{ "id": 1580145, "name": "Shawn SMITH, Petitioner, v. DOWELL CORPORATION, A DIVISION OF DOW CHEMICAL, USA, and Aetna Life & Casualty Company, Insurer, Respondents", "name_abbreviation": "Smith v. Dowell Corp.", "decision_date": "1984-09-21", "docket_number": "No. 15167", "first_page": "102", "last_page": "106", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "102 N.M. 102" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "692 P.2d 27" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "673 P.2d 476", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 2506997 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mont/207/0314-01" ] }, { "cite": "648 P.2d 794", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 N.M. 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 N.M. 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582500 ], "weight": 2, 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[ "/nm/90/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "558 P.2d 621", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 9", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 N.M. 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2865706 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/89/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 P. 903", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "year": 1924, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 N.M. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8841595 ], "year": 1924, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/29/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 N.M. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1589291 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/59/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 N.M. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", 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1568721 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/93/0078-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 777, "char_count": 15171, "ocr_confidence": 0.788, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.564177473288817e-07, "percentile": 0.6774310008035217 }, "sha256": "1fd8253659207e3b8d16c18bf75ba2589b17361f0841505199485dc2c257e5c7", "simhash": "1:b67b185386e624f9", "word_count": 2543 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:42:54.117025+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "FEDERICI, C.J., and RIORDAN, J., concur.", "WALTERS, J., not participating.", "STOWERS, J., dissenting." ], "parties": [ "Shawn SMITH, Petitioner, v. DOWELL CORPORATION, A DIVISION OF DOW CHEMICAL, USA, and Aetna Life & Casualty Company, Insurer, Respondents." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nSOSA, Senior Justice.\nPlaintiff-Appellant, Shawn Smith (Smith) filed a claim for benefits under New Mexico Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act (Act), NMSA 1978, Sections 52-1-1 through 52-1-69 (Orig.Pamp. and Cum.Supp.1982) against his former employer Dowell Corporation (Dow). The district court granted summary judgment for Dow, stating plaintiff\u2019s claim was barred by his failure to timely file under Section 52-l-31(A). In a memorandum opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted certiorari and reverse the Court of Appeals.\nThe sole issue before the Court is when will a worker with a latent injury be held to reasonably recognize the nature and probable, compensable character of the injury, thus activating the running of the statute of limitations.\nWhile in Dow\u2019s employ on August 12, 1980, Smith suffered an accidental injury when a cement truck he was driving left the road and flipped over, crushing the cab. Smith continued working his regular job, but a month following the accident he had to be placed on light duty for a three week period. He then returned to his normal job. He continued to work for Dow until he was terminated December 4, 1981.\nThe record reflects that at Dow\u2019s request Smith was examined and treated at least twice by Dr. Hillmer, an orthopedic specialist, chosen by the company. Two letters written by Dr. Hillmer were placed in evidence as exhibits. The insurance company and Dow received the letters.\nIn a June 1, 1981 letter, Dr. Hillmer noted the following: Smith had three weeks of light duty about a month after the accident and then returned to his normal duties; his present job (at Dow) involved \u201cheavy duty\u201d work; his visits to a chiropractor were decreasing in frequency; and \u201c[cjomplaints will become less severe * * * I do not feel he will have any permanent impairment from this accident.\u201d There was no finding of disability in the letter. In a second letter dated October 19, 1981, Dr. Hillmer concluded: \u201cI still feel he will ultimately make a good recovery.\u201d Two months later Smith was terminated. He then joined the army.\nApproximately three months after Dr. Hillmer\u2019s October letter, on January 25, 1982, army doctors informed Smith he had a permanent disability to his back resulting from the August 1980 accident. He received a medical discharge from the army. Thereafter, he attempted to find light duty work but was unsuccessful.\nSmith filed a workmen\u2019s compensation complaint on November 18, 1982, within a year of the time the army doctors informed him of his disability. The complaint for benefits was denied by the district court under the statute of limitations bar, Section 52-l-31(A).\nFirst, we set forth principles that are fundamental to the concept of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act. Since its inception, we have held that the Act was adopted to provide a humanitarian and economical system of compensation for the injured worker and should be liberally construed in favor of the claimant. Gonzales v. Chino Copper Co., 29 N.M. 228, 222 P. 903 (1924). That is still the law today. Transport Idemnity Co. v. Garcia, 89 N.M. 342, 552 P.2d 473 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 9, 558 P.2d 621 (1976). If no guidelines are given by statute, fundamental fairness must be the guideline. Id. The Act was adopted for the protection of the worker, not the employer. Clark v. Electronic City, 90 N.M. 477, 565 P.2d 348 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 636, 567 P.2d 485 (1977).\nSmith relies on De La Torre v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 89 N.M. 683, 556 P.2d 839 (Ct.App.1976) as authority for the date to begin the running of the limitations statute. De La Torre holds: \u201cTime does not begin to run until the disability is discovered rather than from the accidental occurrence.\u201d Id. at 686, 556 P.2d at 842 (emphasis added). The De La Torre court used the rationale that to hold otherwise would oppose the public policy of the State and the philosophy underlying the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act. Id.\nUnder Section 52-1-30 of the Act the employer is obligated to pay compensation on the \u201coccurrence of disability.\u201d In a case recognizing the occurrence of latent injuries, the Court of Appeals has explained the difference between the terms \u201cdate of disability\u201d and \u201cdate of accident\u201d by stating:\n[I]f the claimant suffers an accident in the course of his employment which does not disable but ultimately leads to a later \u201cmalfunction of the body\u201d resulting in disability, the continuing pain and degenerating ability to function constitute the operative \u201caccident\u201d which brings about the compensable \u201caccidental injury\u201d on the date of disability.\nCasias v. Zia Co., 93 N.M. 78, 79, 596 P.2d 521, 522 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 93 N.M. 8, 595 P.2d 1203 (1979).\nThe record states that Smith was performing his regular job, one which Dr. Hillmer\u2019s letter described as \u201cheavy duty.\u201d While Smith does not deny he had pain, he functioned in his regular job and the company doctor reported he would not have \u201cpermanent impairment from this accident,\u201d and would \u201cmake a good recovery.\u201d\nThe Court of Appeals states that \u201c[t]he physician\u2019s reports, contained in the record, do not affirmatively state that plaintiff was not disabled.\u201d Smith continued to work, but because he had pain, the Court of Appeals held he could not reasonably rely on the diagnosis of the company\u2019s medical specialist. The Court of Appeals concluded \u201cthe workman was aware at all times of a compensable injury, even though he may not have appreciated its degree.\u201d\nThe rule for the discovery of a disability is that discovery occurs \u201c[a]s soon as it becomes reasonably apparent, or should become reasonably apparent, to a workman that he has an injury on account of which he is entitled to compensation * * *\u201d ABF Freight System v. Montano, 99 N.M. 259, 260, 657 P.2d 115, 116 (1982), (quoting Noland v. Young Drilling Co., 79 N.M. 444, 447, 444 P.2d 771, 774 (Ct.App.1968)).\nIt is essential to this limitations issue that we decide whether Smith should have known he was disabled prior to being so advised by army doctors. Here we have an employee performing his normal work duties. Additionally he is reassured twice by a company doctor, specializing in back injuries, that he has no permanent impairment. It would be patently unfair to expect the common laborer to have greater knowledge than the medical expert. See Duran v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 83 N.M. 38, 487 P.2d 1343 (1971); Pena v. New Mexico Highway Department, 100 N.M. 408, 671 P.2d 656 (Ct.App.1983); Sedillo v. LeviStrauss Corp., 98 N.M. 52, 644 P.2d 1041 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982); see also, 3 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen\u2019s Compensation, \u00a7 78.-42(a) at 15-221 (1983).\nA sister state dealt with a similar fact pattern by holding the worker should not be barred by limitations. Bowerman v. Employment Security Commission, Mont., 673 P.2d 476 (1983). In Bowerman the worker fell down a stairwell in 1976. He continued to work, but saw medical specialists in 1977 and 1979. When his symptoms worsened in March, 1980, his job performance was impaired. The claim he submitted in December, 1980 was disallowed by the trial court because it was not timely filed.\nThe Montana Court in reversing referred to 3 A. Larson, supra, Sections 78.40 to 78.42. Larson states:\nIt is odd indeed to find, in a supposedly beneficent piece of legislation, the survival of this fragment of irrational cruelty surpassing the most technical forfeitures of legal statutes of limitation. Statutes of limitation generally proceed on the theory that a man forfeits his rights only when he inexcusably delays assertion of them, and any number of excuses will toll the running of the period. But here no amount of vigilance is of any help. The limitations period runs against a claim that has not yet matured; and when it matures, it is already barred.\nA. Larson, supra, \u00a7 78.42(b), at 15-225, 15-226. (emphasis added).\nAgreeing with the logic in Larson, supra, the Montana Supreme Court held that \u201cin cases of latent injury * * * the time period for notice of claim does not begin to run until the claimant, as a reasonable man, should recognize the nature, seriousness and probable, compensable character of his latent injury.\u201d Bowerman, Mont., 673 P.2d at 479. This standard should apply as well in New Mexico. Here, we are concerned with the date of the \u201coccurrence of disability\u201d under Section 52-1-31. The letters from the company doctor assured both the employer and the worker that there was no permanent impairment. Under the facts of this case, it could not have been reasonably apparent to the worker or his employer that he had a latent disability while being told by a specialist he would make a \u201cgood recovery.\u201d\nUnder the Montana standard adopted by this Court for recognizing a latent injury, Smith could not have recognized the nature, seriousness and probable, compensable character of his back injury until he was so advised by army doctors on January 25, 1982. The statute of limitations therefore began to run on that date. Smith filed his workmen\u2019s compensation complaint on November 18,1982, well within the limitations time under Section 52-1-31(A). See Montano.\nAccordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in granting summary judgment. A full trial is proper on the issues presented by plaintiff Smith\u2019s claim, including the question of when the plaintiff discovered that there was a compensable injury-\nThe district court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nFEDERICI, C.J., and RIORDAN, J., concur.\nWALTERS, J., not participating.\nSTOWERS, J., dissenting.", "type": "majority", "author": "SOSA, Senior Justice." }, { "text": "STOWERS, Justice,\ndissenting.\nThe majority ignores the facts of this case and simply assumes that there is a latent injury. There is no latent injury in this case.\nThe following facts are undisputed. On August 12, 1980, the truck Smith was driving flipped over, crushing the cab of the truck. In his deposition, Smith stated that immediately after the accident he experienced substantial back pain and pain in a leg that caused him to limp for a week. More importantly, Smith stated, as the reason for seeking a physician\u2019s attention about one month after the accident, that \u201c[he] knew that there had to be something wrong because [he] couldn\u2019t do [his] job at all.\u201d Smith further stated that although he often experienced extensive pain, he \u201cfelt that [he] should try to work through this pain.\u201d Smith received weekly or biweekly care and treatment from a chiropractor for continued back and neck pain and for numbness in hands and feet. Therefore, based on the undisputed facts and Smith\u2019s statements, Smith knew that he had a disabling injury at the time of the accident.\nOn November 18, 1982, two years and three months after his accident, Smith filed this action for relief under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act. Under NMSA 1978, Section 52-l-31(A), a workman who remains employed by the same employer from the time of an accident has a maximum period in which to file his workmen\u2019s compensation claim of two years and thirty-one days. See ABF Freight System v. Montano, 99 N.M. 259, 657 P.2d 115 (1982). Thus, Smith\u2019s claim is barred because he did not file his claim by September 13, 1982, the end of the limitation period.\nBy their assumption of a \u201clatent injury\u201d in this case, the majority circumvent the clear application of Section 52-l-31(A). This Court stated that in determining when the statutory period begins to run, \u201c[t]he important thing is whether the injury was not or could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence.\u201d Letteau v. Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., 60 N.M. 234, 237, 290 P.2d 1072, 1074 (1955). Or, as more recently held by the Court in ABF Freight Systems v. Montano:\nthe statutory period begins to run \u201c[a]s soon as it becomes reasonably apparent, or should become reasonably apparent to a workman that he has an injury on account of which he is entitled to compensation and the employer fails or refuses to make payment he has a right to file a claim and the statute begins to run from that date.\u201d (Citation omitted.)\n99 N.M. at 260, 657 P.2d at 116 (quoting Noland v. Young Drilling Co., 79 N.M. 444, 447, 444 P.2d 771, 774 (Ct.App.1968)).\nIn this case, Smith was in pain and unable to perform his normal work from the date of the accident. Also, he stated that he \u201cknew something * * * [was] wrong because [he] couldn\u2019t do [his] job at all.\u201d Therefore, Smith\u2019s injury was apparent, not latent; and the statutory period began on the date of the accident and ended on September 13, 1982.\nThe majority\u2019s statement that it would be unfair to expect a \u201ccommon laborer\u201d to have greater knowledge than a medical expert, is not relevant to any issue in this case. None of the cases cited by the majority support such a statement. In Letteau, relying on Gonzales v. Coe, 59 N.M. 1, 277 P.2d 548 (1954), we stated that \u201cthe mere fact that a claimant, from a medical standpoint, does not know the full extent of his injury does not relieve him from timely filing his claim for workmen\u2019s compensation.\u201d 60 N.M. at 238, 290 P.2d at 1074. The record reveals that Smith knew he was injured on the date of the accident. Thus, it was his burden to file a timely claim.\nThe majority relies on a quotation from Casias v. Zia Co., 93 N.M. 78, 596 P.2d 521 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 93 N.M. 8, 595 P.2d 1203 (1979), which does not address the holding of that case. The holding of Casias is represented more accurately by the following:\n(1) The statute of limitation does not begin to run when a non-disabling accident occurs, but rather when the workman knows or should know that he has sustained a compensable injury as a result of the accident. (Citations omitted.)\n93 N.M. at 80, 596 P.2d at 523. Thus, Casias is consistent with the holdings of this Court that the workman\u2019s awareness of his injury begins the statute of limitations period.\nIn effect, the majority have overruled all prior \u201clatent injury\u201d cases. By dispensing with the \u201capparent injury\u201d standard in favor of a standard that requires a reasonable man to recognize the \u201cnature\u201d of his injury, the \u201cseriousness\u201d of his injury, and the \u201cprobable, compensable character\u201d of his injury, the majority have nullified the limitation period in Section 52-l-31(A). Such an over-burdened standard of proof is contrary to the intent of the Legislature and to the purpose of the statute.\nIn addition, by making the relative knowledge or education level of a claimant the premise of their rationale, the majority arguably have created a standard not previously recognized or applied to Section 51-1-31(A). Such an unsupported premise creates additional confusion in the application of the statute.\nI would affirm the trial court.", "type": "dissent", "author": "STOWERS, Justice," } ], "attorneys": [ "Prince, Schmidt & O\u2019Friel, Daniel J. O\u2019Friel, Winston Roberts-Hohl, Santa Fe, for petitioner.", "Catron, Catron & Sawtell, John S. Ca-tron, Santa Fe, for respondents." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "692 P.2d 27\nShawn SMITH, Petitioner, v. DOWELL CORPORATION, A DIVISION OF DOW CHEMICAL, USA, and Aetna Life & Casualty Company, Insurer, Respondents.\nNo. 15167.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nSept. 21, 1984.\nRehearing Denied Dec. 13, 1984.\nPrince, Schmidt & O\u2019Friel, Daniel J. O\u2019Friel, Winston Roberts-Hohl, Santa Fe, for petitioner.\nCatron, Catron & Sawtell, John S. Ca-tron, Santa Fe, for respondents." }, "file_name": "0102-01", "first_page_order": 140, "last_page_order": 144 }