{ "id": 1598940, "name": "B & W CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a New Mexico corporation, Donald Paul Wood and Robert Bowers, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. N.C. RIBBLE COMPANY, a New Mexico corporation, Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellant, v. B & W CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a New Mexico corporation, Donald Paul Wood and Robert Bowers, Counterdefendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "B & W Construction Co. v. N.C. Ribble Co.", "decision_date": "1987-03-05", "docket_number": "No. 16066", "first_page": "448", "last_page": "453", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "105 N.M. 448" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "734 P.2d 226" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "98 N.M. 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582461 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/98/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 N.M. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2790772 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "court's ruling on qualification of expert not disturbed absent abuse of discretion" }, { "parenthetical": "court's ruling on qualification of expert not disturbed absent abuse of discretion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/69/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 N.M. 56", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 711403 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/103/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 N.M. 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1568837 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469" }, { "page": "439" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/93/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 N.M. 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2838553 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/88/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 N.M. 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2827763 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/86/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "662 P.2d 645", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.M. 644", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.M. 645", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1584627 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/99/0645-01" ] }, { "cite": "676 P.2d 262", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 1588566 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264-65" }, { "page": "266", "parenthetical": "dicta" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/100/0735-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2872324 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301-02" }, { "page": "95-96" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 F.Supp. 356", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3434816 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/535/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 B.R. 274", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "B.R.", "case_ids": [ 6552062 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294-96" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/br/40/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 Iowa L. Rev. 892", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Iowa L. Rev.", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "910" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "151 P. 315", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "year": 1915, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322-23" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "20 N.M. 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 4714779 ], "year": 1915, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508-11" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/20/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 N.M. 680", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5358793 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682-83" }, { "page": "844-45" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/80/0680-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 N.M. 56", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 711403 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57-59" }, { "page": "1002-04" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/103/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 N.M. 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1568837 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469" }, { "page": "439" }, { "page": "469-70" }, { "page": "439-40", "parenthetical": "Wood, C.J., specially concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/93/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 N.M. 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2838553 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/88/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 N.M. 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2827763 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422-23" }, { "page": "1038-39" }, { "page": "419" }, { "page": "1035" }, { "page": "423" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/86/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "662 P.2d 645", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "remand where alternative theory erroneously submitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "99 N.M. 644", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "remand where alternative theory erroneously submitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "99 N.M. 645", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1584627 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655" }, { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/99/0645-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 951, "char_count": 19392, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2259179820294102e-07, "percentile": 0.6045404577641399 }, "sha256": "0a42263153a2b652a4d2089814bad1eb373786cf0c915a4fdb4e21d7217367bf", "simhash": "1:8b38eb26e8447de4", "word_count": 3189 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:20:30.820213+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "SCARBOROUGH, C.J., and WALTERS, J., concur.", "STOWERS, J., dissents.", "RANSOM, J., not participating." ], "parties": [ "B & W CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a New Mexico corporation, Donald Paul Wood and Robert Bowers, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. N.C. RIBBLE COMPANY, a New Mexico corporation, Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellant, v. B & W CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a New Mexico corporation, Donald Paul Wood and Robert Bowers, Counterdefendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nSOSA, Senior Justice.\nThis appeal arises out of a dispute over the rental of rock crushing machinery for highway construction. The jury found in favor of defendant N.C. Ribble Company (NCR) against B & W Construction Company (B & W) on the basic contract questions, but against NCR's effort to enforce a personal guarantee allegedly executed by plaintiffs-counterdefendants, Robert Bowers (Bowers) and Donald Paul Wood (Wood). NCR contends that three errors of the trial court led to the verdict in favor of Bowers and Wood. We affirm the trial court.\nNCR raises three issues:\nI. Whether the trial court erred in submitting the question of economic duress to the jury;\nII. Whether the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of a polygrapher; and\nIII. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to give an instruction requested by NCR and a clarification when asked by the jury.\nBACKGROUND\nThe facts pertinent to this appeal are that B & W is a corporation, owned by Bowers and Woods, which subcontracted with a general contractor, Herzog Contracting Corporation (Herzog), to crush rock for construction of a highway near Alamogordo. B & W rented the necessary equipment from NCR and began working on September, 1981. On previous jobs, the parties had entered into lease agreements which provided that rental payments could contribute to the purchase price of the equipment. Apparently B & W anticipated a similar deal on the rock crushers at issue here.\nFrom the outset, however, the agreement foundered. B & W failed to tender installment payments, while some of the machinery did not perform as promised. By January 7, 1982, B & W was approximately $700,000 in arrears on its lease, maintenance and parts payments. On that date the president of NCR, Norman Ribble (Ribble), notified B & W that NCR would exercise its lien rights and shut the job down unless other arrangements could be made to secure the present and future indebtedness. At this time Herzog, too, became impatient with the performance of B & W and threatened to terminate the subcontract. It appeared that the impasse could best be avoided by keeping B & W on the job so as to assure payment by Herzog, provided that such payment would ultimately come to NCR.\nRibble went to the offices of B & W on the morning of January 20, 1982 to present a proposal that the leasing would continue only if Bowers and Wood executed a personal guaranty covering the indebtedness. Bowers refused. Ribble returned in the afternoon, but the testimony differs as to the agreement arrived at orally. Bowers maintains that he suggested instead that he would guarantee B & W\u2019s payment to NCR only after Herzog had paid B & W and after the bank\u2019s first assignment had been satisfied. Bowers also insisted on a provision to cover refinancing on a purchase rather than a lease basis. Ribble\u2019s attorney had drafted a document, which Wood\u2019s secretary retyped supposedly to incorporate Bowers\u2019 suggestions. Wood signed one page and Bowers the other. Bowers\u2019 secretary notarized the signatures the next morning.\nB & W kept the equipment and finished the job, but never paid NCR. Instead B & W filed this suit, alleging numerous deficiencies in NCR\u2019s performance of the rental contract. NCR counterclaimed against B & W for the amount owed, and against Bowers and Wood personally on the guaranty they had signed.\nAt trial, Bowers and Wood claimed that they had not signed the guaranty, or, if they had, it was as a result of economic duress and coercion. The jury found for NCR and against B & W on the debts, but in favor of Bowers and Wood individually. On appeal, NCR argues that the trial court should have directed a verdict for NCR on the personal guaranty. We address each component of the argument raised by NCR.\nI. Economic Duress\nThe jury instruction stating the case indicated that Bowers and Wood denied liability on the personal guaranty because:\n(1) It was obtained under economic coercion or duress; or\n(2) It was forged or altered from the document that they signed.\nIt cannot now be determined upon which ground the jury based its verdict. NCR maintains that reversal is required if it would be improper to base a verdict on one of the alternative theories, citing Perfetti v. McGhan Medical, 99 N.M. 645, 662 P.2d 646 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 644, 662 P.2d 645 (1983).\nNCR contends that the trial court erred in submitting this issue to the jury instead of directing a verdict in NCR\u2019s favor, arguing that there is no basis in law for giving the instruction on economic duress because economic duress cannot result from the exercise of a legal right. Terrel v. Duke City Lumber Co., 86 N.M. 405, 524 P.2d 1021 (Ct.App.1974), aff'd in part, rev\u2019d in part, 88 N.M. 299, 540 P.2d 229 (1975). There is no question that NCR had the legal right to request security for the indebtedness.\nBowers and Wood counter this authority with the contention that NCR\u2019s legal rights extended only to B & W as a corporation and not to themselves as individuals. In First National Bank v. Wood, 93 N.M. 467, 601 P.2d 437 (Ct.App.1979), the court did find economic duress where the bank refused to continue defendant\u2019s line of credit unless he signed a guaranty on the separate account of his son.\nNCR responds that it had the right to repossess the equipment or impose a lien on the job, both of which options it abandoned as consideration for Bowers and Wood executing the personal guaranty. Thus it would distinguish the facts of this case from those in First National Bank v. Wood, where the lending party gave up nothing as it insisted on an additional promise from the borrower. We point out, however, that the holding in Wood rests on the principle that duress can be found if the party in the superior bargaining position uses its power to deny the weaker party a reasonable choice of alternatives. Id. at 469, 601 P.2d at 439.\nIn the case at bar, NCR was the party possessing superior power. Bowers\u2019 theory throughout was that he never intended to sign any guaranty of B & W\u2019s indebtedness without a provision that Herzog would first have to pay B & W. A factual question was thus raised by the evidence as to whether NCR\u2019s actions were coercive or not. NCR does not challenge the instructions given to the jury on the elements of economic duress. These properly stated that duress cannot result from the exercise of a legal right, as well as that proof of duress must be made by clear and convincing evidence.\nFrom the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court acted properly in submitting the question of economic duress to the jury, and that it was not error to deny NCR\u2019s motion for a directed verdict.\nII. Testimony of Reilly Taitte\nIn support of his position that he did not recall signing the personal guaranty, Bowers proffered the testimony of Reilly Taitte, a polygraph examiner. This came after the court had refused to admit the testimony of Bill Cox, the polygrapher who had examined Wood. At the hearing, outside the presence of the jury, counsel for NCR objected to Taitte\u2019s testimony because not all of the pretest interview had been recorded, as required by NMSA 1978, Evidence Rule 707(e) (Repl.Pamp.1983) (Now SCRA 1986, 11-707-E). Counsel for Bowers stated that Taitte had recorded the interview. Counsel for NCR declined voir dire of the witness.\nRule 707 does not define \u201cpre-test interview.\u201d Taitte testified that he recorded the interview according to his understanding of the rule. The tape of the interview and the test itself was introduced into evidence. On appeal NCR repeats its assertion that the pre-test interview was not recorded.\nTaitte went on to testify that Bowers gave truthful answers concerning the subject of a personal guaranty: that he did not sign anything to make himself personally liable to NCR for B & W\u2019s debts, but that he did sign something to assign payments from Herzog to NCR. He was not asked whether he signed the specific document in dispute.\nIn response, NCR called as an expert witness, Dr. David Raskin, whose testimony discredited the validity of the test performed by Taitte. The conflict between the two experts as to how the test should be conducted simply contributes to the controversy surrounding the subject of polygraph evidence. This court has repeatedly wrestled with the problem in the criminal context. See Tafoya v. Baca, 103 N.M. 56, 702 P.2d 1001 (1985).\nConsistent with the other rules regulating the admission of expert testimony, Rule 707-C entrusts the admissibility of polygraph evidence to the sound discretion of the trial court. SCR A 1986, 11-707-C. See Sturgeon v. Clark, 69 N.M. 132, 364 P.2d 757 (1961) (court\u2019s ruling on qualification of expert not disturbed absent abuse of discretion). Given the inconclusiveness of the colloquy concerning the pre-test interview in the civil case before us, we determine that appellant\u2019s objections are not so clear and uncontroverted as to require reversal. The reliability of Taitte\u2019s testimony relates to the weight to be given the evidence, not to the question of its admissibility. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony into evidence.\nIII. Jury Instructions\nThe two issues above assume that the guaranty was signed, but invalid, or that it was never signed. NCR\u2019s last point on appeal is that the jury might have disregarded or misconstrued its instructions and disallowed the personal guaranty on the basis that Bowers or Woods signed the document but meant something different by it than its terms would indicate. Instructions numbered 10, 11 and 12, respectively, defined the subjects of express contract, implied contract and mutual assent. \u201cMeeting of the minds\u201d was the concept contained in Number 10, while Number 12 distinguished between subjective and objective intent in contract formation. NCR tendered an instruction, Number 32, refused by the trial court, that the parties to a contract are bound by its terms.\nDuring its deliberations, the jurors sent a note to the court which read, \u201cPlease clarify the language in instructions No. 10 and 12. We need the lay terms.\u201d The trial court properly concluded that it would be error to speculate about the thought process of the jury, and that, therefore, the question would be answered by a direction to consider the instructions given as a whole.\nNCR argued then, as now, that the jury was misled by the suggestion of Bowers\u2019 attorney that one could not be bound by contract terms one did not understand. Thus the jury might have failed to enforce the personal guaranty because they would have found no \u201cmeeting of the minds.\u201d Furthermore, NCR intimates that this confusion caused the jury to request clarification.\nEven if NCR\u2019s supposition were true, the relief it requested would not have cured the confusion, because its Instruction No. 32 goes to the duties of the parties once a contract has been formed, whereas, \u201cmeeting of the minds\u201d goes to the question of whether a contract was formed in the first place. Secondly, in its brief, NCR agrees that \u201cmeeting of the minds\u201d means mutual assent as reflected by the objective manifestations of the parties. Instruction No. 12, as given, properly states this standard. Finally, the question submitted by the jury does not reflect any conflict between Nos. 10 and 12, but at most an unfamiliarity with the terminology therein. We find no error in the instructions submitted to the jury nor in the rejection of NCR\u2019s requested No. 32.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nSCARBOROUGH, C.J., and WALTERS, J., concur.\nSTOWERS, J., dissents.\nRANSOM, J., not participating.\nSTOWERS, Justice,\n. Bowers was the principal financial contributor to the corporation, while Woods oversaw the operational side.\n. At oral argument it came out that the cassette in question was not included in the record on appeal. The burden is upon appellant to provide the complete record. SCRA 1986, 12-211; Nichols v. Nichols, 98 N.M. 322, 648 P.2d 780 (1982). We have no basis, therefore, for reviewing NCR\u2019s claim; so we must conclude that the representation of Bowers' attorney and NCR\u2019s waiver of voir dire satisfied the requirements of Rule 707-E.", "type": "majority", "author": "SOSA, Senior Justice. STOWERS, Justice," }, { "text": "dissenting.\nI dissent.\nI cannot concur in the majority opinion because I believe that the trial court erred, first, in submitting to the jury the defense of economic duress and, second, in submitting to the jury polygraph evidence inadmissible under NMSA 1978, Evid.Rule 707 (Repl.Pamp.1983) (now codified at SCRA 1986,11-707). Because the jury may have based its verdict upon a legal theory that should not have been before it and also received polygraph evidence that should have been excluded, I would reverse the judgment in favor of Bowers and Wood on NCR\u2019s personal guaranty counterclaim and would remand for a new trial on that counterclaim alone.\nI. Economic Duress\nThis Court long has recognized that a party coerced into a transaction by the wrongful act of another party may void that transaction. See Pecos Constr. Co. v. Mortgage Investment Co., 80 N.M. 680, 682-83, 459 P.2d 842, 844-45 (1969); see also Cadwell v. Higginbotham, 20 N.M. 482, 508-11, 151 P. 315, 322-23 (1915). The doctrine of economic compulsion or economic duress protects the party in a weaker bargaining position from the unreasonable exercise of economic power or advantage by the party in a stronger position by imposing upon the latter a duty to offer the weaker party a reasonable choice of alternatives. See Terrel v. Duke City Lumber Co., 86 N.M. 405, 422-23, 524 P.2d 1021, 1038-39 (Ct.App.1974), aff'd in part, rev\u2019d in part, 88 N.M. 299, 540 P.2d 229 (1975). Economic duress therefore cannot be established if a reasonable choice of alternatives was available to the weaker party. See id., 86 N.M. at 419, 524 P.2d at 1035; see also First National Bank v. Wood, 93 N.M. 467, 469, 601 P.2d 437, 439 (Ct.App.1979). Nor can it be established if the conduct threatened by the stronger party consisted merely of the exercise of a legal right, under circumstances in which that conduct would have been justified if the weaker party had refused to accept the stronger party\u2019s contractual offer. See Terrel v. Duke City Lumber Co., 86 N.M. at 423, 526 P.2d at 1039; Note, Economic Duress After the Demise of Free Will Theory: A Proposed Tort Analysis, 53 Iowa L. Rev. 892, 910 (1968); cf. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Bokum Resources Corp., 40 B.R. 274, 294-96 (Bkrtcy.N.M.1983) (legal right and reasonable alternatives defenses; decided under N.M. law); Electrical Products Co. v. Combined Communications Corp., 535 F.Supp. 356, 360 (D.N.M.1980) (legal right defense; decided under N.M. law); First National Bank v. Wood, 93 N.M. at 469-70, 601 P.2d at 439-40 (Wood, C.J., specially concurring) (legal right defense).\nAs the majority opinion observes, there is no question that NCR had the legal right to request security for B & W\u2019s obligations. There is also no question that NCR had the legal right to repossess the leased equipment and to file liens against the job to secure payment of B & W\u2019s indebtedness of approximately $700,000. Furthermore, the record clearly indicates that the parties negotiated at length, alternatives were offered, and NCR gave valuable consideration for the personal guaranty agreement by waiving its right to file liens. On the evidence and the facts of this case, reasonable minds cannot differ in concluding that NCR merely threatened to exercise a legal right and that its threatened conduct would have been justified had Bowers and Wood not acceded to NCR\u2019s demand for personal guaranties. The trial court therefore had a duty to direct a verdict against Bowers and Wood on their economic duress defense to NCR\u2019s counterclaim on the personal guaranty agreement. See Owen v. Burn Construction Co., 90 N.M. 297, 301-02, 563 P.2d 91, 95-96 (1977). It erred in instructing the jury on that defense.\nII. Polygraph Evidence: Testimony of Reilly Taitte\nThe \u201ctwisted history\u201d of the admission of polygraph test evidence in New Mexico has been recounted elsewhere. See Tafoya v. Baca, 103 N.M. 56, 57-59, 702 P.2d 1001, 1002-04 (1985); State v. Anthony, 100\nN.M. 735, 737-38, 676 P.2d 262, 264-65 (Ct.App.1983); and cases cited therein. In 1983, this Court promulgated Rule 707 in order to supersede our troublesome case law criteria and to standardize the admission of polygraph evidence by establishing detailed minimum requirements for polygraphs examiners and examinations. See Tafoya v. Baca, 103 N.M. at 59-60 & n. 2, 702 P.2d at 1004-05 & n. 2; State v. Anthony, 100 N.M. at 737-39 & n. 1, 676 P.2d at 264-66 & n. 1. One of those requirements is that the \u201cpretest interview and actual testing * * * be recorded in full.\u201d See NMSA 1978, Evid.R. 707(e) (Repl.Pamp.1983) (now codified at SCRA 1986, 11-707(E)) (emphasis added).\nThe record indicates that the trial court was informed that Reilly Taitte, the polygraph examiner who tested Bowers, had not recorded the portions of the pretrial interview during which the examination questions were formulated. Nevertheless, the trial court admitted Taitte\u2019s testimony and the results of that examination over NCR\u2019s objection. Although the trial court may, in its discretion, admit evidence of polygraph examinations conducted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 707, the trial court here had no authority to admit evidence of an examination conducted in violation of the clear and express recording requirement of Rule 707(e). See State v. Anthony, 100 N.M. at 739, 676 P.2d at 266 (dicta); NMSA 1978, Evid.R. 707(c) (Repl.Pamp.1983) (now codified at SCRA 1986,11-707(C)). It erred in submitting Reilly Taitte\u2019s testimony to the jury.\nIII. Conclusion\nIf the jury\u2019s verdict in favor of Bowers and Wood on the personal guaranty issue was based upon the defense that the guaranty agreement was forged or altered from the document they signed, that verdict should be reversed because the trial court erroneously admitted polygraph evidence prejudicial to the substantial rights of NCR. If the jury\u2019s verdict was based upon the defense of economic duress, that verdict should be reversed because the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on that defense when it should have directed a verdict in favor of NCR. Because we do not know which theory underlay the jury\u2019s verdict, the judgment in favor of Bowers and Wood on the personal guaranty counterclaim should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial on this issue. Cf. Perfetti v. McGhan, 99 N.M. 645, 655, 662 P.2d 646, 656 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 644, 662 P.2d 645 (1983) (remand where alternative theory erroneously submitted).\nFor the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": null } ], "attorneys": [ "Miller, Stratvert, Torgerson & Schlenker, Alan Konrad, Stephen M. Williams, Albuquerque, for defendant-counterclaimant-appellant.", "Marchiondo & Berry, Michael E. Vigil, Albuquerque, for plaintiff-appellee Bowers." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "734 P.2d 226\nB & W CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a New Mexico corporation, Donald Paul Wood and Robert Bowers, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. N.C. RIBBLE COMPANY, a New Mexico corporation, Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellant, v. B & W CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a New Mexico corporation, Donald Paul Wood and Robert Bowers, Counterdefendants-Appellees.\nNo. 16066.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nMarch 5, 1987.\nRehearing Denied April 1, 1987.\nMiller, Stratvert, Torgerson & Schlenker, Alan Konrad, Stephen M. Williams, Albuquerque, for defendant-counterclaimant-appellant.\nMarchiondo & Berry, Michael E. Vigil, Albuquerque, for plaintiff-appellee Bowers." }, "file_name": "0448-01", "first_page_order": 488, "last_page_order": 493 }