{ "id": 12168381, "name": "PHILLIP G. RAMIREZ, JR., Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. STATE OF NEW MEXICO CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES DEPARTMENT, DORIAN DODSON, in her individual and official capacities, RON WEST, in his individual and official capacities, BARBARA AUTEN, in her individual and official capacities, ROGER GILLESPIE, in his individual and official capacities, TED LOVATO, in his individual and official capacities, TIM HOLESINGER, in his individual and official capacities, DANIEL BERG, in his individual and official capacities, Defendants-Respondents, and NEW MEXICO ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, Intervenor", "name_abbreviation": "Ramirez v. State Children, Youth & Families Department, Dorian Dodson", "decision_date": "2016-04-14", "docket_number": "Docket No. S-1-SC-34613", "first_page": "696", "last_page": "707", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2016-NMSC-016" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "79 N.M. 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2736919 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/79/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "1968-NMSC-179", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 3" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2009 WL 3328484", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "*4", "parenthetical": "\"This Court will not reach the constitutional question raised above because it is clear that the [Wisconsin Legislature] waived the State's sovereign immunity by necessary implication when it incorporated USERRA, without qualification, within its general laws.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "819 N.W.2d 360", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 4028826 ], "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366-67", "parenthetical": "holding that a statute providing that the discharge from federal active duty of persons restored to state employment is subject to all federal laws affecting any private employment was sufficient to authorize the plaintiffs claims against the state under USERRA" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/343/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMSC-022", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 77128 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 N.M. 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1592852 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/108/0633-01" ] }, { "cite": "1989-NMSC-045", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 4" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "465 U.S. 89", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11334896 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99-100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/465/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 U.S. 651", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6179827 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "673" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/415/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "766 So. 2d 1186", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11215319 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1189", "parenthetical": "\"Although a waiver of sovereign immunity by a legislative enactment must be clear, specific, and unequivocal, no particular magic words are required.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/766/1186-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 S.W.3d 692", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 9114989 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e do not insist that the statute [waiving sovereign immunity] be a model of perfect clarity.\" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw3d/106/0692-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 N.M. 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552617 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "1994-NMSC-032", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 14" }, { "page": "\u00b6 14" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 201-219", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2012, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 U.S. 47", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6141907 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53" }, { "page": "54", "parenthetical": "\"[I]t is not consonant with our dual system for the Federal courts ... to read the consent to embrace Federal as well as state courts.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/322/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 U.S. 123", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8288600 ], "year": 1908, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/209/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMSC-016", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 1427947 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 1, 28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/135/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 P.3d 806", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2012-NMSC-001", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4187263 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/1/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "546 U.S. 356", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5917860 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/546/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 U.S. 775", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1107935 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/501/0775-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 U.S. 313", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 430003 ], "year": 1934, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328-29", "parenthetical": "collecting cases" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/292/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "2002-NMSC-009", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 260718 ], "weight": 17, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 4-8" }, { "page": "\u00b6 13" }, { "page": "\u00b6 13" }, { "page": "\u00b6 24" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 16-24" }, { "page": "\u00b6 24" }, { "page": "\u00b6 22" }, { "page": "\u00b6 18" }, { "page": "\u00b6 18" }, { "page": "\u00b6 18" }, { "page": "\u00b6 19" }, { "page": "\u00b6 22" }, { "page": "\u00b6 22" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 21-22" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 21-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/132/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 U.S. 706", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1248280 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "732-33", "parenthetical": "\"Although the sovereign immunity of the States derives at least in part from the common-law tradition, the structure and history of the Constitution make clear that the immunity exists today by constitutional design.\"" }, { "page": "713" }, { "page": "730-31" }, { "page": "730-31" }, { "page": "754-55" }, { "page": "755" }, { "page": "712" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/527/0706-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 P.3d 405", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2013-NMSC-018", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4335316 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/4/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMSC-027", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3670818 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMSC-006", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 18391 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/124/0640-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 S.W.3d 88", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 7093859 ], "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw3d/392/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 U.S. 743", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 354518 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "766" }, { "page": "765", "parenthetical": "\"[S]tate sovereign immunity serves the important function of shielding state treasuries and thus preserving the [state's] ability to govern.\" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/535/0743-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 N.M. 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1558923 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/120/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "1995-NMSC-036", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 Stat. 3315", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "981 F. Supp. 529", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 1140617 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532", "parenthetical": "dismissing a USERRA claim against the Michigan entities for lack of jurisdiction" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/981/0529-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 U.S. 44", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11744357 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/0044-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Stat. 3149", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 U.S.C. \u00a7 4323", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(3)" }, { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(b)(2)" }, { "page": "(b)(2)" }, { "page": "(b)(2)" }, { "page": "(a)(3)" }, { "page": "(b)(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 U.S.C. \u00a7 4303", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(4)(A)(iii)", "parenthetical": "defining the term \"employer\" to include \"a State\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 U.S.C. \u00a7 4311", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "409 F.3d 840", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 8958131 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/409/0840-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 U.S.C. \u00a7 43", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2014-NMCERT-005", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 P.3d 474", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2014-NMCA-057", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4239221 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 1, 27" }, { "page": "\u00b6 1" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 17-18" }, { "page": "\u00b6 25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/6/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 4301-4335", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2012, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1346, "char_count": 36142, "ocr_confidence": 0.796, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.2468506851171632 }, "sha256": "8463172d485f42ca1a1be71b2d9dc9e2b9aeffe565692652eb4e27a295c5e8e3", "simhash": "1:7f18273042a11eae", "word_count": 5757 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:30:56.942854+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "JUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Justice", "CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice", "PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice", "EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice", "BARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice" ], "parties": [ "PHILLIP G. RAMIREZ, JR., Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. STATE OF NEW MEXICO CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES DEPARTMENT, DORIAN DODSON, in her individual and official capacities, RON WEST, in his individual and official capacities, BARBARA AUTEN, in her individual and official capacities, ROGER GILLESPIE, in his individual and official capacities, TED LOVATO, in his individual and official capacities, TIM HOLESINGER, in his individual and official capacities, DANIEL BERG, in his individual and official capacities, D efendants-Resp ondents, and NEW MEXICO ATTORNEY GENERAL\u2019S OFFICE, Intervenor." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nNAKAMURA, Justice.\n{1} We are called to decide whether a New Mexico National Guard member may assert a claim against the State as employer under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 4301-4335 (2012). Phillip Ramirez, a member of the New Mexico Army National Guard, was employed by the New Mexico Children, Youth and Families Department (CYFD). In July 2005, Ramirez was ordered to federal active duty and deployed to Iraq. After Ramirez returned to work in New Mexico, CYFD terminated his employment. Ramirez sued CYFD, asserting a USERRA claim. A jury found that CYFD took adverse employment actions against Ramirez because of his military service and awarded him monetary damages. The Court of Appeals reversed the damages award, concluding that CYFD as an arm of the State was immune to Ramirez\u2019s USERRA claim. Ramirez v. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep\u2019t, 2014-NMCA-057, \u00b6\u00b6 1, 27, 326 P.3d 474, cert. granted, 2014-NMCERT-005. We disagree. By enacting NMSA 1978, Section 20-4-7.1(B) (2004), the Legislature specifically extended \u201c[t]he rights, benefits and protections\u201d of USERRA to members of the New Mexico National Guard who are ordered to federal or state active duty for a period of thirty or more consecutive days. In so doing, the Legislature consented to suits brought against state employers who violate the protections guaranteed by USERRA. Accordingly, we reverse and reinstate the district court\u2019s judgment and damages award.\nI. BACKGROUND\nA. USERRA\n{2} Congress enacted USERRA to encourage noncareer military service, to minimize disruptions in the lives and communities of those who serve in the uniformed services, and \u201cto prohibit discrimination against persons because of their service in the uniformed services.\u201d 38 U.S.C. \u00a7 43 01 (a)(l )-(3). Congress created USERRA pursuant to its War Powers set forth in Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the United States Constitution. Bedrossian v. Nw. Mem'l Hosp., 409 F.3d 840, 843-44 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2005). In pertinent part, USERRA provides:\nA person who is a member of, applies to be a member of, performs, has performed, applies to perform, or has an obligation to perform service in a uniformed service shall not be denied initial employment, reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit of employment by an employer on the basis of that membership, application for membership, performance of service, application for service, or obligation.\n38 U.S.C. \u00a7 4311(a). USERRA\u2019s antidiscrimination rights apply to states as employers. See 38 U.S.C. \u00a7 4303(4)(A)(iii) (defining the term \u201cemployer\u201d to include \u201ca State\u201d). To enforce these guarantees, USERRA creates a private right of action for qualified service members to recover monetary damages against a state as an employer. 38 U.S.C. \u00a7 4323(a)(3), (d)(1)(B)(C).\n{3} Congress originally conferredjurisdiction on the federal district courts to adjudicate USERRA actions brought by private individuals against state employers. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-353, 108 Stat. 3149, 3165 (1994) (providing that \u201c[i]n the case of an action against a State as an employer, the appropriate district court is the court for any district in which the State exercises any authority\u201d) (current version at 38 U.S.C. \u00a7 4323(b)). In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, however, the Supreme Court rejected Congress\u2019s authority under the powers granted by Article I of the United States Constitution to abrogate a state\u2019s sovereign immunity and subject nonconsenting states to suit in federal court. 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996). Because Congress enacted USERRA pursuant to its War Powers granted by Article I, Section 8, Seminole Tribe cast doubt on the federal courts\u2019 jurisdiction to adjudicate USERRA actions for monetary damages against states as employers. See, e.g., Palmatier v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 981 F. Supp. 529, 532 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (dismissing a USERRA claim against the Michigan entities for lack of jurisdiction).\n{4} In 1998, Congress amended USERRA\u2019s jurisdictional provision concerning claims against state employers to provide that \u201c[i]n the case of an action against a State (as an employer) by a person, the action may be brought in a State court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the laws of the State.\u201d Veterans Programs Enhancement Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-368, \u00a7 211(a), 112 Stat. 3315, 3329 (1998) (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. \u00a7 4323(b)(2)). With this amendment, Congress sought to channel private USERRA claims against state employers to state courts. See 38 U.S.C. \u00a7 4323(b)(2). Given this background, Ramirez asserted a USERRA claim against CYFD in New Mexico district court.\nB. Ramirez\u2019s USERRA claim\n{5} Ramirez joined the New Mexico National Guard on August 22,1991. On April 9, 1997, CYFD hired him as a surveillance officer. In November 2005, Ramirez was deployed to Iraq where he led a platoon charged with providing security escort to supply convoys. After his service in Iraq, Ramirez was transferred to Kuwait, where on May 13, 2006, he was promoted to Sergeant First Class. Ramirez returned to Gallup in November 2006.\n{6} Ramirez resumed employment with CYFD on January 2, 2007 under the supervision of Daniel Berg and Tim Holesinger. Within a few months of his return, Ramirez\u2019s relationship with his supervisors deteriorated. Berg and Holesinger allegedly harassed and reprimanded Ramirez for being insubordinate. On May 8, 2008, CYFD terminated his employment.\n{7} On May 19,2008, Ramirez filed a lawsuit in the Eleventh Judicial District Court against CYFD, the former secretary of CYFD, Holesinger, Berg, and others at CYFD who supervised Ramirez, alleging a USERRA claim for monetary relief and other claims arising under federal and state law. CYFD moved to dismiss Ramirez\u2019s USERRA claim on grounds that, as a state agency, it was immune to USERRA claims brought by private individuals. The record indicates that the district court did not specifically rule on that motion and commenced a jury trial on, inter alia, Ramirez\u2019s USERRA claim. During trial, CYFD moved for a directed verdict with respect to the USERRA claim. The district court denied that motion. The jury found that Ramirez\u2019s military service was a motivating factor for the adverse employment actions taken by CYFD and returned a verdict in his favor, awarding him $36,000 in damages for lost earnings. The district court entered the judgment and award in favor of Ramirez.\n{8} CYFD appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. Ramirez, 2014-NMCA-057, \u00b6 1. In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeals held that CYFD, as a state agency, was immune to Ramirez\u2019s USERRA claim. See id. The Court of Appeals determined that the Legislature had not waived New Mexico\u2019s sovereign immunity with respect to Ramirez\u2019s USERRA claim because the Legislature had not spoken with \u201cthe requisite specificity required to determine . . . [an] intension] to waive the State\u2019s constitutional sovereign immunity to private USERRA suits for damages.\u201d Id. \u00b6 19. The Court of Appeals also held that CYFD was immune to Ramirez\u2019s USERRA claim because, in the absence of a state\u2019s consent to suit, Congress lacks the power to abrogate a state\u2019s sovereign immunity when acting pursuant to its War Powers. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 17-18.\n{9} We granted Ramirez\u2019s petition for a writ of certiorari to consider whether New Mexico is immune to private USERRA suits for damages, exercising our appellate jurisdiction provided by Article VI, Section 3 of the New Mexico Constitution and NMSA 1978, Section 34-5-14(B) (1972). We also granted the New Mexico Office of the Attorney General\u2019s motion to intervene and allowed amicus curiae briefs from the United States, the Reserve Officers Association of America, and the American Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico.\nII. DISCUSSION\nA. State sovereign immunity should be determined at the outset of litigation\n{10} The procedural history of Ramirez\u2019s USERRA claim in the district court gives us pause. In its motion to dismiss, CYFD argued that the USERRA claim should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because CYFD was immune from suit. CYFD requested a hearing on that motion, and the district court held a hearing on February 9, 2010. At the hearing, the district court announced it would issue a written ruling. The record, however, contains no indication that the district court ruled on CYFD\u2019s motion, and CYFD maintains that the district court did not so rule.\n{11} When the State moves to dismiss a plaintiffs claim by raising the affirmative defense of sovereign immunity invoking the lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the district courtmustrule on that motionbefore allowing the claim to proceed. See Gonzales v. Surgidev Corp., 1995-NMSC-036, \u00b6 12, 120 N.M. 133, 899 P.2d 576 (\u201cSubject matter jurisdiction is [a court\u2019s] power to adjudicate the general questions involved in the claim.\u201d). This is a matter of both principle and practice. First, sovereign immunity protects the State not only from liability but also from suit. Fed. Mar. Comm\u2019n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 766 (2002). Courts may not allow a plaintiff to impose on the State the expense of litigating a claim to which it is immune. See id. at 765 (\u201c[S]tate sovereign immunity serves the important function of shielding state treasuries and thus preserving the [state\u2019s] ability to govern.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Second, if the State properly invokes its sovereign immunity to a pending claim, \u201cany [ruling] regarding that claim is advisory to the extent that it addresses issues other than immunity.\u201d See Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 95 (Tex. 2012). And \u201c[w]e avoid rendering advisory opinions.\u201d City of Las Cruces v. El Paso Elec. Co., 1998-NMSC-006, \u00b6 18, 124 N.M. 640, 954 P.2d 72. Third, as a matter of judicial administration, if the State raises the defense of sovereign immunity to a claim, that issue should be decided well before the claim goes to a jury\u2014not after a jury has rendered a verdict.See Gonzales, 1995-NMSC-036, \u00b6 12.\n{12} In this case, we conclude that the Legislature consented to private USERRA actions for damages. Hence, the risks associated with not deciding a state sovereign immunity defense at the outset did not materialize. Nevertheless, we reiterate that the defense of state sovereign immunity should be adjudicated at the outset of litigation, instead of permitting the issue to be decided after the expense of trial.\nB. USERRA and state sovereign immunity\n1. Standard of review\n{13} We review de novo whether New Mexico is immune in its own courts to a claim for damages arising under federal law. See Manning v. Mining & Minerals Div. of Energy, Minerals & Nat. Res. Dep't, 2006-NMSC-027, \u00b6 9, 140 N.M. 528, 144 P.3d 87. Further, whether the Legislature waived New Mexico\u2019s sovereign immunity with respect to USERRA claims filed by private individuals in state court is an issue of statutory interpretation that is also subject to de novo review. Moongate Water Co. v. City of Las Cruces, 2013-NMSC-018, \u00b6 6, 302 P.3d 405.\n2. State sovereign immunity and congressional legislation enacted under the War Powers Clause\n{14} As framed by the parties, this case principally concerns whether the War Powers Clause grants Congress the power to abrogate a state\u2019s sovereign immunity to suit in its own courts. To enforce the rights furnished to private individuals by USERRA against state employers, Congress subjects the states to private actions for money damages in their own courts. See 38 U.S.C. \u00a7 4323(b)(2). The parties dispute whether this statutory provision is beyond Congress\u2019s power to enact.\n{15} This case concerns New Mexico\u2019s sovereign immunity to federal causes of action for monetary damages in its own courts\u2014an immunity that derives from the federal Constitution. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 732-33 (1999) (\u201cAlthough the sovereign immunity of the States derives at least in part from the common-law tradition, the structure and history of the Constitution make clear that the immunity exists today by constitutional design.\u201d); Cockrell v. Bd. of Regents of N.M. State Univ., 2002-NMSC-009, \u00b6\u00b6 4-8, 132 N.M. 156, 45 P.3d 876 (discussing Alden at length). New Mexico\u2019s immunity to suit for damages is a fundamental aspect of its sovereignty and is held by virtue of its \u201cadmission into the Union upon an equal footing with the other States.\u201d Alden, 527 U.S. at 713.\n{16} Because New Mexico\u2019s sovereign immunity is grounded in the federal Constitution, it exists only where the states\u2019 sovereign immunity was not relinquished either \u201cby the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional Amendments.\u201d Id.; see also The Federalist No. 81 (Hamilton) (\u201cIt is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent. . . . Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the States . . . .\u201d) (emphasis added). For example, \u201c[i]n ratifying the Constitution, the States consented to suits brought by other States or by the Federal Government.\u201d Alden, 527 U.S. at 754 (citing Principality of Monaco v. State of Miss., 292 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1934) (collecting cases)).\n{17} In Alden, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of state sovereignty at the Constitutional Convention and specifically examined whether any provision of Article I grants Congress the power to subject nonconsenting states to private suits for damages in their own courts. See 527 U.S. at 730-31. The Supreme Coirrt determined that Congress only has such a power \u201cif there is \u2018compelling evidence\u2019 that the States were required to surrender this power to Congress pursuant to the constitutional design.\u201d Id. at 730-31 (quoting Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 781 (1991)). After analyzing the \u201chistory, practice, precedent, and the structure of the Constitution,\u201d the Supreme Court held that \u201cthe States retain immunity from private suit in their own courts, an immunity beyond the congressional power to abrogate by Article I legislation.\u201d Id. at 754.\n{18} In Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006), the Supreme Court retreated from the broad holdings of Seminole Tribe and Alden that nothing in Article I empowers Congress to subject a state to suit by a private party for monetary relief without its consent. Katz concluded after looking to the history of the Bankruptcy Clause, U.S. Const. art I, \u00a7 8, cl. 4, and bankruptcy legislation considered and enacted in the wake of the Constitution\u2019s ratification that the B ankruptcy Clause enables Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity in bankruptcy proceedings. See 546 U.S. at 377 (\u201cThe ineluctable conclusion, then, is that States agreed in the plan ofthe Convention not to assert any sovereign immunity defense they might have had in proceedings brought pursuant to \u2018Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies.\u2019\u201d (quotingU.S. Const, art I, \u00a7 8, cl. 4)). Katz, therefore, applied the framework articulated in Alden to conclude that Congress\u2019s power under the Bankruptcy Clause includes a limited power to abrogate state sovereign immunity. See id. In so doing, Katz opened the door to arguments that constitutional history and structure show that Congress, by acting pursuant to other Article I powers, may subject the states to private suits absent their consent.\n{19} Encouraged by the Supreme Court\u2019s holding in Katz, Ramirez, the New Mexico Office of the Attorney General (as an intervenor), and the United States (as an amicus curiae) argue that Congress\u2019s War Powers include the power to subject states to private suits for monetary relief without their consent. They maintain that this putative power sounds in the plan of the Convention.\n{20} We decline to decide whether, pursuant to the constitutional structure outlined at the Convention and ratified thereafter, the states implicitly consented to Congress\u2019s authority under its War Powers to override their sovereign immunity. The resolution of that constitutional question is unnecessary to the disposition of this case; therefore, we do not address it. See Allen v. LeMaster, 2012-NMSC-001, \u00b6 28, 267 P.3d 806 (\u201cIt is an enduring principle of constitutional jurisprudence that courts will avoid deciding constitutional questions unless required to do so.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Instead, we address whether the New Mexico Legislature waived New Mexico\u2019s sovereign immunity to private suits seeking monetary relief for a state employer\u2019s alleged violation of a right guaranteed by USERRA.\n3. Determining waiver of state sovereign immunity\n{21} New Mexico\u2019s privilege to assert its sovereign immunity in its own courts \u201cdoes not confer upon the State a concomitant right to disregard the Constitution or valid federal law.\u201d Alden, 527 U.S. at 754-55. Sovereign immunity does not bar all judicial review of state compliance with federal law in New Mexico courts. For instance, a private individual may bring a federal cause of action seeking prospective, injunctive relief against a state officer. See Gill v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd. of Pub. Emps. Ret. Ass\u2019n of N.M., 2004-NMSC-016, \u00b6\u00b6 1, 28, 135 N.M. 472, 90 P.3d 491 (applying the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), to private suits against state officials).\n{22} Furthermore, the Legislature may consent to suits against the State. See Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, \u00b6 13 (\u201c[I]t is within the sole province of the Legislature to waive the State\u2019s constitutional sovereign immunity.\u201d). \u201cThe rigors of sovereign immunity are thus \u2018mitigated by a sense of justice which has continually expanded by consent the suability of the sovereign. \u2019\u201d Alden, 527 U.S. at 755 (quoting Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 53 (1944)). The Legislature may waive New Mexico\u2019s sovereign immunity with respect to causes of action that it creates. See, e.g., NMSA 1978, \u00a7 14-2-12 (1993) (providing for enforcement, including the award of monetary damages, for a claim arising under the Inspection of Public Records Act); NMSA 1978, \u00a7 28-l-13(D) (2005) (providing for the State\u2019s monetary liability for injury to a person under the Human Rights Act). The Legislature may also waive New Mexico\u2019s immunity to federal causes of action that Congress creates through the exercise of its Article I powers. See Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, \u00b6 13.\n{23} This case turns on whether the Legislature waived the State\u2019s immunity to suit by enacting Section 20-4-7.1(B), which applies the rights created by USERRA to qualifying members of the New Mexico National Guard. Cockrell guides the resolution of this question. In Cockrell, this Court stated \u201cthat any waiver of the State\u2019s constitutional sovereign immunity must be clear and unambiguous.\u201d 2002-NMSC-009, \u00b6 24. There, we specifically considered whether NMSA 1978, Section 37-1-23(A) (1976) waived the State\u2019s sovereign immunity in actions for overtime wages asserted under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 201-219 (2012). Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, \u00b6\u00b6 16-24. Section 37-1-23(A) grants immunity to governmental entities \u201cfrom actions based on contract, except actions based on a valid written contract.\u201d This Court concluded that this statute did not clearly and unambiguously indicate the Legislature\u2019s intent to make state entities amenable to suits asserting FLSA claims instate courts. Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, \u00b6 24. We accordingly held that \u201cSection 37-1-23 does not waive the State\u2019s constitutional sovereign immunity.\u201d Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, \u00b6 22.\n{24} We first look to the text of a statute to determine whether the Legislature\u2019s waiver of immunity is clear and unambiguous. For example, in Cockrell we first addressed whether the text of Section 37-1-23(A) indicated an express waiver of immunity. 2002-NMSC-009, \u00b6 18. This Court determined that an FLSA claim, which is purely statutory, is not \u201cbased on a valid written contract\u201d within the meaning of Section 37-1-23(A), even where there is a valid contract for employment incorporating the protections of the FLSA. Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, \u00b6 18. Accordingly, this Court concluded that \u201cSection 37-1-23 does not provide an express waiver of immunity for . . . FLSA cl aim [s].\u201d Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, \u00b6 18.\n{25} With respect to a textual indication of waiver, we clarify that the Legislature is not required to employ certain magic words or a specific formulaic recital to express its intention to consent to suit in state court. In Luboyeski v. Hill, for example, this Court concluded that the State waived its immunity to private suits brought to enforce the New Mexico Human Rights Act under its provision that \u201c\u2018the state shall be liable the same as a private person.\u2019\u201d 1994-NMSC-032, \u00b6 14, 117 N.M. 380, 872 P.2d 353 (quoting Section 28-1-13 (D) (1987)). Other jurisdictions have also declined to adopt a magic-words test to discern a waiver of state sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 697 (Tex. 2003) (\u201c[W]e do not insist that the statute [waiving sovereign immunity] be a model of perfect clarity.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Klonis v. State, Dep\u2019t of Revenue, 766 So. 2d 1186, 1189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (\u201cAlthough a waiver of sovereign immunity by a legislative enactment must be clear, specific, and unequivocal, no particular magic words are required.\u201d). Like these courts, we do not favor any particular language by which the Legislature may render the State amenable to suit in its own courts.\n{26} This Court may also discern a clear and unambiguous waiver by examining the purpose of a statute. The clear and unambiguous standard does not confine our statutory analysis to the text alone. For example, in Cockrell, after considering whether Section 37-l-23(A) expressly waived immunity, this Court addressed whether the statute \u201cimplicitly evidencefd] a legislative intent to waive immunity from FLSA claims.\u201d 2002-NMSC-009, \u00b6 19. Cockrell \u201crecognized that the purpose of the legislative enactment containing Section 37-1-23 was to reinstate the sovereign immunity which had been abolished by Hicks v. State, subject to certain exceptions.\u201d Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, \u00b6 22 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court determined that the purpose of the limited waiver of immunity expressed in Section 37-l-23(A) was to encourage parties who contract with state entities to do so in writing in order to ensure clear terms and to verify that the \u201cgovernmental entity is authorized to enter into [the] contract.\u201d Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, \u00b6 22 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Cockrell concluded that the purposes of Section 37-l-23(A) did not support making state entities amenable to suit in state courts for alleged violations of the FLSA. See Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, \u00b6\u00b6 21-22.\n{27} We clarify that the method that this Court employs to determine whether the Legislature waived New Mexico\u2019s immunity to suit in its own courts is not the method employed by the federal courts to discern a waiver of state sovereign immunity to suit in federal court. While the federal courts may hesitate to look beyond the statutory text to discern a state\u2019s consent to suit in the federal courts, see, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1973), in Cockrell, this Court appropriately examined both the text and the purpose of a statute to determine the Legislature\u2019s intent to consent to suit in its own court. 2002-NMSC-009, \u00b6\u00b6 21-22. The federal courts\u2019 determination of waivers of sovereign immunity to suit in federal court is guided by federalism concerns that do not bear upon this Court\u2019s determination of the Legislature\u2019s consent to suit in the courts of New Mexico. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1984) (\u201cA State\u2019s constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely -whether it may be sued, but where it may be sued. . . . [BJecause of the problems of federalism inherent in making one sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other, a restriction upon the exercise of the federal judicial power has long been considered to be appropriate. . . .\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Unlike the federal courts, when this Court interprets a statute to determine the Legislature\u2019s intent to waive sovereign immunity, we are concerned with the State\u2019s amenability to suit in its own courts. Thus, as in Cockrell, this Court will examine both statutory text and purpose to determine whether the Legislature clearly intended to waive the State\u2019s sovereign immunity to a federal cause of action in its own courts.\n{28} We also make clear that any determination by this Court that the Legislature consented to suit in its own courts does not also mean that the Legislature consented to suit in the federal courts. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100 n.9 (noting that the United States Supreme Court \u201cconsistently has held that a State\u2019s waiver of sovereign immunity in its own courts is not a waiver of the Eleventh Amendment immunity in the federal courts\u201d); Great N. Life Ins., 322 U.S. at 54 (\u201c[I]t is not consonant with our dual system for the Federal courts ... to read the consent to embrace Federal as well as state courts.\u201d).\n4. New Mexico waived sovereign immunity to USERRA claims\n{29} Ramirez contends that by enacting Section 20-4-7.1(B), the Legislature waived state sovereign immunity to his USERRA action. We agree. Section 20-4-7.1(B) provides as follows: \u201cThe rights, benefits and protections of the federal Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 shall apply to a member of the national guard ordered to federal or state active duty for a period of thirty or more consecutive days.\u201d The Legislature enacted this provision in 2004, with knowledge oiAlden's holding that \u201cthe powers delegated to Congress under Article I ... do not include the power to subject nonconsenting States to private suits for damages in state courts.\u201d See Alden, 527 U.S. at 712; 2004 N.M. Laws, ch. 37 \u00a7 1 (codified at \u00a7 20-4-7.1(B)). See also Inc. Cty. of Los Alamos v. Johnson, 1989-NMSC-045, \u00b6 4, 108 N.M. 633, 776 P.2d 1252 (presuming that the legislature is well informed as to existing law).\n{30} Under Section 20-4-7.1(B), the Legislature provided that members of the New Mexico National Guard who are ordered to active duty for at least thirty consecutive days will benefit from every applicable right that USERRA creates. Two of these rights are pertinent here. First, USERRA guarantees members of a uniformed service the right not to be denied \u201cany benefit of employment by an employer on the basis\u201d of their membership in a uniformed service. 38 U.S.C. \u00a7 4311(a). Second, USERRA creates a private right of action for damages against a state employer to remedy violations of USERRA\u2019s substantive antidiscrimination protections. See 38 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 4323(a)(3), (d)(l)(B)-(C), 4311(a).\n{31} Section 20-4-7.1(B) guarantees both the substantive antidiscrimination right and the right of action against a state employer to members of the national guard ordered to federal or state active duty for a period of thirty or more consecutive days. Section 20-4-7.1(B) adopts the rights guaranteed by USERRA without limitation. The statutory provision contains no suggestion that it only extends some of the rights created by USERRA. See \u00a7 20-4-7.1(B). It does not suggest that the Legislature intended to extend USERRA\u2019s substantive antidiscrimination right to members of the New Mexico National Guard but to withhold USERRA\u2019s right to a remedy for damages. See id. We therefore have no reason to construe the statute as not conferring USERRA\u2019s right of action against state employers to national guard members.\n{32} Other relevant statutes counsel against such a construction, and we read statutes in pari materia to ascertain legislative intent. See State v. Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, \u00b6 12, 134 N.M. 172, 74 P.3d 1064. The Legislature has made clear that \u201c[t]he intent of the New Mexico Military Code and all laws and regulations of the state affecting the military forces is to reasonably conform to all laws and regulations of the United States affecting the same subjects, except as otherwise expressly provided with respect to military justice.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 20-1-2 (1987). Furthermore, it has long been the policy of New Mexico to provide a private right of action for damages against the State as an employer for the failure to reemploy a qualifying service member who returns to state employment from active duty. See NMSA 1978, Section 28-15-3 (1941, amended 1971) (creating a private right of action to enforce the substantive rights created by NMSA 1978, Section 28-15-1 (1941)). To be sure, Sections 28-15-1 and 28-15-3 would not provide Ramirez with a remedy because those provisions guard against a state employer\u2019s failure to reemploy a qualifying service member and Ramirez was reemployed by CYFD. Ramirez complained of separate adverse employment actions, including termination, taken by CYFD because of his military service. Nevertheless, the Legislature\u2019s creation of a private right of action for qualifying service members to recover from the discrimination of not being reemployed because of their uniformed service strongly supports that, by enacting Section 20-4-7.1(B), the Legislature intended to create a right of action for qualifying service members to recover from other forms of employment discrimination. Thus, in light of both the Legislature\u2019s longstanding willingness to confer a private right of action against state employers on service members who return from active duty and suffer the employment discrimination of not being reemployed because of their military service (as indicated by Section 28-15-3) and the Legislature\u2019s intent that New Mexico law conform to federal law with respect to the military forces (as expressed by Section 20-1-2), it is clear that Section 20-4-7.1(B) confers on members of the New Mexico National Guard who are ordered to federal or state active duty for a period of thirty or more consecutive days a private right of action for damages against the State to remedy a violation of USERRA\u2019s substantive antidiscrimination rights.\n{33} Other courts, when confronted with the same issue, have interpreted statutes similar to Section 20-4-7.1(B) and Section 20-1-2 to indicate a legislative intent to waive immunity to private USERRA actions. See Scocos v. State Dep\u2019t of Veteran Affairs, 819 N.W.2d 360, 366-67 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that a statute providing that the discharge from federal active duty of persons restored to state employment is subject to all federal laws affecting any private employment was sufficient to authorize the plaintiffs claims against the state under USERRA); Panarello v. State, 2009 WL 3328484, at *4 (R.I. Super. Jan. 22, 2009) (\u201cThis Court will not reach the constitutional question raised above because it is clear that the [Wisconsin Legislature] waived the State\u2019s sovereign immunity by necessary implication when it incorporated USERRA, without qualification, within its general laws.\u201d).\n{34} When the Legislature creates a right of action for damages against the State it thereby makes the State liable to suit. See Luboyeski, 1994-NMSC-032, \u00b6 14 (holding that the Human Rights Act\u2019s provisions permitting plaintiffs to obtain damages and attorney\u2019s fees from the State waived the State\u2019s sovereign immunity created by the Tort Claims Act). When enacting Section 20-4-7.1(B), the Legislature furnished qualifying members of the New Mexico National Guard a right of action against state employers for money damages if they are denied any benefit of employment by a state employer on the basis of their membership in the national guard or their service to this State and the United States. Therefore, we conclude that the Legislature consented to private USERRA suits for damages against state employers.\n{35} Our analysis differs from the reasoning of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals first determined that the War Powers Clause does not grant Congress the power to subject nonconsenting states to private suits for damages in their own courts. Ramirez, 2014-NMCA-057, \u00b6\u00b6 17-18. The Court of Appeals then reasoned that Sections 20-1-2 and20-4-7.1(B), which serve to confer the rights created by USERRA on qualifying members of the New Mexico National Guard, cannot have extended USERRA\u2019s jurisdictional provision that a private right of action may be brought in a state court. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded that neither Section 20-1-2 nor Section 20-4-7.1(B) waived New Mexico\u2019s sovereign immunity to private USERRA actions seeking monetary damages. Ramirez, 2014-NMCA-057, \u00b6 25.\n{36} Unlike the Court of Appeals, we do not decide whether the War Powers Clause grants Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Whether USERRA\u2019s jurisdictional provision that enforcement actions \u201cmay be brought in a State court\u201d is ultra vires, and, consequently, whether the Legislature could have validly extended that jurisdictional provision, are issues inapposite to the proper resolution of this case. 38 U.S.C. \u00a7 4323(b)(2). New Mexico\u2019s district courts are corrrts of general jurisdiction. Trujillo v. State, 1968-NMSC-179, \u00b6 3, 79 N.M. 618, 447 P.2d 279. Their power to adjudicate claims is grounded in the New Mexico Constitution, not in a federal statute. N.M. Const., art. VI, \u00a7 13.\n{37} In the light of the text and purpose of Section 20-4-7.1(B), the Legislature clearly conferred USERRA\u2019s antidiscrimination rights on qualifying members of the New Mexico National Guard and extended USERRA\u2019s private right of action for damages against state employers that violate those antidiscrimination rights. In so doing, the Legislature waived New Mexico\u2019s immunity to suit.\nIII. CONCLUSION\n{38} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the district court\u2019s judgment and damage award.\n{39} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nJUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Justice\nWE CONCUR:\nCHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice\nPETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice\nEDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice\nBARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice", "type": "majority", "author": "NAKAMURA, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Vega Lynn Law Offices, LLC Rosario D. Vega Lynn Albuquerque, NM Lorenz Law Alice Tomlinson Lorenz Albuquerque, NM for Petitioner", "Hinkle Shanor, LLP Ellen S. Casey Jaclyn M. McLean Loren S. Foy Santa Fe, NM for Respondent", "Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General Robert David Pederson, Assistant Attorney General Phillip Patrick Baca, Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM for Intervenor", "Serra & Garrity, PC Diane M. Garrity Santa Fe, NM Reserve Officers Association Samuel F. Wright Washington, DC Law Office of Thomas G. Jarrar\u00e1, PLLC Thomas G. Jarrar\u00e1 Spokane, WA Robert Mitchell Attorney at Law, PLLC Robert W. Mitchell Spokane, WA for Amicus Curiae Reserve Officers Association of America", "Office of the U.S. Attorney Damon P. Martinez, U.S. Attorney Manuel Lucero, Assistant U.S. Attorney Albuquerque, NM Department of Justice Civil Rights Division Nathaniel S. Pollock Washington, DC for Amicus Curiae United States", "Garcia Ives Nowara, LLC George L. Bach Albuquerque, NM for Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2016-NMSC-016\nFiling Date: April 14, 2016\nDocket No. S-1-SC-34613\nPHILLIP G. RAMIREZ, JR., Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. STATE OF NEW MEXICO CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES DEPARTMENT, DORIAN DODSON, in her individual and official capacities, RON WEST, in his individual and official capacities, BARBARA AUTEN, in her individual and official capacities, ROGER GILLESPIE, in his individual and official capacities, TED LOVATO, in his individual and official capacities, TIM HOLESINGER, in his individual and official capacities, DANIEL BERG, in his individual and official capacities, D efendants-Resp ondents, and NEW MEXICO ATTORNEY GENERAL\u2019S OFFICE, Intervenor.\nVega Lynn Law Offices, LLC Rosario D. Vega Lynn Albuquerque, NM Lorenz Law Alice Tomlinson Lorenz Albuquerque, NM for Petitioner\nHinkle Shanor, LLP Ellen S. Casey Jaclyn M. McLean Loren S. Foy Santa Fe, NM for Respondent\nHector H. Balderas, Attorney General Robert David Pederson, Assistant Attorney General Phillip Patrick Baca, Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM for Intervenor\nSerra & Garrity, PC Diane M. Garrity Santa Fe, NM Reserve Officers Association Samuel F. Wright Washington, DC Law Office of Thomas G. Jarrar\u00e1, PLLC Thomas G. Jarrar\u00e1 Spokane, WA Robert Mitchell Attorney at Law, PLLC Robert W. Mitchell Spokane, WA for Amicus Curiae Reserve Officers Association of America\nOffice of the U.S. Attorney Damon P. Martinez, U.S. Attorney Manuel Lucero, Assistant U.S. Attorney Albuquerque, NM Department of Justice Civil Rights Division Nathaniel S. Pollock Washington, DC for Amicus Curiae United States\nGarcia Ives Nowara, LLC George L. Bach Albuquerque, NM for Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico" }, "file_name": "0696-01", "first_page_order": 712, "last_page_order": 723 }