{ "id": 706773, "name": "Ramon MARES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SANTA FE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Mares v. Santa Fe Public Schools", "decision_date": "1987-08-24", "docket_number": "No. 16634", "first_page": "354", "last_page": "357", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "106 N.M. 354" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "743 P.2d 110" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "639 F.2d 588", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1361678 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "593", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/639/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "628 F.Supp. 759", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3833706 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/628/0759-01" ] }, { "cite": "672 F.2d 1044", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1142342 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1049" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/672/1044-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 A.2d 890", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 7957496 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "893" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/413/0890-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 F.Supp. 793", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 5723775 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "796" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/431/0793-01" ] }, { "cite": "441 U.S. 750", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1780341 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/441/0750-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a7 633", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 586, "char_count": 11077, "ocr_confidence": 0.787, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.025796484659916467 }, "sha256": "f49ce3140eaf49d7d2732f63533edd3725b6e9ed2c0e959a087e50822d8d484c", "simhash": "1:a9d07b51c3e0ed1f", "word_count": 1820 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:27:22.270695+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "SCARBOROUGH, C.J., and RANSOM, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "Ramon MARES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SANTA FE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nSOSA, Senior Justice.\nPlaintiff-appellant, Ramon Mares (Mares), appeals the judgment of the district court in favor of defendant-appellee, Santa Fe Public Schools (School Board). For the reasons stated below, we affirm.\nFACTS\nOn September 22, 1983, Mares filed a complaint with the New Mexico Human Rights Commission (HRC), alleging that he had been fired (May 11,1983) by the School' Board because of his age (50). On September 29, 1983, HRC wrote to Mares explaining that HRC\u2019s rules and regulations specify that in the event a complainant cannot be contacted for a sixty-day period, the complainant\u2019s case would be closed by HRC\u2019s executive director (the Director) without prejudice.\nMares asked HRC to forward his file to the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) for a determination of Mares\u2019 rights under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\u201cADEA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. Section 621 (1967). On July 12, 1984, the Director advised Mares in writing that the EEOC \u201chas determined that your complaint is not timely, within 300 days of the act of harm, May 11, 1983.\u201d On July 16, 1984, the Director advised the School Board\u2019s superintendent that a formal hearing on Mares\u2019 case had been scheduled for October 9, 1984. On September 18, 1984, HRC tried unsuccessfully to have Mares\u2019 attorney file an entry of appearance; subsequently the hearing set for October 9 was cancelled. On October 15, 1984, HRC tried unsuccessfully to contact Mares to have Mares\u2019 attorney enter an appearance of record. On November 9, 1984, HRC wrote to Mares, stating, \u201cThis office needs to set your case for Pre-Hearing Conference and Formal Hearing and I still don\u2019t have an Entry of Appearance from your attorney. Please let me know what your intentions are by November 20.\u201d Attached to the bottom of the letter was a handwritten note dated \u201c11/21/84,\u201d which read, \u201cBerardinelli\u2019s secretary called. He will enter appearance.\u201d On November 24, 1984, Mares\u2019 attorney (Berardinelli) formally entered an appearance in the case.\nOn January 4, 1985, counsel for both parties were advised by HRC to send their respective drafts of a proposed pre-hearing order to HRC by January 14. On April 1, 1985, the Director wrote Mares\u2019 attorney advising him that Mares\u2019 version of the pre-hearing order had not arrived, and requested receipt of the order by April 10. In his letter the Director cited the applicable HRC rule which governs submission of pre-hearing orders. On April 16, the Director wrote Mares\u2019 attorney again, saying, \u201cThe pre-hearing order was due in our offices by January 14, 1985. On April 1, 1985 we wrote you and allowed you until April 10 to submit your order. To date we have not received the order nor any other response from you. Please be advised that the formal hearing scheduled for May 6 is now cancelled. As per Section II G 2 of the Rules and Regulations of the Human Rights Commission, we are now closing this case administratively, without prejudice, for your failure to cooperate. It is our opinion that we have been more than fair with your office in trying to accommodate your needs.\u201d\nOn August 29, 1984, approximately three months before Mares\u2019 attorney had filed entry of appearance in his client\u2019s HRC case, Mares, through his attorney, filed in the United States District Court, District of New Mexico, a \u201cComplaint For Damages For Age Discrimination,\u201d naming the School Board as defendant. On July 31, 1985, Mares, through his attorney, confessed judgment in the federal case in favor of defendant, acknowledging that Mares\u2019 failure to timely file his complaint with the EEOC deprived the federal court of jurisdiction. On July 31 Mares\u2019 attorney wrote the Director asking HRC to reinstate Mares\u2019 complaint. On August 7, 1985, the federal district court entered an order dismissing Mares\u2019 complaint. On August 30, 1985, the Director responded to Berardinelli\u2019s letter of July 31 by writing, \u201cDue to your apparent lack of interest and attention in pursuing this case, we have decided to sustain our decision that the case continue to be administratively closed. Your letter [of July 31] fails to adequately explain the delays in filing a Pre-Hearing Order * * * At no time during this period did you request an extension of time limits as is provided for in the Rules.\u201d\nOn September 25, 1985, Mares, through his attorney, filed in the District Court of Santa Fe County his \u201cNotice of Appeal of Decision of Human Rights Commission of New Mexico,\u201d in which he appealed \u201cthe decision of [HRC] rendered * * * on August 30, 1985,\u201d and asked for \u201cTrial de Novo * * * as provided in Section 28-1-13(A), NMSA 1978 Comp.\u201d On June 19, 1986, after a trial de novo, the trial court ruled, \u201c[T]he action of [HRC] in closing Mares\u2019 file for failure of cooperation was correct and * * * accordingly, Mares\u2019 appeal should be dismissed.\u201d The present appeal then followed.\nEFFECT OF THE FEDERAL \u201cADEA\u201d ON THE HRC ACTION\nThe only meritorious issue which Mares raises on appeal is that his filing of the complaint in federal court stayed the proceeding before HRC, and thus HRC\u2019s dismissal of and subsequent refusal to reinstate Mares\u2019 case (April 16, 1985) are actions that were void. Mares relies on 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 633, which states that a complaint filed under the ADEA \u201cshall supersede any state action.\u201d Mares argues that \u201csupersede\u201d is equivalent to \u201cstay,\u201d and that HRC was prohibited from taking any action during the time that Mares\u2019 case was being considered by the federal court, even though the Director\u2019s action of August 30, 1985 post-dated the federal court\u2019s order of dismissal of August 7, 1985.\nWhile it is mandatory that an aggrieved person in a state with an agency empowered to remedy age discrimination in employment resort to the state\u2019s appropriate administrative remedies before bringing suit in federal court under the ADEA, Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 99 S.Ct. 2066, 60 L.Ed.2d 609 (1979), such requirement does not mean that the state agency must cease consideration of a prior complaint until such time as the federal court has resolved an ancillary lawsuit filed in federal court under the ADEA. Mares cites Pandis v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div. of United Technologies Co., 431 F.Supp. 793 (D.Conn.1977), as support for the opposite proposition, but Pandis merely held that a federal court hearing a case based on the ADEA should not assume pendent jurisdiction in a subsidiary action based on a state age discrimination statute.\nFurther, the meaning of the words \u201cstate action\u201d in 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 633 has been held to mean \u201ca trial on the merits.\u201d National Cash Register v. Riner, 413 A.2d 890, 893 (Del.Super.1979). In the case before us there was no state action resembling a trial on the merits. HRC\u2019s actions during the pendency of Mares\u2019 abortive federal cause of action, including HRC\u2019s April 16, 1985 dismissal, were taken only because HRC could not stir Mares or his attorney to notify HRC as to Mares\u2019 intentions concerning the complaint pending before HRC. Thus, even assuming that 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 633 requires a stay, HRC\u2019s action during the period of Mares\u2019 federal lawsuit was not the type of action prohibited by Section 633.\nThere appear to be three general interpretations of the word \u201csupersede\u201d as used in Section 633. The first is to interpret \u201csupersede\" as meaning \u201cstay\", and has been stated by the Second Circuit as follows: \u201cAs the district court correctly found, under the ADEA \u2018the Secretary [of Labor] has absolutely no power to extinguish * * * state claims [or] state statutory rights.\u2019 The relevant section of the ADEA, \u00a7 14(a), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 633(a), provides only that the commencement of a federal action shall \u201csupersede\u201d state claims. The legislative history is clear that this language only empowers the Secretary to stay state proceedings, not to dismiss them.\u201d (Citations omitted.) Dunlop v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 672 F.2d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir.1982).\nThe second interpretation of \u201csupersede\u201d supports the proposition that a federal case filed under the ADEA does not require staying of the state action (thereby construing \u201csupersede\u201d more narrowly than did the court in Dunlop v. Pan American World Airways). This interpretation is found in Hunnewell v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 628 F.Supp. 759 (S.D.N.Y.1986), where the court found that New York\u2019s equivalent of HRC \u201cusually stays its proceedings while the federal case is pending.\u201d Id. at 761 (emphasis added). The emphasized word \u201cusually\u201d illustrates that \u201csupersede\u201d does not necessarily mean \u201cstay,\u201d and that such \u201cstaying\u201d as is done by the administrative agency in New York is optional. Finally, in Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588 (10th Cir.1980), the court interpreted the Supreme Court\u2019s holding in Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans as standing for the proposition that it is the federal court, and not the state court, which \u201c \u2018should be held in abeyance,\u2019 so as to give the state agency the opportunity to entertain respondent\u2019s grievance.\u201d Id. at 593 (citations omitted).\nNone of these interpretations requires us to hold that HRC\u2019s action during the pend-ency of Mares\u2019 federal claim was inconsistent with the federal statute. Further, regardless of the meaning of the word supersede as used in Section 633, Mares is still left with the fact that the Director\u2019s August 30, 1985 refusal to reinstate Mares\u2019 case post-dated the federal court\u2019s August 7 dismissal of Mares\u2019 federal claim. Thus, such arguments as Mares may have made with respect to \u201cstaying\u201d before August 7, may not be applied to any action which HRC took after August 7. See Pandis v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div. of United Technologies Co., where the court held, \u201cIf at the termination of his federal lawsuit plaintiff thinks that state law would afford remedies not granted in this case, he will be free to resume his action before the [Connecticut equivalent of HRC] and pursue his state appeal if necessary.\u201d 431 F.Supp. at 796. Pursuing his state appeal at the termination of his federal lawsuit is precisely what Mares did here, but the District Court of Santa Fe County found in favor of the school board. Our reading of the record supports the trial court\u2019s decision.\nWe thus hold that HRC\u2019s action during the pendency of Mares\u2019 federal case did not violate 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 633, and that both HRC\u2019s dismissal of Mares\u2019 complaint on April 16,1985 and its refusal on August 30, 1985 to reinstate Mares\u2019 case were within the authority granted to the Director by New Mexico\u2019s Human Rights Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 28-1-1 to -7, 28-1-9 to -14, and not an abuse of discretion.\nAccordingly, we affirm the District Court of Santa Fe County.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nSCARBOROUGH, C.J., and RANSOM, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "SOSA, Senior Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Berardinelli & Martinez, Martin M. Martinez, David J. Berardinelli, Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Caldwell, Lenssen, Mandel & Jesmer, Paul R. Caldwell, Kally A. Genova, Santa Fe, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "743 P.2d 110\nRamon MARES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SANTA FE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendant-Appellee.\nNo. 16634.\nSupreme Court of New Mexico.\nAug. 24, 1987.\nBerardinelli & Martinez, Martin M. Martinez, David J. Berardinelli, Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellant.\nCaldwell, Lenssen, Mandel & Jesmer, Paul R. Caldwell, Kally A. Genova, Santa Fe, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0354-01", "first_page_order": 394, "last_page_order": 397 }