{ "id": 4362023, "name": "JULIAN SEGURA, CHRISTOPHER DIXON, and KEVIN J. MEYN, in their own behalf and in behalf of similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. J.W. DRILLING, INC., a New Mexico corporation, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Segura v. J.W. Drilling, Inc.", "decision_date": "2015-08-14", "docket_number": "No. 35,417; Docket No. 33,801", "first_page": "395", "last_page": "401", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2015-NMCA-085" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "104 N.M. 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1594945 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/104/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "1986-NMSC-030", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 39" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 N.M. 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5361745 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/81/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "1970-NMCA-023", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 5" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2005-NMCA-029", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 929160 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/137/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 P.3d 802", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2013-NMSC-021", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4333701 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/4/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 P.3d 992", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2014-NMCA-082", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4239941 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/6/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "2011-NMSC-015", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4251393 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/150/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 U.S. 680", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 377256 ], "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "691", "parenthetical": "stating that \"the walking time [on the employer's property, which was at issue] differed vitally from the time spent in traveling from workers' homes to the factory\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/328/0680-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 U.S. 161", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6155946 ], "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166", "parenthetical": "distinguishing \"[t]hose who are forced to travel in underground mines in order to earn their livelihood\" from \"the ordinary workman on his way to work\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/325/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "2015 WL 1246780", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "distinguishing \"[t]hose who are forced to travel in underground mines in order to earn their livelihood\" from \"the ordinary workman on his way to work\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 U.S. 590", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 301920 ], "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599", "parenthetical": "stating that the travel at issue took place on the employer's property and \"[bore] no relation whatever to [the employees '{needs or to the distance between their homes and the mines.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/321/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999 WL 1002360", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "**1-2" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 Stat. 1755", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a7 254", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 N.W.2d 255", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257", "parenthetical": "\"Compensation acts are sui generis, and care must be taken not to defeat their purpose by applying, through long judicial habit, concepts belonging to fundamentally different fields of litigation.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "602 S.E.2d 805", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 8926924 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "817-18", "parenthetical": "stating that workers' compensation law \"stands alone from all other areas of the law, causing decisions rendered in the workers' compensation realm to be almost wholly unusable in any other area of the law, and vice-versa\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/w-va/216/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 N.M. 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 720237 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/112/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "1991-NMCA-080", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b64" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.M. 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 725417 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/115/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "1993-NMCA-057", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 14-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2008-NMCA-140", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4243183 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/145/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMCA-122", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3691625 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/142/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "2000-NMCA-011", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 106582 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/128/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMCA-047", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 2544432 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/139/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 P.3d 978", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2012-NMCA-100", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4188847 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/2/0623-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 N.M. 785", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1586440 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/101/0785-01" ] }, { "cite": "1984-NMCA-090", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 13" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 201", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2010-NMSC-035", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4246569 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/148/0713-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 N.M. 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 18767 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/124/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMSC-052", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 13" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 954, "char_count": 17341, "ocr_confidence": 0.764, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14872237725056558 }, "sha256": "aced7f14f6d6ad246e75d720758d2d1d4cc0072833dff98c5d27410d175c6506", "simhash": "1:4de3a9626ca73fc5", "word_count": 2831 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:13:54.428467+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge", "WE CONCUR:", "MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Chief Judge", "RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge" ], "parties": [ "JULIAN SEGURA, CHRISTOPHER DIXON, and KEVIN J. MEYN, in their own behalf and in behalf of similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. J.W. DRILLING, INC., a New Mexico corporation, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nBUSTAMANTE, Judge.\n{1} Julian Segura, Christopher Dixon, and Kevin J. Meyn (Workers), in their own behalf and on behalf of similarly situated persons, filed a complaint alleging that J.W. Drilling, Inc. (Employer), failed to pay them for overtime wages for the time spent traveling from their homes to Employer\u2019s job sites. Employer moved for summary judgment on the ground that such time was not compensable under New Mexico\u2019s Minimum Wage Act (MWA), NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 50-4-19 to -30 (1955, as amended through 2013). Workers appeal the district court\u2019s grant of summary judgment in favor of Employer. We affirm.\nBACKGROUND\n{2} Workers are former employees of Employer, a contractor that performed oil field drilling and related work in the Permian Basin in southeastern New Mexico and west Texas. Workers were paid hourly wages as nonexempt employees. Based in Artesia, New Mexico, Employer hired employees there and \u201cdispatch[edj them on day trips requiring travel to and from the job sites of at least one hour per day.\u201d\n{3} Workers brought suit against Employer seeking unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, injunctive relief, and attorney fees for themselves and other employees similarly situated under the MWA. Workers\u2019 complaint alleged that \u201c[Employer\u2019s] method of operation made travel a part of their employees\u2019 duties and a term of their employment relationship\u201d and that Employer \u201cengaged in a continuing course of conduct. . . pursuant to which they only paid employees from the arrival time to the departure time at the remote work locations, even though travel time caused the employees to work more than 40 hours per week.\u201d Workers asserted that they were \u201c \u2018traveling employees\u2019 within the meaning of New Mexico common law[.]\u201d Workers asserted that under Section 50-4-22(D) of the MWA, they \u201chad a right to compensation at one and one-half times their regular]] hourly rates for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours\u201d during a seven day period. See Section 50-4-22(D) (\u201cAn employee shall not be required to work more than forty hours in any week of seven days, unless the employee is paid one and one-half times the employee\u2019s regular hourly rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty hours.\u201d). Since Employer had not paid Workers for the time spent traveling to the job sites, they asserted that Employer is \u201cliable to them for their overtime compensation and also the mandatory liquidated damages\u201d provided for in the MWA.\n{4} Employer moved for summary judgment. See Rule 1-056 NMRA. For purposes of the motion, Employer accepted the basic facts set out in Workers\u2019 complaint. After a hearing, the district court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. This appeal followed.\nDISCUSSION\n{5} \u201cWhen a party actually admits, for purposes of the summary judgment motion, the veracity of the allegations in the complaint, a reviewing court should consider the facts pleaded as undisputed and determine if a basis is present to decide the issues as a matter of law.\u201d GCM, Inc. v. Kentuclcy Cent. Life Ins. Co., 1997-NMSC-052, \u00b6 13, 124 N.M. 186, 947 P.2d 143 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). Generally, \u201cNew Mexico courts . . . view summary judgment with disfavor, preferring a trial on the merits.\u201d Romero v. Philip Morris Inc., 2010-NMSC-035, \u00b6 8, 148 N.M. 713, 242 P.3d 280.\n{6} The parties agree that the essential legal question posed by the complaint is \u201cwhether travel time is compensable under the [MWA].\u201d Because Workers\u2019 complaint states that the travel at issue is \u201ctravel to and from the job sites,\u201d and their briefs do not mention travel between job sites, we understand their argument to be focused on travel from their homes to one job site and back each day. Workers make two arguments. First, they argue that the district court erred in relying on case law construing a federal statute to construe the MWA. Second, they argue under the MWA their travel time to the job sites is compensable when it exceeds the \u201cnormal commute\u201d time. We address these arguments in turn.\n{7} In their first argument, Workers contrast the MWA with its federal counterpart, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 201 to 219 (1938, as amended throirgh 2012). They note that a portion of the FLSA, the Portal-to-Portal Act, excludes from compensable time the time spent traveling from home to the place of an employee\u2019s \u201cprincipal activity.\u201d See 29 U.S.C \u00a7 254(a). Specifically, the Portal-to-Portal Act provides that\nExcept as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment under the [FLSA] ... on account of the failure of such employer to pay an employee minimum wages, or to pay an employee overtime compensation, for .. .\n(1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities which such employee is employed to perform, and\n(2) activities which are preliminary to orpostliminary to said principal activity or activities^]\nId.\n{8} Workers argue that the district court erred \u201cby engrafting onto the [MWA] the [Portal-to-Portal Act] making all travel noncompensable, even round trips nearly equal to a day of work[.]\u201d They maintain that the MWA, passed eight years after the Portal-to-Portal Act, has no similar express exclusion, and thus the district court erred in relying on federal case law interpreting the Portal-to-Portal Act.\n{9} Workers \u2019 claims are based entirely on the MWA. Although several New Mexico cases refer to federal law as persuasive authority in interpreting the MWA, in those cases the MWA and the FLSA had similar provisions. See, e.g., Garcia v. Am. Furniture Co., 1984-NMCA-090, \u00b6 13, 101 N.M. 785, 689 P.2d 934 (stating that because the definitions in the MWA \u201care similar to definitions in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. . . . it is appropriate to look to decisions of federal courts determining the meaning of \u2018employ\u2019 in the federal statute, and to consider those federal decisions as persuasive authority in deciding the meaning of \u2018employ\u2019 in the New Mexico statute\u201d); Sinclaire v. Elderhostel, Inc., 2012-NMCA-100, \u00b6 6, 287 P.3d 978 (discussing the FLSA and the MWA provisions related to the definition of a work week). However, when the language of the MWA and the FLSA differ, we treat federal case law differently. In New Mexico Department of Labor v. Echostar Communications Corp., for example, this Court declined to rely on cases interpreting the FLSA in part because the language in the MWA and FLSA differed. 2006-NMCA-047, \u00b6 12, 139 N.M. 493, 134 P.3d 780. Here, the exclusions in the Portal-to-Portal Act are completely absent from the MWA. There being no analogue in the MWA, the interpretations of the Portal-to-Portal Act in case law are unhelpful. Thus, to the extent the district court relied on federal law interpreting the Portal-to-Portal Act to decide this case, we agree that it erred. Federal law does not answer the issue presented by this case.\n{10} We turn to Workers\u2019 argument that their travel time is compensable under the MWA. Workers first argue that employees like them are entitled to compensation for their travel time because they are \u201ctraveling employees.\u201d The \u201ctraveling employee\u201d concept to which Workers refer is derived from workers\u2019 compensation law. Under that body of law, employees generally are not considered within the course of their employment when they are on their way to work or returning home from work. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 52-1-19 (1987). This is known as the \u201cgoing and coming rule.\u201d Ramirez v. Dawson Prod. Partners, Inc., 2000-NMCA-011, \u00b6 7, 128 N.M. 601, 995 P.2d 1043. However, when travel is an integral part of the employee\u2019s duties and a benefit to the employer, the employee will be considered within the course of employment the entire time he or she is traveling. Id. \u00b6 11. This is known as the \u201ctraveling employee\u201d exception to the \u201cgoing and coming rule.\u201d Id. Workers urged the district court and now urge this Court to import the traveling employee exception from workers\u2019 compensation law into the context of wage and hour law. They note that the rationale for the traveling employee exception is that the travel is occasioned by and solely for the benefit of the employer. They argue that their travel here is similarly for the benefit of the employer and, therefore, should be compensable.\n{11} We decline to apply the traveling employee concept in this context. Workers compensation law is \u201csui generis\u201d and New Mexico courts have repeatedly declined to mingle its principles with those in other areas of law. For instance, in Lessard v. Coronado Paint & Decorating Center, Inc., this Court stated that although \u201csimilar principles may support [applying the going and coming rule] in [the context of workers\u2019 compensation and tort law],\u201d the going and coming rule in workers\u2019 compensation law was inapplicable to scope of employment analyses in tort law because \u201cthe policies served by the two areas of law differ, and application of the rule in each context has produced analyses that differ from each other.\u201d 2007-NMCA-122, \u00b6 9, 142 N.M. 583, 168 P.3d 155. Similarly, this Court declined to import principles related to traveling employees from workers\u2019 compensation law into vicarious liability analyses, concluding that \u201cworkers\u2019 compensation cases involving \u2018traveling employees\u2019 are not helpful to our analysis of common-law vicarious liability.\u201d Ovecka v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 2008-NMCA-140, \u00b6 13, 145 N.M. 113, 194 P.3d 728; see also Rivera v. N.M. Highway & Transp. Dep\u2019t, 1993-NMCA-057, \u00b6\u00b6 14-15, 115 N.M. 562, 855 P.2d 136 (stating that the \u201crationale for allowing workers\u2019 compensation benefits for accidents arising from horseplay is unique to workers\u2019 compensation cases\u201d and that the \u201crationale does not apply outside the workers\u2019 compensation context\u201d); Aragon v. Furr\u2019s, Inc., 1991-NMCA-080,\u00b64, 112 N.M. 396, 815 P.2d 1186 (stating that statutes of limitation related to other causes of action were irrelevant because workers\u2019 compensation law is \u201csui generis\u201d); Wampler Foods, Inc. v. Workers\u2019 Comp. Div., 602 S.E.2d 805, 817-18 (W. Va. 2004) (stating that workers\u2019 compensation law \u201cstands alone from all other areas of the law, causing decisions rendered in the workers\u2019 compensation realm to be almost wholly unusable in any other area of the law, and vice-versa\u201d); cf. Olson v. Trinity Lodge No. 282, A. F. & A. M., 32 N.W.2d 255, 257 (Minn. 1948) (\u201cCompensation acts are sui generis, and care must be taken not to defeat their purpose by applying, through long judicial habit, concepts belonging to fundamentally different fields of litigation.\u201d).\n{12} In amore general argument, Workers ask this Court to hold that \u201call employee travel beyond a normal commute [i]s compensable, regardless of who owns the vehicle.\u201d As support, Workers direct us to the Employee Commuting Flexibility Act (ECFA), a 1996 amendment to the Portal-to-Portal Act, which states that\nthe use of an employer\u2019s vehicle for travel by an employee and activities performed by an employee which are incidental to the use of such vehicle for commuting shall not be considered part of the employee\u2019s principal activities if the use of such vehicle for travel is within the normal commuting area for the employer\u2019s business or establishment and the use of the employer's vehicle is subject to an agreement on the part of the employer and the employee or representative of such employee.\n29 U.S.C. \u00a7 254(a) (emphasis added); Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, \u00a7\u00a7 2101-2103, 110 Stat. 1755. They also cite a U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) opinion letter issued in 1999 interpreting the ECFA, in which the DOL addressed whether \u201ctime spent in driving [in the employer\u2019s vehicle] between the [employee\u2019s] home and the job site [would] constitute hours worked.\u201d Opinion Letter Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 1999 WL 1002360, at **1-2. In the letter, the DOL stated that\nwhere a[n employee\u2019s] commute to the first job site in the morning takes four hours, we would consider the greater portion of travel time compensable under the principles described in 29 CFR 785.37. That rule allows a portion of the total commute time to be considered noncompensable home-to-work travel. If the employer treated three of the four hours as compensable travel, we would not question such practice.\nId. at *2. Worlcers argue that the MWA should be interpreted consistently with the DOL\u2019s interpretation of the ECFA.\n{13} The problem for us with this argument is that it is based on explicit language in the federal statute. As already discussed, there simply is no similar language in the MWA. Instead, the MWA is silent on travel time, whether within a \u201cnormal commute\u201d or otherwise. See, e.g., \u00a7 50-4-21 (not defining \u201ctravel time,\u201d \u201chours worked,\u201d or \u201cwork\u201d in the definitions); Section 50-4-22 (not addressing travel time).\n{14} Although Workers argue that the absence of language similar to the Portal-to-Portal Act in the MWA indicates that travel time is compensable under the MWA, Workers also appear to acknowledge the general rule that commuting time to and from a job site is not compensable absent an agreement to the contrary. Even the United States Supreme Court cases they cite in their favor distinguish between travel from home to the employer\u2019s property and travel once on the property. See Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 599 (1944) (stating that the travel at issue took place on the employer\u2019s property and \u201c[bore] no relation whatever to [the employees \u2019{needs or to the distance between their homes and the mines.\u201d), superseded by statute as stated in Ford v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist.,___F. Supp. 3d___, 2015 WL 1246780; Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers of Am., 325 U.S. 161, 166 (1945) (distinguishing \u201c[t]hose who are forced to travel in underground mines in order to earn their livelihood\u201d from \u201cthe ordinary workman on his way to work\u201d); Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 691 (1946) (stating that \u201cthe walking time [on the employer\u2019s property, which was at issue] differed vitally from the time spent in traveling from workers\u2019 homes to the factory\u201d); see also 1 Wage & Hour Law \u00a7 6:38 (2015) (\u201cOrdinary travel from home to work does not require compensation. This is still true even if the employer\u2019s worksite is a moving site.\u201d (footnote omitted)). Since the MWA is silent on this issue, Workers are, in essence, asking this Court to fashion out of whole cloth a new scheme, similar to the ECFA, that alters the general rule and declares some commuting time compensable.\n{15} Under ourrules of construction, \u201c[i]f the Legislature is silent on an issue, we look at the overall structure and function of the statute, as well as the public policy embodied in the statute.\u201d Delfino v. Griffo, 2011-NMSC-015, \u00b6 12, 150 N.M. 97, 257 P.3d 917. The purpose of the MWA is \u201cto safeguard existing minimum wage and overtime compensation standards which are adequate to maintain the health, efficiency and general well-being of workers against the unfair competition of wage and hours standards which do not provide adequate standards of living.\u201d Section 50-4-19. Holding that some portion of employees\u2019 travel time is compensable would likely further this goal. But to do what Workers ask would require us to resolve a number of policy questions as to the scope of compensable time. The effect of such an effort \u2014 in the face of legislative silence \u2014 would be to amend the current statutory language. This we are loath to do. \u201c \u2018Courts must construe statutes as they find them and may not amend or change them under the guise of construction.\u2019 \u201d Jones v. Holiday Inn Express, 2014-NMCA-082, \u00b6 19, 331 P.3d 992 (quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 370 (2014)); Gonzalez v. Performance Painting, Inc., 2013-NMSC-021, \u00b6 53, 303 P.3d 802 (Daniels, J., specially concurring) (stating that \u201cjudges are not legislators\u201d); Martinez v. Sedillo, 2005-NMCA-029, \u00b6 7, 137 N.M. 103, 107 P.3d 543 (\u201cWe will not rewrite a statute.\u201d); City of Albuquerque v. Sanchez, 1970-NMCA-023, \u00b6 5, 81 N.M. 272, 466 P.2d 118 (\u201c[Tjhis is a situation which calls for legislative therapy and not judicial surgery.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Ball, 1986-NMSC-030, \u00b6 39, 104 N.M. 176, 718 P.2d 686.\nCONCLUSION\n{16} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court\u2019s grant of summary judgment to Employer.\n{17} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nMICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nMICHAEL E. VIGIL, Chief Judge\nRODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge", "type": "majority", "author": "BUSTAMANTE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Templeton & Crutchfield, P.C.", "C. Barry Crutchfield", "Lovington, NM", "Riojas Law Firm, P.C.", "Robert E. Riojas", "El Paso, TX", "Michael T. Milligan", "El Paso, TX", "for Appellants", "Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A.", "Charles J. Vigil", "Jeffrey L. Lowry", "Albuquerque, NM", "Hennighausen & Olsen, L.L.P.", "Kenneth B. Wilson", "Roswell, NM", "for Appellee" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Certiorari Denied, August 14, 2015,\nNo. 35,417\nIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2015-NMCA-085\nFiling Date: June 25, 2015\nDocket No. 33,801\nJULIAN SEGURA, CHRISTOPHER DIXON, and KEVIN J. MEYN, in their own behalf and in behalf of similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. J.W. DRILLING, INC., a New Mexico corporation, Defendant-Appellee.\nTempleton & Crutchfield, P.C.\nC. Barry Crutchfield\nLovington, NM\nRiojas Law Firm, P.C.\nRobert E. Riojas\nEl Paso, TX\nMichael T. Milligan\nEl Paso, TX\nfor Appellants\nRodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A.\nCharles J. Vigil\nJeffrey L. Lowry\nAlbuquerque, NM\nHennighausen & Olsen, L.L.P.\nKenneth B. Wilson\nRoswell, NM\nfor Appellee" }, "file_name": "0395-01", "first_page_order": 411, "last_page_order": 417 }