{ "id": 708689, "name": "STATE of New Mexico, ex rel. Abe RODRIGUEZ, Director, Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, and Steven Schiff, District Attorney of the Second Judicial District, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. AMERICAN LEGION POST NO. 99, CLUB LICENSE NO. 1626, et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "State ex rel. Rodriguez v. American Legion Post No. 99", "decision_date": "1987-11-05", "docket_number": "Nos. 9436, 9527 and 9530", "first_page": "784", "last_page": "788", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "106 N.M. 784" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "750 P.2d 1110" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "101 N.M. 713", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1586427 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/101/0713-01" ] }, { "cite": "43 N.M. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1568250 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he gambling spirit feeds itself with as much relish upon a charity lottery as upon any other kind.\"" }, { "page": "1091", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he gambling spirit feeds itself with as much relish upon a charity lottery as upon any other kind.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/43/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 N.M. 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2735702 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/79/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 N.M. 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 711367 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/103/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 Mont. 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mont.", "case_ids": [ 5295354 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mont/170/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 N.M. 241", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1580064 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/102/0241-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 N.M. 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2863831 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/89/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 N.M. 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1586399 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194" }, { "page": "1292" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/101/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 N.M. 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2809948 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/77/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 A.L.R. 3d 663", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 N.M. 623", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566901 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1940, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/44/0623-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 725, "char_count": 12898, "ocr_confidence": 0.822, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.616409728882295e-07, "percentile": 0.6865083640011445 }, "sha256": "2f1ac174f5ac43c85c183c4e470c0b31329d28be43d0494c7ef6c80486bb8f2b", "simhash": "1:3de8bbb46ec8f2bf", "word_count": 2151 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:27:22.270695+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "MINZNER and APODACA, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE of New Mexico, ex rel. Abe RODRIGUEZ, Director, Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, and Steven Schiff, District Attorney of the Second Judicial District, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. AMERICAN LEGION POST NO. 99, CLUB LICENSE NO. 1626, et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nBIVINS, Judge.\nAppellant organizations (Clubs) and appellees State of New Mexico and Schiff (state) disputed the application of the Bingo and Raffle Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 60-2B-1 to -14 (Repl.Pamp.1981 & Cum.Supp. 1987) (the Act) to certain activities of the Clubs. The dispute was submitted to the District Court of the First Judicial District as an action for declaratory judgment filed by the state. The parties entered into a stipulation of facts and submitted cross-motions for summary judgment. After reviewing the parties\u2019 arguments, the district court granted the state\u2019s motion and issued a declaratory judgment holding that the Clubs\u2019 activities constituted gambling not authorized by the Act. These appeals ensued. On September 23, 1986, we issued an order consolidating the cases for purposes of appeal and staying the declaratory judgment pending the outcome of the appeal,\nISSUE\nThe only issue on appeal is whether the Clubs\u2019 video gaming machines are protected by the Act. The Clubs contend that their practice of awarding prizes and cash based on the results of the games constitutes the operation of games of chance sanctioned by the Act. We disagree and affirm the trial court.\nFACTS\nIn 1981 the New Mexico Legislature passed the Act. It allows certain nonprofit organizations to conduct games of chance commonly known as bingo and raffles, as long as the entire net proceeds of any game are spent for educational, charitable, patriotic, religious or public-spirited purposes. \u00a7\u00a7 60-2B-3 and -8.\nFollowing the passage of the Act, the Clubs placed electronic or mechanical video gaming machines on their premises for the use of their customers. These machines award free games to lucky players, and the Clubs convert those free games into cash or prizes by, for example, paying the winner 25$ for each free game. The state discovered this practice and agreed to refrain from immediate prosecution and instead to file an action for a declaratory judgment to allow the courts to determine the legality of the Clubs\u2019 practice under the Act. To expedite this action, the parties stipulated to the following key facts: (a) the Clubs have video gaming machines on their premises; (b) the games are operated by putting a coin or tokens (purchased from the Clubs) into a slot; (c) the players who win free games from the machines are awarded prizes in cash or merchandise; (d) the award of free games, and thus of the prizes, is determined by chance, although perhaps accompanied by some skill; (e) the machines are available for play during the entire time in which the Clubs are open to members; and (f) the Clubs are all licensed under the Act or have applied for licenses under the Act.\nThe parties demonstrated for the trial court one type of machine found in the Clubs. This machine was an electronic draw poker game; the machine deals the player a hand that appears on the screen. The player can discard cards and draw new ones, or stand pat, by pressing appropriate buttons. The game ends after one deal/discard/draw sequence. If at the end of the game the player\u2019s hand includes a pair of jacks or better, the player has won one or more free games. The number of free games depends on the hand; two pairs are worth two games; three-of-a-kind, three; and so on up to a maximum of 250 free games for a royal flush. The player can then play those free games or cash them in with the bartender for 25$ per game or, in some Clubs, merchandise. Thus, a player can potentially win $62.50 on one 25$ play of the machine. This game allows one player to play up to twenty games at one time, which means the player can risk $5.00 on each play. Not all of the Clubs\u2019 games are poker games; other games include electronic blackjack, bingo, and simulated horse-racing, as well as games not described in the record.\nDISCUSSION\nThe Act defines \u201cgame of chance\u201d as that specific kind of game of chance commonly known as bingo or lotto in which prizes are awarded on the basis of designated numbers or symbols on a card conforming to numbers or symbols selected at random and that specific kind of game of chance commonly known as raffles which is conducted by drawing for prizes or the allotment of prizes by chance or by the selling of shares, tickets or rights to participate in the game[.]\n\u00a7 60-2B-3(M). The Clubs construe this provision to mean that the legislature authorized three types of raffles: (1) drawing for prizes; (2) allotment of prizes by chance; (3) selling of shares, tickets or rights to participate in the game. They then argue that their machines allot prizes by chance by awarding free games that can be converted into prizes. Thus, the Clubs contend their operations of these games are \u201craffles\u201d under the Act.\nThe Clubs bolster their position by referring to the statutory and common-law definitions' of \u201clottery\u201d found in NMSA 1978, Section 30-19-l(C) (Cum.Supp.1987) and in cases such as State v. Jones, 44 N.M. 623, 107 P.2d 324 (1940). These definitions state essentially that a lottery exists any time one pays consideration for an opportunity to win a prize awarded by chance. The Clubs argue that the definitions of \u201clottery\u201d mirror the \u201callotment of prizes by chance\u201d phrase in the definition of raffles. Therefore, the Clubs contend the legislature must have had the definitions of lottery in mind when defining raffles. This argument would make the definitions of \u201clottery\u201d and \u201craffle\u201d synonymous; as such, any scheme for the distribution of prizes by chance in exchange for consideration (the lottery definition) would be a raffle. Thus, the Clubs conclude the phrase \u201ccommonly known as raffles\u201d would include any game in which consideration was paid to win a prize by chance. Under this broad definition of \u201ccommonly known as raffles,\u201d the Clubs\u2019 activities would be allowed under the Act. To support their broad definition of \u201craffles,\u201d the Clubs cite numerous foreign cases. We find these cases unpersuasive. We conclude that the language of our statute, properly construed, provides a resolution of the appellate issue. See generally Annot., Validity and Construction of Statute Exempting Gambling Operations Carried on By Religious, Charitable, or Other Nonprofit Organizations from General Prohibitions Against Gambling, 42 A.L.R. 3d 663 (1972).\nIf we were to adopt the Clubs\u2019 broad definition of \u201craffles,\u201d any game in which a prize is awarded by chance would qualify as a raffle. Organizations licensed under the Act could operate slot machines, roulette wheels, many types of card games, and, in fact, virtually any sort of gambling device as long as the net profits were spent for lawful purposes as defined in the Act. We reject this interpretation. It is not reasonable to assume that the legislature would authorize such widespread gambling without explicitly saying so, and this court must presume that the legislature acted reasonably. Sandoval v. Rodriguez, 77 N.M. 160, 420 P.2d 308 (1966).\n\u201cA statute should be construed in light of the purpose for which it was enacted.\u201d State v. Rodriguez, 101 N.M. 192, 194, 679 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Ct.App.1984). This court \u201cmust give words used in a statute their ordinary meaning unless the legislature indicates a different intent.\u201d Id. If a statute is unambiguous, we apply the literal meaning of the words of the statute. Hutchinson v. State, 89 N.M. 501, 554 P.2d 663 (1976). The rule in New Mexico is that specific statutes control over general statutes. State ex rel. Dep\u2019t of Human Servs. v. Manfre, 102 N.M. 241, 693 P.2d 1273 (Ct.App.1984).\nA narrower reading of the definition in question is both possible and reasonable. In addition, it is supported by the grammatical construction of the phrase. Under this reading, a raffle is that specific kind of game of chance commonly known as raffles, which is conducted: (1) by drawing for prizes or the allotment of prizes by chance; or (2) by the selling of shares, tickets or rights to participate in the game. The absence of the word \u201cby\u201d before \u201cthe allotment\u201d indicates that this phrase is a part of the phrase \u201cby drawing for prizes or the allotment of prizes by chance\u201d and does not stand alone as a complete phrase. The allotment of prizes by chance is not a separate method of conducting a lottery but is something to be accomplished by a drawing, which is the traditional form of raffle. This construction avoids the overly broad interpretation of the term \u201craffle\u201d advocated by the Clubs, and is a reasonable interpretation of the statute.\nSome of the Clubs maintain that their activity is authorized by the Act because it is \u201cbingo\u201d as defined in the Act. The Clubs base their argument on Treasure State Games, Inc. v. State, 170 Mont. 189, 551 P.2d 1008 (1976), in which the Montana court interpreted a definition of \u201cbingo\u201d substantially similar to our Act\u2019s definition of that term. The Treasure State court held that electronic bingo and keno games, which in all respects duplicated one version of the live game of bingo, fell within the statutory definition of bingo. In the case before us, the machines in question do not all duplicate a version of the live game of bingo. Some of them, as noted earlier, duplicate draw poker and blackjack games. In addition, the Montana statute interpreted by the court is less restrictive than New Mexico\u2019s Act. It does not limit operation of bingo and raffles to nonprofit entities, but allows games to be run for profit. Also, it contains minimal restrictions on the operation of the bingo games, while New Mexico\u2019s Act details the way in which the games must be played. For example, our Act mandates that all objects or balls must be in the receptacle before each game begins; that the caller must be present in the room containing the greatest number of players; that all numbers shall be announced audibly; and so on. Compare Mont.Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 23-5-401 to -431 (1987) and \u00a7\u00a7 60-2B-1 to -14, particularly \u00a7 60-2B-8.\nGiven the foregoing considerations and reading our Act as a whole, see General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Anaya, 103 N.M. 72, 703 P.2d 169 (1985), it is plain that the Clubs\u2019 activities are not \u201cbingo\u201d within the meaning of the Act.\nThe Clubs argue that public policy considerations mandate holding in their favor. They contend they earn no pecuniary profit from the machines but spend the net proceeds on charitable causes such as youth sports leagues and Christmas baskets for needy people. Notwithstanding the value of the Clubs\u2019 charitable activities, we note that a countervailing public policy exists, which is to restrain and discourage gambling except in very limited circumstances. Schnoor v. Griffin, 79 N.M. 86, 439 P.2d 922 (1968); see also Harriman Inst. of Social Research, Inc. v. Carrie Tingley Crippled Children\u2019s Hosp., 43 N.M. 1, 6, 84 P.2d 1088, 1091 (1938) (\u201c[T]he gambling spirit feeds itself with as much relish upon a charity lottery as upon any other kind.\u201d). The legislature passed the Act to allow limited forms of gambling of a more or less innocuous nature, as long as the proceeds were spent to benefit the public. The statutory construction urged by the Clubs would authorize them to conduct almost any type of gambling activity. Such an interpretation is contrary to public policy and the Act as written, and we will not adopt it. In so holding, we are restricted, as a reviewing court, by the principles of statutory construction referred to above. We must construe the language of the Act based on these principles. This court does not legislate. Varos v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 101 N.M. 713, 688 P.2d 31 (Ct.App.1984). If the Clubs seek a different result, that is a matter for legislative therapy, not judicial surgery. Id.\nCONCLUSION\nWe hold that the Clubs\u2019 practice of awarding cash or merchandise prizes for free games won on the electronic video machines in question does not constitute the operation of games of chance under the Act. Therefore, the declaratory judgment issued by the trial court is affirmed. The stay we entered on September 23, 1986 shall continue in effect until mandate has issued. We award no costs.\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\nMINZNER and APODACA, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BIVINS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hal Stratton, Atty. Gen., Holly A. Hart, John M. Paternoster, Asst. Attys. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiffs-appellees.", "John P. McCollum, Albuquerque, for defendant-appellant, American Legion Post No. 99.", "Ken Cullen, Albuquerque, for defendant-appellant, Solo Club, Inc.", "Michael E. Vigil, Marchiondo, Vigil & Voegler, P.A., Albuquerque, for defendants-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "750 P.2d 1110\nSTATE of New Mexico, ex rel. Abe RODRIGUEZ, Director, Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, and Steven Schiff, District Attorney of the Second Judicial District, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. AMERICAN LEGION POST NO. 99, CLUB LICENSE NO. 1626, et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nNos. 9436, 9527 and 9530.\nCourt of Appeals of New Mexico.\nNov. 5, 1987.\nCertiorari Denied Feb. 26, 1988.\nHal Stratton, Atty. Gen., Holly A. Hart, John M. Paternoster, Asst. Attys. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiffs-appellees.\nJohn P. McCollum, Albuquerque, for defendant-appellant, American Legion Post No. 99.\nKen Cullen, Albuquerque, for defendant-appellant, Solo Club, Inc.\nMichael E. Vigil, Marchiondo, Vigil & Voegler, P.A., Albuquerque, for defendants-appellants." }, "file_name": "0784-01", "first_page_order": 824, "last_page_order": 828 }