{ "id": 1599073, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raymond SANCHEZ and Robert N. Landlee, Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Sanchez", "decision_date": "1987-03-03", "docket_number": "Nos. 9551, 9635", "first_page": "619", "last_page": "623", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "105 N.M. 619" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "735 P.2d 536" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "78 N.M. 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5326226 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/78/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "Alaska Stat. \u00a7 11.81.900", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Alaska Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)(3)", "parenthetical": "Cum.Supp. 1986" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Alaska Stat. \u00a7 11.46.310", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Alaska Stat.", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 N.M. 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2822538 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/86/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 N.M. 12", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1586361 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/101/0012-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 N.M. 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1586399 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/101/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "Alaska Stat. \u00a7 11.46.350", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Alaska Stat.", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "699 P.2d 893", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "699 P.2d 890", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10417417 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "893" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/699/0890-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 N.E.2d 660", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "663", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "47 Ohio Misc. 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio Misc.", "case_ids": [ 6701759 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-misc/47/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "622 S.W.2d 416", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9968650 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/622/0416-01" ] }, { "cite": "624 P.2d 916", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10442644 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/624/0916-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 N.M. 771", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1573095 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/94/0771-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 N.M. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5333963 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/83/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 N.M. 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1557241 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/92/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "699 P.2d 890", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10417417 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/699/0890-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 755, "char_count": 15120, "ocr_confidence": 0.773, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.4047372962222337e-07, "percentile": 0.7992998819622302 }, "sha256": "647943ea891d186e5c35952ebef558bb5952eff82502a6565fbba2b2eddf5316", "simhash": "1:59e57954e81f6e6a", "word_count": 2429 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:20:30.820213+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "BIVINS, J., concurs.", "APODACA, J., specially concurs." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raymond SANCHEZ and Robert N. Landlee, Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nALARID, Judge.\nDefendants appeal from their convictions for burglary, raising the same issue on appeal. Citing Arabie v. State, 699 P.2d 890 (Alaska App.1985), each defendant asks this court to adopt an analysis of the New Mexico burglary statutes that would preclude his conviction for burglary. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 30-16-3 and -4 (Repl. Pamp.1984). Defendant Sanchez raises this argument at the fourth calendaring notice .stage of his appeal. Defendant Landlee raises this argument in his motion for rehearing, a memorandum opinion affirming his conviction having been previously entered by this court. In light of the issue, defendant Landlee\u2019s motion for rehearing was granted, and these appeals were consolidated for purposes of disposition. We decline to adopt the analysis proposed, and affirm each defendant\u2019s conviction.\nDefendant Landlee was convicted of burglary by his unauthorized entry into the loading dock area of A.P.K. Auto Parts, a retail store, with intent to steal. Defendant Sanchez was convicted of burglary by his unauthorized entry into an office in Presbyterian Hospital in Albuquerque, from which he stole a purse containing credit cards, cash and other valuables. Presbyterian Hospital is a building generally open to the public, as is the auto parts store burglarized by defendant Landlee. The essence of defendants\u2019 argument is that this court should follow the Alaska court\u2019s holding in Arabie and find that the acts committed by these defendants fail to fall within the definition of \u201cburglary.\u201d Defendants continue to preserve other issues disposed of in previous calendaring notices and in the memorandum opinion entered in defendant Landlee\u2019s appeal, but raise no new arguments and cite no new authority on these other issues. We affirm as to these other issues, for reasons stated in the calendaring notices and the memorandum opinion previously entered.\nNarrowly stated, defendant Landlee urges this court to find that entry into the rear entrance of an auto parts store, the store being otherwise open to the public, is not \u201cunauthorized entry\u201d for purposes of sustaining a conviction for burglary. Defendant Sanchez similarly argues that his entry into a particular office at Presbyterian Hospital, a public building not closed at the time of his entry, fails to satisfy the \u201cunauthorized entry\u201d element, and that the facts of his case do not sustain a conviction for burglary.\nIn Arabie, cited by defendants for their proposition, the Alaska Court of Appeals reversed a defendant\u2019s conviction for burglary on facts quite similar to those in defendant Landlee\u2019s case. Arabie was apprehended inside a walk-in cooler at the back of a 24-hour store with a case of beer in his hands. The Alaska court concluded that, while Arabie\u2019s entry into the rear room and beer cooler may have constituted criminal trespass, it did not, in itself, constitute unlawful entry of a building, an element of burglary under the Alaska statute. 699 P.2d at 893. Defendants similarly argue that, while they may have been guilty of larceny under the facts charged, their respective entries into Presbyterian Hospital and A.P.K. Auto Parts did not satisfy the \u201cunauthorized entry\u201d element of burglary under the New Mexico statute. See \u00a7\u00a7 30-16-3 and -4.\nSeveral differences between the language of the New Mexico and Alaska burglary statutes, coupled with differences in legislative history, convince us that New Mexico\u2019s law of burglary is not so strictly defined as that of our sister state. Foremost among those differences is Alaska\u2019s commitment to bringing statutory burglary close to its common law ancestor. \u201cAt common law, the crime of burglary consisted of a breaking and entering of a dwelling house of another in the nighttime with the intent to commit a felony therein.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 179 (5th Ed.1979) (\u201cBurglary\u201d). Although the definition of burglary has been considerably expanded under modern statutes, id., it was the determination of the Alaska Court of Appeals in the Arabie case that certain language in the Alaska statute was designed to \u201cbring the law of burglary closer to its common law ancestor.\u201d 699 P.2d 893-94; see Alaska Stat. \u00a7 11.46.350(a) (1986). Consideration was given to the likelihood that the type of entry charged would terrorize occupants. 699 P.2d at 894; see also Model Penal Code, \u00a7 221.1 commentary at 70.\nNew Mexico, unlike Alaska, has demonstrated no legislative intent to restrict the definition of burglary nor to bring that crime closer to its common law root. State v. Rodriguez, 101 N.M. 192, 679 P.2d 1290 (Ct.App.1984). In New Mexico, the statutory offense of burglary is one against the security of property, and its purpose is to protect possessory rights. Id. We find no justification for considering the likelihood of terrorizing occupants as a significant criterion in determining whether a particular entry fits within our statute. Our state statute departs significantly from its common law origins. The court in Arabie noted that it did not mean to imply that a broader definition of burglary would ultimately be unsound as a matter of public policy or impermissible as a matter of law. 699 P.2d at 894, n. 3. New Mexico currently recognizes a broader definition of the crime.\nThe Arabie court concluded that the walk-in cooler in that case failed to qualify as a \u201cseparate unit\u201d for purposes of determining that Arabie had made unlawful entry into a \u201cbuilding\u201d for burglary purposes. 699 P.2d at 893. Since it was undisputed that the store building itself was open for business, it was determined that the defendant in Arabie made lawful entry into the premises. Id. Again, New Mexico departs from Alaska. Two cases in our state establish that entry into separate units of a single building, if coupled with the necessary intent, will sustain a burglary conviction. State v. Harris, 101 N.M. 12, 677 P.2d 625 (Ct.App.1984); State v. Ortega, 86 N.M. 350, 524 P.2d 522 (Ct.App.1974). Harris and Ortega involved not only separate units, but separate propriety interests. In the case at bar, an argument could be made that an office worker has a separate propriety interest in use and occupancy of her own private office in the situation of defendant Sanchez, but it seems indisputable that a single proprietary interest is represented in the separate sections of the auto parts store in the situation of defendant Landlee. We therefore go further and look to the language of the statutes involved.\nIn New Mexico, the crime of burglary is defined by Section 30-16-3, which reads:\nBurglary consists of the unauthorized entry of any vehicle, watercraft, aircraft, dwelling or other structure, movable or immovable, with the intent to commit any felony or theft therein.\nA. Any person who, without authorization, enters a dwelling house with intent to commit any felony or theft therein is guilty of a third degree felony.\nB. Any person who, without authorization, enters any vehicle, watercraft, aircraft or other structure, movable or immovable, with intent to commit any felony or theft therein is guilty of a fourth degree felony.\nIn Alaska, burglary is defined under Alaska Stat. \u00a7 11.46.310(a) (1986), which reads:\nA person commits the crime of burglary . * * * if the person enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime in the building.\n\u201cBuilding\u201d is further defined by Alaska statute as follows:\n\u201c[BJuilding\u201d, in addition to its usual meaning, includes any propelled vehicle or structure adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business; when a building consists of separate units, including apartment units, offices, or rented rooms, each unit is considered a separate building[.]\nAlaska Stat. \u00a7 11.81.900(b)(3) (Cum.Supp. 1986). Significant differences between statutes is apparent even on cursory inspection. New Mexico permits a conviction for fourth-degree (commercial) burglary upon entry of any vehicle, not specifying that such a vehicle must be adapted for overnight accommodations or for carrying on of business. See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez. Alaska relies exclusively on the definition of \u201cbuilding,\u201d as modified by statute, while New Mexico expressly brings not only dwelling houses, but vehicles, watercraft, aircraft and \u201cother structures,\u201d movable or immovable, within the definition of its statute. The ejusdem generis argument that \u201cother structure\u201d is limited in its definition to the types of structures preceding it in the statute has been rejected by our supreme court, leaving the definition to be literally construed. State v. Gonzales, 78 N.M. 218, 430 P.2d 376 (1967).\nBlack\u2019s Law Dictionary definition of \u201cburglary\u201d encompasses a definition of \u201cstructure\u201d that is adequate for the broad purposes of New Mexico statutory law. Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 179 (5th Ed.1979). That definition of the actus reus is:\nA person is guilty of burglary if he enters a building or occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with purpose to commit a crime therein, unless the premises are at the time, open to the public or the actor is licensed or privileged to enter.\nId. The separately occupied office entered by defendant Sanchez and the separately secured area of the store entered by defendant Landlee fall within the definition of \u201cstructure\u201d set forth above, and the necessary violation of \u201cprohibited space\u201d was thus proven at trial. Cf. State v. Rodriguez.\nThe convictions are AFFIRMED.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nBIVINS, J., concurs.\nAPODACA, J., specially concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "ALARID, Judge." }, { "text": "APODACA, Judge,\nspecially concurring.\nI specially concur with the majority to express some additional concerns raised by these two appeals. It is true, as the majority suggests, that the trend in American jurisprudence has been to expand considerably the definition of burglary under modern criminal statutes. But I believe there is a risk involved in stepping too far afield and I am concerned we may be approaching the limit of our statute\u2019s application. The court in Arabie v. State, 699 P.2d 890 (Alaska App.1985), cited by the majority, noted the potential problems with a broader definition of burglary if the distinction between burglary and other crimes (such as shoplifting) is blurred. Although we need not address what application our interpretation of the statute would have in every factual situation, I suggest these potential problems may be curbed by our adopting the two definitional standards I discuss below.\nAn essential element of the crime of burglary is an unauthorized entry. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-16-3 (Repl.Pamp.1984); State v. Ortiz, 92 N.M. 166, 584 P.2d 1306 (Ct.App.1978). If a structure is open to the public, then an entry into that structure is deemed authorized. State v. Rogers, 83 N.M. 676, 496 P.2d 169 (Ct.App.1972). I agree with the majority\u2019s determination that where a building is partially open to the public, a defendant may be convicted of burglary if his entry exceeds the scope of the invitation to the public. However, I am troubled because the law in New Mexico provides no guidance on how one is to determine the scope of the invitation.\nTo be convicted of burglary, a defendant must know his entry was not authorized. State v. Ruiz, 94 N.M. 771, 617 P.2d 160 (Ct.App.1980). When a building is at least partially open to the public, the prosecution must show defendant knew that his entry into the particular portion of the building was not within the scope of the public invitation. Even if a defendant is not actually authorized to enter, this fact alone does not unequivocally prove defendant knew he was unauthorized. The requisite knowledge must usually be inferred from the circumstances of defendant's actions. But when the building is at least in part open to the public, how is the fact finder supposed to measure the evidence presented by the prosecution? How far does the scope of the public invitation extend? The answers lie in the standards I am proposing.\nI believe the Oregon statutory definition of \u201copen to the public,\u201d which is part of that state\u2019s burglary statute, provides an appropriate guide. \u201c\u2018Open to the public\u2019 means premises which by their physical nature, function, custom, usage, notice or lack thereof or other circumstances at the time would cause a reasonable person to believe that''no permission to enter or remain is required.\u201d Or.Rev.Stat. \u00a7 164.-205(4) (1971). In this connection, I am particularly disturbed by the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to defendant Sanchez. I realize a jury found otherwise, but I, myself, am not entirely certain the state met its burden in showing that the hospital basement and the office entered by defendant were \u201cprohibited space\u201d to the public. A mere push of the \u201cB\u201d button on an elevator and a short walk down an open corridor would get anyone there.\nAs a guide to the bench and the bar, I would expressly adopt the Oregon standard as the law in New Mexico. Colorado and Missouri have already done so. People v. Bozeman, 624 P.2d 916 (Colo.Ct.App.1980); State v. McGinnis, 622 S.W.2d 416 (Mo.Ct.App.1981).\nThere is one additional concern I find necessary to address in light of the broadness of our burglary statute. Inasmuch as the decision in these two consolidated appeals holds that under our statute, a person may be convicted of burglary committed within a building open to the public, I submit the court should expand on its definition of a \u201cstructure,\u201d by holding there is a violation of \u201cprohibited space\u201d whenever a person enters \u201cany separately secured, separately delineated portion of another * * structure.\u201d State v. Shears, 47 Ohio Misc. 27, 30, 352 N.E.2d 660, 663 (1975) (emphasis added).\nBy applying these definitional standards, we can address potential problems arising from the historical trend \u2014 an expanding application of our burglary statute. The incorporation of these standards as uniform jury instructions may be an appropriate avenue to consider and would assure us the standards are not only known to, but applied by, a jury. I am not advocating that we judicially limit prosecutions under our burglary statute, but only that we take care we do not blur those often fine-line junctures of criminal elements, where one crime ends and another begins. Ultimately, it is the prosecutor who will discretionarily determine what criminal charge to bring against a particular defendant; where one crime does not fit, another may. But let us not lose sight of the constitutional risks involved in applying a criminal statute with too broad a brush.\nI concur in the affirmances because I am satisfied that under the above standards, there was sufficient evidence presented to support the convictions.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "APODACA, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Hal Stratton, Atty. Gen., Elizabeth Major, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Jacquelyn Robins, Chief Public Defender, Lynne Fagan, Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for defendants-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "735 P.2d 536\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raymond SANCHEZ and Robert N. Landlee, Defendants-Appellants.\nNos. 9551, 9635.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nMarch 3, 1987.\nCertiorari Denied April 9, 1987.\nHal Stratton, Atty. Gen., Elizabeth Major, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee.\nJacquelyn Robins, Chief Public Defender, Lynne Fagan, Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for defendants-appellants." }, "file_name": "0619-01", "first_page_order": 659, "last_page_order": 663 }