{
  "id": 12166518,
  "name": "NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SOLUTIONS, Petitioner-Appellant, and ALBERTSONS, Employer, v. NANCY GARDU\u00d1O, Respondent-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "New Mexico Department of Workforce Solutions v. Gardu\u00f1o",
  "decision_date": "2015-11-19",
  "docket_number": "Docket No. S-1-SC-34,546",
  "first_page": "112",
  "last_page": "124",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "2016-NMSC-002"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.M.",
    "id": 8835,
    "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 52,
    "name_long": "New Mexico",
    "name": "N.M."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "575 F. Supp. 590",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "F. Supp.",
      "case_ids": [
        3620042
      ],
      "year": 1983,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "593, 600",
          "parenthetical": "\"We do not question the Government's legal right to collect back all legitimate overpayments of [Federal Supplemental Social Security Income] benefits from recipients who are presently able to repay their debts after they obtain their full [Social Security] checks.\""
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/f-supp/575/0590-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "2004 WL 1878786",
      "category": "reporters:specialty_west",
      "reporter": "WL",
      "year": 2004,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "*4"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "2014 WL 6724937",
      "category": "reporters:specialty_west",
      "reporter": "WL",
      "year": 2014,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "*4-5",
          "parenthetical": "holding that online system of appeals did not violate due process rights because it \"was not affirmatively misleading\" and it adequately explained the \"potential consequences\" of failing to file a timely appeal (citations omitted)"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "633 N.W.2d 25",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.W.2d",
      "case_ids": [
        9483010,
        9482978
      ],
      "year": 2001,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "30",
          "parenthetical": "affirming an appellate denial of the appellant's due process claim based on constitutionally valid notice of the hearing because the appellant knew the potential consequences of a reversal of the initial decision and participated in the appeal with counsel"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nw2d/633/0025-02",
        "/nw2d/633/0025-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "612 F.2d 1055",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "F.2d",
      "case_ids": [
        1411367
      ],
      "year": 1980,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "1057",
          "parenthetical": "holding a due process violation for lack of notice of the possible decrease in a food stamp allotment because notice did not meaningfully inform persons so they could protect their interest"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/f2d/612/1055-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "354 N.W.2d 830",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.W.2d",
      "case_ids": [
        10673400
      ],
      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1984,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "831"
        },
        {
          "page": "831-32"
        },
        {
          "page": "835"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nw2d/354/0830-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "2009-NMSC-031",
      "category": "reporters:neutral",
      "reporter": "NMSC",
      "case_ids": [
        4244666
      ],
      "weight": 3,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "\u00b6 24"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nm/146/0391-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "316 P.3d 918",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "P.3d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "2014-NMCA-016",
      "category": "reporters:neutral",
      "reporter": "NMCA",
      "case_ids": [
        4077014
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "\u00b6 7"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nm-app/5/0378-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "112 N.M. 528",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.M.",
      "case_ids": [
        720235
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nm/112/0528-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "1991-NMSC-089",
      "category": "reporters:neutral",
      "reporter": "NMSC",
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 4,5"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "267 P.3d 65",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "P.3d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "2012-NMSC-002",
      "category": "reporters:neutral",
      "reporter": "NMSC",
      "case_ids": [
        4188874
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "\u00b6 13"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nm-app/1/0102-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "2001-NMCA-042",
      "category": "reporters:neutral",
      "reporter": "NMCA",
      "case_ids": [
        352608
      ],
      "weight": 3,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 6, 14"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nm/130/0543-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "20 F.3d 636",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "F.3d",
      "case_ids": [
        10509650
      ],
      "year": 1994,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "639",
          "parenthetical": "requiring that if there is a deprivation, \"we must determine whether the procedures relative to that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.\" (citation and footnote omitted)"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/f3d/20/0636-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "39 F.3d 1030",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "F.3d",
      "case_ids": [
        10530362
      ],
      "year": 1994,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/f3d/39/1030-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "796 F. Supp. 1316",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "F. Supp.",
      "case_ids": [
        3776833
      ],
      "year": 1992,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "1319"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/f-supp/796/1316-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "94 L.Ed 865",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "L. Ed.",
      "year": 1950,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "parenthetical": "requiring that an adjudication for deprivation of property \"be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case\""
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "339 U.S. 306",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "U.S.",
      "case_ids": [
        362818
      ],
      "weight": 4,
      "year": 1950,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "31-14",
          "parenthetical": "requiring that an adjudication for deprivation of property \"be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case\""
        },
        {
          "parenthetical": "requiring that an adjudication for deprivation of property \"be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case\""
        },
        {
          "page": "314"
        },
        {
          "page": "314",
          "parenthetical": "citations omitted"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/us/339/0306-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "319 P.3d 639",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "P.3d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "2014-NMSC-006",
      "category": "reporters:neutral",
      "reporter": "NMSC",
      "case_ids": [
        4077676
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "\u00b6 20"
        },
        {
          "page": "\u00b6 19"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nm-app/5/0492-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "1999-NMSC-016",
      "category": "reporters:neutral",
      "reporter": "NMSC",
      "case_ids": [
        257693
      ],
      "weight": 3,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "\u00b6 26"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nm/127/0254-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "289 P.3d 1232",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "P.3d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "2012-NMSC-039",
      "category": "reporters:neutral",
      "reporter": "NMSC",
      "case_ids": [
        4190919
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "\u00b6 38"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nm-app/3/0020-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "402 U.S. 121",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "U.S.",
      "case_ids": [
        11732861
      ],
      "weight": 5,
      "year": 1970,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "131",
          "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks, citation, and footnote omitted"
        },
        {
          "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks, citation, and footnote omitted"
        },
        {
          "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks, citation, and footnote omitted"
        },
        {
          "page": "131-32",
          "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks, citation and footnote omitted"
        },
        {
          "page": "132",
          "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/us/402/0121-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "627 F.2d 650",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "F.2d",
      "case_ids": [
        1287936
      ],
      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1980,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "664",
          "parenthetical": "\"State statutes providing for the payment of unemployment compensation benefits create in the claimants for those benefits property interests protected by due process.\" (citation omitted)"
        },
        {
          "page": "664",
          "parenthetical": "\"State statutes providing for the payment of unemployment compensation benefits create in the claimants for those benefits property interests protected by due process.\" (citation omitted)"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/f2d/627/0650-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "397 U.S. 254",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "U.S.",
      "case_ids": [
        12052726
      ],
      "weight": 5,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "267"
        },
        {
          "page": "264"
        },
        {
          "page": "262",
          "parenthetical": "citations omitted"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/us/397/0254-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "408 U.S. 564",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "U.S.",
      "case_ids": [
        1782964
      ],
      "weight": 6,
      "year": 1972,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "577"
        },
        {
          "page": "576",
          "parenthetical": "\"a person receiving welfare benefits under statutory and administrative standards defining eligibility for them has an interest in continued receipt of those benefits that is safeguarded by procedural due process.\" (citations omitted)"
        },
        {
          "page": "576",
          "parenthetical": "\"The Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is a safeguard of the security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits.\""
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/us/408/0564-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "367 U.S. 886",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "U.S.",
      "case_ids": [
        1785544
      ],
      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1961,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "895"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/us/367/0886-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "424 U.S. 319",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "U.S.",
      "case_ids": [
        12026449
      ],
      "weight": 9,
      "year": 1976,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "334-35"
        },
        {
          "page": "335, 340-43"
        },
        {
          "page": "339-40"
        },
        {
          "page": "335"
        },
        {
          "page": "335"
        },
        {
          "page": "347"
        },
        {
          "page": "347-48"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/us/424/0319-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "2005-NMSC-006",
      "category": "reporters:neutral",
      "reporter": "NMSC",
      "case_ids": [
        929161
      ],
      "weight": 5,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "\u00b6 31"
        },
        {
          "page": "\u00b6 31"
        },
        {
          "page": "\u00b6 32"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nm/137/0161-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "2010-NMSC-013",
      "category": "reporters:neutral",
      "reporter": "NMSC",
      "case_ids": [
        4248331
      ],
      "weight": 3,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "\u00b6 19"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nm/148/0021-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "309 P.3d 89",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "P.3d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "2013-NMSC-042",
      "category": "reporters:neutral",
      "reporter": "NMSC",
      "case_ids": [
        4335234
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "\u00b6 9"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nm-app/4/0688-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "304 P.3d 427",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "P.3d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "2013-NMCA-055",
      "category": "reporters:neutral",
      "reporter": "NMCA",
      "case_ids": [
        4334169
      ],
      "weight": 5,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 16, 23"
        },
        {
          "page": "\u00b6 8"
        },
        {
          "page": "\u00b6 17"
        },
        {
          "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 7-9"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nm-app/4/0031-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "2014-NMCERT-003",
      "category": "reporters:neutral",
      "reporter": "NMCERT",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "324 P.3d 377",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "P.3d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "2014-NMCA-050",
      "category": "reporters:neutral",
      "reporter": "NMCA",
      "case_ids": [
        4240453
      ],
      "weight": 5,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "\u00b625"
        },
        {
          "page": "\u00b6 13"
        },
        {
          "page": "\u00b6 17"
        },
        {
          "page": "\u00b6 17"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nm-app/6/0001-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 1429,
    "char_count": 40738,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.775,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08,
      "percentile": 0.2467989446488965
    },
    "sha256": "faa836fe576a2f8348897bca819cc85b7fb81a4afa1f6ee9d619a5b1925d3356",
    "simhash": "1:3d3686261f22a4ca",
    "word_count": 6211
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:30:56.942854+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice",
      "BARBARA J. VIGIL, Chief Justice",
      "EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice",
      "CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice",
      "RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice, Retired Sitting by Designation"
    ],
    "parties": [
      "NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SOLUTIONS, Petitioner-Appellant, and ALBERTSONS, Employer, v. NANCY GARDU\u00d1O, Respondent-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "OPINION\nMAES, Justice.\n{1} Following a determination that Respondent Nancy Gardu\u00f1o (Gardu\u00f1o) was ineligible for unemployment benefits because her employer terminated her for misconduct connected with her employment, the Cabinet Secretary of the New Mexico Department of Workforce Solutions (the Department) ordered Gardu\u00f1o to repay $ 11,256 in overpaid unemployment benefits. The Court of Appeals majority held that due process precluded the Department from collecting the overpaid unemployment benefits from Gardu\u00f1o where she received benefits payments during the ongoing appeals process because she was unaware of her employer\u2019s appeal for 130 days. See N.M. Dep\u2019t of Workforce Solutions v. Gardu\u00f1o, 2014-NMCA-050, \u00b625, 324 P.3d 377 (Hanisee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. granted 2014-NMCERT-003. We reverse the Court of Appeals and hold that Gardu\u00f1o\u2019s procedural due process rights were not violated because the Department provided Gardu\u00f1o with constitutionally adequate procedural protections prior to terminating her benefits and ordering her to reimburse the Department for the overpaid benefits.\nI. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY\n{2} On February 5, 2010, Albertsons, a grocery store chain, terminated Gardu\u00f1o from her job as a front-end clerk for violation of the associate-purchase policy, which prohibited giving away \u201cfree merchandise of any kind.\u201d This included giving deep discounts, a practice called \u201csweethearting.\u201d Surveillance cameras recorded Gardu\u00f1o charging a coworker and his wife $2.82 for merchandise that should have totaled approximately $17.00. An investigation conducted by Albertsons\u2019 management revealed that an incident that occurred on January 14, 2010, was not an isolated one and that Gardu\u00f1o gave at least one other employee an unauthorized discount.\n{3} Gardu\u00f1o filed for unemployment insurance benefits on February 14, 2010. The Department\u2019s claims examiner issued a notice of claim determination awarding Gardu\u00f1o $402 in weekly benefits. The notice stated that the determination was final \u201cunless an appeal is filed within fifteen calendar days from: 03/12/2010.\u201d Additionally, the notice stated, \u201cIf your employer challenges a decision allowing benefits to you and the appeal decision is against you, you will be required to repay those benefits.\u201d See 11.3.300.308 NMAC (1/1/03) On March 26, 2010, Albertsons appealed the claim determination. The Department continued to pay Gardu\u00f1o benefits during the ongoing appeals process.\n{4} The Department did not notify Gardu\u00f1o of the Albertsons appeal until August 3, 2010, when the D epartment mailed Gardu\u00f1o a notice of hearing. The notice of hearing stated that \u201cthe appeal hearing\u201d in front of the Department\u2019s appeals tribunal was scheduled for August 19,2010, and listed the legal issues to be addressed. After receiving the notice of hearing, Gardu\u00f1o continued filing weekly claims for benefits, collecting an additional $2,010 in unemployment benefits. At the appeal hearing on August 19, 2010, an administrative law judge (ALJ) began hearing testimony but ultimately elected to continue the hearing to give Gardu\u00f1o the chance to resubmit documents and request subpoenas. On August 23, 2010, the Department issued a notice stating that the hearing would resume on September 9, 2010. On that day, the ALJ heard testimony from Gardu\u00f1o, the store manager, an employee, and the store\u2019s loss prevention investigator, and considered evidence consisting of written statements, policies, receipts, and surveillance video. On September 14, 2010, the ALJ issued a decision disqualifying Gardu\u00f1o from benefits eligibility due to her employee misconduct. That same day, the Department issued an overpaymentnotice informing Gardu\u00f1o of her disqualification from benefits because she had \u201cclaimed and received benefits to which [she was] not entitled,\u201d and she was therefore required to refund the overpayment, totaling $11,256.\n{5} Gardu\u00f1o appealed the ALJ\u2019s decision. The board of review, which provides a second-tier administrative review of Department decisions, affirmed Gardu\u00f1o\u2019s disqualification on November 23, 2010. Gardu\u00f1o did not seek review of the board\u2019s decision. However, she did appeal to the appeals tribunal the Department\u2019s decision to recoup the $ 11,256 overpayment. The tribunal held a hearing on December 29, 2010, on the issue of the overpayment and issued a decision the next day affirming the Department\u2019s decision to recoup the overpayments. On January 13, 2011, Gardu\u00f1o appealed the tribunal\u2019s decision to theDepartment\u2019s cabinet secretary. Citing NMSA 1978, Section 51-1-38 (1993), the cabinet secretary affirmed the decision of the tribunal on January 28, 2011, and ordered Gardu\u00f1o to repay the Department for the overpaid benefits.\n{6} Having exhausted her administrative remedies, Gardu\u00f1o appealed the cabinet secretary\u2019s decision to state district court. Gardu\u00f1o asserted that the Department should be equitably estopped from pursuing collection of overpayments because the Department failed to comply with federal timeliness standards for processing appeals. Gardu\u00f1o also argued that the Department violated her right to notice and hearing under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In an order reversing the cabinet secretary\u2019s decision, the district court held that (1) the appeals tribunal\u2019s hearing, conducted six months after Gardu\u00f1o started receiving benefits, violated the timeliness requirements for processing appeal claims under state and federal law; (2) the doctrine of equitable estoppel barred the Department from claiming and collecting an overpayment from Gardu\u00f1o; and (3) the overpayment claims process violated Gardu\u00f1o\u2019s due process rights by failing to provide Gardu\u00f1o with timely notice and hearing. The Department appealed the district court\u2019s order to the Court of Appeals.\n{7} At the time of the Department\u2019s appeal, the Court of Appeals had another pending case with similar facts. See Millar v. N.M. Dep\u2019t of Workforce Solutions, 2013-NMCA-055, 304 P.3d 427. Despite the Department\u2019s motion to consolidate this case with Millar, the Court of Appeals decided them separately. See Gardu\u00f1o, 2014-NMCA-050, \u00b6 28 n.1 (Hanisee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Millar, the Court of Appeals rejected the claimant\u2019s equitable estoppel and federal timeliness regulation arguments, holding that the claimant did not have \u201ca right to unemployment compensation benefits to which he was not entitled and which [the Department] has a statutory obligation to recover.\u201d 2013-NMCA-055, \u00b6\u00b6 16, 23. Procedural due process was not at issue in Millar. See id. \u00b6 1.\n{8} After the Millar opinion was filed, a majority of a different Court of Appeals panel held that Gardu\u00f1o\u2019s federal and state timeliness and equitable estoppel arguments lacked merit for the same reasons set forth in Millar. See Gardu\u00f1o, 2014-NMCA-050, \u00b6 13. The majority concluded, however, that the Department\u2019s failure to provide Gardu\u00f1o with timely notice of the employer\u2019s appeal from the notice of claim determination awarding Gardu\u00f1o benefits violated her right to procedural due process so as to preclude the Department from collecting the overpaid benefits. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 21, 26. Judge Hanisee did \u201cnot agree that Gardu\u00f1o\u2019s due process rights were violated, even assuming she ha[d] a legitimate property interest,\u201d because the \u201cproceeding was conducted \u2018in a reasonable time and manner.\u201d\u2019 Id. \u00b6 34 (Hanisee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Department appealed to this Court. We granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred by (1) holding that Gardu\u00f1o had a constitutionally protected property interest in unemployment benefits she received before being found ineligible for such benefits, (2) holding that Gardu\u00f1o\u2019s procedural due process rights were violated, and (3) providing Gardu\u00f1o with a remedy contrary to law and the public interest in preserving the unemployment fund.\nII. STANDARD OF REVIEW\n{9} Generally, we review \u201can administrative order to determine if it is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion; not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or, otherwise not in accordance with law.\u201d N.M. Att\u2019y Gen. v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm\u2019n, 2013-NMSC-042, \u00b6 9, 309 P.3d 89 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Because Gardu\u00f1o did not appeal the Department\u2019s eligibility determination, the only issue on appeal is the constitutionality of the Department\u2019s procedures leading to the administrative order. The constitutionality of the Department\u2019s procedures presents this Court with a question of law, which we review de novo. See Albuquerque Bernalillo Cty. Water Util. Auth. v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm\u2019n, 2010-NMSC-013, \u00b6 19, 148 N.M. 21, 229 P.3d 494 (citations omitted).\nIII. DISCUSSION\n{10} The Due Process Clauses of the United States and New Mexico Constitutions require the government to afford certain procedural protections prior to depriving any person of a constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty, or property. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, \u00a7 1 (\u201cNo State shall. . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.\u201d); N.M. Const. art. II, \u00a7 18 (\u201cNo person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.\u201d). Accordingly, \u201c[administrative hearings that affect a property or liberty interest must comply with due process.\u201d Archuleta v. Santa Fe Police Dep\u2019t ex rel. City of Santa Fe, 2005-NMSC-006, \u00b6 31, 137 N.M. 161, 108 P.3d 1019.\n{11} In New Mexico state courts, \u201c[t]he Mathews test is the appropriate analytical framework for a due process issue.\u201d Archuleta, 2005-NMSC-006, \u00b6 31 (citation omitted). The Mathews test evaluates the following factors: (1) \u201cthe private interest that will be affected by the official action;\u201d (2) \u201cthe risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;\u201d and (3) \u201c the Government\u2019s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.\u201d Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).\nA. New Mexico\u2019s Unemployment Compensation Law creates a constitutionally protected property interest in unemployment benefits\n{12} The first factor of the Mathews test requires considering the private property interest affected by state action. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 340-43. \u201c[Consideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of... the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.\u201d Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961). The Department argues that Gardu\u00f1o does not have a property interest in overpaid benefits because she failed to appeal the question ofher eligibility. The Department agrees that an individual can have a constitutionally protected property interest in unemployment benefits that are improperly denied, but here, Gardu\u00f1o was deemed ineligible for the benefits and has never challenged that determination. Gardu\u00f1o contends that the interest of an individual in continued receipt of governmentally created benefits is a constitutionally protected \u201cproperty\u201d interest. Gardu\u00f1o argues that, once the Department issued a notice finding her eligible for unemployment benefits, she had a protected property right in the those benefits. We hold that Gardu\u00f1o acquired a constitutionally protected property interest in unemployment benefits when she began receiving payments and that Gardu\u00f1o\u2019s retention of those benefits cannot be terminated without due process.\n{13} Property interest in a benefit was defined by the United States Supreme Court in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth:\nTo have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined.\n408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Property interests \u201care created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.\u201d Id.\n{14} A statutory scheme providing for the receipt of government benefits may give rise to property interests protected by the due process clause. In Mathews, the United States Supreme Court determined that the private interest affected by state action was the claimant\u2019s continued receipt ofbenefits, which was a source of income, pending a final decision on his claim for Social Security disability benefits. See 424 U.S. at 339-40. Similarly, a private interest affected by state action is a claimant\u2019s continued receipt of welfare benefits. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267, 90 S.Ct 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (holding that \u201cthe pre-termination hearing has one function only; to produce an initial determination of the validity of the welfare department\u2019s grounds for discontinuance of payments in order to protect a recipient against an erroneous termination of his benefits.\u201d (citations omitted)); Roth, 408 U.S. at 576 (\u201ca person receiving welfare benefits under statutory and administrative standards defining eligibility for them has an interest in continued receipt of those benefits that is safeguarded by procedural due process.\u201d (citations omitted)); see also Wilkinson v. Abrams, 627 F.2d 650, 664 (3d Cir. 1980) (\u201cState statutes providing for the payment of unemployment compensation benefits create in the claimants for those benefits property interests protected by due process.\u201d (citation omitted)).\n{15} New Mexico\u2019s Unemployment Compensation Law articulates the great importance of this source of income to unemployed claimants. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 51-1-3 (1936) (\u201c[The purpose of the statute is to] lighten [the] burden which now so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and [the worker\u2019s] family.\u201d). Lacking independent resources, a claimant\u2019s \u201cneed to concentrate upon finding the means for daily subsistence ... adversely affects his ability to seek redress from the [state\u2019s] bureaucracy.\u201d Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264. Unemployment benefits are significant to the recently unemployed worker because they \u201cgive prompt if only partial replacement of wages to the unemployed, to enable workers to tide themselves over, until they get back to their old work or find other employment, without having to resort to relief.\u201d Cal. Dep't of Human Res. Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 131, 91 S.Ct. 1347, 28 L.Ed.2d 666 (1970) (internal quotation marks, citation, and footnote omitted) (discussing the legislative purpose behind the Federal unemployment insurance scheme). Further, \u201c[unemployment benefits provide cash to a newly unemployed worker at a time when otherwise he would have nothing to spend, serving to maintain the recipient at subsistence levels . . . .\u201d Id. at 131-32 (internal quotation marks, citation and footnote omitted). The security provided by unemployment benefits during a period of unemployment is also important in \u201cassisting a worker to find substantially equivalent employment. . . [because] [t]hey should not be doing anything else but looking for a job.\u201d Id. at 132 (internal quotation marks omitted).\n{16} Because New Mexico\u2019s unemployment compensation scheme provides for the payment of unemployment compensation benefits, see generally NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 51-1-1 to -59 (1936, as amended through 2013); 11.3.300 NMAC (07/15/1998, as amended through 07/31/2013) (specifying the administration of unemployment benefits claims), claimants for such benefits possess a property interest protected by due process. See Wilkinson, 627 F.2d at 664 (\u201cState statutes providing for the payment of unemployment compensation benefits create in the claimants for those benefits property interests protected by due process.\u201d (citation omitted)); Roth, 408 U.S. at 576 (\u201cThe Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s procedural protection of property is a safeguard of the security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits.\u201d).\n{17} The Court of Appeals majority concluded that \u201cGardu\u00f1o has a property right in receiving unemployment benefits by virtue of the Unemployment Compensation Law.\u201d Gardu\u00f1o, 2014-NMCA-050, \u00b6 17 (citations omitted). Judge Hanisee disagreed that Gardu\u00f1o had a legitimate property interest because she \u201cabandoned] any challenge to the Tribunal\u2019s determination that she was substantively ineligible for unemployment benefits.\u201d Id. \u00b6 31 (Hanisee, J., dissenting in part). Judge Hanisee wrote that, \u201cGardu\u00f1o\u2019s desire to keep\u2014and not repay to [the Department]\u2014the overpaid benefits does not give rise to a \u2018legitimate claim of entitlement.\u2019 Rather, her interest is of the type disallowed by Roth: that for which a claimant has an \u2018abstract need or desire\u2019 or a \u2018unilateral expectation.\u2019\u201d Id. (citations omitted).\n{18} The characterization of Gardu\u00f1o\u2019s claim makes little difference when determining the existence of a protected property interest. Whether Gardu\u00f1o is seeking to keep her benefits\u2014benefits she was initially found eligible for\u2014or whether she is seeking continued receipt of those benefits is irrelevant. Gardu\u00f1o\u2019s constitutionally protected property interest in the benefits arose when the claims examiner made the initial eligibility determination and she began receiving bene fit payments. Once this property interest arose, procedural due process protections began protecting the security of that interest, and the Department could neither discontinue payments nor recoup earlier payments based on a disqualification and termination of benefits without affording Gardu\u00f1o due process. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that \u201c[r]elevant constitutional restraints apply as much to the withdrawal of public assistance benefits as to disqualification for unemployment compensation.\u201d Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 (citations omitted); see also Wilkinson, 627 F.2d at 664-65 n.18 (\u201cOur conclusion that claimants for state unemployment compensation benefits have a protected property interest applies no less to claimants, like the Wilkinson class, seeking to establish eligibility in the first instance, than to claimants . . . seeking to establish continued eligibility.\u201d (citation omitted)).\n{19} We affirm the Court of Appeals\u2019 holding that \u201cGardu\u00f1o has a property right in receiving unemployment benefits by virtue of the Unemployment Compensation Law.\u201d Gardu\u00f1o, 2014-NMCA-050, \u00b6 17 (citations omitted). Judge Hanisee is correct that Gardu\u00f1o did not challenge the substantive determination that she was ineligible for benefits. But that alone does not give the Department authority to terminate and recoup her unemployment benefits without affording Gardu\u00f1o due process. The next step in our procedural due process analysis is to determine whether the Department employed constitutionally adequate procedures in depriving the claimant of that interest. See Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass\u2019n, Inc. v. D\u2019Antonio, 2012-NMSC-039, \u00b6 38, 289 P.3d 1232.\nB. There was no due process violation where there was neither erroneous procedural deprivation of the private interest nor probable value in the additional or substitute procedural safeguards\n{20} The second Mathews test requires examining both the risk that the private interest will be erroneously deprived with the procedures used and any probable value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.\n1. Erroneous procedural deprivation\n{21} In examining the potential risk of erroneous deprivation, we look to the procedures as a whole. See In re Comm \u2019n Investigation Into 1997 Earnings of U.S. West Commc'ns, Inc., 1999-NMSC-016, \u00b6 26, 127 N.M. 254, 980 P.2d 37 (citations omitted). To prevent erroneous deprivation in the administrative context, due process requires \u2018\u201creasonable notice and opportunity to be heard and present any claim or defense\u2019.\u201d Rayellen Res., Inc. v. N.M. Cultural Props. Review Comm., 2014-NMSC-006, \u00b6 20, 319 P.3d 639 (citation omitted); see also Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 31-14, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed 865 (1950) (requiring that an adjudication for deprivation of property \u201cbe preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case\u201d). However, \u201cconstitutional due process does not require an agency to afford a petitioner all elements of a traditional judicial proceeding. \u2019\u2019 Archuleta, 2005-NMSC-006, \u00b6 32 (citing Miller v. County of Santa Cruz, 796 F. Supp. 1316, 1319 (N.D. Cal. 1992), aff'd, 39 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 1994)).\n{22} Because Gardu\u00f1o did not challenge the substantive determination that she was ineligible for benefits, this is not the usual procedural due process case involving a prehearing deprivation of benefits. Gardu\u00f1o does not argue that she was deprived of her benefits by a lack of process provided in the hearing. The essence of her deprivation is that she continued to receive the benefits during the ongoing appeals process unaware of her employer\u2019s appeal for 130 days and that she was actually incurring a debt. According to Gardu\u00f1o, \u201c[d]ue process requires prompt notice with the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.\u201d She points to an alleged deficiency in notice and hearing and argues that she should have received an earlier notice and hearing.\n{23} We are therefore called to assess the significance of prompt notice and disposition of first-level appeals on a claimant\u2019s interest in unemployment benefits when the initial determination found the claimant eligible and the claimant received benefit payments through the first level of administrative appeal. The New Mexico Unemployment Compensation statute provides that upon appeal by any party of a initial determination of eligibility, the Department must provide a \u201creasonable opportunity for a fair hearing.\u201d NMSA 1978, Section 51-1-8(D) (2013, amended in 2015). The Department\u2019s regulations further provide that \u201c[ojnee an initial determination is made and payment of benefits is begun, payments shall not be stopped without prior notice and an opportunity to be heard....\u201d 11.3.300.308(E) NMAC (1/1/2003).\n{24} Notice is important to due process because the \u201cright to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest.\u201d Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. \u201cDue process does not require the same form of notice in all contexts; instead, the notice should be appropriate to the nature of the case.\u201d Rayellen, 2014-NMSC-006, \u00b6 19 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Put simply, we must determine whether the notice was \u201creasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.\u201d Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (citations omitted).\n{25} The goal of the Unemployment Compensation Law, and the importance behind unemploymentbenefits, centers around promptly providing support for the innocent workers who have become unemployed through no fault of their own. See Section 51 - 1 -3. The Court of Appeals in Millar observed that this system \u201cnecessarily results in some payments being made upon an initial determination of eligibility that are subsequently overturned. As a result, the [Department] advises the claimant that if the appeal decision is against him, he will be required to repay the benefits received.\u201d 2013-NMCA-055, \u00b6 8.\n{26} We agree with the Court of Appeals in Millar that \u201cprompt payment is not the only consideration of procedural fairness to a claimant};] prompt notice of benefits being in jeopardy must be [considered] as well.\u201d 2013-NMCA-055, \u00b6 17. However, the importance in avoiding administrative delay is of less significance where the initial determination is one of eligibility and the claimant is receiving payments during the appeal process. Here, the claims examiner\u2019s initial determination concluded that Gardu\u00f1o was eligible, and she continued to receive benefits until the ALJ\u2019s determination following the hearing at the first level of appeal. We do not hold that any claim of late notice of an appeal or any late timing of the hearing cannot result in a due process violation. Instead, our holding requires weighing a claimant\u2019s deprivation of an important private interest, such as unemployment benefits, relative to procedures used in such a deprivation. See Welch v. Thompson, 20 F.3d 636, 639 (5th Cir. 1994) (requiring that if there is a deprivation, \u201cwe must determine whether the procedures relative to that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.\u201d (citation and footnote omitted)).\n{27} In New Mexico, the distinguishing factor used to determine whether there was or was not a violation of due process rights depends on whether the defective notice deprived the claimant of the ability to participate in the proceeding. See Franco v. Carlsbad Mun. Schs., 2001-NMCA-042, \u00b6\u00b6 6, 14, 130 N.M. 543, 28 P.3d 531 (holding that a notice recommending termination of an employee to the board without notice to the employee of employee\u2019s right to attend and dispute the claims violated due process), recognized in Lobato v. N.M. Env\u2019t Dep\u2019t, 2012-NMSC-002, \u00b6 13, 267 P.3d 65. There is at least one instance when eventual notice was deemed constitutionally sufficient in the administrative context because claimant was not deprived of an opportunity to be heard by participating in the proceeding. In Uhden v. N.M. Oil Conservation Comm \u2019n a lessee of oil and gas interests provided notice by publication of two adjudications purporting to increase well spacing on a landowner\u2019s property, which the landowner did not receive, and subsequently the landowner did not attend or participate in the hearing. 1991-NMSC-089, \u00b6\u00b6 4,5, 112 N.M. 528, 817 P.2d 721. However, three months later the lessee notified the landowner of two resulting orders and retained subsequent royalty payments to offset the overpayments. Id. \u00b6 5. The landowner filed an application for a hearing to obtain relief from the two orders. Id. The landowner attended and participated in that hearing and a third order was issued denying her application for relief. Id. \u00b6 5. In the subsequent appeal to this Court, we declared the first two orders void reasoning that service by publication in that context violated due process requirements of reasonable notice. Id. \u00b6 13. As to the third order, this Court stated, \u201cWe do find that Uhden eventually had notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue of spacing . ...\u201d Id. The Court determined that eventual notice coupled with the ability to participate in the proceedings met the requirements of due process. See Id. \u00b6\u00b6 10, 13.\n{28} Even though Gardu\u00f1o did not receive notice ofher employer\u2019s appeal for 130 days, we cannot conclude that the risk of erroneous deprivation of unemployment benefits is unnecessarily high as a consequence of the procedures utilized by the Department. In this case, the Department completely adhered to the protocols outlined in the Unemployment Compensation statutes and accompanying regulations as described in Millar, including not ceasing payments without prior notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Millar, 2013-NMCA-055, \u00b6\u00b6 7-9; see also 11.3.300.308(E) NMAC (1/1/2003) (\u201cOnce an initial determination is made and payment of benefits is begun, payments shall not be stopped without prior notice and an opportunity to be heard.\u201d) The erroneous deprivation that Gardu\u00f1o alleges would occur during the delay in the decision of a second-tier appeal which could reverse the initial determination. But prior to and during the appeal, Gardu\u00f1o was receiving her benefits and was deprived of nothing. Moreover, during the appeals process, Gardu\u00f1o was afforded abundant process that included a hearing and opportunities to obtain counsel, present evidence, and confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.\n2. Probable value of earlier notice or of additional or substitute procedural safeguards\n{29} We next examine any possible value of the additional safeguards proffered by Gardu\u00f1o. Gardu\u00f1o argues that she should have received an earlier notice and hearing. Inherent in this question is whether the outcome would have been different if the Department had provided the additional process Gardu\u00f1o requests. Cf. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep\u2019t v. Christopher B., 2014-NMCA-016, \u00b6 7, 316 P.3d 918 (\u201c[I]n order to show a denial of due process, we do require the [claimant] to \u2018demonstrate that there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome might have been different}]\u2019 had the denied procedure been afforded.\u201d (Third alternation and emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).\n{30} Gardu\u00f1o relies on Waters-Haskins v. Human Services Department, Income Support Division to argue that DWS\u2019s late notice of the pending appeal amounted to \u201ca false representation or concealment of material facts,\u201d which implied \u201c\u2018representations that are contrary to the essential facts to be relied on, even when made innocently or by mistake\u2019.\u201d 2009-NMSC-031, \u00b6 24, 146 N.M. 391, 210 P.3d 817 (citation omitted) (holding that because the agency clearly knew of claimant\u2019s ineligible status but continued to pay her food stamp benefits for eight years while the claimant had no way of knowing she was ineligible, the agency was estopped from later attempting to recoup the paid benefits). In that case, this Court applied a theory of equitable estoppel, an issue which Gardu\u00f1o does not argue on appeal. Further, the Waters-Haskins holding is not dispositive because Gardu\u00f1o was made aware of the possibility of appeal and of the possibility of having to pay back benefits should she lose on appeal. The notice to Gardu\u00f1o stated, \u201cIf your employer challenges a decision allowing benefits to you and the appeal decision is against you, you will be required to repay those benefits.\u201d Gardu\u00f1o appears to be making an equitable estoppel argument couched in procedural due process; however, because Gardu\u00f1o did not cross-appeal the Court of Appeals\u2019 adverse equitable estoppel determination, the issue is not before us.\n{31} Here, the delayed notice of appeal Gardu\u00f1o received is more analogous to the eventual notice received in Uhden. Despite the delay, Gardu\u00f1o still received notice of the hearing and appeal prior to the hearing, and the delay did not prevent Gardu\u00f1o from attending and participating in the D WS appeal hearing. See 11.3.500.10(A)(1) NMAC (1/1/2003). At the appeal hearing, the ALJ heard testimony from Gardu\u00f1o, the store manager, an employee, and the store\u2019s loss prevention investigator; and the ALJ considered evidence consisting of written statements, policies, receipts, and surveillance video. Like Uhden, Gardu\u00f1o was not deprived of an opportunity to be heard on the issue ofrepayment of unemployment benefits.\n{32} The Minnesota Court of Appeals considered a due process argument similar to Gardu\u00f1o \u2019s and added another element requiring notice of the interest at stake. In Schulte v. Transportation Unlimited, Inc., a discharged employee received notice of a hearing requested by his employer to challenge the unemployment benefits he had already received. 354 N.W.2d 830, 831 (Minn. 1984). Because the employee was reemployed before the hearing and was not informed of the potential requirement of repayment upon reversal of the initial decision to award benefits, the employee did not attend the hearing. Id. at 831-32. The Minnesota Court held that the notice was \u201caffirmatively misleading\u201d and resulted in a denial of due process because it failed to communicate the interest at stake. Id. at 835; see also Dilda v. Quern, 612 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding a due process violation for lack of notice of the possible decrease in a food stamp allotment because notice did not meaningfully inform persons so they could protect their interest)).\n{33} Gardu\u00f1o\u2019s case is more like cases from the Court of Appeals of Minnesota that distinguish Schulte where the Court ultimately held that there was no constitutional violation when the employee did participate in the hearing. See Comm \u2019r of Nat. Res. v. Nicollet Cty.Pub. Water/Wetlands Hearings Unit, 633 N.W.2d 25, 30 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming an appellate denial of the appellant\u2019s due process claim based on constitutionally valid notice of the hearing because the appellant knew the potential consequences of a reversal of the initial decision and participated in the appeal with counsel); see also Aubin v. Family Dollar, Inc., No. A14-0483, 2014 WL 6724937, at *4-5 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 1, 2014) (holding that online system of appeals did not violate due process rights because it \u201cwas not affirmatively misleading\u201d and it adequately explained the \u201cpotential consequences\u201d of failing to file a timely appeal (citations omitted)); Koch v. Sheldahl, No. A03-1562, 2004 WL 1878786, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2004) (determining that employee was not entitled to notice of consequences of losing an unemployment benefits appeal until she received notice that the employer had, in fact, appealed and concluding that when faced with the decision of whether to participate in the appeal, the employee also had notice of the consequences of losing an appeal thus there was no due process violation). In Gardu\u00f1o\u2019s case, like the Nicollet case, the late notice did not prevent Gardu\u00f1o from participating in the appeal hearing. The facts also indicate that Gardu\u00f1o, like Nicollet was given notice of the potential consequences of losing an appeal. Gardu\u00f1o\u2019s participation in the appeal hearing coupled with her notice of the potential consequences was not \u201caffirmatively misleading.\u201d\n{34} Even though Gardu\u00f1o was unaware of her employer\u2019s appeal for a substantial time, Gardu\u00f1o\u2019s argument overlooks that the notice of claim determination dated March 12, 2010 stated that \u201c[i]f your employer challenges a decision allowing benefits to you and the appeal decision is against you, you will be required to repay those benefits.\u201d Further, the August 3, 2010, notice of hearing the Department mailed to Gardu\u00f1o informed Gardu\u00f1o of the issues to be addressed, including the issue of whether she left her employment without good cause or was discharged for misconduct. The notice contained references to the legal and regulatory bases related to those issues. The notice included information required by the regulations meant to inform Gardu\u00f1o of the issues to be addressed so she could prepare for the hearing. See 11.3.500.9(D) NMAC; 11.3.500.9(D)(1), (3) NMAC.\n{35} We are not persuaded that there was probable value to Gardu\u00f1o\u2019s proffered additional procedural protection in receiving earlier notice. The requested additional procedures would not have changed the outcome of the final eligibility determination. Gardu\u00f1o was discharged from employment for her own misconduct, and no amount of time would have permitted her to show otherwise. Indeed, before the district court, Gardu\u00f1o\u2019s counsel acknowledged that the Department\u2019s eligibility decision was probably correct. Additionally, Gardu\u00f1o cannot prove that earlier notice would have led to a smaller overpayment debt where, even after she received actual notice of the appeal, she continued to collect benefits voluntarily increasing the risk that she would have a higher overpayment debt.\n{36} There would be no added value in a speedier notice and hearing where it would not have afforded additional protections from an erroneous deprivation of the continuation of benefits or from a wrongful order to repay benefits. The Court of Appeals in this case failed to view the process as a whole by focusing on the lack of a specific type of notice and not considering the abundant process and safeguards afforded to Gardu\u00f1o. Accordingly, the late notice did not violate due process.\n{37} We also note that the Department has the legal right to recoup overpaid benefits, even those benefits mistakenly overpaid by the Department. See, e.g., Ellender v. Schweiker, 575 F. Supp. 590, 593, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (\u201cWe do not question the Government\u2019s legal right to collect back all legitimate overpayments of [Federal Supplemental Social Security Income] benefits from recipients who are presently able to repay their debts after they obtain their full [Social Security] checks.\u201d); see generally Section 51-1-38 (describing a claimant\u2019s liability for unemployment benefit overpayment).\nC. The Government\u2019s interest includes the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement entails\n{38} The third factor of the Mathews test is \u201cthe Government\u2019s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.\u201d Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Mathews described this factor as a consideration of \u201cthe public interest\u201d which includes \u201cthe administrative burden and other societal costs\u201d associated with providing the proposed additional procedural safeguards. Id. at 347. In discussing this test, Mathews looked both to the financial burden on the administration and to the effect the costs of additional procedures for undeserving recipients may have on deserving recipients. Id. at 347-48. The Department argues that the government\u2019s interest at issue here is in recouping benefits erroneously paid to claimants who did not deserve them. We disagree. The added procedural safeguards Gardu\u00f1o requests are more timely notice and hearing. Thus, we must determine the added burden on the Department to provide a more timely notice and hearing. It appears to us that the added burden of notifying claimants of an employer\u2019s appeal sooner is minimal. Significantly, the Department does not contest our conclusion. In fact, at oral argument before this Court, the Department stated that claimants are currently provided with notice of appeal and an appeal hearing much sooner than occurred in Gardu\u00f1o\u2019s case.\n{39} While the private interest in the continuation of benefits is important, there is a very low risk of erroneous deprivation under the procedures utilized by the Department. The interest in the continuation of benefits was attenuated where Gardu\u00f1o received benefits through the first level of administrative appeal. Unemployment benefits hearings must comport with due process and be conducted in such a manner as to ascertain the substantial rights of parties; fundamental fairness is the essence of due process. More specifically, a claimant is entitled to a full, fair, and impartial hearing which conforms to the fundamental principles of due process and which includes the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. In this case, the Department provided and Gardu\u00f1o received adequate notice and a fundamentally fair, full, and impartial hearing.\nIV. CONCLUSION\n{40} Gardu\u00f1o was not deprived of a protected property interest where she continued to receive benefits up until it was determined that she was ineligible for the benefits. The Department\u2019s late notice of a pending appeal did not deprive Gardu\u00f1o of due process of law where the late notice neither prejudiced her ability to defend against the employer\u2019s assertion that she had been fired for misconduct nor prejudicially delayed her merits hearing.\n{41} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nPETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice\nWE CONCUR:\nBARBARA J. VIGIL, Chief Justice\nEDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice\nCHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice\nRICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice, Retired Sitting by Designation",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "MAES, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "New Mexico Department of Workforce Solutions Marshall J. Ray Elizabeth A. Garcia Richard Lawrence Branch Albuquerque, NM for Petitioner-Appellant",
      "Rodey Dickason Sloan Akin & Robb P.A. Jeffrey L. Lowry Albuquerque, NM for Employer",
      "New Mexico Legal Aid, Inc. Alicia Clark Albuquerque, NM Timothy R. Hasson Taos, NM for Respondent"
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2016-NMSC-002\nFiling Date: November 19, 2015\nDocket No. S-1-SC-34,546\nNEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SOLUTIONS, Petitioner-Appellant, and ALBERTSONS, Employer, v. NANCY GARDU\u00d1O, Respondent-Appellee.\nNew Mexico Department of Workforce Solutions Marshall J. Ray Elizabeth A. Garcia Richard Lawrence Branch Albuquerque, NM for Petitioner-Appellant\nRodey Dickason Sloan Akin & Robb P.A. Jeffrey L. Lowry Albuquerque, NM for Employer\nNew Mexico Legal Aid, Inc. Alicia Clark Albuquerque, NM Timothy R. Hasson Taos, NM for Respondent"
  },
  "file_name": "0112-01",
  "first_page_order": 128,
  "last_page_order": 140
}