{ "id": 12167173, "name": "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ANTHONY HOLT, Defendant-Petitioner", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Holt", "decision_date": "2016-02-25", "docket_number": "Docket No. S-1-SC-35298", "first_page": "442", "last_page": "447", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2016-NMSC-011" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "1999-NMCA-018", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 827405 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 P.3d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2012-NMSC-013", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4186851 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/1/0673-01" ] }, { "cite": "2000-NMSC-009", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 106493 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 26" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/128/0711-01" ] }, { "cite": "2011-NMCA-095", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4250773 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 4, 8" }, { "page": "\u00b6 7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/150/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 N.M. 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2866025 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/89/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "1976-NMCA-054", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 P.3d 920", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "924-27" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "247 Cal. Rptr. 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399" }, { "page": "399", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "399", "parenthetical": "\"[W]hen a screen which forms the outer barrier of a protected structure is penetrated, an entry has been made for purposes of the burglary statute.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 P.3d 622", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2012-NMSC-029", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4188995 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 41" }, { "page": "\u00b6 45" }, { "parenthetical": "alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/2/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 N.M. 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552772 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "1994-NMSC-023", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 23" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2004-NMSC-001", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 77119 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0768-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 N.M. 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5331390 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/82/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "1970-NMSC-144", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 42" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2010-NMSC-019", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4248191 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/148/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-050", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4245434 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/147/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 P.3d 702", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "year": 2015, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2015-NMCA-073", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4362477 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2015, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/8/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMSC-008", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 2542655 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/139/0167-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 844, "char_count": 15962, "ocr_confidence": 0.786, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.901789129495574e-08, "percentile": 0.41958006045912327 }, "sha256": "bab05e7fbb1d515f7bf74a6b4e41e16d40daef65e38e91b66906aee790982110", "simhash": "1:e8efeab0c8ed2226", "word_count": 2580 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:30:56.942854+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "JUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Justice", "BARBARA J. VIGIL, Chief Justice", "PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice", "EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice", "CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice" ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ANTHONY HOLT, Defendant-Petitioner." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nNAKAMURA, Justice.\n{1} Anthony Holt had partially removed a window screen from a residential dwelling when he was detected by the homeowner and fled. In the process of removing the screen, he placed his fingers behind the screen and inside the outer boundary of the home. Holt was subsequently arrested and charged with breaking and entering, in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-14-8 (1981). An \u201cunauthorized entry\u201d is an essential element of this offense. Section 30-14-8(A). We must decide whether Holt\u2019s conduct constitutes an \u201centry.\u201d It does. Accordingly, we affirm Holt\u2019s conviction. While we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, we issue this opinion to clarify the appropriate analysis for resolution of the issue presented.\nI. BACKGROUND\n{2} We view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Treadway, 2006-NMSC-008, \u00b6 7, 139 N.M. 167, 130 P.3d 746. So viewed, on the afternoon of December 19, 2010, Carolyn Stamper was home alone when she heard the doorbell ring. She was not expecting company. Shortly after the unanticipated ring, she heard some \u201cwrestling at the front door.\u201d She moved slowly towards the door and peeped through the peephole in the front door. She saw no one.\n{3} Stamper then heard a noise emanating from the living-room window which was about seven feet away from her position. The sound was like \u201cmetal on metal\u201d or a cat \u201cclawing at the screen.\u201d She walked towards the window. The curtain was closed, but not completely; there was a gap about four inches wide. The window was open, raised from the bottom, also about four inches. Between the curtains, Stamper observed a man, later identified as Holt, removing the screen from her window. Stamper testified that Holt\nhad the screen halfway off the window, and he had his hand on each side of the screen, and he was twisting it and turning it and looking down. He was looking down at the bottom part of the screen. He was trying to get the screen off. It wasn\u2019t completely off, but it was bent out away from the house and he was working the screen like this.\nUpon further questioning, Stamper clarified that Holt\u2019s fingers were over the screen and the palms of his hands were at its edges. He had pulled the screen out of its track \u201cand bent it about maybe half way down.\u201d It was crooked at the top where Holt had \u201cworked\u201d it, but it was still in the groove at the bottom. As a result of Holt\u2019s conduct, the screen was \u201cpretty well destroyed.\u201d\n{4} Because Holt\u2019s attention was focused downward, he did not initially see Stamper. At some point, however, he looked up and saw her. Their faces were only about two and a half feet apart. When Holt saw Stamper watching him, his \u201ceyes bugged out.\u201d He said \u201cOh, I\u2019m sorry,\u201d and then promptly fled.\n{5} Holt was arrested and charged by an amended indictment with breaking and entering. At trial, after the State rested, Holt moved for a directed verdict. He argued that no entry had occurred because he was interrupted by Stamper and \u201cnever did get inside.\u201d The district court denied the motion, finding that the State had presented sufficient evidence to proceed. Holt presented no evidence.\n{6} The jury formd Holt guilty of breaking and entering. He was sentenced to five years and six months\u2014eighteen months for the breaking-and-entering violation and a four-year habitual-offender enhancement\u2014 followed by one year of parole.\n{7} Holt appealed to this Court. He argued that the district court incorrectly construed the term \u201centry\u201d in Section 30-14-8(A) and claimed that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction because he had attempted only to remove the window screen and had not entered Stamper\u2019s residence. The Court of Appeals affirmed Holt\u2019s conviction in a divided opinion. State v. Holt, 2015-NMCA-073, 352 P.3d 702, cert. granted, 2015-NMCERT-_(No. 35,298, June 19, 2015). We granted Holt\u2019s petition for a writ of certiorari\u2014exercising our jurisdiction under Article VI, Section 3 of the New Mexico Constitution and NMSA 1978, Section 34\u20145\u201414(B) (1972)\u2014to decide whether Holt entered Stamper\u2019s residence, for purposes of New Mexico\u2019s breaking and entering statute, by placing his fingers behind a window screen and beyond the outer boundary of Stamper\u2019s home.\nII. DISCUSSION\n{8} Holt contends that only penetration of an interior protected space, not the outermost plane of a structure, constitutes an \u201centry\u201d for purposes of the breaking-and-entering statute. The space between a screen and window, he argues, is not interior space. Thus, he claims that his conduct did not constitute an \u201centry\u201d for purposes ofSection 30-14-8(A). Based on his interpretation of the statute, Holt argues that there was insufficient evidence presented to support the conviction. The State responds that the Legislature did indeed intend penetration of a window screen to constitute an \u201centry\u201d under Section 30-14-8(A) because a window screen forms the outer barrier of a structure and people reasonably rely on window screens to protect their possessory rights. Accordingly, the State contends that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.\nA. Standard of Review\n{9} Whether Holt\u2019s conduct constituted an \u201centry\u201d for purposes ofSection 30-14-8(A) is a question of statutory construction this Court reviews de novo. State v. Nick R., 2009-NMSC-050, \u00b6 11, 147 N.M. 182, 218 P.3d 868 (citation omitted).\nB. Definition of \u201centry\u201d in Section 30-14-8(A)\n{10} The primary goal in construing a statute is to \u201cascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.\u201d State v. Tafoya, 2010-NMSC-019, \u00b6 10, 148 N.M. 391, 237 P.3d 693 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n{11} Section 30-14-8(A) provides as follows:\nBreaking and entering consists of the unauthorized entry of any vehicle, watercraft, aircraft, dwelling or other structure, movable or immovable, where entry is obtained by fraud or deception, or by the breaking or dismantling of any part of the vehicle, watercraft, aircraft, dwelling or other structure, or by the breaking or dismantling of any device used to secure the vehicle, watercraft, aircraft, dwelling or other structure.\n{12} It is well-settled that words in a statute take their ordinary meaning absent legislative intent to the contrary. State ex rel. Maloney v. Sierra, 1970-NMSC-144, \u00b6 42, 82 N.M. 125, 477 P.2d 301. The term \u201centry\u201d is not defined in Section 30-14-8. The first question we must decide, then, is whether the ordinary meaning of \u201centry\u201d resolves the statutory interpretation question before us. As described below, ascribing the term \u201centry\u201d its ordinary meaning does not dispose of this case.\n{13} According to one commonly used dictionary, \u201centry\u201d is \u201c[t]he action of coming or going in.\u201d V The Oxford English Dictionary 308 (2d ed. 1991). Another dictionary defines \u201centry\u201d as \u201c[t]he act or an instance of entering.\u201d The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 596 (5th ed. 2011). A leading legal dictionary defines \u201centry\u201d as \u201c[t]he act, right, or privilege of entering real property.\u201d Entry, Black\u2019s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). All of these definitions give rise to additional and redundant definitional questions: if \u201centry\u201d is going \u201cin,\u201d what is \u201cin\u201d? To state that \u201centry\u201d is \u201centering\u201d is no help at all. Additionally, how does one define the boundaries of the space entered? Assuming we can discern what entering is, and \u201centry\u201d is entering real property, where does the real property begin or end?\n{14} We cannot rely on the ordinary usage of the term \u201centry\u201d to resolve the instant issue of statutory interpretation. The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals appears to have understood this and appropriately concluded that it was necessary to look to the purpose of the breaking-and-entering statute to fashion a functional definition of the term \u201centry.\u201d Holt, 2015-NMCA-073, \u00b6 9. The majority opinion framed the issue as \u201cwhether the space between a window screen and an open window is protected space under the statute.\u201d Ld. This framing of the issue is problematic. It suggests that the space between the screen and the window is a separate and independent dimension of space apart from the further interior space that comprises Stamper\u2019s residence. The issue is more straightforward: did Holt\u2019s conduct constitute entry into Stamper\u2019s residence? To resolve this question we must determine where the boundaries of the home begin and end, and the purposes underlying the breaking-and-entering statute are our guide. See State v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, \u00b6 12, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939 (\u201cApplication of the plain meaning rule often does not end the analysis when construing a statute. Rather, the rule is a tool used by courts during the course of seeking and effectuating the legislative intent underlying the statute.\u201d (citation omitted)); State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 1994-NMSC-023, \u00b6 23, 117 N.M. 346, 871 P.2d 1352 (\u201c[Where] one or more provisions giv[e] rise to genuine uncertainty as to what the legislature was trying to accomplish ... it is part of the essence of judicial responsibility to search for and effectuate the legislative intent\u2014the purpose or object\u2014underlying the statute.\u201d).\n{15} \u201cNew Mexico\u2019s breaking-and-entering statute is itself grounded in common law burglary.\u201d State v. Rubio, 1999-NMCA-018, \u00b6 13, 126 N.M. 579, 973 P.2d 256 (\u2018\u201cNew Mexico\u2019s breaking and entering statute is a type of statutory burglary.\u2019\u201d (quoting UJI 14-1410 NMRA committee commentary)). As such, we look to our treatment of the burglary statute to discern the purposes behind the enactment of the breaking-and-entering statute.\n{16} Our burglary statute protects the \u201cright to exclude,\u201d a right that \u201chas been described as perhaps the most fundamental of all property interests.\u201d State v. Office of Pub. Def. ex rel. Muqqddin, 2012-NMSC-029, \u00b6 41, 285 P.3d 622 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The right to exclude \u201cimplies some notion of a privacy interest.\u201d Id. \u00b6 42 (citation omitted). \u201cIt is the invasion of privacy and the victim\u2019s feeling of being personally violated that is the harm caused by the modern burglar, and the evil that our society is attempting to deter through modern burglary statutes.\u201d Id. (citation omitted). \u201cThe privacy interest that our modern burglary statute protects is related to, though broader than, the security of habitation.\u201d Id. \u00b6 43. That privacy interest extends to all enclosed, private, prohibited spaces. See id. \u00b6\u00b6 44-45. Thus, an \u201centry,\u201d for purposes of the breaking- and-entering statute, occurs whenever there is an invasion into an enclosed, private, prohibited space. See Section 30-14-8(A). But still we must ask how do we define the boundaries of these spaces.\n{17} As we explained in Muqqddin, \u201c[i]t is the nature of the enclosure that creates the expectation of privacy. Enclosure puts the public on notice.\u201d 2012-NMSC-029, \u00b6 45. To define the boundaries of enclosures, we embraced the following test: \u201c\u2018[t]he proper question is whether the nature of a structure\u2019s composition is such that a reasonable person would expect some protection from unauthorized intrusions.\u2019\u201d Id. (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Nible, 247 Cal. Rptr. 396, 399 (Ct. App. 1988), holding modified by People v. Valencia, 46 P.3d 920, 924-27 (Cal. 2002)).\n{18} Based on the foregoing, we determine that putting one\u2019s fingers behind a window screen affixed to a residential dwelling is an intrusion into an enclosed, private, prohibited space and constitutes an \u201centry\u201d for the purposes of New Mexico\u2019s breaking-and-entering statute. Section 30-14-8(A). It is reasonable for the citizens of New Mexico to expect that their window screens afford them protection from unauthorized intrusions. As the Nible Court explained, a window screen \u201cis not to be considered as a mere protection against flies, but rather as a permanent part of the dwelling,\u201d and, as such, \u201ca reasonable person would believe a window screen provides some protection against unauthorized intrusions.\u201d 247 Cal. Rptr. at 399 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted),\n{19} The law has long been settled in New Mexico that \u201centry,\u201d for purposes of the burglary statute, occurs where there is \u201c[a]ny penetration, however slight, of the interior space ....\u201d State v. Tixier, 1976-NMCA-054, \u00b6 12, 89 N.M. 297, 551 P.2d 987. In Tixier, the Court of Appeals held that a one-half inch penetration into a building by an unidentified instrument was sufficient to constitute an entry. See id. In State v. Sorrelhorse, 2011-NMCA-095, \u00b6\u00b6 4, 8, 150 N.M. 536, 263 P.3d 313, the defendant forcibly entered an apartment; however, the entry consisted of nothing more than the defendant\u2019s foot going in \u201ca little way.\u201d As noted, our breaking-and-entering statute is intertwined with our burglary statute. The Uniform Jury Instruction for breaking and entering directs that, where \u201centry is in issue,\u201d the court is to instruct the jury that \u201cthe least intrusion constitutes an entry.\u201d UJI 14-1410 & n.2. To the extent Sorrelhorse and Tixier suggest that the least intrusion must be into some \u201cinterior space,\u201d that space simply refers to the area beyond the boundary that a reasonable person would expect to afford them protection from unauthorized intrusions. See Sorrelhorse, 2011-NMCA-095, \u00b6 7; Tixier, 1976-NMCA-054, \u00b6 12; cf. Nible, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 399 (\u201c[W]hen a screen which forms the outer barrier of a protected structure is penetrated, an entry has been made for purposes of the burglary statute.\u201d).\nC. Sufficiency of the Evidence\n{20} \u201cIn reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, indulging all reasonable inferences and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the verdict.\u201d State v. Cunningham, 2000-NMSC-009, \u00b6 26, 128 N.M. 711, 998 P.2d 176 (citations omitted). In that light, the Court determines whether \u201cany rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). \u201c[T]he [j]ury instructions become the law of the case against which the sufficiency of the evidence is to be measured.\u201d State v. Arrendondo, 2012-NMSC-013, \u00b6 18, 278 P.3d 517 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n{21} To convict Holt of the breaking-and-entering charge, the jury was instructed that it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that \u201c1. The defendant entered [Stamper\u2019s address] without permission; the least intrusion constitutes an entry; 2. The entry was obtained by the dismantling of a window screen; 3. This happened in New Mexico on or about the 19th day of December, 2010.\u201d\n{22} The only element for which Holt contends there was insufficient evidence is the entry instruction. Stamper testified that she was two and a half feet from Holt when she saw him removing the screen from her window. She testified that Holt\u2019s fingers were over the screen, i.e., beyond the boundary created by the window screen. Holt concedes that Stamper so testified. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.\nIII. CONCLUSION\n{23} Holt placed his fingers behind Stamper\u2019s window screen. The screen marked the outer boundary of Stamper\u2019s home. Thus, Holt entered Stamper\u2019s residence for purposes of Section 30-14-8(A). Accordingly, we affirm.\n{24} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nJUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Justice\nWE CONCUR:\nBARBARA J. VIGIL, Chief Justice\nPETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice\nEDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice\nCHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice", "type": "majority", "author": "NAKAMURA, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert E. Tangora, L.L.C. Robert E. Tangora Santa Fe, NM for Petitioner", "Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General Jacqueline R. Medina, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Respondent" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2016-NMSC-011\nFiling Date: February 25, 2016\nDocket No. S-1-SC-35298\nSTATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ANTHONY HOLT, Defendant-Petitioner.\nRobert E. Tangora, L.L.C. Robert E. Tangora Santa Fe, NM for Petitioner\nHector H. Balderas, Attorney General Jacqueline R. Medina, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Respondent" }, "file_name": "0442-01", "first_page_order": 458, "last_page_order": 463 }