finding or provision be reasonably inferred from the foregoing testimony. We do not consider this unsupported argument further. See Rule 12-213 (A)(4) NMRA (requiring an appellant to provide record proper citations in support of each argument).\n{53} Gila also argues that the witness\u2019s testimony supports a conclusion that the ground water underlying a waste rock stockpile is entitled to protection because it has a reasonably foreseeable future use. Gila\u2019s argument in this regard does not demonstrate a conflict. The Commission found that a new waste rock stockpile that is designed in accordance with Part 20.6.7.21(A) and (B) NMAC will \u201cnot typically result in ground water contamination.\u201d Thus, although, according to the witness, the mine will use the underlying ground water for its own purposes, the area underlying waste rock stockpiles could be used as a place of withdrawal after the mining- operations because the requisite design ofthe waste rock stockpiles is expected to preserve the ground water quality. Therefore, to the extent that Gila contends that the ground water underlying a waste rock stockpile is entitled to protection, the Regulations comport with Gila\u2019s contention.\n{54} Gila argues, further, that the Commission\u2019s finding that an NMED witness \u201ctestified that requiring a variance versus approving proven technologies by rule is a distinction without a difference\u201d was \u201ccontrary to law and not based on substantial evidence.\u201d In support of this argument, Gila claims that the witness was not competent to testify regarding rule-making or variance proceedings. Contrary to the Rules of Appellate procedure, Gila does not show whether, and if so, where in the record it raised the issue ofthe competence ofNMED\u2019s witness to testify regarding a distinction between a variance and the Regulations. See Rule 12-213(A)(4). We will not search the record to determine whether the argument was raised before or resolved by the Commission, and therefore this argument presents no issue for our review.\n{55} Gila also attacks the Order on substantial evidence grounds. On appeal, the party challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an administrative agency\u2019s action \u201cmust set forth the substance of all evidence bearing upon the proposition\u201d in the light most favorable to the agency\u2019s decision and \u201cthen demonstrate why, on balance, the evidence fails to support the finding made.\" Martinez v. Sw. Landfills, Inc., 1993-NMCA-020, \u00b6\u00b6 8-11, 115 N.M. 181, 848 P.2d 1108; see Rule 12-213(A)(3). Instead of presenting its argument in the foregoing manner, Gila points to the evidence in the record that contradicts the Commission\u2019s findings and that, in Gila\u2019s view, supported adoption of an alternative version of the Regulations and repeatedly asserts that \u201csubstantial evidence contradicts\u201d various findings of the Commission.\n{56} Gila\u2019s decisions to omit citations to the evidence in the record that supported the agency\u2019s decision and to present the evidence in the light most favorable to itself leaves to this Court the task of digging through the voluminous record to determine whether, \u201con balance, the evidence fails to support the [Commission\u2019s] finding[s].\" Martinez, 1993-NMCA-020, \u00b6 10; see McNeill v. Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co., 2007-NMCA-024, \u00b6 16, 141 N.M. 212, 153 P.3d 46 (\u201cThe question is not whether substantial evidence exists to support the opposite result, but rather whether such evidence supports the result reached.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), aff'd, 2008-NMSC-022, 143 N.M. 740, 182 P.3d 121. This we will not do. Martinez, 1993-NMCA-020, \u00b6\u00b6 13, 15 (stating that \u201cit is not the responsibility of the reviewing court to search through the record to determine whether substantial evidence exists to support a finding[,]\u201d recognizing that in a whole record review this Court \u201cshould be able to rely entirely on the appellant\u2019s brief-in-chief in canvassing all the evidence bearing on a finding or a decision,\u201d and noting that \u201cthe reviewing court should [not] have to supplement the appellant\u2019s presentation of the evidence\u201d). Gila\u2019s substantial evidence arguments do not warrant reversal.\n{57} Gila also argues that the Commission failed to review Appellants\u2019 Joint Proposal or any of Appellants\u2019 \u201cclosing submittals,\u201d and as a result, the Commission \u201cmade numerous erroneous findings in which it mischaracterize[d] . . . Appellants\u2019 . . . recommended [regulation] changes or states that they failed to submit any recommended changes.\u201d In support of this argument, Gila cites more than 100 of the Commission\u2019s allegedly erroneous findings and hundreds of pages of Appellants\u2019 supporting documentation. Apparently Gila\u2019s expectation is that as to each of the 100-plus findings, this Court will ferretoutthe relevant portions from the hundreds of pages of Appellants\u2019 broadly cited documentation to determine whether the Commission\u2019s findings were erroneous. Additionally, having itself notably failed to set out the evidence bearing upon the proposition in the light most favorable to the agency\u2019s decision, Gila admonishes this Court that after we review the record, we must refrain from \u201csupplying the reasons\u201d supporting the Order.\n{58} Again, we remind Gila that it is Appellants\u2019 burden in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to set out all of the evidence bearing on a proposition and to specifically attack contested findings. Martinez, 1993-NMCA-020, \u00b6 9; see Rule 12-213(A)(3), (4). Even when undertaking a whole-record review, it is not the duty of this Court to search through the record seeking the bases for reversal or to re-weigh the evidence. See Martinez, 1993-NMCA-020, \u00b6\u00b6 12-15 (explaining that in a whole-record review it is incumbent upon the appellant to present \u201call the evidence bearing on a finding or a decision, favorable or unfavorable\u201d to show that the evidence supporting the decision is not substantial \u201cwhen viewed in the light that the whole record furnishes\u201d and \u201cit is not the responsibility of the reviewing court to search through the record to determine whether substantial evidence exists to support a finding\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. N.M. Water Quality Control Comm\u2019n, 2004-NMCA-073, \u00b6 29, 136 N.M. 45, 94 P.3d 788 (stating that in reviewing an agency\u2019s decision, this Court will not re-weigh the evidence). Further, we need not search the record to supply support for the findings in the Order, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, we presume that those findings were correct. Pickett Ranch, LLC v. Curry, 2006-NMCA-082, \u00b6 57, 140 N.M. 49, 139 P.3d 209 (\u201c[C]ourts presume regularity and'correctness on the part of administrative [agencies.]\u201d).\n{59} Additionally, Gila\u2019s assertion thatthe Commission failed to consider Appellants\u2019 Joint Proposal and their \u201cclosing submittals\u201d is directly contradicted by the record. To that end, we observe the Commission\u2019s transcribed deliberations in which each member of the Commission confirmed that they had reviewed each party\u2019s \u201cwritten closing arguments and proposed statements of reason\u201d and during which the contents of Appellants\u2019 Joint Proposal were reviewed and discussed.\n{60} In sum, Appellants have not demonstrated that the Order provides any basis for reversal. We conclude that Appellants\u2019 attacks on the Commission\u2019s findings as unsupported by sufficient evidence or as being contrary to law do not warrant reversal.\nCONCLUSION\n{61} We affirm the Commission\u2019s order adopting the Regulations.\n{62} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nJONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nMICHAEL E. VIGIL, Chief Judge\nLINDA M. VANZI, Judge\n\u201cDowngradient\u201d means \u201c[t]he direction that ground[]water flows[.]\u201d Ecomii Green Dictionary a to z, http://www.ecomii.com/dictionary/downgradient (last visited Mar. 12, 2015).", "type": "majority", "author": "SUTIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "N.M. Environmental Law Center", "R. Bruce Frederick", "Douglas Meiklejohn", "Santa Fe, NM", "for Appellant Gila Resources Information Project and Turner Ranch Properties, L.P.", "High Desert Energy + Environment Law", "Partners", "Tracy Hughes", "Santa Fe, NM", "for Appellant Amigos Bravos", "Water, Environment and Utilities Division", "Office of the N.M. Attorney General", "Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General", "Tannis L. Fox, Assistant Attorney General", "Santa Fe, NM", "for Appellant State of New Mexico", "High Desert Energy + Environment Law Partners", "Charles F. Noble", "Santa Fe, NM", "for Appellant William C. Olson", "Hinkle Shanor LLP", "Thomas M. Hnasko", "Julie A. Sakura", "Santa Fe, NM", "for Appellee N.M. Water Quality Control Commission", "Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A.", "John J. Kelly", "Stuart R. Butzier", "Emil J. Kiehne", "Albuquerque, NM", "Gallagher & Kennedy, P.A.", "Dalva L. Moellenberg", "Anthony (T.J.) J. Trujillo", "Santa Fe, NM", "for Intervenors-Appellees Freeport McMoRan Chino Mines Co., Freeport-McMoRan Tyrone, Inc., and Freeport-McMoRan Cobre Mining Co.", "N.M. Environment Department", "Andrew P. Knight, Assistant General Counsel", "Kathryn S. Becker, Assistant General Counsel", "Santa Fe, NM", "for Intervenor-Appellee N.M. Environment Department" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Certiorari Granted, July 13, 2015,\nNo. 35,279;\nCertiorari Granted, July 13, 2015,\nNo. 35,289;\nCertiorari Granted, July 13, 2015,\nNo. 35,290\nIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2015-NMCA-076\nFiling Date: April 8, 2015\nDocket No. 33,237\n(consolidated with\nNos. 33,238 and 33,245)\nGILA RESOURCES INFORMATION PROJECT, AMIGOS BRAVOS, TURNER RANCH PROPERTIES, L.P., STATE OF NEW MEXICO, ex rel. Gary King, Attorney General, and WILLIAM C. OLSON, Appellants, v. NEW MEXICO WATER QUALITY CONTROL COMMISSION, Appellee, and FREEPORT-MCMORAN CHINO MINES COMPANY, FREEPORT-MCMORAN TYRONE, INC., FREEPORT-MCMORAN COBRE MINING COMPANY, and NEW MEXICO ENVIRONMENT DEPARTMENT, Intervenors-Appellees. APPEAL FROM THE WATER QUALITY CONTROL COMMISSION Butch Tongate, Chair\nN.M. Environmental Law Center\nR. Bruce Frederick\nDouglas Meiklejohn\nSanta Fe, NM\nfor Appellant Gila Resources Information Project and Turner Ranch Properties, L.P.\nHigh Desert Energy + Environment Law\nPartners\nTracy Hughes\nSanta Fe, NM\nfor Appellant Amigos Bravos\nWater, Environment and Utilities Division\nOffice of the N.M. Attorney General\nHector H. Balderas, Attorney General\nTannis L. Fox, Assistant Attorney General\nSanta Fe, NM\nfor Appellant State of New Mexico\nHigh Desert Energy + Environment Law Partners\nCharles F. Noble\nSanta Fe, NM\nfor Appellant William C. Olson\nHinkle Shanor LLP\nThomas M. Hnasko\nJulie A. Sakura\nSanta Fe, NM\nfor Appellee N.M. Water Quality Control Commission\nModrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A.\nJohn J. Kelly\nStuart R. Butzier\nEmil J. Kiehne\nAlbuquerque, NM\nGallagher & Kennedy, P.A.\nDalva L. Moellenberg\nAnthony (T.J.) J. Trujillo\nSanta Fe, NM\nfor Intervenors-Appellees Freeport McMoRan Chino Mines Co., Freeport-McMoRan Tyrone, Inc., and Freeport-McMoRan Cobre Mining Co.\nN.M. Environment Department\nAndrew P. Knight, Assistant General Counsel\nKathryn S. Becker, Assistant General Counsel\nSanta Fe, NM\nfor Intervenor-Appellee N.M. Environment Department" }, "file_name": "0290-01", "first_page_order": 306, "last_page_order": 323 }