{ "id": 12168209, "name": "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REQUILDO CARDENAS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Cardenas", "decision_date": "2016-02-16", "docket_number": "No. S-1-SC-35793; Docket No. 33,564", "first_page": "638", "last_page": "644", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2016-NMCA-042" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "2005-NMCA-060", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 929130 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/137/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "2010-NMSC-039", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4247544 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 14" }, { "page": "\u00b6 16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/148/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "945 P.2d 996", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 N.M. 778", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 142224 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/123/0778-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMSC-044", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 50" } 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"opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 N.M. 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 715120 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/111/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "1990-NMCA-119", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2007-NMSC-007", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3669553 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/141/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 N.M. 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1579465 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/52/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "1946-NMSC-047", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 44" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 P. 529", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 N.M. 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8841575 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/27/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "1921-NMSC-009", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 30" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 18, 31" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1999-NMSC-038", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 106481 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 15" }, { "page": "\u00b6 15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/128/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "2001-NMCA-021", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 352378 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/130/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMSC-030", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4002756 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6 21" }, 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"2023-07-14T22:30:56.942854+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge", "MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge", "LINDA M. YANZI, Judge" ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REQUILDO CARDENAS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nKENNEDY, Judge.\n{1} A formal opinion in this matter was filed on February 2, 2016. We hereby withdraw that opinion and substitute it with this Opinion to correct an oversight. The victim was referred to as \u201cMatthew Lucero\u201d in the preceding opinion, and the correct name of victim is \u201cMatthew Lujan.\u201d\n{2} Defendant shot and killed an unknown intruder, who he later discovered was his friend, by firing a single fatal shot through his front door in the early hours of the morning. Defendant appeals the district court\u2019s refusal to give a defense of habitation instruction as well as an involuntary manslaughter instruction. We conclude that adequate evidence was presented to warrant the giving of both. We therefore reverse.\nI. BACKGROUND\n{3} Matthew Lujan and Defendant, Requildo Cardenas, were close friends. At approximately 1:30 a.m., on July 5, 2012, Lujan was involved in a fight at a party. Enraged by the fight, Lujan left the party and drove immediately to Defendant\u2019s home. Lujan arrived at Defendant\u2019s home, opened the screen door, and began knocking and pounding on the door within. Lujan\u2019s actions were loud enough to rouse Defendant from sleep. Defendant armed himself and demanded that the visitor identify himself. Defendant received no answer in response to his demand, and the intruder continued pounding on the door. Defendant fired a single shot through the front door, which killed Lujan. When Defendant fired the fatal shot, Lujan\u2019s identity was unknown to him.\n{4} Defendant was tried for voluntary manslaughter. He requested jury instructions on defense of habitation and involuntary manslaughter. The district court denied the instructions. Defendant was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Defendant now appeals his conviction, asserting that the district court erred in denying his requested instructions on defense of habitation and involuntary manslaughter.\nII. DISCUSSION\n{5} Whether a jury instruction was properly denied is a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo. State v. Guerra, 2012-NMSC-014, \u00b6 13, 278 P.3d 1031. \u201c \u2018When considering a defendant\u2019s requested instructions, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the giving of the requested instruction[s].\u2019 \u201d State v. Skippings, 2011-NMSC-021, \u00b6 10, 150 N.M. 216, 258 P.3d 1008 (quoting State v. Boyett, 2008-NMSC-030, \u00b6 12, 144 N.M. 184, 185 P.3d 355). While \u201c[a] defendant is entitled to an instruction on his or her theory of the case if evidence has been presented that is sufficient to allow reasonable minds to differ as to all elements of the offense[,]\u201d the failure to instruct the jury on a defendant\u2019s theory of the case is reversible error only if there is evidence to support giving the instruction. Boyett, 2008-NMSC-030, \u00b6 12 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A defendant charged with involuntary homicide may present a theory of self-defense. State v. Gallegos, 2001-NMCA-021, \u00b6 18, 130 N.M. 221, 22 P.3d 689.\nA. Defense of Habitation\n{6} Defense of habitation contains both a subjective and an objective element; the parties acknowledge this. Cf. State v. Coffin, 1999-NMSC-038, \u00b6 15, 128 N.M. 192, 991 P.2d 477 (indicating self-defense is made up of both a subjective standard that focuses on the perception of the defendant at the time of the incident and an objective standard that focuses on how a reasonable person in the same situation would have acted). The subjective element allows for the use of deadly force where \u201c[i]t appeared to the defendant that the commission of [a violent felony] was immediately at hand and that it was necessary to kill the intruder to prevent the commission of [the violent felony].\u201d UJI 14-5170 NMRA; Boyett, 2008-NMSC-030, \u00b6 21 (requiring felony, in defense of habitation context, to be a violent felony). In evaluating this element, it is necessary to look to the subjective belief of the defendant. The objective element requires that \u201c[a] reasonable person in the same circumstances as the defendant would have acted as the defendant did.\u201d UJI 14-5170.\n{7} Our Supreme Court\u2019s opinion in Boyett sought to clarify the law governing defense of habitation. 2008-NMSC-030, \u00b6\u00b6 9, 11. The Boyett court acknowledged that, although defense of habitation applies to the prevention of a felony in the home, felonies no longer solely encompass \u201cforcible and atrocious\u201d crimes. Id. \u00b6 20 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As a result, the Court endeavored to clarify what qualifies as a \u201cfelony\u201d in the defense of habitation context. Id. The Court concluded, based on applicable precedent, that a \u201c \u2018felony\u2019 in the defense of habitation context is properly limited to those felonies involving violence.\u201d Id. \u00b6 21 (stating that a felony must result \u201cin violence against the occupants were it not prevented\u201d). The Court reasoned that, using this clarification, an instruction on defense of habitation would be warranted \u201cif some evidence reasonably tended to show that [the defendant] killed [the v]ictim to prevent her from forcing entry into his home and committing a violent felony once inside.\u201d Id. \u00b6 22. The Court looked to the evidence presented in the case and concluded that an instruction on defense of habitation was not warranted because there was no evidence that the victim was endeavoring to enter the home by violence or intended to do violence on those inside. Id. \u00b6 23. The Court acknowledged that, assuming the defendant held a reasonable belief that the victim intended to commit a felony in his home, defense of habitation would justify the defendant\u2019s actions \u201conly if he could show that [the v]ictim was attempting to force entry to his home.\u201d Id. Thus, if there is evidence that the victim is trying to break through the defendant\u2019s front door at the time he kills the victim, defense of habitation applies. Id.\n{8} The district court in this case seems to have interpreted Boyett to require an analysis of the intruder\u2019s intent for the subjective element of defense of habitation, rather than solely on Defendant\u2019s perception of the intruder\u2019s actions and intentions. The State asserts that the defense of habitation instruction was not warranted because there was no evidence that \u201cthe commission of [a violent felony] was immediately at hand.\u201d UJI 14-5170. The State also asserts that, without evidence that Defendant intended to kill Lujan, no evidence existed to support the assertion that Defendant believed \u201cit was necessary to kill [Lujan] to prevent the commission of [the violent felony.]\u201d Id. We address each argument in turn.\n1. Evidence of a Violent Felony\n{9} Perhaps following the district court\u2019s ruling, the State suggests that in order to satisfy the subjective prong of defense of habitation, which requires Defendant to believe that the commission of a violent felony was immediately at hand, there must have been evidence that Lujan intended to commit a violent felony within Defendant\u2019s home. In support of this suggestion, the State cites to Boyett and suggests that by requiring a certain type of felony\u2014namely, a violent one\u2014the Court super-imposed a requirement that evidence of Lujan\u2019s intent to commit a violent felony be presented to warrant a defense of habitation instruction.\n{10} Self-defense and defense of habitation are virtually identical, State v. Bailey, 1921-NMSC-009, \u00b6 30, 27 N.M. 145, 198 P. 529, and it is well-established that self-defense focuses on the subjective intent of the defendant. See Coffin, 1999-NMSC-038, \u00b6 15 (indicating that the subjective element of self-defense focuses on the perception of the defendant at the time of the incident). Defense of habitation employs the same focus with regard to the subjective prong; the relevant inquiry lies in the defendant\u2019s own subjective perception of the intruder\u2019s intentions, rather than interpreting the intruder\u2019s intent itself. By asserting that evidence of the victim\u2019s intent is required, the State misstates the law governing defense of habitation. UJI 14-5170 contains no reference to the intruder\u2019s intent; instead, the instruction mentions only the defendant\u2019s perception of what is happening. The State\u2019s shifted emphasis is not supported by the language of the UJI.\n{11} Our case law is also clear that the defendant\u2019s interpretation of the victim\u2019s actions is the relevant criterion in a defense of habitation inquiry. In State v. Couch, 1946-NMSC-047, \u00b6 44, 52 N.M. 127, 193 P.2d 405, our Supreme Court decided that the defendant was entitled to a defense of habitation instruction because he could have believed that the person attacking his home intended to enter and commit violence against the occupants. In Couch, the defendant, whose home had been subjected to other attacks and invasions, awoke late one night while his home was the target of vandals throwing rocks. Id. \u00b6 2. The defendant shot at the intruders and killed one of them. Id. The Court concluded that the defendant was entitled to a defense ofhabitation instruction: \u201cWhen one\u2019s home is attacked in the middle of a dark night . . . the householder, being unable to determine what weapons the [unknown] assailants have ... may pursue his adversaries till he finds himself out of danger.\u201d Id. \u00b6\u00b6 44, 49.\n{12} We interpret Boyett to stand not for the proposition that there must be evidence of the intruder\u2019s intent or that the victim intended to commit a violent felony, but solely whether evidence exists that could give rise to a defendant\u2019s belief that commission of a felony of a violent nature was imminent. The instruction must be given when the evidence presented at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to giving the instruction, supports Defendant\u2019s alleged belief that he or his home was subject to the threat of a violent felony.\n{13} According to the evidence, Lujan arrived at Defendant\u2019s door at approximately 1:30 a.m. and was pounding on the door loudly enough to rouse Defendant from sleep and threateningly enough to cause Defendant to arm himself. Despite yelling a request that the intruder identify himself, Defendant received no response before firing the fatal shot.\n{14} Evidence at trial indicated that Lujan was in the process of opening the door when he was shot. Expert testimony suggested, based on spatter patterns of Lujan\u2019s blood on the hinges and frame of the door, that the door could have been anywhere between one and four inches open when Defendant fired the fatal shot. Because there is no evidence that Defendant opened the door, it is reasonable to infer from the facts that Lujan did. One of the investigating officers testified that he believed Lujan was \u201ctrying to gain entry\u201d into Defendant\u2019s home. Defendant\u2019s father testified that when he visited the residence the day after the shooting, he observed that the lock on the door had been damaged. This evidence, considered in the light most favorable to giving the instruction, Skippings, 2011-NMSC-021, \u00b6 10, satisfies Boyetfs requirement that some evidence show that the intruder was attempting to force entry into Defendant\u2019s home. 2008-NMSC-030, \u00b6 23. It was therefore adequate to support an assertion by Defendant that he reasonably believed that a violent felony was about to occur in his home. Confronted with a violent and unauthorized attempt of an unknown actor to enter his home, and in the absence of the intruder\u2019s response to Defendant\u2019s request to identify himself, Defendant\u2019s actions could be found to be objectively reasonable, as discussed more completely below. We therefore conclude that the district court erred in refusing Defendant\u2019s requested defense of habitat instruction.\n2. Intent to Kill\n{15} The State incorrectly asserts that Defendant is required to prove he had an intent to kill Lujan in order to receive a defense of habitation instruction. The district court did not deny Defendant\u2019s requested defense of habitation instruction based on Defendant\u2019s lack of intent to kill. In fact, it appears that the State did not raise this argument below. The State suggests, however, that we affirm the district court\u2019s decision using the right for any reason doctrine. While we may affirm the district court on grounds not relied on by it, we may not do so if it would result in unfairness to the appellant. State v. Gallegos, 2007-NMSC-007, \u00b6 26, 141 N.M. 185, 152 P.3d 828. Because we conclude that adding an \u201cintent to kill\u201d element to defense of habitation would be inappropriate, we decline the State\u2019s invitation to affirm on that ground.\n{16} According to UJI 14-5170, it must appear to the defendant that it is \u201cnecessary to kill the intruder to prevent the commission of [a violent felony].\u201d In Bailey, our Supreme Court noted, in dicta, that the right to kill in self-defense or defense of habitation was not at issue in the case and that the defendant was not entitled to have that issue presented to the jury because the defendant absolutely denied killing the victim. 1921-NMSC-009, \u00b6\u00b6 18, 31 (noting that the defendant \u201cnever intended to kill [the intruder], did not attempt to kill him, and did not kill him\u201d).\n{17} Bailey is inapposite to the case before us, and the State\u2019s reliance on it is misplaced. Defense counsel argued at trial thatDefendant may have intended the shot to be a warning shot, and that both the single shot fired and the location of the shot indicated that Defendant did not intend to kill the intruder. He does not contend that he did not shoot the victim or that he did not intentionally pull the trigger. The State now uses these arguments to assert that Defendant is not entitled to a defense of habitation instruction because he had no intent to kill the intruder, contrary to the UJI which requires that the defendant believe it is \u201cnecessary to kill the intruder.\u201d See UJI 14-5170.\n{18} The State\u2019s reading of Boyett, UJI 14-5170, and Bailey misinterprets the language therein by suggesting that a belief that it is necessary to use deadly force to prevent commission of a violent felony equates to an intent to kill an intruder. The two are not equivalent; an intent to kill pertains to a desired result while a belief that it is necessary to use deadly force relates to the means by which that result may be reached. The focal point of the jury instruction\u2019s \u201cnecessary to kill\u201d language lies on the defendant\u2019s intent to prevent the commission of the violent felony using whatever force\u2014including deadly force\u2014is necessary. The explicit language of UJI 14-5170 therefore requires that the defendant believe deadly or lethal force is necessary to prevent the commission of a violent felony. \u201cThe inquiry in a self-defense claim focuses on the reasonableness of [a] defendant\u2019s belief as to the apparent necessity for the force used to repel an attack.\u201d State v. Reneau, 1990-NMCA-119, \u00b6 6, 111 N.M. 217, 804 P.2d 408.\n{19} Under UJI 14-5170, once a defendant reasonably holds the belief that it is necessary to use lethal force to prevent the felony and defend his habitation, he has satisfied the second half of the subjective element of defense of habitation. This belief can be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Cf. State v. Duarte, 1996-NMCA-038, \u00b6 7, 121 N.M. 553, 915 P.2d 309 (acknowledging that the defendant\u2019s fear in self-defense context can be inferred from circumstantial evidence); State v. Wood, 1994-NMCA-060, \u00b6 13, 117 N.M. 682, 875 P.2d 1113 (pointing out that subjective elements are \u201crarely established by direct evidence and generally must be proven by circumstantial or factual inferences\u201d). In this case, a jury could reasonably conclude that Defendant exhibited a belief that it was necessary to use deadly force by picking up his gun and firing it. Regardless of whether he intended for that particular shot to be lethal, the firing of the shot under the circumstances exhibited a willingness to use deadly force. See Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 760 (10th ed. 2014) (defining \u201cdeadly force\u201d as a \u201c[vjiolent action known to create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm\u201d). If the first subjective element is met, and the choice to use deadly force is reasonable, the elements of the defense are met, and the killing is legally justified. The existence of any evidence to support the giving of a defense of habitation instruction, however slight, provides an adequate basis for giving the instruction. State v. Heisler, 1954-NMSC-032, \u00b6 23, 58 N.M. 446, 272 P.2d 660 (\u201c[Wjhere self-defense is involved in a criminal case and there is any evidence, although slight, to establish the same, it is not only proper for the court, but its duty as well, to instruct the jury fully and clearly on all phases of the law on the issue that are warranted by the evidence}.]\u201d). Because the evidence was sufficient to entitle Defendant to a defense of habitation instruction and that instruction was not given, we reverse. See State v. Salazar, 1997-NMSC-044, \u00b6 50, 123 N.M. 778, 945 P.2d 996 (\u201cFailure to give an instruction which is warranted by the evidence is not harmless error.\u201d).\nB. Involuntary Manslaughter Instruction\n{20} There are three circumstances in which an involuntary manslaughter instruction is warranted: (1) \u201cthe commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony\u201d; (2) \u201cthe commission of a lawful act that might produce death, in an unlawful manner\u201d; or (3) \u201cthe commission of a lawful act that might produce death without due caution and circumspection.\u201d State v. Henley, 2010-NMSC-039, \u00b6 14, 148 N.M. 359, 237 P.3d 103 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). \u201cAn involuntary manslaughter instruction is proper only where there is evidence of an unintentional killing and a mens rea of criminal negligence[.]\u201d Id. \u00b6 22. Criminal negligence has been described in many different ways. It exists where there is a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that harm will result from certain conduct. Id. \u00b6 16. It exists where a person acts with willful disregard of the rights or safety of others and in a manner that endangers any person or property. Id. It also exists where a person\u2019s actions are so reckless, wanton, and willful that they show an utter disregard for the safety of others. Id. D efendant requested an instruction pursuant to the third category of involuntary manslaughter instruction. Because we have held that a defense of habitation instruction was available to Defendant, the jury could have found that his shooting Lujan was in the commission of a lawful act, but was done without due caution or circumspection. See State v. Romero, 2005-NMCA-060, \u00b6 17, 137 N.M. 456, 112 P.3d 1113.\n{21} Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to giving the instruction, we conclude that the trial testimony would establish that D efendant knew that an intruder was on the other side of the door and that, because he was pounding on the door, the intruder was within an arm\u2019s length of the door. Despite having at least this much knowledge, Defendant fired a shot through the door. The jury could have determined that Defendant was criminally negligent because firing a gun at the door while someone was on the other side of it was \u201cwillful disregard of the rights or safety of others\u201d and endangered that unknown intruder. Henley, 2010-NMSC-039, \u00b6 16 (quoting UJI 14-133 NMRA) (internal quotation marks omitted). The jury also could have inferred that Defendant unintentionally killed the intruder based on Defendant\u2019s theory that he fired a warning shot, Duarte, 1996-NMCA-038, \u00b6 7 (stating that intent can be inferred), and evidence that Defendant only shot once, shot high into the door, and requested identification before he fired the shot. Because the jury could have found that Defendant committed a lawful act, and unintentionally killed the victim while acting criminally negligently, we conclude that an involuntary manslaughter instruction should have been given.\nIII. CONCLUSION\n{22} Having decided that, when considering the evidence in the light most favorable to giving the instructions, there was sufficient evidence to support the instructions, we conclude that the district court erred in refusing Defendant\u2019s request for a defense of habitation instruction and involuntary manslaughter instruction. We therefore reverse.\n{23} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nRODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nMICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge\nLINDA M. YANZI, Judge\nDuring a previous trial, a jury acquitted Defendant of second degree murder, but it could not reach a verdict on the voluntary manslaughter charge. The district court declared a mistrial, and the case went to trial again based solely on the voluntary manslaughter charge.\nThis came to light as impeachment evidence; defense counsel impeached the officer using prior statements made regarding Lujan\u2019s actions that evening.", "type": "majority", "author": "KENNEDY, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General Santa Fe, NM M. Victoria Wilson, Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM for Appellee", "Alan Maestas Law Office, P.C. Kathryn J. Hardy Alan H. Maestas Taos, NM for Appellant" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Certiorari Denied, April 5, 2016,\nNo. S-1-SC-35793\nIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2016-NMCA-042\nFiling Date: February 16, 2016\nDocket No. 33,564\nSTATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REQUILDO CARDENAS, Defendant-Appellant.\nHector H. Balderas, Attorney General Santa Fe, NM M. Victoria Wilson, Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM for Appellee\nAlan Maestas Law Office, P.C. Kathryn J. Hardy Alan H. Maestas Taos, NM for Appellant" }, "file_name": "0638-01", "first_page_order": 654, "last_page_order": 660 }