{ "id": 12168091, "name": "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TREVOR BEGAY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Begay", "decision_date": "2016-01-13", "docket_number": "No. S-1-SC-35751; Docket No. 33,588", "first_page": "611", "last_page": "615", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2016-NMCA-039" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "113 N.M. 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 723226 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/113/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "1991-NMCA-107", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2000-NMCA-093", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1217182 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/129/0667-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMSC-033", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3671133 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "2010-NMSC-026", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4246809 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/148/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-018", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4243873 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0142-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 628, "char_count": 13013, "ocr_confidence": 0.784, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.2468414181676229 }, "sha256": "f320a8cbec9b41d5ae3fe5d3103fbf867cf343bc672a390514e45b3a19bcd46f", "simhash": "1:b6000db4dd3b6f42", "word_count": 2066 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:30:56.942854+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge", "MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge", "JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge" ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TREVOR BEGAY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nGARCIA, Judge.\n{1} A criminal sentencing statute requires magistrate, metropolitan, and district courts to place a convicted defendant on probation whenever those courts defer or suspend that defendant\u2019s sentence of imprisonment. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 31-20-5 (1985, amended 2003). Once the period of the defendant\u2019s suspended sentence expires, that defendant is generally \u201crelieved of any obligations imposed on him . . . and has satisfied his criminal liability for the crime.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 31-20-8 (1963, amended 1977). The Probation and Parole Act contains an exception to this rule. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 31-21-3 to -19 (1955, as amended through 2013). Section 31-21-15(C) allows a court to effectively toll the running of a defendant\u2019s suspended sentence where he has violated the terms of his probation and cannot be immediately located to answer for this violation (hereinafter, the tolling provision). However, the statutory language used by the Legislature limited the tolling provision to cases in which the defendant\u2019s underlying conviction occurred in the district court. See \u00a7 31-21-5 (A), (F). As a result, when a defendant is convicted of a crime in magistrate court, placed on probation in lieu of serving a prison sentence, violates the terms of his probation, and cannot be located to answer for this violation until the period of his suspended sentence has expired, tolling does not apply, and the defendant is relieved of his obligations without any apparent consequence. The magistrate court and the district court in this case concluded that the tolling provision applied to the defendant, even though the defendant\u2019s underlying conviction was imposed by the magistrate court, and not the district court. For reasons we explain below, we conclude that the plain language of the Probation and Parole Act does not permit the tolling provision to apply to persons convicted in magistrate court and that the Legislature intended this result when it enacted the Probation and Parole Act. Accordingly, we reverse the district court\u2019s order.\nBACKGROUND\n{2} D efendant Trevor B egay was convicted of battery in the San Juan County Magistrate Court and sentenced to 182 days of imprisonment with credit for eleven days of time served. The magistrate court suspended his sentence and ordered that Defendant serve 171 days of supervised probation. Defendant violated the terms of his probation and could not be located to answer for this violation until after the period of his suspended sentence expired. When he was finally brought back before the magistrate court, the court determined that Section 31-21-15(C) permitted it to toll the running of Defendant\u2019s sentence. As a result, the magistrate court revoked Defendant\u2019s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in prison. Defendant appealed to the district court, which reached the same conclusion and affirmed the magistrate court. Defendant now appeals to this Court, asserting that the tolling provision cannot be applied to Defendant because his conviction was obtained in the magistrate court.\nDISCUSSION\nStatutory Interpretation Principles\n{3} We review statutory interpretation issues de novo. State v. Nozie, 2009-NMSC-018, \u00b6 28, 146 N.M. 142, 207 P.3d 1119. Our \u201cprimary goal\u201d in interpreting a statute \u201cis to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.\u201d State v. Morales, 2010-NMSC-026, \u00b6 6, 148 N.M. 305, 236 P.3d 24 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\nIn doing so, we examine the plain language of the statute as well as the context in which it was promulgated, including the history of the statute and the object and purpose the Legislature sought to accomplish. We must take care to avoid adoption of a construction that would render the statute\u2019s application absurd or unreasonable or lead to injustice or contradiction.\nId. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\nHistorical Context of the Probation and Parole Act and the Magistrate Court\n{4} Our Legislature originally enacted \u201cThe Parole Act of 1955\u201d to provide for \u201cthe release to the community of an inmate of a [sjtate correctional institution [prior to the expiration of his term], by the decision of a parole board . . ., [and] subject to conditions imposed by the board and to its supervision.\u201d 1955 N.M. Laws, ch. 232, \u00a7\u00a7 1, 3. The Legislature amended this act in 1963 to include probation, changing its title to the \u201cProbation and Parole Act.\u201d 1963 N.M. Laws, ch.301,\u00a7 l.This amendment defined the term \u201cprobation\u201d as \u201cthe procedure under which an adult defendant, found guilty of a crime upon verdict or plea, is released by the court without imprisonment under a suspended or deferred sentence and subject to conditions[.]\u201d Id. \u00a7 3 (emphasis added); see \u00a7 31-21-5(A). The amendment defined \u201cadult\u201d as \u201cany person convicted of a crime by a district court.\" 1963 N.M. Laws, ch. 301, \u00a7 3 (emphasis added); see \u00a7 31-21 -5(F). These definitions have remained unchanged since the 1963 amendment was enacted. See \u00a7 31-21-5(A), (F). Furthermore, the 1963 amendment created the tolling provision at issue in this case, which has also remained unchanged.\nAt any time duringprobation[,] . .. the court may issue a warrant for the arrest of a probationer for violation of any of the conditions of release. . . .\nIf it is found that a warrant for the return of a probationer cannot be served, the probationer is a fugitive from justice. After hearing upon return, if it appears that he has violated the provisions of his release, the court shall determine whether the time from the date of violation to the date of his arrest, or any part of it, shall be counted as time served on probation.\n1963 N.M. Laws, ch. 301, \u00a7 13 (emphasis added); see \u00a7 31-21-15(A), (C). Thus, when the Legislature enacted these 1963 provisions, it expressly limited the application of the tolling provision to \u201cadult\u201d persons convicted of crimes in the district court.\n{5} In 1963, like today, the district court also had original jurisdiction over all misdemeanors. See N.M. Const. art. VI, \u00a7 13. But some misdemeanors could instead be tried by \u201cmagistrates[,j\u201d also known as \u201cjustices of the peace[,]\u201d NMSA 1953, \u00a7\u00a7 36-2-1, -5 (1961) (providing magistrates/justices of the peace jurisdiction over misdemeanors punishable by a maximum fine of $100 or six months imprisonment), or by a \u201cmunicipal magistrate court[,]\u201dNMSA 1953, \u00a7\u00a7 37-1-1 to -2 (1961) (providing a municipal magistrate court jurisdiction over offenses under municipal ordinances). The Legislature did not create the present day \u201cmagistrate court\u201d system until 1968, five years after it created the tolling provision. See 1968 N.M. Laws, ch. 62, \u00a7\u00a7 3, 49 (establishing the \u201c \u2018magistrate court\u2019 as a court of limited original jurisdiction within the judicial department of the state government\u201d and limiting its criminal jurisdiction to misdemeanors punishable by a maximum fine of $100 or up to six months imprisonment); see also N.M. Const, art. VI, \u00a7 26 (authorizing and directing the Legislature in 1966 to \u201cestablish a magistrate court to exercise limited original jurisdiction as may be provided by law\u201d). In creating the current magistrate court system in 1968, the Legislature \u201cabolished\u201d the office of justice of the peace and transferred its jurisdiction, powers, and duties to the magistrate court. 1968 N.M. Laws, ch. 62, \u00a7 40. Finally, although the Legislature later amended Section 31-20-5 in 1984 to require the magistrate court to order probation when it defers or suspends a sentence, 1984 N.M. Laws, ch. 106, \u00a7 2, it did not amend the Probation and Parole Act to extend the tolling provision to magistrate court convictions.\n{6} Viewing the plain language of the Probation and Parole Act and considering the totality of the historical considerations, we conclude that the Legislature intended to limit the tolling provision to \u201cadult\u201d persons who were convicted in the district court, as opposed to persons convicted by magistrates, even though the magistrate court had concurrent jurisdiction over crimes punishable by a maximum fine of $100 and six months imprisonment. Compare NMSA 1953, \u00a7\u00a7 36-2-1, -5, with 1968 N.M. Laws, ch. 62, \u00a7\u00a7 3, 49. The Legislature\u2019s decision in this regard does not appear unreasonable or to have created an absurd or unjust result, at least at the time the tolling provision was created. As Defendant suggests, the Legislature may have chosen to limit the tolling provision in this manner because (1) convictions obtained by magistrates (and, later, the magistrate court) only involved minor crimes with less severe punishment implications than the more serious convictions addressed by the district court; and (2) the burden of injecting an additional administrative process and additional inmates into our magistrate court system arising from probation violations involving only minor offenses may well outweigh the public benefits achieved through these courts of limited criminal jurisdiction. Whatever the reasons, such policy decisions are primarily within the domain of the Legislature. See Hartford Ins. Co. v. Cline, 2006-NMSC-033, \u00b6 8, 140 N.M. 16, 139 P.3d 176 (\u201cIt is the particular domain of the [Legislature, as the voice of the people, to make public policy. Elected executive officials and executive agencies also make policy, to a lesser extent, as authorized by the [Cjonstitution or the [Ljegislature. Thejudiciary, however, is not as directly and politically responsible to the people as are the legislative and executive branches of government.\u201d (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)). Although it seems that the Legislature\u2019s decision in 1984 to require the magistrate court to order probation when deferring or suspending a sentence would have been logically followed by an amendment to the Probation and Parole Act to provide that the term \u201cprobation\u201d under the Act also applies to persons convicted in magistrate court, we cannot judicially amend the Probation and Parole Act to reach this result. See id.', see also Eskew v. Nat\u2019l Farmers Union Ins. Co., 2000-NMCA-093, \u00b6 17, 129 N.M. 667, 11 P.3d 1229 (\u201cA court cannot judicially amend a statute[.j\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).\n{7} In support of the State\u2019s position that the Probation and Parole Act\u2019s tolling provision applies to persons convicted in magistrate court, it notes that Section 31-21-9(A) of the Probation and Parole Act recognizes that the magistrate court, as well as the district court, may order a presentence report from the director of the field services division of the corrections department. We are not convinced that this 1972 amendment shows that the Legislature also meant to allow the tolling provision to apply to magistrate court convictions, because the Legislature did not require the magistrate court to order probation until 1984. See 1984 N.M. Laws, ch. 106, \u00a7 2. Also, the State\u2019s argument concerning the statement contained in Section 31-21-18 that the provisions of the Probation and Parole Act \u201capply to all persons who, at the effective date, are on probation\u201d ignores the Act\u2019s definitions of \u201cprobation\u201d and \u201cadult\u201d as limited to persons convicted in the district court. Section 31-21-5(A), (F). Finally, we are not persuaded by the State\u2019s reliance on this Court\u2019s statement in State v. Candelaria that \u201callowance of... a variation in penalty based on the pure happenstance of where a case is tried would be an unreasonable result, which we must avoid in interpreting our statutes.\u201d 1991-NMCA-107, \u00b6 8, 113 N.M. 288, 825 P.2d 221. In Candelaria, this Court determined that the statute at issue had two potential interpretations and declined to adopt the interpretation that would create such a variation in penalty. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 6, 8. Here, the Probation and Parole Act\u2019s language is not open to varying interpretations; the tolling provision plainly applies only to \u201cadult\u201d persons convicted in the district court.\nCONCLUSION\n{8} We reverse the district court\u2019s order and remand the case to the district court for an order requiring the magistrate court to withdraw its amended judgment and sentence and for the further entry of an order certifying that Defendant is relieved of \u201cany obligations imposed on him . . . and has satisfied his criminal liability for the crime\u201d as required under Section 31-20-8.\n{9} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nTIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nMICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge\nJONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge", "type": "majority", "author": "GARCIA, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General Santa Fe, NM Jacqueline R. Medina, Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM for Appellee", "Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender Sergio Viscoli, Assistant Appellate Defender David Henderson, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellant" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Certiorari Granted, March 25, 2016,\nNo. S-1-SC-35751\nIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2016-NMCA-039\nFiling Date: January 13, 2016\nDocket No. 33,588\nSTATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TREVOR BEGAY, Defendant-Appellant.\nHector H. Balderas, Attorney General Santa Fe, NM Jacqueline R. Medina, Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM for Appellee\nJorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender Sergio Viscoli, Assistant Appellate Defender David Henderson, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellant" }, "file_name": "0611-01", "first_page_order": 627, "last_page_order": 631 }