{ "id": 1588618, "name": "In the Matter of John DOE, a child. STATE of New Mexico, ex rel. HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, Petitioner, v. Julie STAPLES, Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "State ex rel. Human Services Department v. Staples", "decision_date": "1983-02-18", "docket_number": "No. 14692", "first_page": "92", "last_page": "97", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "100 N.M. 92" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "666 P.2d 771" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "109 U.Pa.L.Rev. 67", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "U. Pa. L. Rev.", "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 Harv.L.Rev. 1157", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Harv. L. Rev.", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1233" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "205 Neb. 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb.", "case_ids": [ 2598350 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/neb/205/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "545 F.2d 1137", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1014983 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/545/1137-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 F.Supp. 10", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3842990 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/406/0010-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 F.Supp. 769", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3879782 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/417/0769-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 U.S. 158", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 302055 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" }, { "page": "442" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/321/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 A.2d 1387", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1388" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N.H. 713", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.H.", "case_ids": [ 4446322 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nh/118/0713-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 N.W. 63", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "year": 1940, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 Minn. 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Minn.", "case_ids": [ 225715 ], "year": 1940, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/minn/209/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 N.E.2d 39", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 Ill.App.2d 933", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2822709 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/130/0933-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 A.2d 163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 N.J.Misc. 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Misc.", "case_ids": [ 436482 ], "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-misc/26/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 N.M. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1568677 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/93/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 Ill. 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5273784 ], "year": 1870, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/55/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 U.S. 589", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11341451 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/385/0589-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 S.E. 185", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1915, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 Ga.App. 693", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga. App.", "case_ids": [ 1287974 ], "year": 1915, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/15/0693-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 N.M. 746", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5361646 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/81/0746-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 N.E.2d 460", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 Ill.App.3d 783", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5305973 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/35/0783-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 So.2d 338", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "217 Miss. 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Miss.", "case_ids": [ 8819507 ], "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/miss/217/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 S.W.2d 37", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10153303 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/357/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 Ark. 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8717540 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/266/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 N.M. 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1568751 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/93/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "575 P.2d 1094", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 Wash.App. 429", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. App.", "case_ids": [ 474013 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-app/19/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "26 A.2d 799", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.J.Eq. 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Eq.", "case_ids": [ 930429 ], "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-eq/132/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 U.S. 816", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 2109 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/431/0816-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 N.M. 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2776921 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "598" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/85/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 N.M. 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1577325 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/96/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 N.M. 780", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1571024 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/91/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Neb. 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb.", "case_ids": [ 2598350 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/neb/205/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "545 F.2d 1137", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1014983 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/545/1137-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 F.Supp. 10", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3842990 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/406/0010-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 F.Supp. 769", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3879782 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/417/0769-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1000, "char_count": 19700, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.961384762096042e-08, "percentile": 0.3712670120922108 }, "sha256": "3a7a0e30c1949d1dfb3aaab2a00b6db7ae87178f379c92dbf9a6e0c4f8b1b647", "simhash": "1:9f6ca20558c25172", "word_count": 3216 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:45:38.267108+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "PAYNE, C.J., SOSA, Senior Justice, and FEDERICI and RIORDAN, JJ., concur.", "LOPEZ, J., concurs.", "WALTERS, C.J., dissents." ], "parties": [ "In the Matter of John DOE, a child. STATE of New Mexico, ex rel. HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, Petitioner, v. Julie STAPLES, Respondent." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION ON CERTIORARI\nSTOWERS, Justice.\nThis Court granted certiorari in State of New Mexico ex rel. Human Services v. Staples, in which the Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of Section 40-7-4(B)(4), N.M.S.A.1978 (Cum.Supp.1982). The Court of Appeals held that Section 40-7-4(B)(4) was void for vagueness and therefore reversed the decision of the trial court. Judge Walters dissented from the majority opinion and outlined her reasons for finding the challenged section neither vague nor indefinite.\nWe adopt the dissenting opinion authored by Judge Walters of the Court of Appeals as the opinion of this Court, thereby upholding the constitutionality of Section 40-7-4(B)(4).\nThe publication of both the Court of Appeals majority opinion, which we reverse, and the dissent, which we adopt, are ordered. This opinion is also to be published.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nPAYNE, C.J., SOSA, Senior Justice, and FEDERICI and RIORDAN, JJ., concur.\nNo. 5306.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nNov. 9, 1982.\nOPINION\nSUTIN, Judge.\nThe Department of Human Services (DHS) filed an application for termination of parental rights of a natural mother to her child pursuant to \u00a7 40-7-4(B)(4), N.M. S.A.1978 (Cum.Supp.1982). The mother filed a motion to dismiss the proceedings on the grounds of unconstitutionality. In its decision, the trial court concluded that the statute was constitutional and entered judgment that the parental rights of the mother were terminated. The mother appeals. We reverse.\nSection 40-7-4(B)(4) reads:\nThe court shall terminate parental rights with respect to a minor child when:\n(4) the child has been placed in foster care by a court order or has been otherwise placed by parents or others into the physical custody of such family and the following conditions exist:\n(a) the child has lived in the foster home for an extended period of time;\n(b) the parent/child relationship has disintegrated;\n(c) a psychological parent/child relationship has developed between the foster family and the child;\n(d) if the court deems the child of sufficient capacity to express a preference, the child prefers no longer to live with the natural parent; and\n(e) the foster family desires to adopt the child.\nAdoption was unknown to the common law, and is purely statutory and is to be strictly construed. Gardner v. Hall, 132 N.J.Eq. 64, 26 A.2d 799 (1942). Given a choice between a narrow, restrictive construction and a broad, more liberal construction, the latter must be chosen. State ex rel. McDonald v. Whatcom Cty., Etc., 19 Wash.App. 429, 575 P.2d 1094 (1978).\nSimply stated, if a \u201cparent/child relationship\u201d has \u201cdisintegrated\u201d and a foster family desires to adopt the child, the court is compelled to terminate parental rights after a \u201cpsychological\u201d foster \u201cfamily\u201d relationship has developed with the child who has lived in this foster home for an extended period of time. This is a method by which a foster family is substituted for a natural parent.\nThe mother claims this statute is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite. \u201cA statute may violate due process if it is so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning. * * * In determining vagueness, we consider the words in the context in which they are used.\u201d State ex rel., Etc. v. Natural Father, 93 N.M. 222, 225, 598 P.2d 1182 (Ct.App.1979). \u201cWhen a statute is too vague to be effective, it is void.\u201d Davis v. Smith, 266 Ark. 112, 583 S.W.2d 37 (1979).\nWhat is meant by 4(b):\nThe parent child relationship has disintegrated?\nSection 40-7-2(H) says:\n\u201cparent\u201d means a natural or an adoptive parent, or an individual who * * * has been established as the parent of an illegitimate child * * *.\nUnder strict construction, a \u201cparent\u201d designated in the singular, should not be enlarged to plural. The word \u201cparent\u201d commonly means a father or mother by blood. Brummitt v. Commonwealth, 357 S.W.2d 37 (Ky.1962). The father is the male parent and the mother is the female parent. Boroughs v. Oliver, 217 Miss. 280, 64 So.2d 338 (1953). However, it has been held \u201cthat the parents of an illegitimate child are included in the definition of \u2018parent\u2019 in the Adoption Act.\u201d Interest of ICE, 35 Ill.App.3d 783, 342 N.E.2d 460, 462 (1976). The word \u201cparents\u201d commonly refers to the natural father and mother. Nunn v. Nunn, 81 N.M. 746, 473 P.2d 360 (1970). Ellis v. Hewitt, 15 Ga.App. 693, 84 S.E. 185, 187 (1915) quoted the following from an early case:\n\u201cThe word \u2018parent\u2019 is connected with no trade and is not a word of art. It means ordinarily mother, as well as father, and must be so construed.\u201d\nThe words, \u201cparent or parents,\u201d and the word \u201cparents\u201d are also found in \u00a7 40-7 \u2014 4.\nWhen used in the form of \u201cparent/child relationship,\u201d the word \u201cparent,\u201d not being a word of art, is a vague and indefinite relationship. Used in the singular, does a mother/child relationship include a father/child relationship? By terminating the rights of the mother, can the State terminate the rights of the father, or must it do so in separate proceedings? Or was the \u201cparent/child relationship\u201d intended to include both parents to effect its purpose? The same vagueness applies to one \u201cwho has been established as the parent of an illegitimate child.\u201d\nWhat is meant by the word \u201cdisintegrated\u201d? It has not been defined. A synonym is \u201cdecay.\u201d Perhaps it means that a \u201cparent/child relationship\u201d has broken apart. By what means and under what circumstances does a relationship of parent and child break apart, creating a separation of the parent from the child? When does it begin and end? Does it mean that a parent has abandoned or abused or neglected the child or one who may have left the child dependent or homeless? The State did not pursue these avenues for termination of parental rights. The word \u201cdisintegrate\u201d appears to be an innovation in this field. The dictionary definition does not apply the word to a human relationship. It is aberrant, inadvertently or mistakenly used. See, Freund, The Use of Indefinite Terms in Statutes, Yale L.J. 437 (1921).\nKeyishian v. Board of Regents of New York, 385 U.S. 589, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967) held that a statute requiring removal of a public school employee for treasonable or seditious utterances or act, without defining the terms \u201ctreasonable\u201d or \u201cseditious\u201d were unconstitutionally vague.\nOver a hundred years ago, the Supreme Court of Illinois could not determine the meaning of \u201cproper parental care.\u201d The People ex rel. v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280 (1870).\nThe word \u201cdisintegrated\u201d does not inform an ordinary person what conduct is required, or must be avoided, to prevent the termination of parental rights. By reference to the wording of the statute, parents should be able to determine what course of conduct to follow. The standard must be specific and direct enough so that an ordinary person will know what conduct is sufficient to justify termination of parental rights. To withstand a vagueness challenge a statute must state its standard with adequate clarity and establish sufficient boundaries for the law to be fairly administered. The evil that has to be avoided is conduct on the part of a parent that would deny the child the care, guidance or control necessary for his physical, emotional and medical needs. Parent/child disintegration does not have a precise meaning. It lacks metes and bounds.\nIt is difficult to conceive of a more valuable right then that of a mother to her child. Nor can few things happen to her with more grievous consequences than to be deprived of her child.\nWhat is meant by 4(c)?\na psychological parent/child relationship has developed between the foster family and the child;\nState Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Duran, 93 N.M. 489, 492, 601 P.2d 722 (Ct.App.1979) defined \u201cfamily\u201d to mean that:\n[O]ne or more persons live together in the same household, are supported by the head of the family in whole or in part, are dependent upon him for that support, and that the head is under a natural or moral obligation to render such support.\n\u201cFamily\u201d has many definitions. Cicchino v. Biarsky, 26 N.J.Misc. 300, 61 A.2d 163 (1948).\nOn the other hand, the Child Placement Agency Licensing Act, says:\n\u201cfoster home\u201d means a home maintained by an individual having the care and control, for periods exceeding twenty-four hours, of a child who is abused, neglected, dependent or homeless and who is not placed for adoption. [Emphasis added.]\nSection 40-7A-3(E), N.M.S.A.1978 (Cum. Supp.1982). Whatever a \u201cfoster family\u201d or a \u201cfoster home\u201d might mean, we do not know. A \u201cfoster family\u201d may or may not be a \u201cfoster parent,\u201d \u201cfoster mother\u201d or \u201cfoster father.\u201d See People v. Parris, 130 Ill.App.2d 933, 267 N.E.2d 39 (1971); Cicchino, supra; In re Norman\u2019s Estate, 209 Minn. 19, 295 N.W. 63 (1940).\n4(e) says:\nthe foster family desires to adopt the child.\nWe are uncertain as to the meaning of \u201cfoster family,\u201d those who may compose it, or whether they must be qualified or competent to express a desire, or whether the desire must be unanimous.\nThe termination of parental rights of a father, mother, or both, under \u00a7 40-7-4(B)(4) is a drastic result. No definite, planned period of time or method appears to destroy the unity of a family. \u201cThe role of parents in the life of a family has attained the status of a fundamental human right and liberty.\u201d State v. Robert H., 118 N.H. 713, 393 A.2d 1387, 1388 (1978). The relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected. \u201cIt is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.\u201d Prince v. Masschusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S.Ct. 438, 442, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944). It is generally desirable for a child to remain with the natural parent because the child\u2019s need for a normal family life will usually best be met in the natural home.\nThe application of the vagueness doctrine to termination of parental rights preserves the' unity of the family. It bars the State from excessive interference with family autonomy. Several courts have recently invoked the vagueness doctrine-to overturn child neglect laws. See, Roe v. Conn, 417 F.Supp. 769 (D.Ala.1976); Alsager v. District Court of Polk Cty., Iowa, 406 F.Supp. 10 (D.Iowa 1977), aff\u2019d per curiam on other grounds, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir.1976); Davis v. Smith, supra; Linn v. Linn, 205 Neb. 218, 286 N.W.2d 765 (1980); Development-The Family, 93 Harv.L.Rev. 1157, 1233 (1980); Day, Termination of Parental Rights Statutes and the Void for Vagueness Doctrine; A Successful Attack on the Parens Patriae Rationale, 16 Journal of Family Law 213 (1977-78); Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U.Pa.L.Rev. 67 (1960).\nThe State relies upon the fundamental rights of the child, the best interests of the child, the unfitness of the parent, and fundamental rights of a foster family. The void-for-vagueness doctrine was not challenged. Nevertheless, we find nothing in \u00a7 40-7-4(B)(4) which seeks to protect the fundamental rights or the best interests of the child. It focuses only on the disintegration of the parent/child relationship.\nWe hold that \u00a7 40-7-4(B)(4) is void for vagueness.\nREVERSED. The statute being void, the child should be returned to the mother. The State shall pay the costs of this appeal.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nLOPEZ, J., concurs.\nWALTERS, C.J., dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "STOWERS, Justice. SUTIN, Judge." }, { "text": "WALTERS, Chief Judge\n(dissenting).\nI respectfully dissent from the majority opinion which holds \u00a7 40-7-4(B)(4), N.M.S. A.1978, as enacted by Laws 1979, ch. 387, \u00a7 1 (now found in 1982 Cum.Supp.), unconstitutional.\nThe majority agrees with appellant that the section under attack is so vague and indefinite that persons of common intelligence must guess at its meaning. That is, indeed, the test to be applied when such a claim of unconstitutionality is made. State v. Libero, 91 N.M. 780, 581 P.2d 873 (Ct.App.1978). But in testing the statute, it is also an indispensable rule that the whole statute be brought under consideration. Id. Section 40-7-4(B)(4) is only a part of a subsection of the statute entitled \u201cTermination of parental rights,\u201d which section, in turn, is only a part of the Act entitled \u201cAdoption Act.\u201d (Section 40-7-1 to 40-7-11 and 40-7-13 to 40-7-17, N.M.S.A.1978 (1982 Cum.Supp.)). Subsection (A) of the statute requiring that \u201c[i]n proceedings to terminate parental rights, the court shall give primary consideration to the physical, mental and emotional welfare and needs of the child,\u201d answers the majority\u2019s complaint that subsection (B)(4) contains \u201cnothing . .. which seeks to protect the fundamental rights or the best interests of the child.\u201d That portion of the statute need not repeat what appears just before it; we need only to \u201cconsider the statute as a whole.\u201d State v. Turley, 96 N.M. 592, 633 P.2d 700 (Ct.App.1980).\nThe majority acknowledges that \u201cparent\u201d may mean \u201cparents\u201d; the opinion then suggests that \u201cparent/child relationship\u201d may not mean both \u201cmother/child\u201d and \u201cfather/child\u201d relationships. As Justice Stephenson noted in Huey v. Lente, 85 N.M. 597, 514 P.2d 1093 (1973), when the Supreme Court overruled this same majority\u2019s decision that the predecessor of the current termination statute was unconstitutional, there is \u201cdifficulty in following this construction of the majority.\u201d (85 N.M. at 598, 514 P.2d 1093.) If common intelligence cannot supply the meaning of \u201cparent,\u201d certainly the definition of \u201cparent\u201d at \u00a7 40-7-2 H of the Act is sufficiently broad and understandable to dispel any notion that a question exists whether \u201cparent\u201d may include either the female or male parent or both of them, or both parents of an illegitimate child.\nThe majority claims ignorance of the meaning of \u201cdisintegrated,\u201d and points out that the dictionary definition \u201cdoes not apply the word to a human relationship.\u201d The dictionary example, \u201c(the disintegrating features of an aging woman \u2014 Philip Wylie),\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary, may not relate the word to a human relationship; it exemplifies, however, the validity of using the root word as a modifier of personal nouns. \u201cTerminate\u201d is not dictionary-defined in connection with a human relationship either, but no one would contend that termination of a marital relationship, or even of human existence, is incapable of being understood because the dictionary \u201cdoes not apply the word to a human relationship\u201d or to a human condition. \u201cDisintegrated\u201d has a well-defined, well-understood meaning. The statute is not vague because of that word.\nI find it inconsistent to say at one point in the opinion that the use of \u201cparent\u201d in the phrase \u201cparent/child relationship\u201d states a vague and indefinite relationship; yet to point out in a later paragraph that such a vague and indefinite \u201crelationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected,\u201d and then to proceed to discuss that relationship in terms of the parent\u2019s duties of \u201c \u2018custody, care and nurture of the child * * * [and] preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder,\u2019 \u201d as well as \u201cthe child\u2019s need for a normal family life * * * in the natural home.\u201d\nIt is equally as superficial to erase from one\u2019s mind the common meanings for \u201cfamily\u201d or \u201cfoster family.\u201d In its brief, the State quoted at length from the Supreme Court case of Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977). That case is replete with the terms \u201cfoster family,\u201d \u201cfoster home,\u201d \u201cfoster parents,\u201d \u201cfoster children,\u201d \u201cchild,\u201d \u201cnatural parents,\u201d \u201cfoster care,\u201d \u201cnatural mother,\u201d \u201cfamily,\u201d and other similar nouns. The ease abounds with definitions and definitional discussions of those terms, and with footnotes which explain and expand upon the concepts of parental functions; the legal and emotional relationships between the child and the parents, the foster parents, and the state agency; and the psychological ties that are broken and formed between a child and its natural and foster parents. Smith, supra, devotes several pages to the discussion of \u201cwhat is a family\u201d in the context of biological and foster relationships, and the case teems with citations to cases and authorities on the subject of the development and disintegration of those relationships.\nI cannot agree that from the great wealth of information and precedent available, and from a lifetime of familiarity with the English language, one must guess at the meaning of any of the words used in \u00a7 40-7-4(B)(4).\nThe termination statute in Linn v. Linn, 205 Neb. 218, 286 N.W.2d 765 (1980), cited by the majority, specified no standards whatever for determining whether termination was in \u201cthe best interests and welfare of the children.\u201d The statute struck down in Roe v. Conn, 417 F.Supp. 769 (M.D.Ala. 1976), did not provide for notice and hearing, absent immediate danger of harm, before removal of a child from its home, and it did not define (to the court\u2019s satisfaction) what constituted an \u201cunfit\u201d or \u201cimproper\u201d home.\nIn Alsager v. District Court of Polk Cty., Iowa, 406 F.Supp. 10 (S.D.Iowa 1975), another case cited in the majority opinion, the trial court found the phrases in one subsection of Iowa\u2019s statute, \u201cnecessary parental care and protection,\u201d and \u201cconduct ... detrimental to the physical or mental health or morals of the child,\u201d to be \u201csusceptible to multifarious interpretations which prevent the ordinary person from knowing what is and what is not prohibited.\u201d (406 F.Supp. at 18.) That court did not consider other stated conditions permitting termination, but found that the quoted language rendered the statute unconstitutional. It also concluded that the Alsagers were denied due process because a compelling state interest justifying termination had not been shown, and because notice to the Alsagers was defective. On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, however, the trial court decision was upheld on the notice issue and because of failure of proof. The constitutionality of the statute was expressly reserved for decision by the Iowa Supreme Court. Alsager v. District Court, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir.1976).\nThus none of the cases the majority cites regarding vagueness of termination statutes are similar or authoritative on the constitutionality of New Mexico\u2019s statute.\nOur review of this matter is not to determine whether the trial court\u2019s decision was correct on the merits, whether the evidence was sufficient to justify its decision, or whether the statute was followed in reaching the result below. The decision of our Supreme Court (No. 14196, 21 N.M.S.B.B. 1295, filed September 7,1982) directed us to confine our consideration to the arguments presented by counsel on appeal. The sole issue raised by appellant was that \u201cSECTION 40-7-4[(B)](4), N.M.S.A.1978, AS AMENDED 1979, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. CONSEQUENTLY, THE COURT HAD NO GROUND TO TERMINATE THE PARENTAL RIGHTS BETWEEN MOTHER AND INFANT SON.\u201d\nIn my opinion the section challenged is not vague or indefinite but is constitutional; the challenged section provided a statutorily constitutional ground for terminating appellant\u2019s parental rights, and the judgment should be affirmed.", "type": "dissent", "author": "WALTERS, Chief Judge" } ], "attorneys": [ "Paul G. Bardacke, Atty. Gen., James W. Catron, Asst. Atty. Gen., Human Services Dept., Santa Fe, for petitioner.", "Jefferson R. Rhodes, Alamogordo, for Scott.", "Elaine Moore Hebard, Hebard & Hebard, Alamogordo, guardian ad litem for John Doe.", "Jack Whorton, Alamogordo, for respondent." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "666 P.2d 771\nIn the Matter of John DOE, a child. STATE of New Mexico, ex rel. HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, Petitioner, v. Julie STAPLES, Respondent.\nNo. 14692.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nFeb. 18, 1983.\nPaul G. Bardacke, Atty. Gen., James W. Catron, Asst. Atty. Gen., Human Services Dept., Santa Fe, for petitioner.\nJefferson R. Rhodes, Alamogordo, for Scott.\nElaine Moore Hebard, Hebard & Hebard, Alamogordo, guardian ad litem for John Doe.\nJack Whorton, Alamogordo, for respondent." }, "file_name": "0092-01", "first_page_order": 124, "last_page_order": 129 }