{ "id": 1599050, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anthony SANDOVAL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Sandoval", "decision_date": "1987-03-10", "docket_number": "No. 9444", "first_page": "696", "last_page": "700", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "105 N.M. 696" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "736 P.2d 501" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "812 F.2d 1302", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1694639 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/812/1302-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 N.M. 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1584545 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/99/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 N.M. 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1573065 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487" }, { "page": "717" }, { "page": "488" }, { "page": "718" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/94/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 U.S. 482", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12125538 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495" }, { "page": "1280" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/430/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 L.Ed.2d 1244", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 372567 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/345/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 U.S. 202", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1524661 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/380/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 U.S. 79", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12787 ], "weight": 13, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1723" }, { "page": "87-88" }, { "page": "1723" }, { "page": "88" }, { "page": "1719" }, { "page": "83" }, { "page": "1723" }, { "page": "88", "parenthetical": "citations omitted & emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0079-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 578, "char_count": 12181, "ocr_confidence": 0.764, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1639111879506609e-07, "percentile": 0.5847041661502272 }, "sha256": "26ec28e4f8a1bbc0b55a86c470bc44b7c9ae02760e8f0b7e192a306ad1dc82ab", "simhash": "1:9d7c39d6ec86d7f8", "word_count": 1967 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:20:30.820213+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "BIVINS and FRUMAN, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anthony SANDOVAL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nDONNELLY, Chief Judge.\nDefendant appeals multiple convictions for armed robbery and false imprisonment with firearm sentencing enhancement. Defendant initially raised seven issues on appeal including an assertion that the state improperly utilized its peremptory challenges to remove jurors of Hispanic heritage from the jury panel on the basis of their race. We reverse and remand for a new trial.\nUSE OF STATE\u2019S PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES\nThe prosecutor, by use of peremptory challenge, excluded the only two Hispanic jurors who could have served on the jury. Defendant moved for a mistrial based on the prosecutor\u2019s attempt to eliminate all members of defendant\u2019s race from the jury. Defendant in this case is of Hispanic background. The jury was selected from a panel of thirty-three prospective jurors. Of the thirty-three panel members, three were Hispanic: Solomon Hernandez, drawn as number one; Jose Lopez, drawn as number fifteen; and Mercy Castillo, drawn as number twenty-nine. The record indicates that the prosecutor, without explanation, struck from the jury venire Mr. Hernandez and Mr. Lopez, the. only two Hispanic jurors with a chance of serving on the jury. Ms. Castillo was not directly involved because the numerical order in which she was drawn was high enough so that a jury was chosen before her number was reached.\nOn appeal, defendant argues that the recent United States Supreme Court decision, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), altered the law applicable to the prosecutor\u2019s use of peremptory challenges, thus requiring reversal of defendant\u2019s convictions on equal protection grounds.\nIn Batson, the Supreme Court significantly modified the rules applicable to a prosecutor\u2019s use of peremptory challenges in criminal cases and overruled in part its earlier holding in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), concerning the evidentiary burden defendant must meet to establish purposeful discriminatory use of peremptory challenges that exclude members of an accused\u2019s racial group from the jury. Under Swain, a defendant was required to show systematic exclusion of jurors based upon race beyond the facts of his own case in order to rebut a presumption that the prosecutor utilized the state\u2019s peremptory challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury.\nThe Supreme Court in Batson, however, recognized that the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution limits the state\u2019s use of peremptory challenges. The Court held that a defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor\u2019s exercise of the state\u2019s peremptory challenges. Batson states in applicable part:\nTo establish such a case, the defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, Castaneda v. Partida, supra, 430 U.S., at 494, 97 S.Ct., at 1280, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant\u2019s race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits \u201cthose to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.\u201d Avery v. Georgia, supra, 345 U.S., [559] at 562, 73 S.Ct., [891] at 892 [97 L.Ed.2d 1244]. Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. This combination of factors in the empanelling of the petit jury, as in the selection of the venire, raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination.\nId. 476 U.S. at _, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 87-88.\nThe Court in Batson further stated that in deciding whether a defendant has made the requisite showing, the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances, including questions asked and statements made by the prosecutor during voir dire and in exercising the challenges.\nBatson specifically cites Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977), to explain the basis of the prima facie case: \u201cOnce the defendant has shown substantial underrepresentation of his group, he has made out a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose, and the burden then shifts to the State to rebut that case.\u201d Id. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 1280. In addition, Batson recognizes that a \u201cpattern\u201d of strikes against certain jurors may give rise to the inference of discrimination. 476 U.S. at _, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88.\nThe strict requirement in Swain was also rejected by this court before Batson in State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (Ct.App.1980). In Crespin, we noted that post-Swain United States Supreme Court cases infer that the challenge allowed in Swain may be too limited, and \u201cthat certain fact situations may arise where the defendant can overcome the presumption based entirely upon the facts of his own case.\u201d Id. at 487, 612 P.2d at 717. We held that improper, systematic exclusion by use of peremptory challenges can be shown (1) \u201cby presenting facts beyond the instant case;\u201d or (2) \u201cwhere the absolute number of challenges in the one case raises the inference of systematic acts by the prosecutor.\u201d Id. at 488, 612 P.2d at 718. This court accordingly held that, where the prosecutor challenged only one black member of the jury venire, defendant did not meet his burden of overcoming the presumption of proper purpose. We note that Crespin has been modified by Batson in that a prima facie case may be established by substantial underrepresentation or any other relevant circumstances in addition to the absolute number of challenges in one case.\nThe state relies on State v. Davis, 99 N.M. 522, 660 P.2d 612 (Ct.App.1983). Davis is not controlling herein, however, because it was grounded in part on a portion of Crespin that has subs\u00e9quently been modified by Batson. We now follow Batson. See also United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir.1987) (interpreting Batson, court of appeals vacated convictions of defendant who was Indian and remanded to trial court for hearing on government\u2019s reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge against member of defendant\u2019s race).\nDefendant complied with the requirements of Batson in order to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose. Defendant made a requisite showing and alerted the trial court to the fact that the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to remove the only two Hispanic jurors with a chance of serving on the jury. Batson does not require defendant to present evidence of additional circumstances in order to make a prima facie showing of discriminatory purpose. Cf. State v. Davis.\nDefendant moved for a mistrial based upon the state\u2019s use of peremptory challenges. The following colloquy occurred:\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: I have a motion at this time. It\u2019s a motion for a mistrial because the state has used two of the peremptory challenges to strike the only two Spanish-surnamed jurors that were on the panel. My client is obviously a Spanish-surnamed person and I believe, as far as authority is concerned, there\u2019s a recent Supreme Court case that says it was improper to preempt Black jurors simply because they are Black, where the defendant is also Black. The two jurors Your Honor, were Mr. Solomon Hernandez and Jose Lopez, juror no. 5 and juror no. 24.\nJUDGE BACA: State reply?\nPROSECUTOR: I wasn\u2019t aware of it, Your Honor. It wasn\u2019t done because they were Spanish-surnamed.\n* * * * * *\nJUDGE BACA: I\u2019m going to deny the motion. I\u2019m aware there is a new Supreme Court of the United States case that dealt with racial strikes. In that instance, Black jurors, I\u2019m not sure, very frankly I haven\u2019t read the case, I don\u2019t know what it says except what the press coverage would indicate. Other cases involving race and exclusion of jurors for race have been couched in some sort of language of a systematic exclusion of people because of race, in that there has to be some sort of showing. And I think what I have, if nothing more, without knowing the very specifics of that case, that I would deny the motion for a mistrial.\nThe prosecutor offered nothing to overcome defendant\u2019s prima facie case.\nBatson recognized that, although a prosecutor ordinarily is entitled to exercise peremptory challenges for any reason as long as that reason is related to his view concerning the outcome of the case to be tried, \u201cthe Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that [jurors of the same race] as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State\u2019s case against [the] defendant.\u201d Id. 476 U.S. at _, 106 S.Ct. at 1719, 90 L.Ed.2d at 83.\nThe state argues that in a case such as this where the number of Hispanic jurors challenged was very small, it was reasonable that the trial court would find no prima facie proof of purposeful, systematic discrimination. The state emphasizes that the various cases cited by defendant have involved greater numbers of challenges than in the present case. The actual number of challenges is not at issue. Cf. State v. Davis. Although the prosecutor only needed to challenge two Hispanics to create a Hispanic-free jury panel, all members of defendant\u2019s racial group were excluded from the jury. Defendant has established a pattern of excluding all members of his group based on the facts in his case alone; this is sufficient under Batson. See also United States v. Chalan.\nOnce defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the state to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging the jurors. Batson v. Kentucky. Here, the prosecutor failed to offer any explanation for his two challenges of Hispanic jurors. The prosecutor may not rebut the defendant\u2019s prima facie case of discrimination merely by denying that he challenged jurors of defendant\u2019s race because of their shared race. The Court in Batson further noted that in order to satisfy constitutional due process requirements, once the burden is shifted to the prosecution, it must then come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging jurors of defendant\u2019s racial background, and:\nThough this requirement imposes a limitation in some cases on the full peremptory character of the historic challenge, we emphasize that the prosecutor\u2019s explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause. But the prosecutor may not rebut the defendant\u2019s prima facie case of discrimination by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the defendant\u2019s race on the assumption \u2014 or his intuitive judgment \u2014 that they would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race. * * * Nor may the prosecutor rebut the defendant\u2019s case merely by denying that he had a discriminatory motive * * * * * *\nId. at -, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88 (citations omitted & emphasis added).\nFollowing the prosecutor\u2019s articulation of a neutral explanation of peremptory challenging members of the venire in the case to be tried, the trial court must then determine if the defendant has established \u201cpurposeful discrimination.\u201d Id.\nOn the record before us, the prosecutor failed to comply with the Constitutional requirements articulated in Batson to rebut defendant\u2019s prima facie showing of discrimination in the use of its peremptory challenges or to offer a neutral basis for the exercise of peremptory challenges against the two jurors of Hispanic background. Cf. United States v. Chalan.\nDefendant\u2019s conviction is reversed and the cause is remanded with instructions to award defendant a new trial.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nBIVINS and FRUMAN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "DONNELLY, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hal Stratton, A tty. Gen., Bill Primm, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Jacquelyn Robins, Chief Public Defender, Bruce Rogoff, Asst. Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "736 P.2d 501\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anthony SANDOVAL, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 9444.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nMarch 10, 1987.\nHal Stratton, A tty. Gen., Bill Primm, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee.\nJacquelyn Robins, Chief Public Defender, Bruce Rogoff, Asst. Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0696-01", "first_page_order": 736, "last_page_order": 740 }