{ "id": 12166941, "name": "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUAN CORDOVA, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Cordova", "decision_date": "2015-06-11", "docket_number": "No. S-1-SC-35386; Docket No. 32,820", "first_page": "316", "last_page": "322", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2016-NMCA-019" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "547 U.S. 398", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3275413 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/547/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 N.M. 779", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1597228 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/107/0779-01" ] }, { "cite": "1988-NMCA-092", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 20" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 N.M. 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1597058 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/107/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "1988-NMSC-031", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 21" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2007-NMCA-108", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3692583 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/142/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "2012-NMCA-105", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4189151 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/2/0675-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 P.3d 993", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "case_ids": [ 3721988 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "998-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or-app/222/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMCA-016", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3670094 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 31" }, { "page": "\u00b6 27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/141/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "21 P.3d 413", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "case_ids": [ 11101037 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416", "parenthetical": "affirming the officer's warrantless entry where the officer noted blood inside the vehicle involved in the crash and a trail of blood leading from the outside of the defendant's apartment through the residence" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p3d/21/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "652 N.E.2d 148", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155", "parenthetical": "\"[The defendant's] driving off from the accident scene suggested lack of incapacitating injury.\"" }, { "page": "155", "parenthetical": "noting that sounds of moaning or distress may be indicative of an emergency inside the residence" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "789 A.2d 621", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "624", "parenthetical": "stating that a witness's observation of the defendant walking away from the accident and down the street \"indicated that she was not physically impaired\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "498 U.S. 1019", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6541637, 6541672, 6541896, 6541805, 6541936, 6541972, 6541844, 6541750, 6541720 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stating that the lack of indication by witnesses that the driver was injured or in need of assistance cast doubt on the notion that the \"driver was injured to the point of needing immediate aid\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/498/1019-01", "/us/498/1019-02", "/us/498/1019-07", "/us/498/1019-05", "/us/498/1019-08", "/us/498/1019-09", "/us/498/1019-06", "/us/498/1019-04", "/us/498/1019-03" ] }, { "cite": "576 A.2d 1283", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1289" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "522 N.W.2d 176", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10713683 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177-78", "parenthetical": "holding that one circumstance justifying the officers' reasonable belief that a driver in an accident suffered sufficiently serious injuries was the presence of \"blood on the seat and blood mingled with glass on the dashboard and steering wheel\"" }, { "page": "177-78", "parenthetical": "holding that the warrantless entry was permissible where the officers knew the defendant was inside, had been involved in a serious accident, was bleeding, and where they received no response after knocking on the front door for several minutes, entered the residence" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/522/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 N.E.2d 607", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "609" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2003-NMSC-030", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 77174 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0566-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMSC-005", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 929147 ], "weight": 13, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 27, 39" }, { "page": "\u00b611" }, { "page": "\u00b6 29" }, { "parenthetical": "alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted" }, { "page": "\u00b6 26" }, { "page": "\u00b6 43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/137/0174-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 944, "char_count": 19326, "ocr_confidence": 0.779, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.837957582870648e-08, "percentile": 0.49811784393607506 }, "sha256": "97253f856093347399cf04da25bbb2137a19e345719bd2b823d274071d938537", "simhash": "1:db096539af4d2258", "word_count": 3025 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:30:56.942854+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge", "JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge", "RODERICK KENNEDY, Judge" ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUAN CORDOVA, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nFRY, Judge.\n{1} Defendant appeals his convictions for causing great bodily injury by vehicle, aggravated driving while under the influence (DWI), knowingly leaving the scene of an accident, and homicide by vehicle. Defendant raises a number of arguments. However, the pertinent issue for this appeal is whether the district court erred in determining that the emergency assistance doctrine justified the warrantless entry by two Rio Arriba County sheriff\u2019s deputies into Defendant\u2019s residence. Because we conclude that the depirties did not have reasonable grounds to believe that a genuine emergency existed requiring their immediate aid, we hold that the district court erred in denying Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nBACKGROUND\n{2} The facts underlying Defendant\u2019s convictions are as follows. A group of motorcyclists returning from a motorcycle rally in Red River, New Mexico, were traveling on State Road 76 near Chimayo, New Mexico. Defendant, driving a truck in the opposite direction, crossed the center lane and struck the motorcyclists. Several of the motorcyclists were injured in the collision, and one, the lead motorcyclist, was killed. Following the collision, Defendant drove a short distance before he and two passengers abandoned the vehicle.\n{3} Deputy Paula Archuleta was one of the first deputies to respond to the scene. A witness informed Deputy Archuleta that the abandoned truck was farther up the road and that three individuals were seen running from the scene in the vicinity of the Rio Chiquito. While a fellow deputy stayed with the victims, Deputy Archuleta began investigating the abandoned truck. She noted damage on the front passenger side and a cracked windshield on the driver side. After running the license plate, Deputy Archuleta was informed that the truck belonged to Defendant. Deputy Archuleta called Deputy Isaac Martinez, who was off-duty but lived nearby, and asked for his assistance in searching for the suspects. The deputies first began searching the area surrounding the Rio Chiquito. After being told by a volunteer firefighter where Defendant lived, the deputies proceeded to Defendant\u2019s residence.\n{4} The deputies\u2019 testimony at the preliminary hearing varied slightly on the events that followed once they reached Defendant\u2019s residence. Deputy Archuleta testified that the door to the house was ajar and that she heard some type of \u201cbackground noise\u201d in the home. She testified that she knocked and announced the deputies\u2019 presence and, upon getting no response, entered the home. Deputy Martinez, however, testified that they did not knock or hear \u201cbackground noises.\u201d He testified that the deputies announced their presence and walked into the home. Both deputies testified that they entered the home with guns drawn.\n{5} The deputies located Defendant in his bedroom lying on the bed. The deputies asked if he was Juan Cordova. When Defendant responded that he was, the deputies ordered him to put his hands up. They then told Defendant he was the suspected driver, escorted Defendant out of the house, and told him that he was being detained for questioning. The deputies testified that Defendant had a cut on his forehead, although a physician who treated Defendant later testified that he did not recall such an injury. When deputies asked if he was okay, Defendant responded that his truck had been stolen and that he was not involved in the accident. Once the deputies removed Defendant from the home, he was placed in handcuffs and searched. A set of car keys was found in his front pocket. Defendant was taken to the sheriffs department and charged in relation to the death and injuries of the motorcyclists. A chemical test would later show Defendant\u2019s blood alcohol content to be O.14.\n{6} Before trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the deputies\u2019 entry into his home was in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. The district court denied the motion to suppress and concluded that, under the emergency assistance doctrine, the deputies\u2019 warrantless entry into the home was justified by the deputies\u2019 concern for Defendant\u2019s safety. See State v. Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, \u00b6\u00b6 27, 39, 137 N.M. 174, 108 P.3d 1032 (holding that \u201cpolice officers may enter a home without a warrant or consent under the emergency assistance doctrine\u201d when police have \u201creasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property\u201d). The case proceeded to trial, and Defendant was convicted on two counts of causing great bodily injury by vehicle, two counts of aggravated DWI, one count of leaving the scene of an accident, and one count of homicide by vehicle. Defendant now appeals.\nDISCUSSION\nStandard of Review\n{7} We review a district court\u2019s decision regarding a motion to suppress evidence as a mixed question of fact and law. State v. Vandenburg, 2003-NMSC-030, \u00b6 17, 134 N.M. 566, 81 P.3d 19. \u201cWe view the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and defer to the district court\u2019s findings of historical facts and witness credibility when supported by substantial evidence.\u201d Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, \u00b611. \u201cThe legality of a search, however, ultimately turns on the question of reasonableness.\u201d Id. Reasonableness is determined de novo. Id.\nEmergency Assistance Doctrine\n{8} Defendant challenges the district court\u2019s ruling that the deputies\u2019 entry into Defendant\u2019s home was justified under the emergency assistance doctrine. While \u201c[wjarrantless searches and seizures inside a home are presumptively unreasonable,\u201d the emergency assistance doctrine is one of the \u201cfew specific, narrowly defined exceptions.\u201d Id. \u00b6 23. In Ryon, our Supreme Court adopted the three-part test utilized in People v. Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d 607, 609 (N.Y. 1976). Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, \u00b6 29. It is the state\u2019s burden to establish all three elements. Id. First, \u201cthe police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property.\u201d Id. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). Second, \u201cthe search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence.\u201d Id. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). Finally, \u201cthere must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched.\u201d Id. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).\n{9} Defendant\u2019s argument largely focuses on the first element. Defendant argues that the deputies did not have sufficient information to reasonably believe that he was in need of immediate aid. Defendant also argues, under the second element of the Mitchell test, that without such reasonable belief, the deputies\u2019 actions were primarily motivated by their intention to apprehend him and gather evidence. In practice, however, this distinction is irrelevant because without such reasonable grounds, the deputies\u2019 actions were unlawful.\n{10} As recognized in Ryon, because of the strong privacy interest in the home, the first element requires a genuine emergency. 2005-NMSC-005, \u00b6 26. This means \u201ca strong perception that action is required to protect against imminent danger to life or limb\u201d and circumstances so \u201csufficiently compelling [as] to make a warrantless entry into the home objectively reasonable[.]\u201d Id. \u00b6 31. Reasonableness is \u201ctested objectively under the totality of the circumstances.\u201d Id. \u00b6 30. Useful factors for this determination are the \u201cpurpose and nature of the dispatch, the exigency of the situation based on the known facts, and the availability, feasibility and effectiveness of alternatives to the type of intrusion actually accomplished.\u201d Id. \u00b6 32 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Furthermore, generalized testimony regarding a possible or potential emergency is insufficient to carry the state\u2019s burden on this element. Instead, \u201cofficers must have credible and specific information that a victim is very likely to be located at a particular place and in need of immediate aid to avoid great bodily harm or death.\u201d Id. \u00b6 42.\n{11} We agree with Defendant that the State failed to establish that there were reasonable grounds for the deputies to believe that an emergency necessitated their immediate entry into Defendant\u2019s home. The only specific information available to the deputies at the time was that Defendant\u2019s truck had been involved in an accident, albeit a serious one, and that three individuals were seen abandoning the truck. At this point, the deputies had no concrete information that Defendant was the driver involved in the accident, or even at home. Id. \u00b6 43 (noting that the officers were unaware if the defendant was even in the home).\n{12} Even assuming the deputies knew that Defendant was the driver, they had no specific information that he was seriously injured and in need of immediate aid. See id. (stating that the officers\u2019 information was insufficient where they \u201cdid not know the nature or extent of the injury\u201d or even \u201cwhether he was injured). There were no obvious indications in the cab of the truck, such as blood or impacts to the windshield coming from inside, that any of the vehicle\u2019s occupants were injured. See City of Fargo v. Ternes, 522 N.W.2d 176, 177-78 (N.D. 1994) (holding that one circumstance justifying the officers\u2019 reasonable belief that a driver in an accident suffered sufficiently serious injuries was the presence of \u201cblood on the seat and blood mingled with glass on the dashboard and steering wheel\u201d). More importantly, none of the witnesses who saw the individuals fleeing the truck told deputies that they appeared injured. See State v. Geisler, 576 A.2d 1283, 1289 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990), vacated on other grounds, 498 U.S. 1019 (1991) (stating that the lack of indication by witnesses that the driver was injured or in need of assistance cast doubt on the notion that the \u201cdriver was injured to the point of needing immediate aid\u201d). Indeed, the fact that the suspects had fled the truck, and, in Defendant\u2019s case, conceivably had run home, is inconsistent with the degree of injury necessitating immediate police assistance by way of a warrantless entry. See State v. Seavey, 789 A.2d 621, 624 (N.H. 2001) (stating that a witness\u2019s observation of the defendant walking away from the accident and down the street \u201cindicated that she was not physically impaired\u201d); Commonwealth v. DiGeronimo, 652 N.E.2d 148, 155 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995) (\u201c[The defendant\u2019s] driving off from the accident scene suggested lack of incapacitating injury.\u201d).\n{13} Finally, no circumstances at Defendant\u2019s home indicated a genuine emergency. No signs of injury, such as blood, were noted on the property. See People v. Copenhaver, 21 P.3d 413, 416 (Colo. App. 2000) (affirming the officer\u2019s warrantless entry where the officer noted blood inside the vehicle involved in the crash and a trail of blood leading from the outside of the defendant\u2019s apartment through the residence). No sounds from inside the house alerted the deputies that Defendant was in need of immediate aid. DiGeronimo, 652 N.E.2d at 155 (noting that sounds of moaning or distress may be indicative of an emergency inside the residence). And, while in some cases an occupant\u2019s failure to respond to repeated knocking can indicate an emergency, especially in instances where the officers already have specific information that the victim is in the home and seriously injured, the deputies did not have that chance here because they entered the home immediately after announcing their presence. See Ternes, 522 N.W.2d at 177-78 (holding that the warrantless entry was permissible where the officers knew the defendant was inside, had been involved in a serious accident, was bleeding, and where they received no response after knocking on the front door for several minutes, entered the residence). Given these circumstances, we conclude that the deputies did not have reasonable grounds to believe that Defendant might have been injured to an extent requiring their immediate entry and assistance.\n{14} Although the State failed to establish that the objective circumstances necessitated a warrantless entry, we are similarly unconvinced that the deputies\u2019 testimony was sufficient to establish that a genuine emergency necessitated their entry. Both deputies testified that the reason they entered the home was because they were \u201cconcerned\u201d for Defendant\u2019s safety. Deputy Martinez acknowledged that they did not know what Defendant\u2019s injuries were, if any. Consistent with the deputies\u2019 lack of specific information, Deputy Martinez characterized the entry as a \u201cwelfare check.\u201d However, this testimony does not establish the requisite circumstances needed to demonstrate a legitimate emergency requiring immediate police assistance. State v. Baca, 2007-NMCA-016, \u00b6 31, 141 N.M. 65, 150 P.3d 1015 (\u201cRyon makes it clear that the burden to demonstrate an emergency is high.\u201d); State v. Martin, 193 P.3d 993, 998-99 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (stating that while the officers\u2019 testimony regarding concern about the defendant\u2019s well-being and if she was \u201cokay\u201d after she was involved in hit and run \u201cmight reveal well-founded speculation that perhaps all was not well with defendant, it falls far short of revealing a belief that immediate intervention was necessary to protect her life.\u201d). Instead, this testimony is the type of speculation and conjecture that we have previously rejected as supporting an officer\u2019s warrantless entry under the emergency assistance doctrine. See Baca, 2007-NMCA-016, \u00b6 27 (\u201cSpeculation and conjecture are insufficient to establish an emergency at hand and an immediate need for police assistance.\u201d (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)); Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, \u00b6 43 (stating that the officers had insufficient information to justify entry into the residence where they \u201chad only generalized, nonspecific information that [the djefendant might be inside [the home] and that he might have sustained a head or face injury.\u201d). We therefore conclude that the district court erroneously denied Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the deputies\u2019 unreasonable entry into Defendant\u2019s home.\nSufficiency of the Evidence\n{15} Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for causing great bodily injury by vehicle to Vivian Woodall contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-101 (2004). Because we are reversing the district court\u2019s judgment, we consider whether sufficient evidence supported this conviction in order to determine whether double jeopardy principles would prohibit retrial of Defendant on this charge. State v. Valino, 2012-NMCA-105, \u00b6 18, 287 P.3 d 372. Because Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence regarding his other convictions, we do not undertake a similar double jeopardy analysis in connection with those charges.\n{16} \u201cWhen reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether substantial evidence of either a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction.\u201d See State v. Templeton, 2007-NMCA-108, \u00b6 28, 142 N.M. 369, 165 P.3d 1145 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). \u201cA reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, resolving all conflicts therein and indulging all permissible inferences therefrom in favor of the verdict.\u201d State v. Sutphin, 1988-NMSC-031, \u00b6 21, 107 N.M. 126, 753 P.2d 1314.\n{17} In order to convict Defendant of causing great bodily injury by vehicle, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) \u201c[t]he defendant operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, or while under the influence of valium, ... or in a reckless manner\u201d; (2) \u201c[t]he defendant thereby caused the great bodily injury to Vivian Woodall\u201d, and (3) \u201c[t]his happened in Rio Arriba County, New Mexico on or about the 28th day of May 2011.\u201d Defendant specifically argues that there was insufficient evidence that Woodall\u2019s injuries constituted great bodily injury. Consistent with UJI 14-131, great bodily injury was defined in the jury instructions as \u201can injury to a person which creates a high probability of death or results in serious disfigurement or results in permanent or prolonged impairment of the use of any member or organ of the body.\u201d\n{18} Woodall testified at trial that she experienced severe bruising, road rash, and bruised ribs as a result of the collision. The bruising and road rash covered her right side. She testified that she was unable to work for approximately a month. In addition, for approximately the first two weeks, she was largely unable to move because of the extreme pain from her bruised ribs. She testified that at certain times she still experiences pain resulting from her bruised ribs.\n{19} Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury could determine that Woodall suffered great bodily injury. \u201cProlonged impairment\u201d is not a technical term. Cf. State v. Jim, 1988-NMCA-092, \u00b6 20, 107 N.M. 779, 765 P.2d 195 (construing similar term, \u201cprotracted impairment\u201d). \u201cProlonged impairment,\u201d like \u201cprotracted impairment,\u201d means a \u201clengthy or unusually long time under the circumstances.\u201d Id. \u00b6 21 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, it was for the jury to determine whether the impairment was for a sufficiently extended period of time so as to meet this definition. Id. In this case, the jury determined that Woodall\u2019s extreme and immobilizing pain over the course of the month, in addition to recurrent bouts of pain, were sufficient to constitute great bodily injury, and we will not interfere with its determination. Accordingly, sufficient evidence supported Defendant\u2019s conviction on this charge, and retrial on this charge is not barred.\nCONCLUSION\n{20} Forthe foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court\u2019s denial of Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.\n{21} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nCYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nJAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge\nRODERICK KENNEDY, Judge\nSubsequent to our Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Ryon, the United States Supreme Court eliminated the second element of the Mitchell test because an officer\u2019s \u201csubjective motivationis irrelevant.\u201d Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006). Although we state the Mitchell test as our Supreme Court adopted it in Ryon, the subjective element of the test is ultimately immaterial to our analysis in this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "FRY, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General Jacqueline R. Medina, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Appellee", "Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender B. Douglas Wood, III, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellant" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Certiorari Granted, August 7, 2015,\nNo. S-1-SC-35386\nIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2016-NMCA-019\nFiling Date: June 11, 2015\nDocket No. 32,820\nSTATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUAN CORDOVA, Defendant-Appellant.\nHector H. Balderas, Attorney General Jacqueline R. Medina, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Appellee\nJorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender B. Douglas Wood, III, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellant" }, "file_name": "0316-01", "first_page_order": 332, "last_page_order": 338 }