{ "id": 12167159, "name": "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. NORMAN BENALLY, Defendant-Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Benally", "decision_date": "2016-02-25", "docket_number": "Docket No. S-1-SC-35145", "first_page": "435", "last_page": "442", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2016-NMSC-010" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "2006-NMSC-033", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3671133 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "702 P.2d 1222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1224", "parenthetical": "\"An impoundment, because it involves the governmental taking of a vehicle into exclusive custody, is a 'seizure' in the literal sense of that term.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2007-NMCA-076", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3668735 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 1" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/141/0742-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 P. 947", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "6 N.M. 682", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 4651293 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/6/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 U.S. 56", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11924920 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "72", "parenthetical": "\"The facts alleged suffice to constitute a 'seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, for they plainly implicate the interests protected by that provision.\" (emphasis added)" }, { "page": "69", "parenthetical": "\"What matters is the intrusion on the people's security from governmental interference. Therefore, the right against unreasonable seizures would be no less transgressed if the seizure . . . was undertaken to collect evidence ... or on a whim, for no reason at all.\"" }, { "page": "69", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he right against unreasonable seizures would be no less transgressed if [an unlawful] seizure . . . was undertaken to collect evidence ... or on a whim, for no reason at all.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/506/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMSC-006", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 2542105 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/139/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMCA-081", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 929132 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/137/0759-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMSC-029", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4004143 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" }, { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/144/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 U.S. 696", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6193241 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "705-06", "parenthetical": "finding that a seizure amounts to an \"intrusion on possessory interests\" and can even be a \"brief detention}] of personal effects\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/462/0696-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 109", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6194938 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113", "parenthetical": "\"A 'seizure' of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property.\" (citations omitted)" }, { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 U.S. 128", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12122066 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134", "parenthetical": "\"A seizure of the article . . . would obviously invade the owner's possessory interest.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/496/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 N.M. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1571126 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/91/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "1978-NMSC-001", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 4" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2000-NMSC-013", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 1217146 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/129/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 P.3d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"The text of a statute or rule is the primary, essential source of its meaning.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2014-NMSC-007", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4077464 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 40", "parenthetical": "\"The text of a statute or rule is the primary, essential source of its meaning.\"" }, { "page": "\u00b6 40" }, { "parenthetical": "alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/5/0529-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMCA-089", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3671170 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "2015-NMCERT-005", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "year": 2015, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 P.3d 1039", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "year": 2015, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2015-NMCA-053", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4241228 ], "year": 2015, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 1" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/7/0732-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 959, "char_count": 23612, "ocr_confidence": 0.789, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.24681458262624578 }, "sha256": "8deac02604ad0f52e5af912fe252f3c13736521edf34ece258013db8f352b7d3", "simhash": "1:cce55a02377db43a", "word_count": 3815 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:30:56.942854+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "JUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Justice", "BARBARA J. VIGIL, Chief Justice", "PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice", "EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice", "CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice" ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. NORMAN BENALLY, Defendant-Respondent." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nNAKAMURA, Justice.\n{1} In this case, we hold that when law enforcement officers seized, impounded, and sealed a vehicle, under NMSA 1978, Section 31-27-5(A) (2002, amended 2015), they \u201cma[de] a seizure\u201d of the currency that the vehicle contained. On June 23, 2011, Gallup police officers seized a vehicle. On June 29, they executed a warrant to search the vehicle and discovered $1295 in currency. The State filed a forfeiture complaint for the $1295 on July 27, which was within thirty days of the search but not within thirty days of the seizure of the vehicle. A provision of the Forfeiture Act then in effect required the State to file the forfeiture complaint \u201c[w]ithin thirty days of making a seizure\u201d ofproperty. Section 31-27-5(A) (2002). Based on that provision, the district court dismissed the State\u2019s forfeiture complaint as untimely, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.\n{2} We note that in 2015 the Legislature amended the Forfeiture Act, NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 31-27-1 to -11 (2002, as amended through 2015), to require that the State file a forfeiture complaint either \u201c[w]ithin thirty days of making a seizure of property or simultaneously upon filing a related criminal indictment . . . .\u201d Section 31-27-5(A) (emphasis added). The State filed the forfeiture complaint and the criminal indictment at the same time. Under the current statute, the State\u2019s forfeiture complaint may have been timely, an issue that we do not address in this case. However, because the 2002 statute controls this case and because the officers \u201cma[de] a seizure\u201d of the money when they seized the vehicle, we affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\n{3} On June 23, 2011, Norman Benally was driving a black Cadillac Escalade with a nonoperating headlight. Officer Houston Largo stopped him alongside eastbound Highway 66 in Gallup. During the stop, Officer Largo smelled marijuana and asked Benally for consent to search the vehicle. Benally declined. Officer Largo then called for the assistance of the K-9 patrol unit. Officer Angelo Cellicion arrived, accompanied by his K-9, Tiko. Tiko alerted the officers to the presence of controlled substances. Shortly thereafter, Danielle Benally, who was the registered owner of the vehicle, arrived at the scene. She also refused consent to the officers\u2019 search of the vehicle. The vehicle was then seized and towed to the Gallup Police Department\u2019s gated and locked impound lot. There, evidence tape was placed on the hood, the passenger and driver side doors, the rear doors, and the rear lift gate. The vehicle was sealed so that no one but the police officers could enter it.\n{4} On June 28, the State sought a warrant to search the vehicle for drugs, drug paraphernalia, and money linked to drug transactions. A warrant was issued, and the following day, June 29, law enforcement agents searched the vehicle. They found 586.7 grams of marijuana; a digital scale; Benally\u2019s wallet, which contained currency, his driver\u2019s license, and his social security cards; and Danielle Benally\u2019s wallet, which contained currency, credit cards, and EBT cards. In total, law enforcement officials discovered $1295 during the search of the vehicle.\n{5} On July 27, 2011, the State filed a criminal complaint against Benally, charging him with distribution of marijuana, conspiracy to distribute marijuana, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. At the same time, the State filed a complaint for the forfeiture of the $1295, alleged to be drug proceeds.\n{6} Benally moved to dismiss the forfeiture complaint as untimely. Benally pointed to former Section 31-27-5(A), which provided that \u201c[wjithin thirty days of making a seizure, the state shall file a complaint of forfeiture or return the property to the person from whom it was seized.\u201d Section 31-27-5(A) (2002). Benally argued that the forfeiture complaint should be dismissed because it was filed more than thirty days after the Gallup police officers seized and sealed the vehicle containing the currency. The trial court held a hearing on the motion and later dismissed the forfeiture complaint as untimely under former Section 31-27-5(A).\n{7} On appeal, the State argued that the forfeiture complaint had been timely filed because the thirty-day statutory limitations period ran from the date the property subject to forfeiture was discovered or, alternatively, from the time the search warrant was issued.\n{8} In an opinion filed January 29, 2015, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court\u2019s dismissal of the forfeiture complaint. State v. Benally, 2015-NMCA-053, \u00b6 1, 348 P.3d 1039, cert. granted, 2015-NMCERT-005 (No. 35,145, May 11, 2015). The Court of Appeals held that, under the plain language of former Section 31-27-5(A), the thirty-day limitations period began to run \u201cwhen the officers impounded [Benally\u2019s] car and its contents on June 23, 2011.\u201d Id. \u00b6 12. The appellate court reasoned that the limitations period began at the point of seizure; when the vehicle was seized on June 23, its contents, including the $1295, were also seized. Id. \u00b6 9 (\u201c[T]he contents of the vehicle were also seized by virtue of being in the impounded car.\u201d). The Court of Appeals concluded, \u201c[sjince the State failed to file a complaint for forfeiture within thirty days of that date, the district court properly dismissed the forfeiture action.\u201d Id. \u00b6 12. We granted the State\u2019s petition for a writ of certiorari, exercising our jurisdiction under Article VI, Section 3 of the New Mexico Constitution and NMSA 1978, Section 34-5-14(B) (1972).\n{9} Former Section 31-27-5(A) controls this case. See Grygorwicz v. Trujillo, 2006-NMCA-089, \u00b6 16, 140 N.M. 129, 140 P.3d 550 (\u201c[Ujnless a contrary legislative intent is expressed, the statute of limitations in effect at the time an action is filed governs the timeliness of the claim.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Under that statute, the State simply had thirty days from the date of the seizure to file a forfeiture complaint. Neither the original nor the amended version of the Forfeiture Act defines \u201cseizure.\u201d Thus, we must interpret the meaning of \u201cseizure\u201d to decide the single issue of statutory interpretation that this case presents: Under former Section 31-27-5(A), did the Gallup police officers \u201cmak[e] a seizure\u201d of the $1295 when they seized, impounded, and sealed the vehicle that contained the currency?\nII. DISCUSSION\nA. Standard of review\n{10} The interpretation of a statute presents an issue of law that this Court reviews de novo. Bank of New York v. Romero, 2014-NMSC-007, \u00b6 40, 320 P.3d 1. When interpreting a statute, this Court first looks to the text. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 12-2A-19 (1997) (\u201cThe text of a statute or rule is the primary, essential source of its meaning.\u201d); see also Bank of N.Y., 2014-NMSC-007, \u00b6 40 (\u201c[W]hen presented with a question of statutory construction, we begin our analysis by examining the language utilized by the Legislature, as the text of the statute is the primary indicator of legislative intent.\u201d (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). \u201cUnder the rules of statutory construction, [wjhen a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.\u201d Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also NMSA 1978, \u00a7 12-2A-2 (1997) (\u201cUnless a word or phrase is defined in the statute or rule being construed, its meaning is determined by its context, the rules of grammar and common usage.\u201d). We also construe statutes to give effect to their object and purpose. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 12-2A-18(A)(1) (1997). Furthermore, \u201cit is well established in New Mexico that, \u2018[fjorfeitures are not favored at law and statutes are to be construed strictly against forfeiture.\u2019\u201d State v. Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, \u00b6 75, 129 N.M. 63, 2 P.3d 264 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Ozarek, 1978-NMSC-001, \u00b6 4, 91 N.M. 275, 573 P.2d 209).\nB. The plain meaning of \u201cseizure\u201d\n{11} \u201cSeizure\u201d is neither an obscure nor polysemic term in American law. A seizure indicates the dispossession of an owner of his or her property. Both the Supreme Court of the United States and the New Mexico appellate courts have explained that a seizure refers to an interference with a person\u2019s possessory interests in his or her property. See, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134 (1990) (\u201cA seizure of the article . . . would obviously invade the owner\u2019s possessory interest.\u201d); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (\u201cA \u2018seizure\u2019 of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual\u2019s possessory interests in that property.\u201d (citations omitted)); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 705-06 (1983) (finding that a seizure amounts to an \u201cintrusion on possessory interests\u201d and can even be a \u201cbrief detention}] of personal effects\u201d); State v. Bomboy, 2008-NMSC-029, \u00b6 9, 144 N.M. 151, 184 P.3d 1045 (\u201c[T]he seizure aspect [of the rights guaranteed by Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution and the Fourth Amendment ofthe United States Constitution] protects notions of possession.\u201d); State v. Sanchez, 2005-NMCA-081, \u00b6 17, 137 N.M. 759, 114 P.3d 1075 (\u201c[T]he seizure aspect protects notions of possession, at least insofar as it applies to objects.\u201d). Unsurprisingly, legal dictionaries reflect those statements. See, e.g., Seizure, Black\u2019s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining \u201cseizure\u201d as \u201c[t]he act or an instance of taking possession of a person or property by legal right or process\u201d). This Court presumes that when the Legislature enacted former Section 31-27-5(A), it did so with knowledge of how New Mexico\u2019s appellate courts and the Supreme Court of the United States define and use the term \u201cseizure.\u201d See Kmart Corp. v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 2006-NMSC-006, \u00b6 15, 139 N.M. 172, 131 P.3d 22 (\u201cWe presume that the Legislature knows the state of the law when it enacts legislation.\u201d).\n{12} Against the weight of the case law, the State suggests that under former Section 31-27-5(A) state officers \u201cmak[e] a seizure\u201d of property only when they knowingly and intentionally seize the property for the purposes of forfeiture. According to the State, \u201cthe Court of Appeals failed to recognize \u2018seizure\u2019 as an active verb.\u201d The State asserts that when the Gallup police officers impounded Benally\u2019s vehicle, they did not knowingly seize the currency because they were unaware of its existence. The State therefore argues that the police only seized the currency after obtaining a warrant to search the vehicle, discovering the currency pursuant to that warrant, and securing the currency after its discovery for the purpose of forfeiture.\n{13} The State\u2019s interpretation does not sufficiently attend to the statutory text. Former Section 31-27-5(A) uses \u201cseizure\u201d as an object. See \u00a7 31-27-5(A) (2002). The statute refers to a state of affairs, not a type of activity that entails a specific mental state. It is clear that the Legislature used the word \u201cseizure\u201d to refer to the dispossession of a person of his or her property, and that meaning is wholly consistent with how the Supreme Court of the United States and the New Mexico appellate courts have explained the concept. See, e.g., Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113; Bomboy, 2008-NMSC-029, \u00b6 9.\n{14} Contrary to the State\u2019s suggestion, whether a law enforcement officer seizes a person\u2019s property does not depend on that officer\u2019s specific intent to take control of the property. Rather, what matters is that the officer\u2019s actions deprive the person of his or her possessory interests in property. See Soldal v. Cook Cty., Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 72 (1992) (\u201cThe facts alleged suffice to constitute a \u2018seizure\u2019 within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, for they plainly implicate the interests protected by that provision.\u201d (emphasis added)). The mental state of the law enforcement official engaged in the act of dispossessing a person of his or her property is not significant; the effect on the property right is. See id. at 69 (\u201cWhat matters is the intrusion on the people\u2019s security from governmental interference. Therefore, the right against unreasonable seizures would be no less transgressed if the seizure . . . was undertaken to collect evidence ... or on a whim, for no reason at all.\u201d).\n{15} Furthermore, in this case, attention to the mental state of the Gallup police officers when they seized the vehicle actually weakens the State\u2019s argument. The officers took control of the vehicle in order to have exclusive access to its contents. In the affidavit for the search warrant, a Gallup police officer stated his belief that the seized vehicle contained money linked to drug transactions. By issuing the search warrant, the district court concluded that this belief was srtpported by probable cause. In light of these facts, the State is essentially arguing that an intentional taking of a vehicle with probable cause to believe it contains contraband does not rise to a seizure of the contraband where the vehicle is not taken with the certainty that it contains contraband. But whether contraband within a vehicle is seized does not turn on the distinction between an officer\u2019s justified belief that the vehicle contains contraband and the officer\u2019s certainty that it does. Simply put, the meaning of \u201cseizure\u201d does not depend on the epistemological distinction between a justified belief and certainty, and we refuse to impute such an odd meaning to the Legislature\u2019s clear usage.\n{16} The meaning of \u201cseizure\u201d in former Section 31-27-5(A) is its common one: When a law enforcement officer deprives a person of the possessory interests in his or her property, the officer has seized the property.\nC. The effect of Section 31-27-4\n{17} Despite the clear and unambiguous use of \u201cseizure\u201d in former Section 31-27-5 (A), the State suggests that other provisions of the 2002 Forfeiture Act indicate \u201cthat the Legislature intended the word \u2018seizure\u2019 to have a more narrow meaning than its common meaning.\u201d Conceding that its interpretation of \u201cseizure\u201d departs from the common meaning, the State proposes that former Section 31 -27-4 supports its interpretation that the Gallup police only seized the $1295 when they discovered it pursuant to a warranted search of the impounded vehicle.\n{18} Prior to the 2015 amendments to the Forfeiture Act, Section 31-27-4 stated:\nProperty may be seized by a law enforcement officer:\nA. pursuant to an order of seizure issued by a district court based on a sworn application of a law enforcement officer from which a determination is made by the court that:\n(1) there is a substantial probability that:\n(a) the property is subject to forfeiture;\n(b) the state will prevail on the issue of forfeiture; and\n(c) failure to enter the order will result in the property being destroyed, removed from the state or otherwise made unavailable for forfeiture; and\n(2) the need to preserve the availability of the property through the entry of the requested order outweighs the hardship to the owner and other parties known to be claiming interests in the property; and\nB. without a prior court order, if the property alleged to be property subject to forfeiture is not a residence or a business, when:\n(1) the seizure is incident to an arrest for a crime, a search conducted pursuant to a search warrant or an inspection conducted pursuant to an administrative inspection warrant and the law enforcement officer making the arrest or executing the search or inspection warrant has probable cause to believe the property to be property subject to forfeiture and that the subject of the arrest, search warrant or inspection warrant is an owner of the property; or\n(2) the law enforcement officer making the seizure has probable cause to believe the property is property subject to forfeiture and that the delay occasioned by the need to obtain a court order would frustrate the seizure.\nSection 31-27-4 (2002).\n{19} In short, the State argues that the limitations period should only run from the time that a search warrant or seizure order is executed in order to effectuate New Mexico\u2019s preference for a warrant. Hence, the State argues that \u201cseizure\u201d in former Section 31-27-5(A) refers only to those instances where the State has lawfully taken control of property after executing a warrant or seizure order, as contemplated by former Section 31-27-4. We disagree that former Section 31 -27-4 compels us to read \u201cseizure,\u201d as the term is employed by former Section 3 l-27-5(A), as an event that necessarily takes place pursuant to a court order.\n{20} First, former Section 31-27-4 cannot mean that a seizure necessarily occurs subsequent to a court order. The Forfeiture Act explicitly provides that, in certain circumstances, property may be seized without a prior seizure order or search warrant. Section 31-27-4(B) (2002). Indeed, both the original and amended provisions of the Forfeiture Act explicitly state that a law enforcement officer is authorized to seize property without a prior order or search warrant when the seizure is made incident to arrest or where \u201cthe delay occasioned by the need to obtain a court order would frustrate the seizure.\u201d Compare \u00a7 31-27-4(B) (2002) (authorizing seizures \u201cwithout a prior court order\u201d such as those made incident to arrest or in exigent circumstances), with \u00a7 31-27-4(E) (same). The State\u2019s argument that we should depart from the common meaning of seizure is undermined by the very statute on which it relies.\n{21} Second, the State\u2019s argument suffers a logical problem. Former Section 31-27-4 provides the conditions under which state officers are permitted to seize property. See \u00a7 31-27-4 (2002). The conditions that make seizures permissible, however, do not define what a seizure is. If the conditions that define a seizure were the same as the conditions that make seizures permissible, then it would make no sense to speak of impermissible or unreasonable seizures. Obviously, that is an absurd result; courts do speak of impermissible seizures. See, e.g., Soldal, 506 U.S. at 69 (\u201c[T]he right against unreasonable seizures would be no less transgressed if [an unlawful] seizure . . . was undertaken to collect evidence ... or on a whim, for no reason at all.\u201d). And we do not interpret statutes to invite absurdity. Cortesy v. Territory, 1892-NMSC-030, \u00b6 4, 6 N.M. 682, 30 P. 947).\n{22} Third, the State\u2019s reading does not attend to the purpose of the limitations period set forth in former Section 31-27-5(A). The original Forfeiture Act provided a right for persons whose property was unlawfully seized to have it returned. See \u00a7 31-27-6(D)(1) (2002). Indeed, that was andremains one of the overarching purposes of the Forfeiture Act. Compare \u00a7 31-27-2(A)(2) (2002), with \u00a7 31-27-2(A)(2), (5). The State must comply with the Forfeiture Act. Albin v. Bakas, 2007-NMCA-076, \u00b6 1, 141 N.M. 742, 160 P.3d 923. To ensure that the State complied with the Act\u2019s requirements, the Legislature required the State to file a forfeiture complaint within thirty days of a seizure to establish the specific statutory basis for the seizure or return the seized property. See \u00a7 31-27-5(A)(4) (2002). Thus, the limitations period for filing a forfeiture complaint applies to all seizures, whether lawfully made pursuant to former Section 31-27-4 or not. To read \u201cseizure\u201d in former Section 31-27-5(A) to mean that the limitations period only applies to seizures made in compliance with former Section 31-27-4 would undermine the Forfeiture Act\u2019s purpose to ensure that, in every instance, the State establish the lawfulness of the seizure or return the seized property. In other words, the Forfeiture Act contemplates that the scope of \u201cseizure[s]\u201d of property, under former Section 31-27-5(A), is more extensive than \u201cproperty subject to forfeiture,\u201d under former Section 31-27-4(B).\n{23} Fourth, the State\u2019s reading of \u201cseizure\u201d fails to satisfy another purpose of former Section 31-27-5(A). The Legislature created a thirty-day limitations period also to prevent the State from holding a person\u2019s property indefinitely. If, as the State suggests, a seizure was not accomplished until state officials acted pursuant to a court order or warrant, then they could retain exclusive control over a person\u2019s property without implicating the requirements of former Section 31-27-5 (A) simply by refraining from seeking a seizure order or search warrant.\nD. Responding to policy concerns\n{24} Under the plain meaning of former Section 31-27-5(A), the State must file a forfeiture complaint \u201c[w]ithin thirty days of making a seizure\u201d\u2014that is, within thirty days of when the State first interfered with a person\u2019s possessory interests in his or her property. When the State impounded and sealed the vehicle on June 23, 2011, it interfered with Benally\u2019s property interests in the contents of the vehicle, including the money subject to the forfeiture complaint. In short, the State seized the vehicle. See State v. Reynoso, 702 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (\u201cAn impoundment, because it involves the governmental taking of a vehicle into exclusive custody, is a \u2018seizure\u2019 in the literal sense of that term.\u201d). When it did so, it also \u201cma[de] a seizure\u201d of the contents of the vehicle because it deprived Benally of his possessory interests in them. Section 31-27-5(A) (2002).\n{25} The State suggests that this holding effectively requires law enforcement officers to intuit the presence of forfeitable material to make a timely forfeiture filing. This argument is not well taken. The plain reading of former Section 31-27-5(A) did not require law enforcement officers to intuit what seized vehicles may contain. Rather, former Section 31-27-5(A) placed a clear burden on the officers to obtain a warrant, to search the seized vehicle and its seized contents, and, if forfeitable material was discovered, to file a forfeiture complaint within thirty days of the seizure.\n{26} The State responds that such a limitations period was unrealistic, but that contention is inapposite. Whether thirty days from the seizure of a vehicle was sufficient time for law enforcement officials to lawfully search the vehicle and, if proper, file a forfeiture complaint is irrelevant to the interpretation of former Section 31-27-5(A). That is a policy question squarely within the Legislature\u2019s ambit. See Hartford Ins. Co. v. Cline, 2006-NMSC-033, \u00b6 8, 140 N.M. 16, 139 P.3d 176 (recognizing \u201cthe unique position of the Legislature in creating and developing public policy\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). This Court will not effectively amend the requirements for filing a forfeiture complaint by tinkering with the plain meaning of \u201cseizure\u201d in Section 31-27-5(A).\nIII. CONCLUSION\n{27} For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted Section 31-27-5(A) (2002), and its judgment is affirmed.\n{28} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nJUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Justice\nWE CONCUR:\nBARBARA J. VIGIL, Chief Justice\nPETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice\nEDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice\nCHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice", "type": "majority", "author": "NAKAMURA, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General M. Anne Kelly, Assistant Attorney General Elizabeth Ashton, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Petitioner", "Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender William O\u2019Connell, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Respondent" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2016-NMSC-010\nFiling Date: February 25, 2016\nDocket No. S-1-SC-35145\nSTATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. NORMAN BENALLY, Defendant-Respondent.\nHector H. Balderas, Attorney General M. Anne Kelly, Assistant Attorney General Elizabeth Ashton, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Petitioner\nJorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender William O\u2019Connell, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Respondent" }, "file_name": "0435-01", "first_page_order": 451, "last_page_order": 458 }