{ "id": 1594909, "name": "David P. DILLARD, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Billye J. DILLARD, Respondent-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Dillard v. Dillard", "decision_date": "1986-08-28", "docket_number": "No. 8693", "first_page": "763", "last_page": "769", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "104 N.M. 763" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "727 P.2d 71" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "100 N.M. 424", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1588655 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/100/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 N.M. 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1594944 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/104/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 N.M. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1594987 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/104/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 N.M. 686", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1571125 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/91/0686-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 P. 294", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "year": 1915, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "where court found children in need of father's support, and placed property in trust for this purpose; decree prevented proceeds from becoming available for support until mother returned children to New Mexico" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 N.M. 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2387229 ], "year": 1915, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "where court found children in need of father's support, and placed property in trust for this purpose; decree prevented proceeds from becoming available for support until mother returned children to New Mexico" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/21/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 N.M. 345", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1586451 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/101/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 N.M. 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582435 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/98/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.M. 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1575617 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "291" }, { "page": "508" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/95/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.M. 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1575536 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/95/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 N.M. 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1557152 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/92/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 N.M. 793", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1568784 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/93/0793-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 N.M. 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1555187 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/97/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 N.M. 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1586357 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/101/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 N.M. 744", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582452 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/98/0744-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 N.M. 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1586363 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/101/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 N.M. 795", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1555130 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/97/0795-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.M. 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1575541 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "child's needs are current and expectation of future payment does not meet the need" }, { "parenthetical": "child's needs are current and expectation of future payment does not meet the need" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/95/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 N.M. 578", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1584779 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1952, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/56/0578-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 N.M. 648", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2822217 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/86/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 N.M. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2774253 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/85/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 N.M. 598", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1568816 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/93/0598-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 N.M. 606", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1584586 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "607" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/99/0606-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 N.M. 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1586367 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/101/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 N.M. 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1571164 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/91/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.M. 791", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1575475 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/95/0791-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 N.M. 737", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1571134 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"It is the duty of the trial court to find all the ultimate facts where a request is seasonably and properly made.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"It is the duty of the trial court to find all the ultimate facts where a request is seasonably and properly made.\"" }, { "page": "742" }, { "page": "963" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/91/0737-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 N.M. 568", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1588602 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/100/0568-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 N.M. 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582551 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/98/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 N.M. 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580240 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/102/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 N.M. 690", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582525 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/98/0690-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 847, "char_count": 19275, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.759084318279461e-08, "percentile": 0.5312827118492236 }, "sha256": "a3c6eed26f86542b66a94418649107641f0bf93c42e7a7bfbb4d8a57cb846637", "simhash": "1:0bef786f774a5c32", "word_count": 3116 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:33:25.530063+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "ALARID and MINZNER, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "David P. DILLARD, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Billye J. DILLARD, Respondent-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nGARCIA, Judge.\nThe parties were divorced in July of 1977. They had three minor children at that time, for whom the trial court ordered David Dillard (petitioner) to pay child support to Billye Dillard (respondent). Petitioner, under the original decree was granted \u201creasonable visitation.\u201d Shortly after the divorce, respondent and the children moved to the state of Washington where they had previously resided. Petitioner, in 1978, alleged that respondent was denying him reasonable visitation. Thus began a running battle between the Eddy County and Kittitas County (Washington) courts, each of which issued conflicting orders regarding visitation and child support. Respondent seeks to appeal two orders issued by the Eddy County trial court \u201cmodifying\u201d the child support payments of petitioner.\nRespondent first seeks to appeal the order of June 1979. This order, resulting from petitioner\u2019s motion for child support modification on the grounds that respondent was withholding reasonable visitation, directed petitioner to pay his previously ordered child support into a bank account \u201cuntil such time as Billye J. Dillard provides reasonable visitation * * * in the State of New Mexico, and at the time she provides reasonable visitation rights the court will make a determination as to whether she is entitled to any of the funds that will be placed in the savings account.\u201d\nRespondent additionally seeks to appeal a second order entered in June of 1985, which directs that the funds accumulated pursuant to the 1979 order be used to create a trust for the post-minority education of the parties\u2019 children. The 1985 order provides that any money left over after the children complete their education, or fail to attend college for more than one year, reverts to petitioner.\nI. PROCEDURAL ISSUES ON 1979 ORDER\nPetitioner raises several procedural problems which he maintains prevent this court\u2019s consideration of respondent's appeal on the merits. We address the following two concerns:\nTimeliness of Respondent\u2019s Appeal\nPetitioner contends this court lacks jurisdiction to review the 1979 order, because on all issues, other than how the trust funds should be dispersed, the order was final in 1979. Consequently, petitioner asks this court to rule that any argument as to the 1979 order is not timely. We view the dispositive questions on appeal as integrally related to the issue of how the trust funds should be dispersed. For that reason, we do not reach the question of whether respondent\u2019s appeal is timely as to the 1979 order.\nRespondent\u2019s failure to include record of hearing preceding 1979 order\nAlthough we view the dispositive issues as part of respondent\u2019s contentions concerning the 1985 order, we note, for the guidance of the bar, the following problem. It is quite clear that it is respondent\u2019s duty to see that the record necessary to review alleged errors is before the court. Three Rivers Land Co. Inc. v. Maddoux, 98 N.M. 690, 652 P.2d 240 (1982). To the extent that respondent\u2019s attempt to challenge the 1979 order is based on a lack of substantial evidence, respondent has failed to provide the necessary record. Berlint v. Bonn, 102 N.M. 394, 696 P.2d 482 (Ct.App.1985); see Luxton v. Luxton, 98 N.M. 276, 648 P.2d 315 (1982).\nRespondent further asserts that the trial court\u2019s failure to find that respondent was able to adequately support the children before ordering the accumulation of the child support in 1979 was an abuse of discretion. On its face, the 1979 order does not contain such a finding. However, we do not reach the necessity for such a finding because we have no record of any tendered findings or conclusions by respondent either oral or written. Respondent admits that she made no written request for findings and conclusions. In the absence of this record, respondent has waived any objection to the court\u2019s findings. Crownover v. National Farmer\u2019s Union Property & Casualty Co., 100 N.M. 568, 673 P.2d 1301 (1983); see also Spingola v. Spingola, 91 N.M. 737, 580 P.2d 958 (1978) (\u201cIt is the duty of the trial court to find all the ultimate facts where a request is seasonably and properly made.\u201d) Id. at 742, 580 P.2d at 963. Respondent\u2019s failure to include the record of the proceedings prior to the 1979 order precludes our review of any part of that order.\nII. COURT\u2019S AUTHORITY TO PROMULGATE 1985 ORDER CREATING TRUST FUND; REINSTATING $200 PER MONTH PAYMENTS TO RESPONDENT FOR YOUNGEST CHILD; PROVIDING FOR REVERSION OF MONIES TO PETITIONER\nRespondent raises two alleged errors in regard to the 1985 order:\n(1) to the extent that the 1985 order provides for payment of accumulated child support monies to a trust for use in meeting the children\u2019s educational needs past the age of 18, the court exceeded its jurisdiction;\n(2) the provision in the 1985 order providing for a reversion of unused funds to petitioner is impermissible.\nAs a preliminary matter, we deal with petitioner\u2019s lack of standing allegations. Petitioner asserts that because respondent is not the parent required by the court to fund the trust created by the 1985 order, she cannot object to the creation of the trust. Petitioner further asserts that because respondent, pursuant to the 1985 order, will receive the same amount of child support for the remaining minor child (commencing November 1, 1984) as was ordered in the original decree, respondent has no basis for objection.\nRespondent counters that the trial court\u2019s order exceeds that court's jurisdiction under NMSA 1978, Section 40-4-7(C) (Repl.Pamp.1986). As a party to this action, respondent may raise jurisdictional error for the first time on appeal. See generally Lasley v. Baca, 95 N.M. 791, 626 P.2d 1288 (1981). Indeed, this court may raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction on its own motion. State v. Doe, 91 N.M. 356, 573 P.2d 1211 (Ct.App.1977).\nTo the extent that petitioner\u2019s standing argument goes to the question of whether respondent is an aggrieved party, we find that she has a \u201cpecuniary interest\u201d affected by the 1985 order. See St. Sauver v. New Mexico Peterbilt, Inc., 101 N.M. 84, 678 P.2d 712 (Ct.App.1984). We reach this conclusion by acknowledging the simple fact that since 1979, respondent has supported the parties\u2019 children without the benefit of the court-ordered child support. Contrary to petitioner\u2019s argument, we do not view the 1979 order as a valid divestment of respondent\u2019s pecuniary interest.\nAs to respondent\u2019s jurisdictional argument, we cannot agree with petitioner\u2019s analysis of the cases where our courts have held that the trial court may not extend child support benefits past the child\u2019s attainment of majority. Psomas v. Psomas, 99 N.M. 606, 607, 661 P.2d 884 (1982), states, \u201cWe agree with husband that the court had no jurisdiction to provide for children who have passed the age of majority.\u201d See also Spingola v. Spingola, 93 N.M. 598, 603 P.2d 708 (1979); Phelps v. Phelps, 85 N.M. 62, 509 P.2d 254 (1973); \u00a7 40-4-7. Our determination of the trial court\u2019s jurisdiction is controlled by our interpretation of the authority granted by the applicable statute, not by the party asserting a lack of jurisdiction. A general reservation of jurisdiction over the accumulated child support does not permit the trial court to exceed its statutory authority. See Unser v. Unser, 86 N.M. 648, 526 P.2d 790 (1974).\nPetitioner further maintains that Section 40-4-7(C) provides authority for the trial court\u2019s creation of this educational trust. The statute provides:\n[I]f any of the property decreed or funds created for the maintenance and education of the children shall remain on hand and be undisposed of at the time the minor children reach the age of majority, the same may be disposed of by the court as it may deem just and proper.\nThe statutory language encompasses funds that \u201cremain\u201d in the sense of the residuum of funds that have been applied to the children\u2019s needs, not funds that the trial court ordered accumulated and which never reached the children ordered to be supported. Petitioner\u2019s reliance on this language to somehow extend the court\u2019s jurisdiction to the creation of an educational trust after majority is misplaced. See Spingola v. Spingola (the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, limited to pre-majority support decrees, cannot be extended by agreement of the parties); In Re Coe's Estate, 56 N.M. 578, 247 P.2d 162 (1952).\nAs a matter of policy, this court does not look favorably upon a six-year accumulation of child support payments at a time when the minor children are most in need of their parents\u2019 financial support. See Mask v. Mask, 95 N.M. 229, 620 P.2d 883 (1980) (child\u2019s needs are current and expectation of future payment does not meet the need).\nWe hold that the trial court acted beyond its statutory authority in establishing a trust which provided for the parties\u2019 children\u2019s post-minority education.\nIII. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE\nWe do not address respondent\u2019s sufficiency claim on appeal as to the 1985 order because of our disposition of the jurisdictional issue.\nPetitioner claims that respondent waived her right to argue that specific findings were necessary because she failed to file a written request for findings or to tender findings and conclusions. See NMSA 1978, Civ.P.R. 52(B)(1)(f) (Repl.Pamp.1980).\nWe agree with petitioner that a failure to make a written request for findings of fact and conclusions of law, generally, precludes petitioner\u2019s requested evidentiary review. Pedigo v. Valley Mobile Homes, Inc., 97 N.M. 795, 643 P.2d 1247 (Ct.App.1982).\nWe specifically reserve our decision on the issue of whether a written general request, once refused by the trial court, is sufficient to preserve a party\u2019s right to claim error in the trial court\u2019s refusal to make findings and conclusions. Cf. McCaffrey v. Steward Const. Co., 101 N.M. 51, 678 P.2d 226 (Ct.App.1984) (where the decision contains findings and conclusions signed by the trial judge and the decision is filed in the record proper, this is sufficient to comply with the requirements of Rule 52(B)). See Peterson v. Peterson, 98 N.M. 744, 652 P.2d 1195 (1982); see also Martinez v. Martinez, 101 N.M. 493, 496, 684 P.2d 1158 (Ct.App.1984) (\u201cRule 52(B)(1)(h) requires the court to allow counsel a reasonable opportunity to submit requested findings and conclusions.\u201d)\nThe trial court refused respondent\u2019s oral request for permission to file findings of fact and conclusions of law. The copy of the clerk\u2019s minutes found in the record proper is not signed by the trial court and is not sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 52(B). See Balboa Construction Co. v. Golden, 97 N.M. 299, 639 P.2d 586 (Ct.App.1981). We reiterate the well-settled rule that an appellate court will not review evidence where an appellant fails to make a general request in writing or to tender specific findings and conclusions. See Lovelace Center for the Health Sciences v. Beach, 93 N.M. 793, 606 P.2d 203 (Ct.App.1980).\nWe note, again, the importance of preserving error for review on appeal.\nThe Reversion Provisions of the 1985 Order\nOur decision on the jurisdictional defect in the trust provision of the 1985 order disposes of that part of the order and requires a remand to the trial court. We discuss respondent\u2019s second issue, the impermissibility of the reversion provisions, and conclude that the trial court erred insofar as it provided for a reversion to petitioner of accrued child support.\nRespondent claims that to the extent that the 1985 order permitted the accumulated savings account monies to revert back to petitioner, the order impermissibly forgave accrued child support. See Gomez v. Gomez, 92 N.M. 310, 587 P.2d 963 (1978), overruled on other grounds, Montoya v. Montoya, 95 N.M. 189, 619 P.2d 1233 (1980).\nPetitioner argues that the money in the savings account is not accrued child support because, as of the 1979 order, respondent had only a \u201cfuture, contingent interest\u201d in those monies, not a vested interest. In short, petitioner argues that the savings account monies are \u201cproperty decreed or funds created for the maintenance and education of the children [which] remain on hand and * * * [are] undisposed of at the time the minor children reach the age of majority * * * [which] may be disposed of by the court as it may deem just and proper.\u201d \u00a7 40-4-7(C). This \u201cjust and proper\u201d disposition, according to petitioner, was the trial court\u2019s creation of the educational trust and the reversion provision, of the 1985 order. We have struck down the trust and now must determine the validity of the reversion provisions of the order.\nOur decision turns on the correct characterization of the various monies involved. The final decree of divorce between the parties is dated July 18, 1977. In that decree, petitioner is ordered to pay \u201cto respondent as child support $600 per month * * * i)\nIn June of 1978, the district judge, on petitioner\u2019s motion, directed petitioner to pay his child support to the clerk of the district court of Eddy County until further hearings and determinations could be made. This order did not modify any previously decreed child support.\nOn September 1, 1978, the New Mexico court (in accord with an order obtained by respondent in Washington state) ordered future child support payments to be made to the Clerk of the Kittitas County, Washington court and ordered the Eddy County Clerk to remit all past payments received by the Clerk to Kittitas County for credit to respondent. The effect of this order was to release the child support payments accumulated in the Eddy County Clerk\u2019s Office and to resume petitioner\u2019s regular payments of child support, albeit, through the Kittitas County Clerk\u2019s Office. Thus far, no modification of the child support obligation mandated by the original decree had occurred.\nOn June 25, 1979, after a hearing pursuant to petitioner\u2019s petition to modify support, the trial court found that respondent\u2019s Washington order modifying visitation was not reasonable, and that respondent had failed to provide reasonable visitation. The court held respondent in contempt for her failure to provide reasonable visitation. The court additionally ordered petitioner to pay the two hundred dollars per month for the two minor children into a savings account until such time as respondent provided reasonable visitation, \u201cand at the time she provides reasonable visitation rights the Court will make a determination as to whether she is entitled to any of the funds that will be placed in the savings account.\u201d\nClearly, no modification of the decreed child support occurred before June 1979, despite the fact that the trial court had ordered the child support paid to two different court clerks in lieu of payment to respondent. See Gomez v. Gomez (father is responsible for child support payments until petition for modification properly brought before court and court finds sufficient change in circumstances to modify future payments); see also \u00a7 40-4-7(C).\nThe ultimate question, then, is whether petitioner is correct in his assertion that the 1979 order effectively modified his support obligation. To warrant a modification in an award of child support, the court must find a \u201csubstantial change of circumstances which materially affects the existing welfare of the child and which must have occurred since the prior adjudication where child support was originally awarded.\u201d Henderson v. Lekvold, 95 N.M. 288, 291, 621 P.2d 505, 508 (1980). No such finding or any language that approximates such a finding appears in the 1979 order.\nGenerally, court-ordered modification of child support is concerned with a petitioned-for decrease or increase in child support payments. See Smith v. Smith, 98 N.M. 468, 649 P.2d 1381 (1982); Peterson v. Peterson; Henderson v. Lekvold; Romero v. Romero, 101 N.M. 345, 682 P.2d 201 (Ct.App.1984). This is not the case here. Rather, petitioner asked the court to use child support as a punitive device to require respondent to provide reasonable visitation. Cf. Fullen v. Fullen, 21 N.M. 212, 153 P. 294 (1915) (where court found children in need of father\u2019s support, and placed property in trust for this purpose; decree prevented proceeds from becoming available for support until mother returned children to New Mexico).\nJust as using reduction in child support payments as a punitive measure is not favored, unless it can be demonstrated that the reduction is in the overall best interests of the children, withholding child support payments to force visitation must similarly be disfavored. See Fullen v. Fullen. The public policy of this state provides that child support exists to benefit the children. Barela v. Barela, 91 N.M. 686, 579 P.2d 1253 (1978). Only in extreme circumstances should courts authorize the withholding of child support to coerce visitation.\nFinally, we note that the trial court\u2019s 1979 order held respondent in contempt for her failure to provide reasonable visitation. We note that civil contempt may issue when respondent has disobeyed an order of the court. The punishment is remedial, designed to coerce respondent to perform the act ordered by the court. State v. Pothier, 104 N.M. 363, 721 P.2d 1294 (1986).\nThe coercive nature of the contempt citation is a future indication that the 1979 order was another in a series of orders designed to procure reasonable visitation for petitioner.\nIn light of the considerations and standards necessary for a modification of child support, we do not believe, nor does the 1979 order anywhere state, that petitioner\u2019s child support responsibility was modified by that order. Cf. Barela v. Barela (only after finding that custodial parent is financially able to support minor child does the court have the power to terminate future support obligations of the non-custodial parent). See also Brannock v. Brannock, 104 N.M. 385, 722 P.2d 636 (1986). We must conclude that the monies accumulated in the savings account prior to 1983 are most correctly characterized as accrued child support.\nThus, the 1985 order, insofar as it attempts to order any new disposition of monies accumulated prior to July 1983 (date of petition to reconsider child support or modification, see Montoya v. Montoya) is beyond the authority of the trial court. Britton v. Britton, 100 N.M. 424, 671 P.2d 1135 (1983); Gomez v. Gomez; Romero v. Romero.\nWe have determined that the 1979 order did not modify petitioner\u2019s original child support obligation, that the trust provision of the 1985 order is invalid, and that the court had no authority to order a new disposition (inconsistent with the 1977 divorce decree) of child support monies accrued prior to July 1983. We reverse and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nRespondent shall be awarded her appellate costs.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nALARID and MINZNER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "GARCIA, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "George A. Graham, Jr., Siegenthaler & Graham, Artesia, Sarah M. Singleton, Montgomery & Andrews, P.A., Santa Fe, for petitioner-appellee.", "Michael T. Murphy, Rosenberg, Shuler, Murphy & Meyer, Carlsbad, for respondent-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "727 P.2d 71\nDavid P. DILLARD, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Billye J. DILLARD, Respondent-Appellant.\nNo. 8693.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nAug. 28, 1986.\nGeorge A. Graham, Jr., Siegenthaler & Graham, Artesia, Sarah M. Singleton, Montgomery & Andrews, P.A., Santa Fe, for petitioner-appellee.\nMichael T. Murphy, Rosenberg, Shuler, Murphy & Meyer, Carlsbad, for respondent-appellant." }, "file_name": "0763-01", "first_page_order": 797, "last_page_order": 803 }