{ "id": 1588553, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Archie MIRANDA, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Miranda", "decision_date": "1983-12-01", "docket_number": "No. 7125", "first_page": "690", "last_page": "694", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "100 N.M. 690" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "675 P.2d 422" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "84 N.M. 717", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2766048 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/84/0717-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 N.M. 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1571035 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/91/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "644 P.2d 1040", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 N.M. 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 N.M. 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1555213 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/97/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 N.M. 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1571197 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/91/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 F.Supp. 674", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 1460977 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "676" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/207/0674-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 U.S. 238", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1771759 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/395/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 U.S. 742", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12058257 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "755" }, { "page": "1472" }, { "page": "760" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0742-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 S.W.2d 956", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10137987, 10138100 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/499/0956-01", "/sw2d/499/0956-02" ] }, { "cite": "197 Colo. 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Colo.", "case_ids": [ 2366921 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/colo/197/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "633 P.2d 901", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Wash.App. 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. App.", "case_ids": [ 1826947 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-app/30/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "453 N.Y.S.2d 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 A.D.2d 775", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.2d", "case_ids": [ 3309634 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/89/0775-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 F.2d 918", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 746979 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/454/0918-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 U.S.App.D.C. 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "U.S. App. D.C.", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 L.Ed.2d 241", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 S.Ct. 362", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "414 U.S. 1005", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11792836, 11792293, 11792167, 11792522, 11792076, 11792237, 11792748, 11792404, 11792023, 11792475, 11791965 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/414/1005-11", "/us/414/1005-06", "/us/414/1005-04", "/us/414/1005-09", "/us/414/1005-03", "/us/414/1005-05", "/us/414/1005-10", "/us/414/1005-07", "/us/414/1005-02", "/us/414/1005-08", "/us/414/1005-01" ] }, { "cite": "475 F.2d 1364", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 281602 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/475/1364-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 L.Ed.2d 774", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 S.Ct. 1550", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "430 U.S. 930", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12151808, 12152130, 12151906, 12152164, 12151852, 12152027, 12152207, 12152080, 12151985, 12151769, 12152251, 12151934 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/430/0930-02", "/us/430/0930-09", "/us/430/0930-04", "/us/430/0930-10", "/us/430/0930-03", "/us/430/0930-07", "/us/430/0930-11", "/us/430/0930-08", "/us/430/0930-06", "/us/430/0930-01", "/us/430/0930-12", "/us/430/0930-05" ] }, { "cite": "544 F.2d 962", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1020857 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/544/0962-01" ] }, { "cite": "621 F.2d 17", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 482267 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/621/0017-01" ] }, { "cite": "624 F.2d 557", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1273079 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/624/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "680 F.2d 64", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 549225 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/680/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 Pa.Super. 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. Super.", "case_ids": [ 211675 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-super/311/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 N.M. 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1557116 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/92/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 N.M. 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5378268 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defenses to habitual charges are such as provide grounds for collateral relief" }, { "parenthetical": "defenses to habitual charges are such as provide grounds for collateral relief" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/75/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 N.M. 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2838520 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/88/0560-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 N.M. 681", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8504400 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/76/0681-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 667", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2867778 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0667-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 N.M. 358", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2803136 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/77/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 N.M. 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2766733 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/84/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 N.M. 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582531 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/98/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 N.M. 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2823043 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/86/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 N.M. 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2868394 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/89/0150-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 804, "char_count": 13973, "ocr_confidence": 0.789, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.15532920978551e-08, "percentile": 0.4287352274205948 }, "sha256": "4b242b5d67c15ac3b2a801449f26fa1958bc8625d3056f99f160f05a44ae3ad7", "simhash": "1:df668d5efb079743", "word_count": 2235 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:45:38.267108+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "LOPEZ and DONNELLY, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Archie MIRANDA, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nWALTERS, Chief Judge.\nDefendant appeals from conviction as an habitual offender, and we affirm.\nThe issues on appeal, all relating to the alleged first prior conviction, were whether Count I (alleging defendant\u2019s guilty plea to and conviction of. attempted burglary in 1977) should have been dismissed; whether that count should have been submitted to the jury, since defendant contended his plea was not intelligently and knowingly made; and whether the jury should have considered the evidence on his claim that the prior conviction was invalid.\nOther issues presented in the docketing statement, but not briefed, are deemed abandoned. State v. Vogentkaler, 89 N.M. 150, 548 P.2d 112 (Ct.App.1976).\nI. Motion to dismiss Count I.\nBefore trial, defendant moved to dismiss the first count, attaching to his motion copies of a withdrawal by J.C. Robinson, the district attorney, and an entry of appearance by V. Lee Vesely as special prosecutor on the charge outlined in Count I. The basis for substitution of those attorneys was Robinson\u2019s comprehensive consultation with defendant regarding the charge, before Robinson became district attorney, for the purpose of representing defendant at trial.\nNotwithstanding the appointment of a special prosecutor, compare State v. Chambers, 86 N.M. 383, 524 P.2d 999 (Ct.App.1974), defendant contends that there remained a conflict of interest and, being unaware of it, defendant could not waive it by pleading guilty. He claims a conflict of interest attaching to the State because (1) Vesely did not act independently in the case but was subject to Robinson\u2019s orders; and (2), that he was completely unaware of Robinson\u2019s status as district attorney as well as of Robinson\u2019s participation in the case. In contrast, the trial court found:\n7. Miranda and his father, Armando B. Miranda, were both aware that J.C. Robinson had been appointed District Attorney.\n* * * * * *\n17. At all times during the negotiation and prosecution of this matter Miranda, his family, and his lawyer were fully and completely aware that J.C. Robinson ... had been appointed and had assumed his duties of District Attorney. They were also fully aware that J.C. Robinson had recused himself from any further participation in the case and that the case was being handled for the State of New Mexico by V. Lee Vesely as Associate Counsel.\n18. During the prosecution of Grant County Case No. CR 77-122 V. Lee Vesely acted independently and exercised independent judgment on behalf of his client reporting only the progress of the case to the District Attorney J.C. Robinson and using only the secretarial services of the District Attorney\u2019s Office.\nOur review is confined to determining whether these findings are supported by substantial evidence. State v. Garcia, 98 N.M. 186, 646 P.2d 1250 (Ct.App.1982).\nTo demonstrate Robinson\u2019s continued participation in the case, defendant relies on his counsel\u2019s initial letter to Robinson requesting a plea bargain, together with Robinson\u2019s notations thereon indicating \u201cattempt burg dwell/4th.\u201d Defendant ultimately pleaded to the charge indicated in the handwritten notes rather than to the greater felony charged at the time. Defendant further relies on Vesely\u2019s testimony, based on Vesely\u2019s notes to his file, indicating that defense counsel wanted certain plea concessions and that Vesely said he would have to consult with Robinson and advise defense counsel later. When asked if he did in fact consult Robinson, Vesely answered, \u201cI suppose I did.\u201d\nHowever, Robinson testified that after he filed his recusal, he did nothing further with the case, \u201cto his knowledge.\u201d He had \u201cno recollection\u201d of having talked to Vesely or defense counsel about the case. Defendant\u2019s counsel\u2019s \u201crecollection or knowledge\u201d after Robinson recused himself was that Robinson had nothing further to do with the matter. Defendant\u2019s argument is that Robinson\u2019s testimony concerning \u201cno recollection\u201d does not overcome Vesely\u2019s testimony and his notes indicating that he had consulted with Robinson. See State v. Chavez, 84 N.M. 247, 501 P.2d 691 (Ct.App.1972) (the fact that something is not remembered is not a denial that the thing occurred). But there was more in the way of evidence to controvert defendant\u2019s contention than simple non-recall of the events. Vesely explained that what he meant by \u201cconsult,\u201d and what he did with Mr. Robinson, was to keep him informed of what was happening. The totality of the evidence is amenable to the trial court\u2019s findings that Robinson did not participate in the case and that Vesely acted independently.\nTo show defendant\u2019s lack of knowledge regarding Robinson\u2019s status, defendant urges that he himself did not testify, and no one who did testify had personal knowledge of defendant\u2019s awareness. There are two answers to this contention: First, defendant himself requested a finding to the effect that both he and his father were aware of Robinson\u2019s appointment as district attorney. A trial court ruling on the issue of defendant\u2019s awareness, therefore, was not fairly invoked. NMSA 1978, Grim., Child.Ct., Dom.Rel. & W/C App.R. 308 (Repl.Pamp.1983). See Cochran v. Gordon, 77 N.M. 358, 423 P.2d 43 (1967). Second, even if defendant did not know about the possible conflict of interest, that fact is irrelevant. Baird v. State, 90 N.M. 667, 568 P.2d 193 (1977), holds that by specifically agreeing to paragraph 4 of the plea entered into at the time, as defendant did, defendant waived any motions or objections that he might thereafter assert. In this case, as in Baird, there is no allegation that the lack of knowledge of the possible conflict made the plea involuntary. Rather, defendant\u2019s contention is that he personally had to know about the possible conflict in order to waive it. This is not true in the context of waivers by a plea of guilty. Baird; State v. Raburn, 76 N.M. 681, 417 P.2d 813 (1966).\nThe trial court ruled that defendant\u2019s claim was stale under State v. Mata, 88 N.M. 560, 543 P.2d 1188 (Ct.App.1975). In deciding that Mata\u2019s claim was stale, this Court held that any appearance of unfairness because of the prosecutor\u2019s conflict was dissipated by an evidentiary hearing. Here, defendant\u2019s claim, even after the evidentiary hearing, is still based on the appearance of unfairness. The trial court\u2019s findings that Robinson did not participate in the case, being supported by substantial evidence, establish that there was no actual unfairness. Consequently, the State was not prohibited from using Count I in the habitual proceedings. Compare State v. Dalrymple, 75 N.M. 514, 407 P.2d 356 (1965) (defenses to habitual charges are such as provide grounds for collateral relief). This issue was resolved against defendant, and there was sufficient evidence to sustain that resolution.\nII. Voluntary, Knowing, and Intelligent Plea.\nDefendant claims that because his counsel did not inform him of the collateral consequences of a deferred sentence, his plea was involuntary and made without the effective assistance of counsel; consequently, Count I could not be used to enhance the sentence. It was undisputed that defendant's counsel advised him that upon successfully completing probation, the conviction which formed the basis of Count I would be \u201cwiped out\" or dismissed.\nDefendant raised this issue in the trial court by attempting to question witnesses in front of the jury on the facts concerning his counsel\u2019s advice. When the State\u2019s objections were sustained, he tendered the facts to the court. Following the last tender of proof, defendant argued:\nDefense Counsel: That concludes my offer of proof, your honor.\nThe Court: All right, sir. [I\u2019m] going to\u2014\nDefense Counsel: I'm familiar, of course, with this case of State v. Martinez but I maintain here, your honor, once it\u2019s raised, in that case we do have a question of voluntariness and knowingly making a confession so as to bring it under the Boykin v. United States case. I don\u2019t think the constitutional aspects of the confession, or in the Martinez case, was ever considered and we are raising the constitutional aspects at this present time.\nThe Court: A higher court will correct me if I\u2019m wrong but I\u2019m going to deny the offers of proof.\nEarlier, defendant had moved the court to exclude Count I from the jury\u2019s consideration because there was no factual basis for the charge of attempted burglary. Counsel also explained in opening statement, his defense of invalidity.\nThe State initially argues that because defendant never specifically requested the trial court\u2019s ruling as a matter of law on the validity of the prior conviction, defendant waived the issue on appeal. It appears, indeed, that defendant\u2019s main thrust was to get the evidence of invalidity in front of the jury for their resolution. Defendant\u2019s final argument, however (reproduced above), cites the Martinez case [State v. Martinez, 92 N.M. 256, 586 P.2d 1085 (1978) ], which holds that invalidity is not a question for the jury but, rather, is one for the court to decide. Defendant concluded his argument by saying that he was raising the \u201cconstitutional aspects\u201d at the time. We give defendant the benefit of the doubt, and decide the issue on its merits.\nThus, the question is: Must a defendant be informed of all collateral consequences of his plea, such as its use in a subsequent habitual proceeding, in order to make the plea voluntary, knowing, and intelligent? The authorities uniformly answer this question in the negative. Commonwealth v. Englert, 311 Pa.Super. 78, 457 A.2d 121 (1983). See also United States v. Garrett, 680 F.2d 64 (9th Cir.1982); Wright v. United States, 624 F.2d 557 (5th Cir.1980); United States v. Keefe, 621 F.2d 17 (1st Cir.1980); United States v. Lambros, 544 F.2d 962 (8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 930, 97 S.Ct. 1550, 51 L.Ed.2d 774 (1977); Cuthrell v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 475 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir.1973), cert. denied 414 U.S. 1005, 94 S.Ct. 362, 38 L.Ed.2d 241 (1973); United States v. Sambro, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 75, 454 F.2d 918 (1971); People v. Sirianni, 89 A.D.2d 775, 453 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1982); State v. Cameron, 30 Wash.App. 229, 633 P.2d 901 (1981); People v. Heinz, 197 Colo. 102, 589 P.2d 931 (1979); Hobby v. State, 499 S.W.2d 956 (Tenn.Cr.App.1973).\nThe above decisions follow Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970), in which the Supreme Court undertook to restate the standard governing voluntariness of guilty pleas. Quoting from a Fifth Circuit decision, the Court said that \u201c[a] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences * * * must stand.\u201d 397 U.S. at 755, 90 S.Ct. at 1472, 25 L.Ed.2d at 760 [emphasis added]. United States v. Sambro expressly noted that the Court had used the word \u201cdirect\u201d in Brady, thereby excluding collateral consequences from the standard. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), did not require any advisement concerning collateral consequences, either. See Hobby v. State. The rationale behind these cases is that there exists a right to assume that defendants will not be guilty of a subsequent offense but will be law-abiding persons in the future. Fee v. United States, 207 F.Supp. 674, 676 (W.D.Va.1962); People v. Heinz. Applying this universal rule, defendant\u2019s point lacks merit.\nAdditionally, we note that New Mexico, as well, has denied a right to challenge a plea bargain in certain circumstances. State v. Lord, 91 N.M. 353, 573 P.2d 1208 (Ct.App.1977), bars defendant from any claims attacking a bargained-for deferred sentence. Lord held that defendant must disclose to the trial court, upon questioning at the plea proceeding, his understanding of any promises made concerning the disposition. State v. Lucero, 97 N.M. 346, 639 P.2d 1200 (Ct.App.1981), cert. quashed, 98 N.M. 51, 644 P.2d 1040 (1982), modified that disclosure requirement when mandatory questions have not been asked by the trial court. Here, however, the trial court made the required inquiries that preclude defendant\u2019s right to assert any issue concerning the ramifications of the deferred sentence. The plea and disposition proceedings clearly show that although the State had no objection to the deferred sentence, the sentence to be imposed was to be in the court\u2019s discretion.\nThe trial court specifically inquired whether \u201canybody\u201d had made \u201cany promises\u201d \u2014 to which defendant answered \u201cNo.\u201d Defendant knew the penalties; no one promised a suspended sentence or probation. Not having told the trial court upon specific questioning that he expected a deferred sentence, the record of which would be wiped out, defendant may not now raise such an issue. Lord.\nIII. Jury Question.\nDefendant finally contends that the validity of Count I should have been submitted to the jury. He recognizes that State v. Martinez and State v. Gallegos, 91 N.M. 107, 570 P.2d 938 (Ct.App.1977), are to the contrary. He asks that we overrule these cases. This Court has no power to do so, Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M. 717, 507 P.2d 778 (1973), particularly in the absence of some argument disclosing why Martinez is or should be inapplicable. This point is without merit.\nMata and the presence of sufficient evidence control the first issue raised. The plethora of cases cited, with regard to the validity of the plea when defendant claims lack of knowledge of collateral consequences, disposes of defendant\u2019s Issue II. Martinez controls Issue III. We therefore affirm defendant\u2019s conviction as an habitual offender, and the sentence imposed thereon.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nLOPEZ and DONNELLY, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WALTERS, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Paul Bardacke, Atty. Gen., William Lazar, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Janet Clow, Chief Public Defender, Ellen Bayard, Asst. Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "675 P.2d 422\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Archie MIRANDA, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 7125.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nDec. 1, 1983.\nPaul Bardacke, Atty. Gen., William Lazar, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee.\nJanet Clow, Chief Public Defender, Ellen Bayard, Asst. Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0690-01", "first_page_order": 722, "last_page_order": 726 }