{ "id": 12166548, "name": "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. DANNY SURRATT, Defendant-Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Surratt", "decision_date": "2015-12-10", "docket_number": "Docket No. S-1-SC-35049", "first_page": "131", "last_page": "141", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2016-NMSC-004" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 8-7-106", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Tenn. Code Ann.", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Mo. Ann. Stat. \u00a7 56.110", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Mo. Ann. Stat.", "year": 2014, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"If the prosecuting attorney ... be interested ... in any case ..., the court having criminal jurisdiction may appoint some other attorney to prosecute or defend the cause.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Mich. Comp. Laws \u00a7 49.160", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Mich. Comp. Laws", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Colo. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 20-1-107", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Colo. Rev. Stat.", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(4)", "parenthetical": "\"If the district attorney is disqualified in any case which it is his or her duty to prosecute or defend, the court having criminal jurisdiction may appoint a special prosecutor to prosecute or defend the cause.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ala. Code \u00a7 12-17-189", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ala. Code", "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"When any district attorney is suspended, the court shall appoint a district attorney pro tem, who shall perform the duties of the office of district attorney....\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 P.3d 1231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "case_ids": [ 8941741 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1233", "parenthetical": "determining that because the district attorney's acts were valid, defendant's challenge to the district attorney's prosecutorial authority did not raise an issue of subject matter jurisdiction" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p3d/116/1231-01" ] }, { "cite": "928 S.W. 2d 47", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10000918 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51", "parenthetical": "\"If voters are in disagreement with a prosecutor's charging determinations, they have the ultimate veto at the ballot box.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/928/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 A.D.2d 773", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.2d", "case_ids": [ 889915 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "775", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he appointment of a Special Prosecutor to replace the District Attorney in a particular matter terminates the latter's authority with respect to any further proceedings in the case . . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/259/0773-01" ] }, { "cite": "516 S.W.2d 895", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 8720132 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "901" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/257/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "2001-NMCA-034", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 352659 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 10-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/130/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "852 S.W.2d 525", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10008113 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526", "parenthetical": "en banc" }, { "page": "527" }, { "page": "528" }, { "page": "527" }, { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/852/0525-01" ] }, { "cite": "903 P.2d 23", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10332567 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25", "parenthetical": "\"When a special prosecutor is appointed, that person becomes the district attorney for that particular case, exercising plenary power.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/903/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "678 P.2d 870", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10425729 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "874" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/678/0870-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMSC-072", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 322315 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 11" }, { "page": "\u00b6 6" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 6, 18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/122/0687-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMCA-036", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3784717 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 16-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/143/0646-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 N.M. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 720239 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/112/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "1991-NMCA-060", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 11" }, { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.M. 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2838221 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/88/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "1975-NMCA-093", "category": "reporters:neutral", 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}, { "cite": "1980-NMSC-061", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 5, 10-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "430 P.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.M. 241", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5323864 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/78/0241-01" ] }, { "cite": "1967-NMSC-172", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 26" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2004-NMSC-032", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 1224669 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/136/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "2010-NMSC-019", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4248191 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/148/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-050", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4245434 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 11" }, { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/147/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 P.3d 371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2015-NMCERT-002", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 P.3d 419", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2015-NMCA-039", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4240886 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 16" }, { "page": "\u00b6 16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/7/0552-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1170, "char_count": 33452, "ocr_confidence": 0.779, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.24679971689469155 }, "sha256": "6c734665066eb9c418bf73bfb07f154b7cfa6658b8f8195f5ccda6ed161f3f9c", "simhash": "1:336d7884ad3cbf25", "word_count": 5173 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:30:56.942854+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice", "BARBARA J. VIGIL, Chief Justice", "PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice", "JUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Justice, not participating" ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. DANNY SURRATT, Defendant-Respondent." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nDANIELS, Justice.\n{1} Following a second trial, Defendant Danny Surratt was convicted of criminal sexual penetration of a minor. Defendant appealed his conviction, claiming the district attorney serving as special prosecutor at the second trial lacked the authority to prosecute the case because his appointment by the first special prosecutor, also a district attorney, was invalid. Defendant maintained that the Lea County District Court was thereby divested of jurisdiction over his criminal proceedings. The Court of Appeals agreed with Defendant and reversed his conviction, effectively remanding the case for a third trial. See State v. Surratt, 2015-NMCA-039, \u00b6 16, 346 P.3d 419. We hold that a properly appointed special prosecutor is given all the authority and duties of the appointing district attorney to prosecute the case for which that special prosecutor was appointed, including the authority to name another special prosecutor if unable to proceed for an ethical reason or other good cause. Defendant does notraise any additional grounds for reversal on appeal. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate Defendant\u2019s conviction.\nI. BACKGROUND\n{2} On August 31, 2010, following an investigation by the New Mexico State Police, Defendant Danny Surratt was charged in Lea County Magistrate Court with several counts stemming from allegations of inappropriate sexual conduct with his two minor stepgranddaughters. Defendant served for many years as a law enforcement officer in Lea County and was a deputy sheriff at the time the allegations arose. Janetta Hicks, who was then the district attorney for the Fifth Judicial District where Lea County is located, determined that Defendant\u2019s position and relationship with the Lea County Sheriffs Department created a conflict of interest for her office. As a result, she appointed the district attorney for the Twelfth Judicial District, Diana Martwick, or her designee as special prosecutor for the State in Defendant\u2019s case. The signed and notarized appointment was filed with the Lea County Magistrate Court on September 1, 2010.\n{3} On December 13, 2010, a Lea County Magistrate found probable cause to order the case bound over for trial in the district court. An assistant district attorney from Martwick\u2019s office filed a four-count criminal information against Defendant in the Lea County Fifth Judicial District Court. At the conclusion of the State\u2019s case, the district court dismissed two counts, a jury found Defendant guilty on one count of criminal sexual penetration of a child between the ages of thirteen and eighteen, and the court declared a mistrial on the final count because the jury could not reach consensus. Prior to sentencing, new counsel for Defendant moved for a new trial on the basis of an improper jury instruction pertinent to the charge for which Defendant was convicted. The district court granted Defendant\u2019s motion, set aside the verdict, and ordered a second trial.\n{4} At the time the case was remanded for a second trial, Martwick determined that her office could no longer effectively prosecute the State\u2019s case against Defendant. She believed the assistant district attorney assigned to the case lacked the requisite experience to conduct a retrial, a conflict had developed between the alleged victims and the State\u2019s prosecutors in the first trial during the course of that trial, and she herself was precluded from participating in a new trial because she was quite ill and undergoing extensive medical treatment. Ultimately, Martwick \u201cfelt that it would be in the best interest of justice to re-assign the case\u201d to the office of another district attorney. She contacted Hicks regarding the case reassignment. They agreed that because Hicks\u2019 office was conflicted out of the case, Martwick herself should appoint another special prosecutor.\n{5} Martwick appointed Matthew Chandler, the Ninth Judicial District Attorney at that time, or his designee as special prosecutor in her place. The appointment was filed with the Lea County District Court on July 6, 2012. Chandler\u2019s chief deputy entered her appearance in the case three days later. Prior to the second trial, the district court granted Defendant\u2019s motion to sever the two remaining charges against him. The State first proceeded against Defendant on one count of criminal sexual penetration of a child under the age of thirteen, and the jury found Defendant guilty. Once again before sentencing, Defendant\u2019s counsel filed a motion for a new trial, indicating that he had received a telephone call from an unidentified individual stating that \u201cthe jury had and used improper information\u201d in Defendant\u2019s case. The district court issued an order permitting Defendant\u2019s counsel to interview jurors to determine whether the anonymous allegation had merit. The court sentenced Defendant to eighteen years of imprisonment but delayed entering the final judgment pending the outcome of defense counsel\u2019s investigation.\n{6} Defense counsel did not uncover any juror misconduct in his investigation but stated in a motion to dismiss the complaint and set aside Defendant\u2019s sentence that, \u201c[i]n the process of investigation, [he] became aware for the first time of defects in the appointment of counsel for the State serving as Special Prosecutor.\u201d Specifically, Defendant challenged Martwick\u2019s appointment of Chandler, arguing Martwick was not authorized to make the appointment and therefore it was \u201cwithout legal effect.\u201d Defendant argued Chandler therefore lacked legal authority to prosecute him, and absent that authority \u201cno jurisdiction exist[ed] for criminal prosecution of the matter.\u201d The district court allowed both parties to submit further briefing before hearing the issue,\n{7} The State\u2019s briefing included affidavits from District Attorneys Hicks, Martwick, and Chandler. In her affidavit, Hicks indicated that \u201c[o]nce this conflict appointment took place, [she] no longer had any authority whatsoever over the case\u201d and that \u201cthe appropriate manner to handle th[e] matter was in [District Attorney Martwick\u2019s] sole discretion,\u201d including decisions regarding any further appointment deemed appropriate. In addition to expounding her reasons for reassigning the case, Martwick stated in her affidavit that she \u201cmade the appointment as [she] was the current assigned Special Prosecutor in the matter and the Fifth Judicial District [Attorney] had already been conflicted out of the proceeding.\u201d Martwick further indicated that when she spoke with Hicks prior to appointing Chandler, both agreed that Hicks was conflicted out and that Martwick \u201cshould be the one to do the appointment.\u201d Finally, Chandler stated in his affidavit that when Martwick appro ached him for assistance, he agreed to represent the State in Defendant\u2019s case and accordingly filed the appointment and oath of special prosecutor.\n{8} The district court denied Defendant\u2019s motion and formally entered the judgment and sentence against Defendant for the first degree felony conviction of criminal sexual penetration in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-9-11(D)(1) (2009). The State dismissed the remaining charge of criminal sexual penetration in the second degree without prejudice for \u201cjudicial efficiency.\u201d All trial court proceedings in Defendant\u2019s case were heard in the Lea County Fifth Judicial District Court before the same judge.\n{9} Defendant appealed the district court\u2019s ruling on his motion to dismiss the complaint and set aside his sentence, asserting that Martwick\u2019s improper appointment of Chandler divested the district court of jurisdiction to hear the second trial. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding that (1) District Attorney Martwick lacked lawful authority to appoint District Attorney Chandler, (2) District Attorney Chandler lacked authority to prosecute the State\u2019s case against Defendant, and (3) the District Court lacked jurisdiction over Defendant\u2019s second trial. See Surratt, 2015-NMCA-039, \u00b6 16.\n{10} We granted certiorari, 2015-NMCERT-002, 346 P.3d 371, to consider the authority of a properly appointed special prosecutor to appoint another special prosecutor when an ethical conflict or other good cause arises altogether preventing continued participation of the original appointee in the criminal proceeding.\nII. DISCUSSION\n{11} We must determine the scope of a special prosecutor\u2019s authority under NMSA 1978, Section 36-1-23.1 (1984), in order to then address the question whether the Lea County Fifth Judicial District Court retained jurisdiction over Defendant\u2019s criminal proceedings. W e turn to principles of statutory construction to guide our analysis.\nA. Standard of Review\n{12} \u201cStatutory construction is a matter of law we review de novo.\u201d State v. Nick R., 2009-NMSC-050, \u00b6 11, 147 N.M. 182, 218 P.3d 868. The primary goal in construing a statute is to \u201cascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.\u201d State v. Tafoya, 2010-NMSC-019, \u00b6 10, 148 N.M. 391, 237 P.3d 693 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court begins by \u201cexamining] the plain language of the statute as well as the context in which it was promulgated, including the history of the statute and the object and purpose the Legislature sought to accomplish.\u201d Nick R., 2009-NMSC-050, \u00b6 11 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). \u201cThis Court has rejected a formalistic and mechanical statutory construction when the results would be absurd, unreasonable, or contrary to the spirit of the statute.\u201d State v. Smith, 2004-NMSC-032, \u00b6 10, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022.\nB. Section 36-1-23.1 Applies to a District Attorney\u2019s Appointment of Another Elected District Attorney When a Conflict of Interest Arises\n{13} The office of the district attorney is a constitutional office with duties prescribed and delimited by the Legislature. See State ex rel. Att\u2019y Gen. v. Reese, 1967-NMSC-172, \u00b6 26, 78 N.M. 241, 430 P.2d 399 (\u201cThe constitution and statutes clearly prescribe and delimit [the district attorney\u2019s] authority.\u201d); see N.M. Const. art. VI, \u00a7 24 (establishing the office of district attorney and authorizing legislation to prescribe duties and qualifications for the office); NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 36-1-1 to -28 (1909, as amended through- 2001) (prescribing duties, administrative and operational provisions, jurisdiction, and requirements for the office of district attorney). Pursuant to the authority granted by the New Mexico Constitution, the Legislature has determined various responsibilities of the district attorney, as well as circumstances in which the district attorney may be succeeded in the exercise of these responsibilities. See, e.g., NMSA 1978, \u00a7 8-5-3 (1933) (authorizing the attorney general to act \u201cupon the failure or refusal of any district attorney to act\u201das otherwise authorized \u201cin any criminal or civil case\u201d in the interest of a \u201ccounty, state, or any department thereof\u2019); \u00a7 36-1-19(A) (giving the offices of the attorney general and district attorney concurrent jurisdiction in representing interests of the state or a county); \u00a7 36-1-23.1 (authorizing a district attorney whose office is unable to \u201cprosecute a case for ethical reasons or other good cause\u201d to \u201cappoint a , . . special assistant district attorney\u201d); see also State v. Naranjo, 1980-NMSC-061, \u00b6\u00b6 5, 10-11, 94 N.M. 407, 611 P.2d 1101 (describing circumstances in which the attorney general, exercising powers concurrent with a district attorney\u2019s powers, appointed a special prosecutor when both the district attorney and the attorney general \u201crecused their offices . . . from prosecuting\u201d the county sheriff).\n{14} Under New Mexico law, \u201c[e]ach district attorney shall . . . prosecute and defend for the state in all courts of record of the counties of his district all cases, criminal and civil, in which the state or any county in his district may be a party or may be interested.\u201d Section 36-1-18(A)(1). As an elected representative of the people, a district attorney has broad discretion in determining \u201cwhat charges to bring and what people to prosecute in the best interest of the people of the State of New Mexico.\u201d State v. Brule, 1999-NMSC-026, \u00b6 14, 127 N.M. 368, 981 P.2d 782 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, \u201ccourts must be wary not to infringe unnecessarily on the broad charging authority of district attorneys, and we will require clear evidence of an intent by the Legislature to limit prosecutorial discretion.\u201d State v. Santillanes, 2001-NMSC-018, \u00b6 21, 130 N.M. 464, 27 P.3d 456.\n{15} One exception to the authority to appear on behalf of the state arises when the district attorney is disqualified from acting in a particular case. See generally State v. Gonzales, 2005-NMSC-025, \u00b6\u00b6 14-19, 138 N.M. 271, 119 P.3d 151 (discussing New Mexico case law pertaining to a court\u2019s disqualification of prosecutors). This includes occasions where \u201cprosecution by a member of the district attorney\u2019s office is inconsistent with a particular standard of professional conduct,\u201d such as improper influence from private interests or existence of a prior professional relationship. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 28, 38, 44. A district attorney aware of a conflict of interest or for other good cause may also voluntarily recuse in a particular case to avoid the conflict or appearance of impropriety. See \u00a7 36-1-23.1 ;see also State v. Hill, 1975-NMCA-093, \u00b6 14, 88 N.M. 216, 539 P.2d 236 (\u201cPublic confidence in the [district attorney\u2019s] office in the exercise of broad powers demands that there be no conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict.\u201d). When a district attorney \u201ccannot prosecute a case for ethical reasons or other good cause,\u201d Section 36-1-23.1 titled \u201cSpecial prosecutors in conflict cases\u201d provides,\nEach district attorney may . . . appoint a practicing member of the bar of this state to act as special assistant district attorney. Any person so appointed shall have authority to act only in the specific case or matter for which the appointment was made. An appointment and oath shall be required of special assistant district attorneys in substantially the same form as that required for assistant district attorneys in Section 36-1-2 NMSA 1978.\n{16} As a threshold matter, the State suggests that Section 36-1-23.1 is not invoked when an elected district attorney requests, for a specific case, that another elected district attorney prosecute the case instead. Applying well established rules of statutory construction, we disagree. An ordinary reading of the statute\u2019s plain language suggests the Legislature intended the statute to apply to the appointment of both private counsel and other public prosecutors. While the terms \u201cspecial prosecutor\u201d and \u201cspecial assistant district attorney\u201d are not specifically defined within the statute, its text is inclusive of both private counsel and other public prosecutors in its generic reference to \u201ca practicing member of the [New Mexico] bar.\u201d This plain-language reading is consistent with the definition of special prosecutor adopted by the National District Attorney\u2019s Association as \u201cany person who performs the prosecution function in a jurisdiction who is not the chief prosecutor elected or appointed in the jurisdiction, or an assistant or deputy prosecutor in the jurisdiction.\u201d National District Attorney\u2019s Association, National Prosecution Standards 2 (3d ed. 2009), available at http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA NPS 3rd Ed. w Revised Commentary.pdf (last visited Dec. 7, 2015).\n{17} Unless an alternative source of legal authority grants the district attorney power to assign a case to another district attorney\u2019s office, Section 36-1-23.1 must control here. There is a line of statutory authority in addition to Section 36-1-23.1 that allows a district attorney to appoint assistants. Sections 36-1-2 and 36-1-5 permit a district attorney to appoint assistant district attorneys as regular employees to aid in the discharge of the legally prescribed duties of the office. But in State v. Hollenbeck, the Court of Appeals construed these statutory provisions together and determined that Sections 36-1-2 and 36-1-5 were not implicated under circumstances comparable to those presented here, and that \u201conly\u201d Section 36-1-23.1 applied. See 1991-NMCA-060, \u00b6 11, 112 N.M. 275, 814 P.2d 143.\n{18} In Hollenbeck, the state sought to avoid statutory noncompliance for appointing a special prosecutor absent an ethical reason or other good cause by arguing that the appointment of a Medicaid Providers Fraud Control Unit attorney as special prosecutor was authorized under Sections 36-1-2 and 36-1-5 and that Section 36-1-23.1 was inapposite. See Hollenbeck \u00b6\u00b6 8-9. Applying the general/specific statute rule of construction, the Court of Appeals rejected the state\u2019s suggestion of \u201can inherent or general statutory power to appoint a special prosecutor for an individual case despite a specific statutory provision governing the appointment of such special prosecutors\u201d and held that Section 36-1-23.1 alone, being \u201cthe more specifically applicable\u201d statute, was implicated. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 11-12; see also Santillanes, 2001-NMSC-018, \u00b6 7 (explaining that under the general/specific statute rule of construction, \u201cif two statutes dealing with the same subject conflict, the more specific statute will prevail over the more general statute . . .\u201d).\n{19} The State here fails to advance an alternative source of legal authority for assigning a case to another district attorney\u2019s office when a conflict of interest arises, nor do we perceive one. We agree with the Hollenbeck Court that Section 36-1-23.1, the provision \u201cdeal[ing] specifically with appointments of assistant district attorneys for individual cases,\u201d is the only provision that could authorize the appointment of another district attorney to prosecute Defendant\u2019s case. See 1991-NMCA-060, \u00b6 11. Accordingly, we conclude that the Legislature intended Section 36-1-23.1 to apply to the appointment of any practicing member of the New Mexico bar, public or private counsel, as special prosecutor.\n{20} Having determined that Section 36-1-23.1 is the controlling legal authority in this case, we now turn to the scope of a special prosecutor\u2019s authority under the statute to appoint another elected district attorney as special prosecutor.\nC. District Attorney Martwick, as Special Prosecutor, Had the Authority to Take Any Action She Deemed Appropriate in Prosecuting Defendant\u2019s Case\n{21} New Mexico courts have not yet addressed the full scope of a special prosecutor\u2019s authority to act pursuant to Section 36-1-23.1, but the practice of appointing a special prosecutor or attorney pro tempore when the elected district attorney is disqualified or has had to recuse from participating in criminal proceedings is not unique to New Mexico. Nevertheless, our state is unique in that the Legislature granted the district attorney who perceives a conflict the authority and discretion to appoint a special prosecutor without seeking leave of the court or permission from the attorney general prior to making the appointment. See \u00a7 36-1-23.1. This is consistent with the high value New Mexico places on \u201cpublic . . . confidence\u201d in the integrity of the office of the district attorney, Gonzales, 2005-NMSC-025, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 51, and with the desire to maintain a prosecutor\u2019s \u201cdistinctive role of disinterested and impartial public advocate[],\u201d State v. Robinson, 2008-NMCA-036, \u00b6\u00b6 16-17, 143 N.M. 646, 179 P.3d 1254.\n{22} In construing statutory sources of authority, we are careful to avoid restricting a district attorney\u2019s prosecutorial discretion. See Santillanes, 2001-NMSC-018, \u00b6 21 (discussing flexible application of a rale of construction so as not to \u201cinfringe unnecessarily on the broad charging authority of district attorneys\u201d). This has been true in our limited construction of Section 36-1-23.1. For example, in State v. Cherryhomes this Court looked at the statutory language and, in the absence of an implicit or explicit Legislative restriction, determined that the Legislature did not intend the appointment to be personal to the appointee but rather allowed a special prosecutor to delegate responsibilities associated with the appointment. See 1996-NMSC-072, \u00b6 11, 122 N.M. 687, 930 P.2d 1139. In fact, we noted in Cherryhomes that the language of Section 36-1-23.1 only places restrictions on a special prosecutor\u2019s scope of authority to act in \u2018\u201cthe specific case or matter for which the appointment was made.\u2019\u201d Id. \u00b6 8 (quoting Section 36-1-23.1). The statute places no other constraints on a special prosecutor\u2019s authority to act in a given case provided an appointment is made and an oath taken. See \u00a7 36-1-23.1; see also Cherryhomes, 1996-NMSC-072, \u00b6 6 (\u201c[T]he rationale for requiring authorization for prosecution is to avoid prosecution by persons who are not held accountable or subject to the oath of office.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).\n{23} Many other jurisdictions have decided that a special prosecutor steps into the shoes of the district attorney and has the same power and authority in relation to the specific case for which that special prosecutor was appointed as the district attorney would have if not otherwise conflicted in the case. See, e.g., Petition of Padget, 678 P.2d 870, 874 (Wyo. 1984) (explaining that the state statute permitting a court to direct or permit any member of the bar to act in the place of a district attorney where a disqualifying conflict of interest arises allows that attorney to assume the same duties and responsibilities as those of the district attorney); People v. Hastings, 903 P.2d 23, 25 (Colo. App. 1994) (\u201cWhen a special prosecutor is appointed, that person becomes the district attorney for that particular case, exercising plenary power.\u201d), as modified on denial of reh\u2019g (Feb. 16, 1995).\n{24} In State v. Rosenbaum, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed whether a special prosecutor appointed to replace a disqualified district attorney had authority to file an appeal absent authorization from that district attorney. See 852 S.W.2d 525, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc). Under state statute, a prosecuting attorney had to personally supervise and authorize appeals undertaken by his office on behalf of the state. See id. The defendant argued the appellate court was without jurisdiction because the special prosecutor lacked such authority. See id. at 527. Like New Mexico, Texas statute allows a district attorney to recuse in a case \u201cfor good cause.\u201d See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 2.07(b-l) (West 1999). Once the state\u2019s attorney is disqualified, the court \u201cmay appoint any competent attorney to perform the duties of the office\u201d during the absence or disqualification of the state\u2019s attorney. Id. art. 2.07(a). The Rosenbaum Court determined that \u201can attorney pro tem or special prosecutor takes the place of the disqualified district attorney assuming all the district attorney\u2019s powers and duties in the case,\u201d and \u201cis not subject to the direction of the disqualified district attorney as is a subordinate, but, for that case, he is the district attorney.\u201d 852 S.W.2d at 528.\n{25} Under the facts in Rosenbaum, the judge and the disqualified and appointed district attorneys properly followed statutory procedure, and the court indicated that by requesting to be disqualified \u201cthe district attorney manifested his intention to give his full power and authority to the special prosecutor in the case.\u201d Id. at 527. In fact, the district attorney filed a motion asking the court to allow him to abstain from signing the notice of appeal, thereby demonstrating his belief that the special prosecutor retained full power and control over the case. See id. The court found that the special prosecutor \u201cwas given all the powers and duties of the district attorney by the court order to \u2018investigate\u2019 and \u2018prosecute\u2019 the case\u201d and that such powers included the authority of a district attorney to file an appeal. Id. at 528.\n{26} Similarly here, Martwick was given all the powers and duties of Hicks by the appointment as special prosecutor to prosecute in Defendant\u2019s case. It would be absurd to construe the legislative mandate that a district attorney altogether precluded from proceeding for an ethical reason or other good cause could appoint a special prosecutor but limit the authority of that special prosecutor solely in this one area of responsibility over a case. Within constitutional limits, a district attorney has broad authority to control key aspects of a prosecution, including determinations about whom and whether to prosecute and what charges to bring. See State v. Estrada, 2001-NMCA-034, \u00b6\u00b6 10-11, 130 N.M. 358, 24 P.3d 793 (\u201cProsecutorial discretion, while broad, is not limitless and is bound by constitutional constraints.\u201d). W ithin the bundle of authorities the Legislature granted a district attorney is the ability to appoint a special prosecutor under circumstances permitted by statute. See \u00a7 36-1-23.1. \u201cA special prosecutor does not displace the prosecuting attorney from his constitutional office, but in order ... to be effective in the investigation and prosecution of the matters for which he has been appointed, he must have the right to proceed in the same manner as the prosecuting attorney.\u201d Weems v. Anderson, 516 S.W.2d 895, 901 (Ark. 1974).\n{27} Defendant suggests that such a reading could give \u201cunlimited discretion\u201d to substitute prosecutors that would result in irresponsible reappointments and \u201cunpredictable results,\u201d but the hypothetical situations he sets forth are neither before this Court nor, in our view, likely to occur.\n{28} The case before us involves three elected district attorneys in the State of New Mexico, subject to the oath of office and obligated to the public. See N.M. Const, art. XX, \u00a7 1 (\u201cEvery person elected or appointed to any office shall, before entering upon his duties, take and subscribe to an oath or affirmation that he will support the constitution of the United States and the constitution and laws of this state, and that he will faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of his office to the best of his ability.\u201d); \u00a7 36-1-1 (requiring for each elected district attorney \u201can oath of office as prescribed for other officers\u201d); \u00a7 36-1-2 (requiring for each appointed assistant district attorney \u201can oath of office as is now prescribed by law for district attorneys\u201d); \u00a7 36-1-23.1 (requiring for each appointed special assistant district attorney \u201can oath ... in substantially the same form as that required for assistant district attorneys\u201d). A special prosecutor is no less obligated than a district attorney to protect the public interest and the rights of the accused impartially and free from conflict. While not required, both Hicks and Martwick strictly complied with the appointment provisions of Section 36-1-23.1. See Cherryhomes, 1996-NMSC-072, \u00b6\u00b6 6, 18 (holding that strict compliance with the appointment and oath provisions of Section 3 6-1 -23.1 is not required but that \u201cthe appointment and oath of a special prosecutor be in 1 substantially the same form\u2019 as the appointment and oath of an assistant district attorney\u201d (emphasis added)). Hicks appointed Martwick or her designee specifically and solely to prosecute Defendant\u2019s case and filed that appointment with the court that had been vested with jurisdiction over the case. Martwick filed an oath to faithfully and impartially discharge her duties as special prosecutor and act only within the bounds of the case for which she was appointed.\n{29} In making the appointment, Hicks manifested her intention to give her full power and authority to Martwick in this specific case because her office had a conflict of interest that made it ethically inappropriate to have future participation in the case. Hicks renewed her belief that Martwick retained full control of the case during her consultation with Martwick about Chandler\u2019s appointment by reaching agreement that Martwick should make the appointment. Once Hicks had disqualified herself and appointed a special prosecutor, Martwick had the full duty, authority, and discretion to make decisions concerning Defendant\u2019s case. This included the authority to decide which charges to file, which charges to dismiss, which experts and evidence to introduce, and which motions to file. That full control over the case encompassed the authority to appoint a special prosecutor when an ethical reason or other good cause to do so arose during the proceedings. If Hicks was displeased with any of these decisions, she would not have had the authority to challenge them. See People v. Dellavalle, 259 A.D.2d 773, 775 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (\u201c[T]he appointment of a Special Prosecutor to replace the District Attorney in a particular matter terminates the latter\u2019s authority with respect to any further proceedings in the case . . . .\u201d). If the public was displeased with Hicks\u2019 choice of special prosecutor and events stemming therefrom, voters could voice their opinion at the polls. See Quillen v. Crockett, 928 S.W. 2d 47, 51 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (\u201cIf voters are in disagreement with a prosecutor\u2019s charging determinations, they have the ultimate veto at the ballot box.\u201d).\n{30} Under the facts of this case, we conclude that District Attorney Martwick, as the duly appointed special prosecutor, stepped into the shoes of elected District Attorney Hicks for all matters relating to the prosecution of this specific case in accordance with Section 36-1-23.1. Martwick, having the same power and authority in Defendant\u2019s case as Hicks would have absent the conflict of interest, had sole discretion and authority to appoint a special prosecutor when ethical reasons or other good cause arose that impeded her own office from remaining on the case. Having been properly appointed by Martwick in accordance with Section 36-1-23.1, District Attorney Chandler had authority to prosecute Defendant\u2019s case.\n{31} Because we conclude that Chandler had authority to proceed on behalf of the State, Defendant\u2019s challenge does not raise an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, and we need not reach the State\u2019s argument that a prosecutor\u2019s lack of authority to conduct a criminal case is a procedural rather than jurisdictional defect. See People v. Scott, 116 P.3d 1231, 1233 (Colo. App. 2004) (determining that because the district attorney\u2019s acts were valid, defendant\u2019s challenge to the district attorney\u2019s prosecutorial authority did not raise an issue of subject matter jurisdiction). The district court properly obtained subject-matter jurisdiction over these criminal proceedings when the charges were initially filed and did not lose jurisdiction over the case as a result of any substitution of the prosecutor.\nIII. CONCLUSION\n{32} We hold that the lawful appointment of District Attorney Martwick as Special Prosecutor vested her with all the powers and duties of the original district attorney to investigate and prosecute this case, including the authority to appoint another special prosecutor pursuant to Section 36-1-23.1. Because we conclude that Martwick had the authority to appoint District Attorney Chandler as special prosecutor in her place, we reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate Defendant\u2019s conviction.\n{33} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nCHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice\nWE CONCUR:\nBARBARA J. VIGIL, Chief Justice\nPETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice\nJUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Justice, not participating\nSee, e.g., Ala. Code \u00a7 12-17-189 (1940) (\u201cWhen any district attorney is suspended, the court shall appoint a district attorney pro tem, who shall perform the duties of the office of district attorney....\u201d); Colo. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 20-1-107(4) (2002) (\u201cIf the district attorney is disqualified in any case which it is his or her duty to prosecute or defend, the court having criminal jurisdiction may appoint a special prosecutor to prosecute or defend the cause.\u201d); Mich. Comp. Laws \u00a7 49.160(1) (2003) (\u201cIf the prosecuting attorney . . . determines himself or herself to be disqualified by reason of conflict of interest ... , he or she shall file with the attorney general a petition stating the conflict... and requesting the appointment of a special prosecuting attorney to perform the duties of the prosecuting attorney...\u201d); Mo. Ann. Stat. \u00a7 56.110 (2014) (\u201cIf the prosecuting attorney ... be interested ... in any case ..., the court having criminal jurisdiction may appoint some other attorney to prosecute or defend the cause.\u201d); Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 8-7-106(a) (West 1996) (\u201cIf the district attorney general fails to attend the circuit or criminal court, or is disqualified from acting, or if there is a vacancy in the office, the court shall appoint some other attorney to supply such district attorney general\u2019s place temporarily. The acts of such district attorney general pro tem shall be as valid as if done by the regular officer, and the district attorney general pro tem shall be entitled to the same privileges and emoluments.\u201d).", "type": "majority", "author": "DANIELS, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General Yvonne Marie Chicoine, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Petitioner", "Templeman & Crutchfield C. Barry Crutchfield Lovington, NM for Respondent" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2016-NMSC-004\nFiling Date: December 10, 2015\nDocket No. S-1-SC-35049\nSTATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. DANNY SURRATT, Defendant-Respondent.\nHector H. Balderas, Attorney General Yvonne Marie Chicoine, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Petitioner\nTempleman & Crutchfield C. Barry Crutchfield Lovington, NM for Respondent" }, "file_name": "0131-01", "first_page_order": 147, "last_page_order": 157 }