{
  "id": 1595024,
  "name": "Hal H. DUNNING, Petitioner, v. Anne M. DUNNING, Respondent",
  "name_abbreviation": "Dunning v. Dunning",
  "decision_date": "1986-06-10",
  "docket_number": "No. 15923",
  "first_page": "295",
  "last_page": "296",
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      "cite": "720 P.2d 1236"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.M.",
    "id": 8835,
    "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico"
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  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 52,
    "name_long": "New Mexico",
    "name": "N.M."
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          "page": "167",
          "parenthetical": "\"Need is the first criterion in determining alimony.\""
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          "parenthetical": "\"Need is the first criterion in determining alimony.\""
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      "year": 1979,
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        1594910
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:33:25.530063+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "RIORDAN, C.J., and WALTERS, J., concur.",
      "FEDERICI, J., not participating.",
      "SOSA, Senior J., dissents."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Hal H. DUNNING, Petitioner, v. Anne M. DUNNING, Respondent."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "OPINION\nSTOWERS, Justice.\nHal H. Dunning (Dunning) petitioned this Court on a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Dunning v. Dunning, 104 N.M. 296, 720 P.2d 1237 (Ct.App.1985). We affirm in part and reverse in part the opinion of the Court of Appeals.\nThe Court of Appeals addressed two issues in its opinion. The first issue deals with whether the district court abused its discretion for failing to terminate or reduce Dunning\u2019s alimony obligations due to his ex-wife's (Mrs. Dunning) decreased need. We. affirm the Court of Appeals and hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined, after a lengthy trial, that Mrs. Dunning\u2019s need did not warrant a termination or a reduction in the amount of alimony she is presently receiving. The discussion of the first issue and the facts of this case are set forth in the opinion of the Court of Appeals.\nThe second issue deals with whether the district court erred when it refused to modify the alimony provision, which is expressed as a percentage of Dunning\u2019s monthly military retirement benefits, and award a definite amount. As to the second issue, we reverse the Court of Appeals.\nThe alimony provision in the present case awarded Mrs. Dunning 25.3 percent of Dunning\u2019s gross military retirement benefits. In 1977, at the time of the divorce, Mrs. Dunning received approximately $524 per month in alimony. At present, Mrs. Dunning is receiving approximately $920 per month in alimony. Mrs. Dunning\u2019s alimony has automatically increased over the years and will continue to automatically increase in the future due to the fact that Dunning is required to pay a percentage of his military retirement benefits which increase on a periodic basis. Because Mrs. Dunning was awarded a percentage of Dunning\u2019s military retirement benefits as alimony, she has been able to bypass the procedures traditionally required before an increase in alimony is granted, i.e., petitioning the trial court and presenting evidence of changed circumstances.\nDunning asked the trial court to modify the alimony provision and award a definite amount instead of a percentage of his military retirement pay. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals denied his request. We reverse both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.\nWe stress that \u201c[t]he public policy on modification of alimony awards is established by \u00a7 40-4-7(B)(2) NMSA 1978, which gives the district court the authority to change any order with respect to alimony allowed to either spouse \u2018whenever the circumstances render such change proper.\u2019 \u201d Brister v. Brister, 92 N.M. 711, 713, 594 P.2d 1167, 1169 (1979). \u201cChanges in circumstances of divorced parties may warrant reducing or terminating alimony obligations. * * * The focal point in each case is the recipient\u2019s need for support. * * * [a]ctual need being the criterion. * * * \u201d Id. at 715, 594 P.2d at 1171; see also Weaver v. Weaver, 100 N.M. 165, 167, 667 P.2d 970, 972 (1983) (\u201cNeed is the first criterion in determining alimony.\u201d).\nBy denying Dunning\u2019s motion to award a definite amount in alimony benefits, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ignore New Mexico\u2019s expressed public policy on modification of alimony awards. Alimony awards which provide for automatic increases result in alimony modifications without requiring evidence of changed circumstances. Such awards ignore the basic criteria of the recipient\u2019s need and the supporting spouse\u2019s ability to pay which must be established by the party seeking to demonstrate need.\nFor these reasons, we hold that it is not proper to include provisions in divorce decrees which provide for automatic alimony increases, whether they are expressed as escalator clauses, in terms of a percentage of a supporting spouse\u2019s income, or based upon a sliding-scale formula.\nWe affirm in part and reverse in part and remand for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nRIORDAN, C.J., and WALTERS, J., concur.\nFEDERICI, J., not participating.\nSOSA, Senior J., dissents.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "STOWERS, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Montoya, Murphy, Kauffman & Garcia, Michael A. Kauffman, Sante Fe, for petitioner.",
      "Ann Yalman, Montgomery & Andrews, Sarah M. Singleton, Santa Fe, for respondent."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "720 P.2d 1236\nHal H. DUNNING, Petitioner, v. Anne M. DUNNING, Respondent.\nNo. 15923.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nJune 10, 1986.\nMontoya, Murphy, Kauffman & Garcia, Michael A. Kauffman, Sante Fe, for petitioner.\nAnn Yalman, Montgomery & Andrews, Sarah M. Singleton, Santa Fe, for respondent."
  },
  "file_name": "0295-01",
  "first_page_order": 329,
  "last_page_order": 330
}