{ "id": 1588649, "name": "Oscar ANCHONDO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CORRECTIONS DEPARTMENT of the State of New Mexico, et al., Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Anchondo v. Corrections Department", "decision_date": "1983-06-10", "docket_number": "No. 14827", "first_page": "108", "last_page": "111", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "100 N.M. 108" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "666 P.2d 1255" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "117 Cal.Rptr. 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 Cal.App.3d 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2351830 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-3d/42/0624-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 So.2d 273", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9570846 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/367/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 So.2d 86", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1741197, 9602142 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ala-app/54/0280-01", "/so2d/307/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 Ala.App. 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ala. App.", "case_ids": [ 1741197 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ala-app/54/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 A.2d 528", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 N.J.Super. 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Super.", "case_ids": [ 4208166 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/102/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 Cal.Rptr. 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Cal.App.3d 780", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4391267 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-3d/24/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 L.Ed.2d 59", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 S.Ct. 91", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "444 U.S. 846", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11334136, 11334601, 11334762, 11334254, 11334320, 11334386, 11334677, 11334197, 11334456, 11334073, 11334525 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/444/0846-02", "/us/444/0846-09", "/us/444/0846-11", "/us/444/0846-04", "/us/444/0846-05", "/us/444/0846-06", "/us/444/0846-10", "/us/444/0846-03", "/us/444/0846-07", "/us/444/0846-01", "/us/444/0846-08" ] }, { "cite": "93 N.M. 307", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1568824 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308" }, { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/93/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 N.M. 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1573206 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" }, { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/94/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.M. 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1575588 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" }, { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/95/0329-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 590, "char_count": 12225, "ocr_confidence": 0.78, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.0898213621662626e-07, "percentile": 0.8585614450881113 }, "sha256": "bae56b2450e07410611f62d1216b24d4cebf24a25a98eb0666c96a139772801c", "simhash": "1:15e09d3d7f057fb9", "word_count": 1909 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:45:38.267108+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "PAYNE, C.J., SOSA, Senior Justice, and FEDERICI and RIORDAN, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "Oscar ANCHONDO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CORRECTIONS DEPARTMENT of the State of New Mexico, et al., Defendants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nSTOWERS, Justice.\nThis matter is before this Court upon certification from the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, Honorable Juan G. Burciaga, District Judge, pursuant to Section 34-2-8, N.M. S.A. 1978 (Repl.Pamp.1981). The question certified to this Court pursuant to Section 34-2-8 is as follows:\nAre the Secretary of Corrections and the Warden of the State Penitentiary in Santa Fe \u201claw enforcement officers\u201d within the meaning of Section 41-4-3(D), N.M. S.A. 1978 (Repl.Pamp.1982)?\nIn our opinion they are not.\nSection 41-4-3(D) of the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, \u00a7\u00a7 41-4-1 through 41-4-29, N.M.S.A. 1978 (Repl.Pamp.1982), defines \u201claw enforcement officer.\u201d To construe the question before us, however, this Court must look at the Legislature\u2019s intent in defining both \u201claw enforcement officer\u201d and \u201cpublic employee\u201d within the Tort Claims Act. Section 41-4-3(D) defines \u201claw enforcement officer\u201d as\nany full-time salaried public employee of a governmental entity whose principal duties under law are to hold in custody any person accused of a criminal offense, to maintain public order or to make arrests for crimes, or members of the national guard when called to active duty by the governor.\nSection 41-4-3(E), N.M.S.A. 1978 (Repl. Pamp.1982) defines \u201cpublic employee\u201d as\nany officer, employee or servant of a governmental entity, including elected or appointed officials, law enforcement officers and persons acting on behalf or in service of a governmental entity in any official capacity, whether with or without compensation, but the term does not include an independent contractor.\nFrom these definitions in the Tort Claims Act, it appears obvious that the Legislature intended to make a necessary distinction between public employees and law enforcement officers. The fact that there are two specific definitions indicates that the Legislature intended to differentiate and to require one to look at what a person actually does, his duties and responsibilities. (We note that subsequent legislation enlarging the definition of \u201cpublic employee\u201d has no effect on this opinion and in no way alters it. See 1983 N.M.Laws, ch. 242, \u00a7 1(E)).\nThe Secretary of Corrections spends all his time in duties and responsibilities that are more accurately categorized as work of a public employee than work of a law enforcement officer. He is a member of the \u201cexecutive cabinet\u201d headed by the governor. \u00a7 9-3-4, N.M.S.A.1978 (Cum.Supp.1982); see generally \u00a7\u00a7 9-1-1 through 9-1-12, N.M.S.A. 1978 (Repl.Pamp.1980). His duties and general powers are specified in the \u201cCorrections Department Act,\u201d Section 9-3-1 through 9-3-12, N.M.S.A. 1978 (Repl.Pamp.1980 and Cum.Supp.1982) and in Section 33-1-6, N.M.S.A. 1978. (Cum.Supp.1982). According to these statutory provisions the Secretary of Corrections must manage all operations of the department (\u00a7 9-3-5 A), exercise general supervisory authority over all department employees (\u00a7 9-3-5 B(l)), delegate authority to subordinates as he deems necessary (\u00a7 9-3-5 B(2)), organize the department into the most efficient organizational units (\u00a7 9-3-5 B(3)), issue and enforce orders and instructions (\u00a7 9-3-5 B(5)), and conduct research and studies that will improve the operations of the department (\u00a7 9-3-5 B(6)). Although these are only a few examples of the powers and duties of the Secretary of Corrections, it is apparent that according to statute, the Secretary possesses none of the traditional duties that are defined for law enforcement officers. The Secretary of Corrections is basically the chief executive or administrative officer of the state\u2019s correction system. \u00a7 9-3-4, N.M.S.A. 1978 (Cum.Supp.1982). The majority, if not all of his time is spent on administrative duties.\nAs far as the Warden is concerned, the vast majority of his duties and responsibilities are those of a public employee and not a law enforcement officer. The Warden of the State Penitentiary is director of one of the divisions of the corrections department known as the \u201cadult maximum security division.\u201d As a director of an organizational unit of the corrections department the Warden has all the powers and duties enumerated in the specific laws involved. \u00a7 9-3-12, N.M.S.A. 1978 (Repl.Pamp.1980). However, Section 9-3-12 specifies that \u201cthe carrying out of those powers and duties shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the secretary and he [the secretary] shall retain the final decision-making authority and responsibility * * Therefore, the Warden, as director of the adult maximum security division, acts as an administrative officer subject to the direction and supervision of the Secretary of Corrections.\nIn addition to Section 9-3-12, Section 33-2-1 through 33-2-47, N.M.S.A. 1978 (Orig.Pamp. and Cum.Supp.1982) specifically refer to the Warden and his duties. These duties include keeping a register of prisoners (\u00a7 33-2-16), keeping accounts (\u00a7 33-2-17), collecting and disbursing funds due the penitentiary (\u00a7 33-2-18), keeping a record book of infractions of prison rules and regulations (\u00a7 33-2-32), assisting with the classification committee in determining meritorious deductions (\u00a7 33-2-34), and instituting an inmate-release program (\u00a7\u00a7 33-2-43 through 33-2 \u2014 17). It is evident from these statutory provisions that the Warden\u2019s primary duties and responsibilities, like those of the Secretary of Corrections, are administrative in nature.\nFrom looking at the statutes, we see that neither the Secretary of Corrections nor the Warden engage in any of the traditional duties of \u201claw enforcement officers.\u201d They do not deal directly with the daily custodial care of prison inmates. Moreover, because they do not have commissions, they have no power to make arrests or to take people into custody should a violation of the public order occur. They are merely administrative officers appointed by the governor to oversee, administer, and supervise the state\u2019s corrections system.\nThe duties and responsibilities of the Secretary of Corrections and the Warden are primarily determined by statute. The principal duties of these positions do not encompass the duties and responsibilities usually associated with \u201claw enforcement officers.\u201d Traditionally, the duties of law enforcement officers include preserving the public peace, preventing and quelling public disturbances, enforcing state laws, including but not limited to the power to make arrests for violation of state laws. See \u00a7\u00a7 29-1-1 through 29-1-2, N.M.S.A. 1978 (Repl.Pamp.1979 and Cum.Supp.1982). Furthermore, most law enforcement officers must receive commissions from the lawfully constituted authorities. See \u00a7 29-1-9, N.M.S.A. 1978 (Repl. Pamp.1979). In determining whether a person is involved in law enforcement work, this Court has adhered to the concept of traditional law enforcement activities. We do not deviate from this concept in the present case.\nIn Methola v. County of Eddy, 95 N.M. 329, 622 P.2d 234 (1980), this Court held that a county sheriff, his deputies, and jailers at the county jail were law enforcement officers within the meaning of the Tort Claims Act. In reaching that conclusion the Court first determined that their \u201c \u2018principal duties under law are to hold in custody any person accused of a criminal offense, [or] to maintain public order.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 332, 622 P.2d at 237 (quoting \u00a7 41-4-3(D), N.M.S.A. 1953 (Int.Supp.1976)); see \u00a7 41-4-3(D), N.M.S.A. 1978 (Repl.Pamp. 1982). A sheriff and his deputies are conservators of the peace within their county. \u00a7\u00a7 4r41-2, -9, N.M.S.A.1978 (Repl.Pamp. 1980). Moreover, the majority of a sheriff\u2019s time is spent in direct contact with the public, making arrests, enforcing laws, and preserving the public order.\nWe previously have held that \u201c[a] jailer is an officer in the public domain, charged with the duty to maintain public order.\u201d State v. Rhea, 94 N.M. 168, 169, 608 P.2d 144, 145 (1980). A jailor\u2019s principal duties also include holding accused persons in custody. See \u00a7\u00a7 33-3-1 through 33-3-23, N.M.S.A. 1978 (Orig.Pamp. and Cum.Supp.1982). To determine whether positions are of a law enforcement nature, this Court will look at the character of the principal duties involved, those duties to which employees devote the majority of their time.\nThe fact that a person is employed at the penitentiary is not sufficient to establish that his job is one in law enforcement. See State v. Linam, 93 N.M. 307, 600 P.2d 253, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 846, 100 S.Ct. 91, 62 L.Ed.2d 59 (1979). We find it significant that Section 33-1-10, N.M.S.A. 1978, specifically grants uniformed guards of the corrections division \u201cthe power of peace officers, as regards arrests and enforcement of laws, when upon the premises of a correctional facility under the control of the corrections division.\u201d Those persons working at the penitentiary whose duties are similar in nature to those of \u201claw enforcement personnel\u201d should be treated as law enforcement officers and given the powers that go along with their responsibilities. It is clear that the Legislature did not intend all persons working at the state\u2019s correctional facilities to be considered or treated as peace officers or law enforcement personnel, only those persons who possess these responsibilities as their primary duties. Had the Legislature intended that all employees of the corrections division be classed as peace officers, it could have so stated in the statute.\nOther states have dealt with the issue of whether a corrections employee is a law enforcement officer. These states generally have dealt with this matter in two contexts: (1) whether a corrections officer employee was a law enforcement officer within the meaning of statutes relating to employee benefits, Schalk v. Department of Administration, 42 Cal.App.3d 624, 117 Cal.Rptr. 92 (1974); Kimball v. County of Santa Clara, 24 Cal.App.3d 780, 101 Cal.Rptr. 353 (1972); and (2) whether a corrections officer employee was a law enforcement officer within the meaning of statutes proscribing assault and battery upon a law enforcement officer, State v. Grant, 102 N.J.Super. 164, 245 A.2d 528 (1968); Lowe v. State, 54 Ala.App. 280, 307 So.2d 86 (1974); Bush v. State, 367 So.2d 273 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1979). However, in determining whether the employee is a law enforcement officer, the courts consistently have looked at the nature of the duties of the employee.\nThis Court has looked at Section 41-4-3(D) and believes that it was the intent of the Legislature in enacting this provision to include within the definition of law enforcement officer or peace officer only those persons whose principal duties include those of a direct law enforcement nature. Both the Warden and the Secretary of Corrections devote the majority of their time to administrative duties. Furthermore, beyond that of any citizen they have no authority to make arrests for crimes, and their contact with the public is minimal.\nThis Court concludes that although a person may be employed by an agency involved with law enforcement work, this does not necessarily make him a law enforcement officer any more than an administrator of a hospital is necessarily a doctor. As this Court stated in State v. Linam, 93 N.M. at 308, 600 P.2d at 254, \u201cThere is no reason to equate the job of record supervisor with the term \u2018law enforcement personnel\u2019 * * * merely because the record supervisor is employed at the penitentiary.\u201d Similarly, in this case there is no reason to equate the positions of Secretary of Corrections or Warden with the position of \u201claw enforcement officer,\u201d as that term is used in the Tort Claims Act. We therefore find that neither the Secretary of Corrections nor the Warden of the State Penitentiary in Santa Fe is a \u201claw enforcement officer\u201d within the meaning of Section 41-4-3(D).\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nPAYNE, C.J., SOSA, Senior Justice, and FEDERICI and RIORDAN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "STOWERS, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "E. Justin Pennington, Kirk Garcia, Albuquerque, for plaintiffs.", "Cherpelis & Nivala, Max Shepherd, Albuquerque, for defendants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "666 P.2d 1255\nOscar ANCHONDO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CORRECTIONS DEPARTMENT of the State of New Mexico, et al., Defendants.\nNo. 14827.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nJune 10, 1983.\nE. Justin Pennington, Kirk Garcia, Albuquerque, for plaintiffs.\nCherpelis & Nivala, Max Shepherd, Albuquerque, for defendants." }, "file_name": "0108-01", "first_page_order": 140, "last_page_order": 143 }