{ "id": 708240, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert TRUJILLO, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Trujillo", "decision_date": "1987-11-17", "docket_number": "No. 9819", "first_page": "616", "last_page": "619", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "106 N.M. 616" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "747 P.2d 262" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "90 N.M. 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2873551 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 N.M. 726", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1588540 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/100/0726-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 P. 47", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "year": 1913, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "penal statutes should not be unnaturally construed to work exemptions from their penalties" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 N.M. 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 4696467 ], "year": 1913, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "penal statutes should not be unnaturally construed to work exemptions from their penalties" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/18/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 N.M. 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1573195 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/94/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 N.M. 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1586343 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/101/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 N.M. 362", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5332503 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/83/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 N.M. 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1555155 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68" }, { "page": "887" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/97/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 N.M. 747", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580121 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/102/0747-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 N.M. 789", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 711395 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/103/0789-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 N.M. 585", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582515 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/98/0585-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 N.M. 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5355298 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/80/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 N.M. 42", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5332911 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/83/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 N.M. 549", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1599008 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" }, { "page": "793" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/105/0549-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 N.M. 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2809731 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/77/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 N.M. 345", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5325851 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/82/0345-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 553, "char_count": 9989, "ocr_confidence": 0.783, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.777305320711252e-08, "percentile": 0.4957277432004723 }, "sha256": "2bca8a53ef1005003b9d5023d0022ab24a08584dd265e9dfd2476b2859c1eaeb", "simhash": "1:3f0a62cb6cd05879", "word_count": 1598 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:27:22.270695+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "MINZNER and FRUMAN, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert TRUJILLO, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nBIVINS, Judge.\nDefendant appeals from a judgment by jury verdict convicting him of escape from the custody of a peace officer, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-10 (Repl.Pamp. 1984). Defendant briefs two issues: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict; and (2) whether defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel. The arguments, however, focus on the propriety of the charge. We determine that, because the charge of violation of Section 30-22-10 was improper, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict and sentence defendant. We, therefore, reverse the conviction on that basis. See State v. McNeece, 82 N.M. 345, 481 P.2d 707 (Ct.App.1971) (conviction and sentence under wrong statute jurisdictional).\nThere is no real dispute as to the pertinent facts concerning defendant\u2019s escape. Defendant was jailed pending trial on criminal charges in the Santa F\u00e9 County Detention Center. Under order of the district court, Santa Fe County Sheriff\u2019s officers transported defendant from the jail to the Forensic Treatment Unit (FTU) of the State Hospital in Las Vegas, New Mexico, for evaluation prior to trial. Sheriff\u2019s officers placed defendant in the custody of hospital staff. Defendant escaped from the hospital about six weeks after arrival and was recaptured a day later by San Miguel County Sheriff\u2019s officers and state police. Defendant was returned to the hospital, where he continued to be evaluated, and was then transported back to the jail by the Santa Fe County Sheriff.\nOur review of the proceedings indicates all of the participants at trial thought that the question of whether defendant could be found guilty of escape from a peace officer, on the undisputed facts of this ease, had been settled by New Mexico case law. Contrary to the assumptions made by both parties and the trial court, interpretation of Section 30-22-10 presents an issue of first impression.\nPenal statutes must be strictly construed, and the legislative definition of crimes is not to be broadened. State v. Allen, 77 N.M. 433, 423 P.2d 867 (1967). \u201cStatutes are to be given effect as written and, where free from ambiguity, there is no room for construction.\u201d State v. Greyeyes, 105 N.M. 549, 553, 734 P.2d 789, 793 (Ct.App.1987). With those principles in mind, we hold that the terms of Section 30-22-10 do not describe the facts and circumstances of defendant\u2019s escape; therefore, we conclude that defendant was charged under the wrong provision.\nWe rely upon the basic principle that it is the legislature\u2019s function and prerogative to define crimes. State v. Moss, 83 N.M. 42, 487 P.2d 1347 (Ct.App.1971); State v. Dennis, 80 N.M. 262, 454 P.2d 276 (Ct.App.1969). Of significance, the legislature has attached criminal penalty to escape under four separate statutes, using different terms and describing different circumstances under which escape is punishable. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 30-22-8 (Repl.Pamp.1984) (escape from jail); 30-22-9 (Repl.Pamp. 1984) (escape from penitentiary); 30-22-10 (escape from a peace officer); and 33-2-46 (Repl.Pamp.1987) (escape from inmate release program). The legislature has chosen to define distinguishable offenses bearing different essential elements and varying penalties. See State v. Garcia, 98 N.M. 585, 651 P.2d 120 (Ct.App.1982) (discussion of legislative history of escape statutes). The elements of these separately defined offenses differ as to the nature of the authority under which the offender is confined or in custody and, with the exception of Section 30-22-10, the place from which escape is made.\nSection 30-22-10, the statute under which defendant was charged and tried, provides a criminal penalty for escape from the custody of a peace officer and describes the offense:\nEscape from custody of a peace officer consists of any person who shall have been placed under lawful arrest for the commission or alleged commission of any felony, unlawfully escaping or attempting to escape from the custody or control of any peace officer.\nWhoever commits escape from custody of a peace officer is guilty of a fourth degree felony.\n(Emphasis added.) This case requires us to interpret the terms underscored above.\nThe state does not ask this court to find that the mental health workers at FTU are \u201cpeace officers.\u201d See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-l-12(C) (Repl.Pamp.1984) (defining \u201cpeace officer\u201d). Cf. State v. Tabaha, 103 N.M. 789, 714 P.2d 1010 (Ct.App.1986) (juvenile correctional officers not \u201cpeace officers\u201d for purpose of statute proscribing battery upon peace officer under statutory definition). Nor does the state dispute that defendant was in the actual physical custody of the sheriff only temporarily in order to comply with the district court\u2019s order that he be transferred to FTU and then returned to the jail after evaluation. Cf. State v. Pitts, 102 N.M. 747, 700 P.2d 650 (Ct.App.1985) (defendant \u201clawfully committed to jail\u201d under order that he be transferred from children\u2019s court to district court). Rather, the state urges us to find that defendant was in the \u201cconstructive custody\u201d of the Santa Fe County Sheriff\u2019s Office during the time he was committed to the FTU.\nThe state argues that the term \u201ccustody,\u201d as it is used in Section 30-22-10, is not limited to physical or actual custody, but is intended to extend to legal or constructive custody as well. In view of the narrow statutory definition of the term \u201cpeace officer\u201d and the absence of any language that would extend the terms \u201ccustody or control,\u201d as described in Section 30-22-10, we find the interpretation urged by the state overly broad.\nWe have interpreted Section 30-22-8 to describe escape from a place other than the actual confines of the jail to which a defendant has been committed at the time of escape, under the rule of \u201cconstructive custody.\u201d In State v. Gilman, 97 N.M. 67, 636 P.2d 886 (Ct.App.1981), this court held that defendant could be found guilty of \u201cescape from jail\u201d when he escaped while performing labor outside the jail. We looked to the terms of Section 30-22-8 and held: \u201cReason and common sense require us to recognize that the statute punishes one who escapes custody while lawfully sentenced to jail.\u201d Id. at 68, 636 P.2d at 887. See also State v. Weaver. 83 N.M. 362, 492 P.2d 144 (Ct.App.1971) (discussing, though not adopting, rule of \u201cconstructive custody\u201d). In State v. Coleman, 101 N.M. 252, 680 P.2d 633 (Ct.App.1984), we established that one does not have to escape from the physical confines of the jail itself in order to be found guilty of escape from jail. Coleman had escaped from a work-release program while being held in jail on a criminal charge. We agree with the state that the facts and circumstances of Coleman are analogous to those of the case before us. Contrary to the state\u2019s attempt to analogize the cases, however, Coleman was appropriately charged with escape from jail.\nNor do we agree with the state\u2019s argument that we should apply the Gilman holding to this case and extend the \u201ccustody or control\u201d of Section 30-22-10 beyond the express limitation of the statute. The common sense of Gilman is that a person \u201cunder lawful commitment to any jail\u201d remains committed, though temporarily released from the confines of the jail. See also State v. Martin, 94 N.M. 251, 609 P.2d 333 (Ct.App.1980) (charge of escape from penitentiary proper though defendant actually escaped from county jail because defendant had been \u201clawfully committed to the penitentiary\u201d). That rationale does not apply to escape from a peace officer while \u201cunder lawful arrest.\u201d Common sense does not compel us to hold that a person transferred from the custody of a \u201cpeace officer\u201d to another person necessarily continues \u201cunder lawful arrest.\u201d\nIt is significant that the legislature defined escape from a peace officer as escape from the \u201ccustody or control\u201d of a peace officer. Also, by using the term \u201cunder lawful arrest\u201d in Section 30-22-10, the legislature, in defining the crime of escape from a peace officer, contemplated different circumstances than escape from jail. We will not broaden the legislature\u2019s intent to include constructive custody or control as the state urges. Section 30-22-10 applies only to those who are in the actual custody or control of a peace officer while under arrest.\nThe state contends that this interpretation of Section 30-22-10 will allow prisoners who escape, after being transferred from a jail to FTU for evaluation or to any hospital for treatment, to avoid penalty. See Ex parte DeVore, 18 N.M. 246, 136 P. 47 (1913) (penal statutes should not be unnaturally construed to work exemptions from their penalties). We disagree. If defendant had been charged under the proper statute, he may well have been penalized. As with any other criminal offense, however, the charge must be appropriate and the prosecution must prove each essential element of the crime as defined by statute. See State v. Brown, 100 N.M. 726, 676 P.2d 253 (1984).\nWe find that the conviction and sentence cannot stand because defendant was charged under an inapplicable statute and, therefore, the trial court proceeded without jurisdiction. State v. McNeece. We do not reach the issues stated in defendant\u2019s docketing statement and briefed by the parties. We reverse defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence, and remand the cause with instructions to dismiss the charge against defendant.\nDefendant requested oral argument. The panel deems oral argument unnecessary; therefore, the request is denied. See Garcia v. Genuine Parts Co., 90 N.M. 124, 560 P.2d 545 (Ct.App.1977).\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nMINZNER and FRUMAN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BIVINS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Jacquelyn Robins, Chief Public Defender, Lynne Fagan, Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for defendant-appellant.", "Hal Stratton, Atty. Gen., Elizabeth Major, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "747 P.2d 262\nSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert TRUJILLO, Defendant-Appellant.\nNo. 9819.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nNov. 17, 1987.\nJacquelyn Robins, Chief Public Defender, Lynne Fagan, Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for defendant-appellant.\nHal Stratton, Atty. Gen., Elizabeth Major, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee." }, "file_name": "0616-01", "first_page_order": 656, "last_page_order": 659 }